

EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN

(1945-1954)

**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

By
SHAH ABDUL QAYYUM
Lecturer in Political Science

Under the Supervision of
Dr. S. A. H. HAQQI
Professor & Head of the Department of Political Science



Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh,
1970



T921

T 921

C O N T E N T S

	<u>PAGE</u>
P r e f a c e	1 - vi
CHAPTER I : INTRODUCTION : A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN PRIOR TO 1945 1 - 41
CHAPTER II : EGYPT'S DEMAND FOR THE REVISION OF THE 1936 TREATY THE/SIDKI- BEVIN DRAFT AGREEMENT 42 - 85
CHAPTER III : THE PALESTINE WAR AND/ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT'S NATIONAL POLITICS 86 -123
CHAPTER IV : EGYPT'S BID TO SETTLE ITS DISPUTES WITH BRITAIN THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS JUNE 1950 THROUGH OCTOBER 1951 124 -168
CHAPTER V : PRELUDE TO THE JULY 1952 REVOLUTION 169-212
CHAPTER VI : THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROS- PECT OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES WITH BRITAIN-(1) THE SUDAN 213 -248
CHAPTER VII : THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE SUES ZONE ISSUES WITH BRITAIN 249 -301
CHAPTER VIII : SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 302 -336
A p p e n d i c e s 337 -377
B i b l i o g r a p h y 378 -788

P R E F A C E

Egypt is an outstanding example of a country whose political destiny and economic development has been more vitally affected by her physical geography and strategic position rather than anything else. Being situated at the cross-roads of Asia, Africa and Europe, she has irresistably attracted great adventurers and empire-builders who sought to extend their influence and authority over the largest possible area of the world. During the last 2,500 years, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, the ^Turks, and the last of all, a succession of Western Europeans were drawn to this verdent delta of the Nile for the simple reason that it was the symbol of world-power-status. Napoleon acknowledged this fact when he called Egypt "the most important country of the world." The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further enhanced the strategic importance of Egypt, as it substantially reduced the time and expense of rough sea-going via the Cape, by connecting the Mediterranean with the Red Sea.

Great Britain, had initially opposed the undertaking of this project as unfeasible and politically inadivisable. But later on it felt it necessary to get hold of the management and control of the canal with a view to neutralising the French influence in Egypt, and in order ^{to} strengthen her own position in Asia and Africa. A series of timely accidents, however, led to the acquisition by Britain both of a major bloc of the canal stock and the actual defense of the canal site. In 1882, Britain's

army forcibly occupied Egypt after suppressing colonel orabi's nationalist agitation against foreign interference in Egypt's domestic matters. Since then, Egypt's political life has been dominated mainly by the problem of her relations with Britain. The various political parties and groups have been more seriously concerned with this most important issue than with any other matter. The most prominent of them, the Wafd, has been particularly engaged in dealing with and trying to redefine their country's relations with Britain. They have repeatedly insisted that their complete independence was the pre-condition for her socio-economic regeneration, that successful experiments in constitutional processes could be undertaken only in the absence of external and un-called for interference in their domestic affairs.

I have dealt with many other sectors of society and pressure-groups which also directed their zeal and energy to oppose or adjust their position with the British dominance. The Communists and the orthodox Ikhwan, though diametrically opposed to each other in their ideological approach and philosophical cannotation, have made common cause against the British.

The king who occupied the central position in the triangular tussle for power and supremacy has always distracted Britain's interference in the making and unmaking of governments.

These features of Egyptian politics became more prominent during the post-second world war period. In the new pattern of international politics in which the USA, and the U.S.S.R. emerged

the strongest powers, Great Britain immensely desired to stay on in Egypt. The Egyptians, on the other hand, desired nothing more than the attainment of her complete independence. Their demand for the revision of the 1936 Treaty was accentuated to a large extent due to the Palestine debacle.

During the decade from 1945 to 1954, Egypt's nationalism became more vigorous and assertive, occasionally resorting to violence and sabotage. The orgy of unprecedented violence, looting, arson, killing and chaos that characterised the Egyptian political scene during 1950-52 was an expression of their anti-British feelings and their utter disappointment to settle accounts with the British at the conference table.

The revolutionary regime of Neguib and Nasser also soon discovered that stability and popularity of the new order as well as successful implementation of various reform plans were largely dependent on an early settlement with Britain. The question of the Sudan and the Suez Canal evacuation were therefore, taken immediately by the new elite.

They succeeded in resolving their disputes with Britain in an amicable manner mainly due to the diplomatic astuteness, straight forwardness and realism of the leaders of ^{the} Revolutionary Command Council. They recognized the principle of self-determination for the Sudanese. This greatly facilitated the conclusion of the most important and epoch-making agreement of the Suez Canal zone in October 1954.

An effort has been made to highlight, analyse and justify Egypt's struggle to emancipate herself from the fetters of colonialism. It has been maintained that it was wholly and primarily an expression of genuine nationalist sentiments, and not an attempt to divert the attention of the masses from the poor state of their national economy and administration, as some western scholars have sought to establish. Their explanation of Egypt's unrest and ^{chaos} is characterised by a prejudicial approach and is not borne out by facts. It amounts to intellectual dishonesty as it is intended to thwart a judicious analysis and is invariably based on deliberately distorted facts. The British hegemony over the Egyptian politics operated as a constant limitation over her full sovereign status and vitiated her efforts in the economic sphere.

Since it has been my purpose to examine and emphasise the Egyptian point of view in respect of their relations with imperialist Britain, the title of the present study has been accordingly worded as 'Egypt's relations with Great Britain.' This appears somewhat uncommon and unconventional in the sense that most studies in this subject have been styled in the reverse order, obviously seeking to defend the British stand vis-a-vis the Egyptian cause of evacuation and freedom.

I have tried to make an extensive study of the Egyptian source-material that could be made available to me in the libraries of Cairo, Damascus and Beirut. The archives of the Arab League Head Quarters at Cairo, were particularly helpful in this

regard. More often, however, I had to depend on official sources because press-censorship and ban on party publications has been too frequently and too rigidly applied by successive governments in Cairo during this period.

Throughout this study I have used the term 'Middle East' instead of the currently popular and more appropriate term of 'West Asia.' Uniformity of expression is the main reason. The various documents, debates, conversations and resolutions have invariably used the term 'Middle East.' Even the Egyptians and other Arabs have used this same term in their expressions of thoughts regarding the problems of the area. Moreover, the term 'West Asia' came in common use only during and after the Suez episode of 1956, while the period of my work is confined to the conclusion of the 1954 Suez Canal Evacuation Agreement.

In the concluding chapter I have tried to summaries the whole issue of relations between the two nations with my observations and comments. The more suitable title for this chapter would be 'resume'.

The appendices attached here, have been selected from the point of view of their frequent reference in the text of the thesis. While going through the relevant chapters, one might need to look for a more comprehensive reference of the brief citation.

Finally, I deem it my most pleasant duty to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable help and scholarly guidance of my teacher and supervisor, Professor Dr.S.A.H. Haqqi, Head of the Department of Political Science, in completing this work. Without

his constant interest, inspiring comments, expert advice and continuous assistance this work would not have been presented in this form. I sincerely thank him for all his encouragement that has sustained me through difficult moments in the course of the preparation of this thesis.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'SA. Qayyum', with a stylized flourish at the end.

SHAH ABDUL QAYYUM

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY OF EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN PRIOR TO 1945.

A. Background of Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882

Egypt's unique position of being situated at the cross roads of Asia, Africa and Europe, (1) the stories of her magnificence and splendour as also the fact of most convenient trade-routes lying across her lands, have always fascinated the great empire-builders and conquerors of the world.

The Assyrians who were the first to annihilate the Pharaohs^{or} in 671 B.C., and their successors, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantians, the Arabs and the Turks, (2) were all irresistibly drawn to the Valley of the Nile for the single reason of her vital strategy and resources. They all knew that Egypt was the "pivot of world-power-status". The European Powers of the modern era also recognized that the possession of Egypt was a

-
1. Egypt occupies the north-eastern corner of the African Continent with an extension across the Gulf of Suez into the Sinai region which is usually, but not always regarded as lying in Asia. The area of Egypt's approximately 386,200 sq. miles. Of this only 4 per cent is permanently settled while the remainder is desert and marsh. Egypt lies between lat. 22° and 32°N; and the greatest distance from north to south is about 674 miles and from east to west 770 miles giving the country a roughly square shape, with the Mediterranean and the Red Sea forming respectively the northern and eastern boundaries. Egypt has political frontiers on the east with Israel (which she has recognized so far), on the south with the Republic of Sudan, and on the west with the United Kingdom of Libya. See The Middle East 1958 (Europe Publications, London, W.C.1), p.93.
 2. See, Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol.8, 1957, pp.56-73.

great advantage in any contest for supremacy in the world.

It is thus rightly said that:

... those who took roots blossomed forth as world powers while those who failed to imbed their roots ~~in the roots~~ in the verdent delta of the Nile, were destined to perish. (3)

Napoleon's Expedition

Napoleon who aspired to extend the hegemony of France far and wide into the East and the West, also admitted that "Egypt was the most important country" in his plan of action because of her strategic importance. (4) He had fully realized that the conquest of England very much depended on the conquest of Egypt because she was then the keystone of British ascendancy in the Indian Ocean. (5) His expedition to Egypt was therefore evidently motivated by his desire to obtain mastery over the Mediterranean in order "to cripple Britain communications with India", and thus to strike a blow at the English trade and politics in the entire East. (6) He succeeded in occupying Egypt because the Egyptians who were already sick and tired of misrule, corruption and cruelty of the Mamelukes, did not offer any resistance to him. On the contrary they well-received him hoping that the revolutionary banner of 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity' raised in France

-
3. Emile Lingyll, Egypt's Role in World Affairs (Washington, 1957), p. 1.
 4. Emile Ludwig, Napoleon, trans. Eden and Paul (N.Y., 1956), pp. 10-11.
 5. A.J. Marriot, The Eastern Question - A Study of European Diplomacy (London, 1917), p. 8.
 6. J.H. Christopher, Bonapart in Egypt (London, 1962), pp. 4, 15.

would also fly over Egypt and hence restore their national dignity. (7)

Russia and Britain, however, became seriously alarmed by the ascendancy of France over Egypt as it was bound to alter the existing balance of Power in her favour. (8) They warned the people of Egypt and the Porte that the real motive of the French General was to make Egypt a permanent military base in order to expand his country's political influence and power in the Orient. (9)

The Egyptians saw this danger within a short while of their association with the French rule of their country. They disliked Napoleon's economic reforms and administrative 'innovations'. They were also seriously annoyed to discover that his 'love of Islam' was merely a pretention for political purposes. Hence, they readily agreed to make a common cause with the Powers and the Porte to get rid of the French occupation of Egypt. (10)

The defeat and departure of the French army from Egypt in 1799 was followed by a period of anarchy and administrative instability from which emerged Mohammed Ali - 'the founder of

-
7. See P.G. Elgood, The Transit of Egypt (London, 1962), pp.33-37; also Jean and Simmare Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (London, 1958), pp. 39-55.
 8. The British Minister at Istambul had warned Lord Granville that "the possession of Egypt by any independent power would be a fatal circumstance to the interests of his country". Quoted in John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1953 (London, 1956), p. 15.
 9. See M. Rifat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London, 1947), pp. 1-5, 10-15.
 10. Anthony M. Galatoli, Egypt In Mid-passage (Cairo, 1950), pp. 3-10. See also, Elgood, op.cit., pp. 40-45; also, D.A. Cmeron, Egypt In The Nineteenth Century (London, 1898), pp. 63-65.

modern Egypt' whose last descendant was Faruk. (11)

Mohammed Ali did many things to raise Egypt's social and political status. In 1841 he secured from the Sultan an autonomous status for Egypt, (12) and thus initiated the process of Egypt's transformation from the position of a canton of Islam to that of a national state. But he could never become popular because of his autocratic methods and personal whims. (13)

His successors were his true replica - self-centred and devoted to their own aggrandizement at the cost of the people and dignity of the nation. They all failed to associate themselves with the land and the people they ruled over. Instead, they always cherished and relied on the friendship and protection of European friends and Missions in Egypt, and thus, virtually made Egypt a pawn of power-politics.

Among his successors, Said and Ismail were mainly responsible for Egypt's political subjugation and suffering during the past several decades. In 1856 Said Pasha obliged his engineer-friend, Ferdinand de Lesseps of France, by granting him permission to construct the Suez Canal on terms which proved to be most harmful and burdensome for Egypt. (14)

-
11. For a detailed description of Mohammed Ali's rise in Egypt, his work and personality, see, Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt - a study of Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt (London, 1930). See also Abd ar-Rehman ar Raffi, Tarikh al Harakat al Qaumiya wa Tatawevar Nizam al Hukuma Fi Misre, vol. VII (Cairo, 1944), pp. 311-13.
 12. Valentine Chirol, The Egyptian Problem (London, 1920), pp. 10-15. See also T.E. Holand, The European Concert In Eastern Question (London, 1885), pp. 110-14.
 13. Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (London, 1961), pp. 30-35. See also, Encyclopaedia Britannica, op.cit. pp. 74-77.
 14. For text of the Suez Canal Concession Act, see Select Studies Committee, The Suez Canal - facts and documents (Cairo, 1956).

Great Britain had strongly opposed the project and had refused to participate in its implementation, considering it unfeasible and politically inadvisable. Nevertheless, after the Canal was completed and was formally opened in 1869 for navigation, Britain became greatly interested in its political aspects. She realized that previously it was possible to neutralize Egypt by keeping all the Powers away, but now France was very much there and her influence could be countered only by adding equal influence of another power. Moreover, the new water-channel had largely reduced the time and expense of shipping to and from India - then Britain's most important colonial outpost as compared to the arduous and tire-some journey via the Cape of Good Hope. (15) Therefore, it now became a cardinal principle of British diplomacy to acquire maximum control over this most strategic waterway and the country which owns it. (16)

Ismail Pasha provided the British with opportunity and the excuse to intervene in Egypt's domestic matters and, eventually to forcibly occupy her in 1882. (17) He borrowed huge sums on

15. Ibid.

16. See, H.C. Deb, vol. 327, cols. 99-100. See also, E.W.P. Newman, Great Britain in Egypt (London, 1928), pp. 7-9. George Young, whose book Egypt has been wide-acclaimed as a fairly objective treatment of the Egyptian question, wrote that it was the Canal that "changed for the worse the relations between the British Empire and Egypt by shifting the main objective of British policy from Constantinople to Cairo. Thereafter, it would have been difficult for Egypt ... to prevent the British Empire from guarding so vital and vulnerable a line of communication by garrisoning at least the Isthmus." See, George Young, Egypt (), p.

17. See W.S. Blunt, Secret History of British Occupation of Egypt (London, 1895).

exorbitant rate of interest - 12 to 15 per cent (18) from the European moneylenders, apparently for the realization of his misconception of modernization of Egypt. His spent-thrift habits and luxurious trips of European capitals, further indebted his country. Being unable to repay the debts from his meagre local resources, he unwisely sold out his country's shares of the Suez Canal, Maritime Company at a 'throw-away' price to Britain. (19)

Selling away his shares was a confession of his bankruptcy and admission of his inability to manage his country's economic affairs. The British and the French who had vast financial interest in stabilizing Egypt's economy, first imposed a 'Joint Control' to look after all financial matters of Egypt, and finally when Ismail resisted this interference, they persuaded the Sultan to depose him, and appoint his son Tewfik Pasha in his place. (20)

B. Orabi's Nationalist Campaign and
Britain's occupation of Egypt

Thus, in 1882 Egypt was already under the authority of the 'Joint Control' of Britain and France. The new Khedive, being installed in office with the blessings of the two Powers could not, indeed he did not wish to, become independent of their influence. He was just a figure head, acting upon the advises

18. John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (London, 1965), pp. 91, 93.

19. H.C. Deb., vol. 327, cols. 99-100. See also Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London, 1967), pp. 39-45; also, Elgood, op.cit., p. 58.

20. Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. I (London, 1907), pp. 57-61. See also Wood Jarvis, Pasha to Faruk (London, 1956), chapter 18; see also, A.T. Wilson, The Suez Canal (London, 1939), pp. 48-58.

and according to the wishes of the British and the French Agents who did not wish to encourage the native's participation in their country's affairs. (21)

The people of Egypt were awfully sick and tired of the incompetence of their rulers and the growing alien interference in their internal matters. They resented the discriminatory policy of the administration and suppressive methods adopted by the 'Dual Control', and were preparing to agitate against injustice and malpractices prevalent in the entire administrative set up. Colonel Ahmed Orabi, a son of the soil, finally led them to protest against the 'hold' of the outsiders over the Palace and the public affairs, and put an end to the rule of self-interested aristocrats. His objectives were purely nationalist. He fought for his country's freedom and to preserve the rights of his fellow-countrymen. The British were alarmed by the rise of a nationalist upsurge and wished to nip it in the bud. They forcibly suppressed the popular uprising and purposely called it a 'rebellion' to justify their naked aggression and capture of political authority of the world's most important country.

From that moment Great Britain exercised her exclusive authority and influence over all matters connected with Egyptian affairs until the Revolution took place in July 1952. During the crucial period of the two Great Wars, Great Britain did not allow Egypt to slip out of her hold, despite continuing nationalist

21. Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism (London, 1960), pp. 22-25. See also M. Mustafa Ala, Egypt between two Revolutions (Cairo), pp. 15-43.

agitation. Egypt was too important a link in her communications with Asia and Africa to let it go free or go against her own economic and strategic interests. By virtue of their strong political position, backed by their standing army and naval units, they imposed their preferences in making and unmaking of governments in Egypt to suit their requirements and war time

The Establishment of Protectorate

At the outbreak of the Great War in September 1914, Egypt's political status underwent a sudden and significant change. His Majesty's Government's formal declaration of war on Germany on 4 August had placed Egypt in a peculiar politico-legal anomaly. Legally, Egypt owed allegiance to the suzerain - the Sultan of Turkey - who was intending to join the side of Britain's enemy. (22)

While practically she was already under the occupation of Britain. In the event of Turkey's siding with Germany, all his subjects, including the Egyptians, were to be considered at war with Britain and all of their hostile acts were to find a legal justification. To avoid the creation of such an awkward and difficult situation, Britain declared Egypt to be a 'Protectorate' free from the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. (23)

Britain's action was, nevertheless, unilateral and illegal in character and consequences, but she justified it on the

22. War between Great Britain and Turkey was declared on 6 November 1914. See Times, 7 November 1914.

23. British and Foreign State Papers, 1915, vol. 109, pp.435-39.

ground of Egypt's peculiar position in their strategy of the war. Under the given circumstances, the least embarrassing course for them was to declare Egypt a 'protected' territory. The alternatives being annexation or full independence were neither desirable nor expedient from their viewpoint. Annexation not only would have prompted suspicion among the neutral nations as well as the allies, but also aroused serious resentment and disorder throughout Egypt, while full autonomy would have added to Britain's strain and anxiety to maintain her vital interests. A protectorate therefore, appeared to them to be the only practicable solution to meet the requirements of the situation. In the words of Elizabeth Monroe, the protectorate was to be "less humiliating to Egyptians, more palatable to allies, and making no difference to the British military grip on the country." (24)

The Egyptians felt humiliated and were annoyed by the establishment of the protectorate and more so by the war-time regulations. The highhandedness of the British military rule destroyed whatever chance there had been of an understanding between the British and the Egyptian national movement.

During the war period, the Egyptians however remained neutral. When the Sultan of Turkey sent around a call for 'Jihad' the Egyptians did not respond to it. This was not solely because their towns and cities were turned into armed camps in which the people were compelled to be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' but also because they hated the Turks. They were too sick and tired of the Turkish domination of their country to wish her a

24. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East 1914-1950 (London, 1963), pp. 25-26.

military victory. In Turkey's defeat they saw their national emancipation and freedom from the Khedive's repressive tutelage. There was also the prospect, upon Turkey's collapse, of the Muslim and Arab leadership devolving upon Egypt. Precisely, it was not solely the dislike of Turkey but certain calculations as well that determined the Egyptian's and other Arab's attitude towards the Ottoman Empire at the time when her dismemberment seemed imminent. The news of Turkey's attack on the Suez Canal on 2 February 1915, and the atrocities of Jemal Pasha in Syria further compelled them to outrightly break with the Sultan of Turkey, hitherto their suzerain and their Caliph. By attacking on Egypt, Turkey sank into the estimation of nationalist groups. (25)

C. Egypt's Nationalist Struggle and the Award of Partial Independence in 1922

After the war, the Egyptians naturally expected a relaxation in British control and to receive independence as a reward for their contribution and sacrifices, without which Sir Archibald Murray, Commander of the Allied Forces in the Suez Canal Area could not have repulsed the Germans. (26)

But to their utter dismay, the Egyptians were to find that President Wilson's announcements that the Allies were fighting

25. Elgood, op.cit., p. 221. See also Reader Bullard, Britain and the Middle East (London, 1951), p. 57.

26. There were 21,000 Egyptians working with the Canal Transport Service in 1917. Of them 220 were killed, 1,400 wounded and 4,000 died in hospital. In all, there were 135,000 Egyptians taking part in the Syrian campaign alone. Besides that, there were 30,000 men of Egyptian army serving under British command in the Sudan, 8,500 serving in the Labour Corps in Mesopotamia and 10,000 men in France. See Little, op.cit., p. 70.

the war 'to preserve the liberties of small nations' (27) and the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, (28) were to be applied to all nations but Egypt. The British showed no regard for Egyptian national sentiments. Soon after the end of the War, they further intensified their hold over business of the State. The number of British officials increased from 300 in 1898 to 1,700 which was obviously an unbearable burden on Egypt's limited resources. (29) In place of a relatively smaller body of well-disciplined troops of the pre-War period, there was now a large number of British and imperial troops who were quite insensitive to the political importance of their good or bad behaviour. It was thus clear from almost every act of Britain in Egypt that they had no intention of leaving Egypt to the Egyptians.

The presence of such a large number of officials and troops were bound to create obstacles for Egypt in the exercise of her sovereign rights. Their large-scale spending caused inflation in the economy of the country. Forced recruitment of peasants for the 'Egyptian Labour Corps' and the seizure of her cattle and crops to feed their troops, badly affected the agriculture which resulted in the acute shortage of food supplies. (30) Above all, the post-War unemployment and moral degeneration of the European soldiers inflamed the people's indignation against the imperialists.

27. British Parliamentary Papers Cmd. 5974, p. 49.

28. The World's Great Events (Colliers, New York), vol.7, p. 47.

29. Reader Bullard, op.cit., p. 118.

30. George Lenzowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (New York, 1956), pp. 394-95.

This was the political climate in which Egypt, insensed with a feeling of injustice, decided that she should take her place, not merely as an independent nation, but also as the leading Muslim and Arab state. In Saad Zaghlul Pasha, a lawyer of Fellahiro origin, ~~in~~ Egyptian nationalism found a successful and energetic champion. Soon after the armistice agreement was signed between the two sides of the Great Powers, he sought permission to go to London to present their demands before His Majesty's Government.

Great Britain's refusal to permit Zaghlul and his associates, was followed by an outbreak of violence which seriously threatened the life and property of the British subjects in Egypt. It seemed that Egypt's legitimate grievances could only be ventilated by means of agitation. In this moment of crisis, when the ruthlessness of administrative machinery had failed to prevent disorder and lawlessness, the Acting High Commissioner, Sir Cheetham committed a serious political mistake by arresting the nationalist leaders and deporting them to Malta. Certainly, Sir Cheetham had underrated Zaghlul's mass popularity and completely misunderstood the Egyptian's mood and their desire for freedom, if he had imagined that a display of firmness was all that was necessary to restore order in the country.

Though the new High Commissioner of Egypt, Lord Allenby, succeeded in suppressing the revolt by force, nevertheless ^{he} seemed to have fully realized that in such circumstances Britain could not maintain her interests without giving Egypt some concessions. (31) The growing influence of the middle class,

31. Marlowe, op.cit., p. 235.

demands of the modernization programmes and increased need for civil servants, sway of new ideas of democracy and self-determination, had allied even the 'moderates' in the nationwide protest. All this revealed the gravity of the situation and the strength of the movement for liberation. Lord Allenby also seemed to have learnt and accepted that the main clamour in Egypt was for independence rather than internal reforms. His immediate reaction was, therefore, to release the acknowledged leaders of nationalism from deportation and to permit them to go to Paris, where the interests of Egypt were sacrificed at the alter of the Great Power politics. Zaghlul failed to receive recognition of Egypt's participation in the war, and thereby to secure its reward. Great Britain had already convinced the world dignitaries that Egypt's constitutional inhibitions were not yet sufficiently developed, and that they would grow up in the shadow of the protectorate.

The Egyptians were seriously disappointed and disgusted at the turn of events. They unanimously boycotted Lord Millner's Mission that arrived in Egypt towards the end of November 1920 to study Egyptian conditions and recommend on that basis a working arrangement under the British Protectorate. In his report to the Foreign Secretary of State, Lord Millner, who had been deeply impressed by the thoroughness of the nationalist determination, recommended to abandon the Protectorate and to redefine Britain's relations with Egypt on the basis of a bilateral treaty. (32) On 28 February 1922, His Majesty's Government in

32. Report of the Special Mission to Egypt, Cmd. 1131 (1921), pp. 19-21. See also Lord Allenby's Note to Lord Curzon, dated 12 January 1922, Cmd. 1722, p. 20.

UK admitted that a policy of forcible repression of nationalist forces in Egypt could not continue indefinitely, when it made a unilateral declaration of partial independence:

Whereas His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign state; and whereas the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital importance to the British Empire; the following principles are hereby declared:

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign state.

2. As soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, Martial Law, as proclaimed on 2 November 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the directions of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government of Egypt:

- a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.
- b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.
- c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.
- d) The Sudan.

On the conclusion of such agreements the status quo in these matters shall remain in tact. (33)

This declaration of independence would have been generally welcomed in Egypt but for the reservations which constituted a serious limitation on her sovereignty. The protection of minorities was merely a pretext for interference in anything and

33. British and Foreign State Papers (London, 1922), pp. 84-85 also Cmd. 1592.

everything relating to internal affairs. Her right of diplomatic representation was also nullified by the necessity to consult the British High Commissioner that is to say, in fact, to submit to his direct control in the conduct of foreign affairs. The document also did not propose for Egypt's membership in the League of Nations. Lord Lloyd, who later as High Commissioner based his entire policy on the text of declaration, pointed out that it had given Egypt 'a qualified independence, an independence which was subject to certain definite reservations', and that these reservations 'were an absolutely vital part of that declaration. (34) The Egyptian nationalists refused to accept the limitations on their sovereign independence involved in the reserved points. Zaghlul Pasha expressed his disappointment but later persuaded himself and his followers to accept it as a useful forward step towards the attainment of complete independence. And, therefore, soon after assuming office of the Prime Minister Zaghlul raised the issue of the presence of the British troops being incompatible with Egyptian independence and the Sudan being an integral part of Egypt. He had hoped that the new British Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who had often sympathised with the Egyptian cause and had openly criticised Lloyd George's Government for its repressive policies in Egypt, (35) would be more considerate towards Egypt's aspirations. In September, he went to London to discuss his country's outstanding problems

34. Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cronver (London, 1933).

35. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), vol. 150, 1922, pp. 87-93. See also Lord Lloyd, *op.cit.*, pp. 85-88.

with the new Labour Government. (36) But the reality turned out to be quite different. Mr. MacDonald did not agree with his demands regarding the Sudan. He plainly told the Egyptian Premier that no arrangement could be contemplated that would jeopardise the administration and development of the Sudan. (37)

It was mainly on the question of the Sudan that their negotiations broke down. On his returning home, anti-British activities broke out in all the major cities of the country. Even in the Sudan the agitation became widespread. Fuel was added to the fire by yet another folly committed by the British administration in the Sudan. They announced to divert more of the Nile water for irrigation of the British-owned cotton fields in Gazira, which was obviously damaging for the Egyptians. (38)

This unilateral action infuriated the Egyptians and was an immediate provocation which culminated in the murder of Sir Lee Stack on 19 November 1924. (39) He was simultaneously the

36. The Times, September 1924.

37. Even before Zaghlul had reached London, MacDonald had written to Lord Allenby that: "Until I have some indication that his (Zaghlul's) aspirations do not conflict too hopelessly with our irreducible requirements regarding the Sudan and the defence of the Canal in particular, I would be unwilling to ask him to undertake negotiations in London." See Foreign Office Despatch, Mr. MacDonald to Viscount Allenby, 3 April 1924 in Lloyd, op.cit., p. 85. Similarly, on 24 June 1924, Lord Paramour had emphatically stated before the House of Lords that the Government was not going to abandon the Sudan in any sense whatever. See House of Lords Debates, 5th Series, vol. 57, col. 986.

38. J.C.
See also, Reader Bullard, op.cit., p. 185.

39. On 19 November, he was going from the war office to his house in Cairo when he received a volley of shots from seven men dressed as students who were lined up on the side wall. He died the following day. See Egyptian Gazette, 20 November 1924.

Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army and the Governor-General of the Sudan.

The reaction of the British High Commissioner on the incident was unduly severe and vindictive. He demanded the Egyptian Government to apologise for the crime, inquire 'with the utmost energy' and punish the culprits 'without respect of persons'; pay an indemnity of £500,000 and suspend all political demonstrations; immediately withdraw all Egyptian forces from the Sudan (within 24 hours); notify to the competent Department that Great Britain reserves the right to 'increase the area for irrigation at Gazira from 300,000 feddams (acres) to an unlimited figure'. (40) (Italics mine)

The tone and nature of these demands and the accompanying waringⁿ that "failing immediate compliance with the demands, His Majesty's Government will at once take appropriate action to safeguard their interests in Egypt and the Sudan", (41) however, showed that Allenby merely intended to use the incident, as a means of discrediting Zaghlul and his Wafdist Government in the eyes of his people, and a pretext to establish Britain's position in the Sudan on permanent basis by forcing the Egyptian officers and troops out of that territory. (42)

40. Abd El Monein Omar, The Sudan Question based on British Documents (Cairo, 1952), pp. 83-85. Also The Times (London), 24 November 1924.

41. Ibid.

42. Mohammad Neguib, Egypt's Destiny (London, 1955), p. 63. See also J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and the Middle East, vol. II, p. 128; also, Information Paper No. 19, op.cit., p. 13.

This was a clear violation of Egypt's sovereignty and an uncalled-for interference in her domestic affairs. Zaghlul resigned in protest on 24 November 1924. (43) King Fuad, who was jealous of Wafd's popularity and held its prominent leaders, and thus became an absolute dictator and ruled with great assertion of personal authority. The British High Commissioner preferred to support him in his bid to suppress the Wafdists. (44)

He exercised his constitutional authority liberally in making and unmaking of ministers. This state of uncertainty and ministerial instability, demagoguery and chaos continued until Fuad's death in April 1936.

The Wafd found its chance to reassert its influence on Egypt's politics vis-a-vis Britain's domination, only after the King died in April 1936. The growing 'menace' of Mussolini in the surrounding areas, Tripolitan and Abyssinia, also enhanced Wafd's bargaining position regarding modifications in the 'Four Reserved Points'.

D. Egypt's Struggle for Full Freedom and the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 - Brief Analysis of its main provisions and their Implications

Nahas Pasha, who had again become Prime Minister in May 1936, (45) however, soon realized that in the event of a major war,

43. The Times, 25 November 1924.

44. F.M.V. Wavell, Allenby - Soldier and Statesman (London, 1946), pp. 338-39.

45. In the General Elections held on 2 May 1936 the Wafd swept the polls by securing 99 out of 132 seats in the Senate and 186 of 232 in the Chambers. It is to be noted here that on 12 December 1935 Fuad had restored the original 1923 Constitution as a result of which his prerogative to appoint

rival powers would fight for the possession of Egypt mainly because of its most important strategic location and transit routes connecting Asia, Africa and Europe. She could not have, therefore, remained neutral or disinterested in this struggle. The defiance of the League of Nations by Italy had already shaken her confidence in international security, in general and her own in particular. Being situated so near to the victim of the Italian invasion, Abyssinia, Egypt would, in no time, be the next to fall. Fear of Italy therefore seemed to have 'temporarily damped the ardour of the Wafd and other Egyptian nationalists to rid themselves too quickly of the British'. (46)

In August 1936, Nahas paid a visit to London and opened negotiations with His Majesty's Government, (47) and finally signed a treaty with the British Government. (48) Under this treaty the Egyptian leaders agreed to collaborate in the Allied-War efforts against the Axis in recognition of Egypt's complete independence. The principal objective of the arrangement, valid for twenty years (Art. 16), was expected to establish a basis for

45. (contd. from back page)

three-fifth Senators was dropped. See Walter H. Mallory, ed., Political handbook of World Parliaments, Parties and Press (New York, 1938), p. 6.

46. Richard Hilton, The Thirteenth Power (London, 1958), p. 83.

47. His team consisted of representatives of all Egyptian political parties, a total of thirteen. This multitude of signatories was an unusual but necessary precaution. In this way all the parties shared the responsibility and it was difficult for any one of them to evade the agreement later. See Anthony Eden, Memoirs - Full Circle (London, 1959), p. 224.

48. For full text of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, see Parliamentary Papers 1937, Treaty Series No. 6, Cmd. 5360.

more cordial and permanent relations between the two countries, by formally terminating the 'Protectorate' (Art. 1). The treaty also provided for the removal of British forces from Cairo and Alexandria to the Canal Zone, and limited their number to 10,000 troops and 400 pilots. (49) Britain also agreed to permit unrestricted immigration of the Egyptians into The Sudan and promised to help Egypt in securing membership of the League of Nations (Art. 3) as well as in the abolition of the capitulations (Art. 13). The approved draft of the agreement also contained a very significant provision - Article 16 which says that the high contracting parties, could 'any time after the expiration of a period of ten years', enter into negotiations for its revision.

Implications of the Treaty

The Treaty was an important landmark in the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations. The Egyptians generally welcomed it as a step forward towards complete independence. (50) Being primarily a treaty of mutual defence and alliance, it also appeared to solve, for the time being, the problem of Egypt's sovereignty and independence by terminating the 'occupation' which had long been abhorrent to the Egyptians.

Nahas Pasha was widely hailed as its chief architect. But, in fact, Britain's predominant position was not fundamentally changed. A closer examination of its provisions would show that Britain actually gave up nothing with the exception of certain responsibilities pertaining to Egypt's internal administration and

49. See Annex to Article 8 in the Appendix.

50. Mustafa Ata, op.cit., p. 81.

protection of foreign and minority interests (Art. 12). She fully retained her position regarding 'imperial communications', 'the Sudan', and 'the defence of Egypt' as provided in the unilateral declaration of 1922. Besides, it was exclusively for the British Military Mission to advise the Egyptian Army in all military matters. Above all, the alliance was perpetual because it could never be broken or repudiated unilaterally. (51) Any demand for a revised treaty which did not contain provision for ultimate British military control was in itself a breach of the Treaty. The nationalist movement demanding full independence, therefore, could be considered not only an act hostile to British interests but also unconstitutional, because the King had bound himself, by ratifying the treaty, to regard British vital interests as also being being vital interests of his own country. (52) The abolition of capitulations too could not be regarded as convincing evidence of Britain's sincerity or good intentions. By compelling other Powers to relinquish their 'capitulatory privileges', Britain only eliminated European opposition to her position and activities in Egypt. The provision that the British Ambassador in Cairo would always be given precedence over all the other members of the diplomatic corps, clearly manifested the desire of Britain to maintain its position in Egypt. Finally, the Sudan problem which had been the principal stumbling block in all previous negotiations was not satisfactorily settled. The Governor-General of the Sudan, essentially a British agent, still exercised the

51. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 226.

52. See Michael Ionides, Divide and Rule (London, 1960), pp. 27-28.

'supreme military and civil command' as originally provided by the 1899 Convention. (53) Restrictions on the size of British forces also were not only unbinding to the Sudan, but not applicable to Egypt also 'in the event of war, menace of war or apprehended emergency' (Art. 7, para 2). Financially too, the treaty was a burden on Egypt's limited resources. She was required (Annex to Art. 8, paras 3 and 4) to 'make available the land and construct the accommodation, water supplies, amenities and convalescent camps', for the British Forces at her own expense. Furthermore, to meet the needs of the increased garrison in the Canal Zone, Egypt was to provide facilities for rapid entrainment of personnel, guns, vehicles and stores, for which she had to construct and maintain several roads, bridges and railways.

The Wafd Party's achievement in concluding this treaty and its later success in securing the abolition of Capitulations at the Montreaux Conference in 1937, and Egypt's admission to the League of Nations in the same year, (54) vastly increased its popularity with the masses. It was therefore naturally expected that the Wafd would remain in power for quite some time. But a series of unpleasant events in Egypt's national politics, rivalries and splits in the ranks of the ruling party, and clashes with the young King, seriously undermined its position and prospects.

The Wafd also entered into conflict with the young and "popular" King as soon as the latter came of age on 29 July 1937, and evinced a keen interest in the affairs of the State. Nahas

53. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question (London, 1951), Appendix A, p. 158.

54. Survey of International Affairs 1937, vol. I, pp. 581-606.

Pasha seemed seriously alarmed by the start of the King Faruk, and felt it necessary to renew his attempt to diminish the 'royal prerogative'. His efforts in this regard, however, only further annoyed the King and consequently widened the gulf between them. Following in the footsteps of his father, Faruk refused to grant the requisite 'royal assent' to any such measure by invoking his authority on the basis of the 1923 constitution which was then in existence. They became more antagonistic to each other when a 'Green Shirt', a member of the Misr al-Fatah, a small extremist body, generally believed to be patronised by the Palace, made an unsuccessful attempt on Nahas Pasha's life. Pro-Nahas demonstrations by students and the 'Blue Shirts' only delayed the King's action until 30th of December 1937, when he dismissed Nahas from the Prime Ministership. The ground of the dismissal was described by the King that he no longer enjoyed public support; that his cabinet's method of work undermined the spirit of the constitution, and that he 'failed to protect public liberties'. (55)

E. Britain sought Egypt's Collaboration in the War

At the outbreak of the war in September 1939, and specially at the advent of a pro-Axis Government in France which rendered the African theatre of war vulnerable, Egypt once again became a major base for the Allied troops. Britain became more concerned about Egypt's internal affairs after their setback in Libya and

55. Philip Graves, "The story of the Egyptian Crisis", Nineteenth Century, March 1938. See also Tom Little, (London, 1958), pp. 156-57.

the Italian air-raids on her borders in June 1940. (56) With successful German blitzkrings in Europe and the decision of the Albanians to seal their destiny with Italy by offering the Crown of Albania to Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia, (57) it became absolutely imperative for Britain to secure Egypt's "administrative cooperation" in resisting the Axis advances in the Mediterranean. Their anxiety was fully appreciated by the Government of Ali Mahir who promptly assured to carry out the obligations of the 1936 Treaty. He repeated the assurance of his country's collaboration with the Allies when he said:

Egypt and its people are loyal and sincere friends of Britain, and will do everything in our power to help her. We shall oppose with all our might any attempt at domination by brute. ... We struggled for years to obtain our independence, and to preserve this independence we are ready to make any sacrifice. (58)

Under the terms of Article 7, para 2, of the Treaty, a state of seige was proclaimed in Egypt, the Prime Minister became the Military Governor of Egypt, solely responsible for the maintenance of security, her communications, ports and aerodromes were placed at the disposal of Great Britain; severed her diplomatic relations with Germany, arrested its nationals and seized their property. (59) Yet her international position remained

56. Charles Issawi, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis (London, Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1947), pp. 68-69.

57. Documents on International Affairs 1939-46, vol. I (RIIA, London, 1951), p. 135.

58. The Times, 8 September 1939.

59. New York Times, 5 September 1939.

anomalous. Despite the fact that Egypt had most sincerely fulfilled the obligations of 1936 Alliance, she had not yet officially declared war on Germany. 'The only practical difference, however, between the existing state of affairs and the state of war was that the Egyptian armed forces were not committed to active hostilities against Germany.' (60)

Ali Mahir seems to have based his attitude on the situation of the war in Europe as well as in the East which had then brightened the prospects of Axis victory. (61) His hesitation in committing his people to Britain, therefore, was not unjustifiable. His anxiety to renew contacts with the Axis Powers (62) too does not seem to have been unwise or impolitic in such circumstances. The intelligentsia of the country, impressed as it had been by the Axis propaganda abroad, their respect for the principles of Islam and the promise of independence from colonial yoke, (63) favoured a non-committal attitude. It was argued that Egypt's declaration of war "would not provide any important accretion of strength to the Allies". On the other hand, if the Allies emerge victorious in this conflagration, Egypt would, no doubt, have many

60. Marlowe, op.cit., p. 313.

61. Heyworth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt (Washington, 1950), p. 86.

62. Survey of International Affairs 1939-46 (RIIA, London, 1951), vol. I, p. 135.

63. Seth Arsenian, "War Time Propaganda in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, vol. II, October 1948, pp. 419-23.

advantages and 'share in the spoils of the victory, but in case they collapse, Egypt will be 'exposed to the vengeance of the Axis'. (64) Such a risk could only be avoided by not making a formal declaration of war against the Axis Powers, who would then admit that Egypt being under actual British control with large contingents of European armies, could not have done otherwise. (65)

But the very fact that Britain still possessed the power to maintain its rights and to assert its views in Egypt's internal affairs, however, did not permit any Government to go against its wishes. At this stage of the war Britain needed Egypt's full and active cooperation to meet the growing strength of the enemy in North Africa. The prospects of Germany's 'summer offensive' against Russia, required speedy and uninterrupted flow of men and material to the Egyptian military base. Any reluctance to openly intervene in Egypt's domestic policies was now overcome by what was regarded by them as 'overwhelming necessity of war'. (66)

On 3 February the British Ambassador is understood to have requested of the King that, in accordance with the constitutional practice, a government should be formed which commanded a majority in the country and would therefore be able to control the internal situation: only a government headed by Nahas Pasha, as leader of the Wafd, in the opinion of His Excellency, could be sure to commanding such a majority.

64. Marlowe, op.cit., pp. 313-14. See also Egyptian Gazette, 16 September 1940.

65. Ali Mahir who was impressed by the recent Axis victories in the Far East and the western Desert and propaganda sought to avoid any conflict with them. He maintained his country's role of non-belligerency even after the actual invasion of Egyptian territory by the Italians who, by October 1939 had advanced 70 miles inside Egyptian territory. See Henry Maitland Wilson, Eight Years Overseas 1939-47 (London, 1950), p. 45. See also The Daily Telegraph, 17 June 1940.

66. George Kirk, The Middle East in the War 1939-46 (RIIA, 1952), pp. 209-210.

King Faruk who had already made up his mind to bring in a government less committed to support the British efforts, did not like the British Ambassador suggesting to appoint a person he did not like, to the position of the Prime Minister. He, however, replied that 'he would consult the leaders of all parties, including Nahas, with a view to the formation of a coalition government'. British sources believed that the King intended to recall Ali Mahir, which they could not have tolerated at a time when 'the strategic outlook was far from good'. Hence they decided to take no chances, and the very next day the British Ambassador clearly warned that

unless I hear by 6 p.m. that Nahas Pasha has been asked to form a Cabinet, His Majesty King Faruk must expect the consequences. (67)

On the King's rejection of the ultimatum, HE Sir Miles Lampson, called on him at 9 p.m. and 'insisted upon the absolute necessity of his sending for Nahas, as representing the majority of the country'. In this epoch-making meeting with the Egyptian King, he was accompanied by the GOC British troops in Egypt and an armoured escort. He was bent upon securing the maximum collaboration of the Egyptian Government in carrying out the terms of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, and he thought Nahas would not disappoint. Surrounded thus by British guns, tanks and troops, Faruk conceded the British demand. (68)

67. Ibid.

68. A Cairo newspaper, close to the King, gave the following account of what happened on that day:

"... at 9 p.m. on 4 February 1942, the Britishers perpetrated a treacherous violation of Egyptian sovereignty. Tanks with guns trained, surrounded Asdin Palace and thousands of troops, fully armed, patrolled the neighbour-

The British Ambassador's insistence upon Nahas Pasha's appointment seemed to have been based first on his understanding that Nahas was more amenable to the British cause while in office, and more critical even harmful, when outside the office. (69) Secondly, after the expulsion of the Italians from Egypt in December 1941, Nahas Pasha himself was convinced of the wisdom of siding with the Allies. He had calculated that in the event of an Axis victory the Wafd would have no political future. Its basic stand of democratic government and rights of the common man quite incompatible with the political philosophy of the Axis Powers. Above all, Nahas being himself the principal architect of the 1936 Treaty could be trusted to fulfil its obligations in the most sincere and suitable manner. (70) Finally, the Wafd in a situation in which the King had been 'completely written off' owing to his pro-Axis sympathies', the constitutional Liberals

68. (contd. from back page)

hood. One tank forced the Palace-gate and was followed by the British Ambassador who had the GOC, British troops, with him in his car.

"The bodyguard was overpowered and eight fully armed officers accompanied the Ambassador to the King's study and remained a guard. The palace telephone links were cut and broadcasting House was surrounded by British troops. The King ordered that there should be no resistance to avoid useless bloodshed. When the Ambassador demanded the appointment of Nahas Pasha (leader of the Wafd) as Prime Minister, His Majesty turned to his suite and remarked that while he could have rejected the ultimatum and turned the country into a battlefield, he wished to spare the lives of his subjects and to let history judge his actions."

See John Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, pp. 32-33.

69. George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (London, 1948), p. 226.

70. See Chicago Daily News, 6 February 1942.

were weak and indecisive about the stand in the war, the Saadists did not command much influence over the nation's political forces and were too weak to withstand the intrigues of the Palace clique, had become almost indispensable for the British Government. It alone was straightforward in its anti-Palace and anti-Axis attitude.

Great Britain's intervention to place Nahas Pasha at the helm of affairs to ensure for themselves security and cooperation during the military crisis, bitterly annoyed the Palace and all the anti-Wafd elements. They openly accused him of having compromised Egypt's integrity and the nation's interest. Ahmed Mahir publicly charged the Wafd leader of having accepted the office "supported by bayonets".

To undo the effects of such damaging propaganda, Nahas made it public that "he had agreed to form Government on the basis that neither the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty nor Egypt's situation as a sovereign independent country permits her ally to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and particularly in the formation and dismissal of ministers". (71) He also declared that he intended to carry out his job with the assistance of a freely elected parliament in which the Wafd had only 12 seats as a result of the 1938 elections, in his opinion, was not a 'free elected' Parliament. He actually got it dissolved on the 7th of February and ordered for immediate elections.

71. This is the main portion of the letter which Nahas Pasha wrote to the British Ambassador, upon taking office of the Prime Minister in which he explained to the addressee that his acceptance of Premiership at this critical juncture would not oblige him to give up his country's main interests. Text of the letter in Survey of International Affairs 1939-46 (1951), p. 210.

As a result of the elections, held in March 1942, the Wafd returned with undisputed majority. (72) Thus armed with a massive vote of confidence in his leadership, Nahas earnestly pursued his policy of wholeheartedly backing the Allies in every way. He took immediate action against Ali Mahir and other pro-Axis elements. (73) During the critical days of June and July 1942 when the British Army was forced by Rommel's advance, to fall back from Tabruk to El-Alamain, the Wafd Government stood firm with Great Britain. The British Ambassador paid generous tribute to bold statesmanship and firmness in dealing with 'the enemies of democracy and liberty'.

Acknowledging the British Ambassador's appreciation of his work, Nahas sent the following reply:

-
72. In the elections, the Wafd secured 223 seats in the Chamber and 81 in the Senate. The election results, under the circumstances, could hardly be regarded as proof or evidence of the Wafd's popularity with the masses. Their victory at the polls has no relevance to the popular inclination towards the Axis. The Wafd's success was due to several reasons: Firstly, there was no contest in 110 out of 264 electoral constituencies. Secondly, freedom of speech and expression of and on behalf of the candidates was limited during the election campaign. They were not allowed to make any reference to the 'recent events leading to the change of government, to the King or to the British'. Political commentators find that thus Nahas had shrewdly disabled the opposition to arouse public sentiments by saying that the Wafd was hoisted into power on British bayonets. Another factor responsible for the Wafd's success in this election was that the Saadists and the Liberal Constitutionalists did not officially participate in the contest. The voters were thus left with no choice.
73. In a bid to preserve order and public morale in the uncertain situation of the war, Nahas Pasha confined Ali Mahir to his country house, interned the fifth columnists and closed the Royal Automobile Club which was a meeting place of pro-Axis elements.

I had to act with a view to the preservation of the interests of the Egyptian people, to secure their rights and guard them from all injury and to inspire confidence amongst them. It gives me pleasure to say that the Egyptians gave proof of their courage and firm conviction. Each of them is conscious of the duty of supporting our friend and ally, England, in the hour of its need. The Egyptian Government and people offered, as I too offered, with the greatest willingness every possible assistance which did not conflict with the interests of the country, and I am proud to say that every Egyptian did at that moment his duty to his country and to Egypt's ally. (74)

The Egyptian Prime Minister mentioned about Egypt's contribution in the Allied war efforts only to ask in return for British support for Egypt's interests in the post-war settlement. At that time His Majesty's Government seem so much indebted to the Egyptian assistance at 'al-Alamain' that they authorised the Ambassador to assure Nahas Pasha that the British Government would use its good offices to secure Egypt the right of representation, on a footing of equality, at all peace negotiations which would directly affect her interests, and that 'Britain would take no part in discussions directly affecting Egypt's interests without having prior consultations with the Egyptian Government. (75)

F. Egypt and the Making of the Arab League
Britain's Interest in Arab Unity

Earlier in 1939, Britain had, however, admitted the advisability of harnessing the Arabs' aspirations for independence and unity, in their favour. They seemed fully convinced that Rashid Ali al-Gilam's uprising, which they had been able to quell

74. Al-Wafd al-Misri (Cairo), 5 August 1942.

75. The Daily Telegraph, 20 November 1942.

only by force (May 1941) and the hostility of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haji Amin-al-Hussaini, were in fact the expression of Pan-Arab sense of frustration with regard to the settlement of the Palestine question and the future of the Levant States. (76) The German promises to favour the Arabs in their struggle for independence seemed to have played quite an important part in the drift to extremism. (77) It was, therefore, not unnatural to visualize the consequences of ignoring the Arabs' discontent. Their first step therefore was to issue a White Paper in 1939 which almost nullified the Balfour Declaration of 1917. (78) It was an attempt to appease the Arab sentiments. (79) Another impelling

-
76. In 1939, Mustafa Nahas Pasha, in a letter to the President of al-Itihad al-Arabi, a Pan-Arab club in Cairo, expressed his party's grave concern for the Arabs of Palestine. He wrote, "The Government takes great interest in the affairs of the sister Arab nations, and is always ready to defend their interests and rights. It also views with great interest the question of Arab unity." Quoted by G. Anwar, "The Egyptian Attitude towards Pan-Arabism", The Middle East Journal II (Summer, 1957), p. 258.
77. Survey, op.cit., p. 334.
78. Cmd. 5479, p. 22.
79. As a result of the Arab rebellion in Palestine, the British Government issued an important statement of Policy in 1939, declaring that neither their undertakings to the Jews nor the national interests of Britain warranted that they should continue to develop the national Jewish home beyond the point already reached. It said: (1) "... the Jewish National Home as envisaged in the Balfour declaration and in previous statements of British policy had been established"; (2) "That to develop it further against Arabs' wishes would be a violation of Britain's undertakings to the Arabs, and that such a policy could only be carried out by the use of unjustifiable force"; (3) "That therefore after the admission of a final quota of 75,000 more Jewish immigrants over a period of five years, Jewish immigration should stop"; (4) "that during this period of five years, a restriction should be placed on the acquisition

(contd. on next page)

consideration in determining Great Britain's policy towards the Arabs was the emergence of several Arab states as independent entities which made it necessary for Britain to try to keep them knit together as an integrated whole by a common bond of unity. A united Arab world, in the opinion of Britain's foreign policy experts, could be expected to adopt a coherent if not uniform attitude towards Britain. Anthony Eden, Churchill's Foreign Secretary, finding it imperative to "line-up the Arab backing in a region so vital to their imperial defence", assured the Arabs of his Government's assistance in bringing them closer to each other. He once said:

... the Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war and many Arab thinkers desire, for the Arab peoples, a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity, they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go unheard. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties, too should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government, for their part, will give full support to any such scheme that commands general approval. (80)

Egypt's Position in the Arab League

Egypt, hitherto, more enthusiastically engaged in her own struggle for 'full independence and unity of the Nile', now found

79. (contd. from back page)

of further land in Palestine by the Jews"; (5) "that at the end of five years, self-governing institutions should be set up in the country." Text of the Statement in Parliamentary Papers 1939, Cmd. 6019, pp. 1-12.

80. White Paper, Misc. No.2 (1941) Cmd. 6289. See also H.C. Deb., 6 May 1941, cols. 737-38. See also Anthony Eden, Freedom and Order - Selected Speeches 1939-46 (Boston, 1948), p. 105. For a similar declaration of support made by Anthony Eden in the House of Commons on 24 February 1943, see H.C. Deb., vol. 387, col. 139.

a new vista to play a vital role in the realization of the common Arab aspirations. Her geographic position and her status as the centre of Islamic learning and culture justifiably encouraged her to assume the leadership. Mustafa an-Nahas claimed:

The bonds which bind us to the Arabs and Eastern peoples are many beyond numbering and disturbing. They have increased in firmness and strength by their common attitude towards the war, in that all of them took for the victory of democracy and await the dawn of the day in which the rights of the young peoples to determine their own future shall be uppermost. On that day these Arabs and neighbouring Eastern states will present, with Egypt in the forefront, a powerful and cohesive bloc, capable of fulfilling its international responsibilities and its moral duties and of taking its fitting place among the free peoples. (81)

It was thus in keeping with this attitude that Egypt virtually stole the initiative from Iraq, (82) in organizing

81. Al-Misri, 14 November 1942.

82. It is generally believed that the first proposal for the creation of a union of Arab States came from Iraq's Premier Nuri Pasha, al-Said, in December 1942. In his plan he suggested unification of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-jordan into a Greater Syria and the latter's merger with Iraq as the first step in the formation of a League of Arab States. But this plan met with little favour because of dynastic rivalries between the Hashimites, the Saidies and the Egyptians. The area covered by his plan constituted a natural geographical and economical, if not an ethnic unit, its political integration, would undoubtedly have strengthened Iraq's position vis-a-vis Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Whether unitary or federal in character, the proposed 'Greater Syria' was to be dominated by Baghdad. The young republics of Syria and Lebanon also did not approve of it. They wished to preserve their newly acquired independent status. The Lebanese Premier, Riyad as such clearly stated on 5 January 1944, that 'Syria and Lebanon, being independent countries would endeavour to cooperate with other Arab States on condition that their independence should not be infringed. According to Majid Khadduri, "Towards an Arab Union", American Political Review (February 1946, XI, p. 95), the President of Syria,

(contd. on next page)

meetings and conferences of Arab leaders and representatives of heads of the state to discuss the ways and means of furthering the cause of Arab unity, prosperity and strength. Finally a general Arab Conference was held on 25 September in Alexandria under the chairmanship of Nahas Pasha as Egypt's Prime Minister which produced the historic Alexandria Protocol on 7 October 1944 under which a League of Arab States was to be created. (83) But this Charter of Arab unity could not become an 'Act' so as to be binding upon all its signatories until 22 March 1945.

The delay in the creation of the Arab League on the basis of the Protocol could be attributed mainly to the political events that occurred in Egypt as a result of Nahas Pasha's dismissal from the Prime Ministership and also because certain modifications in the Alexandria Protocol were being suggested by the new Egyptian delegation to safeguard the sovereignty of its member states. For instance, whereas the Protocol had envisaged a progressively increasing surrender of sovereignty, the Pact in its final shape laid emphasis on its retention.

Another clause of the Protocol which stated that 'in no case will a state be permitted to pursue a foreign policy which would be detrimental to the policy of the League or to any of its member states, was dropped from the Pact. The Egyptian delegation

82. (contd. from back page)

Shukri al Quwwatly endorsed the view that their independence would be retained in all circumstances. He said: "Syria will refuse to have raised in her sky any flag higher than her own, save that of an Arab Union."

83. Text of the Protocol in, Arab Information Centre, Basic Documents of the League of Arab States (N.Y., 1955), pp. 5-8.

also succeeded in incorporating into the Pact a clause binding 'each member state not to interfere in the system of government of the others'. The Pact also stressed the importance of Palestine and pledged support in general terms for the Palestine Arabs; 'without the inclusion of Palestine, public opinion in the Arab world would not have regarded the League as complete'. (84) The Alexandria Protocol also made it explicit that the Arab leaders believed that the prospects of future peace and stability in the Arab world largely depended upon satisfactory solution of the Palestine problem. (85)

Though the formation of the League of the Arab States recognized Egypt's important position vis-a-vis other Arab States, (86) the feuds in her internal politics, particularly the tussle between the Palace and the Wafd continued uninterrupted. The King could never reconcile himself to the humiliation he had to undergo in appointing under British pressure Nahas as Egypt's Prime Minister against his utter dislike of him and his party. Towards the end of April 1944 Faruk made a serious attempt to dismiss Nahas Pasha, but again the British Ambassador openly intervened against the King who might have thought that, after the

84. Cecil A. Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective", The Middle East Journal, April 1947, vol. I, p. 132.

85. Text of the Protocol in The Arab World (Arab Information Center, New York, April 1959), pp. 15-16.

86. Article 10 of the Pact between the seven Arab States which participated in the making of the League of Arab States, provided that the permanent seat of the League is established in Cairo. The first Secretary-General of the League, appointed under Article 2 by a majority of two-third, was also an Egyptian, Abdul Rehman Azzam Pasha.

defeat of the Axis forces in Egypt and Tunisia, the British won't be so very keen to see Nahas continue as Egypt's Premier. But the British still needed Egypt's support and sympathy because the strategic bases of Lower Egypt still remained vital to them for the wider prosecution of the war. (87) They were particularly more seriously concerned about public security in Egypt, which the Wafd under Nahas's leadership had thus far successfully maintained. The British Ambassador, therefore, declared:

... this was no time for a change of personnel in the United Nations front, and informed the King that if he did not recind the dismissal they would take the strongest measures. (88)

As he also had the consent of the Foreign Office to again resort to military action, if this were necessary to deter the King from his proposed action, Faruk put off the matter for some more opportune hour. And, he did not have to wait too long. The opportunity for him to dismiss Nahas and furnish his reputation arose in the wake of serious dissensions inside the Wafd itself.

As soon as the preparatory conference for a League of Arab States, being held at Alexandria under Nahas Pasha's chairmanship, was over, the King sent him a carefully worded letter of dismissal on the 8th of October. His recent tours of the provinces of his kingdom had shown to him that the Wafd was still well-rooted and that Nahas was dearly loved by the people. (89) He therefore so

87. Information Paper No.19, op.cit., p. 75. See also Wilson, Eight Years Overseas (London, 1950), pp. 158-59.

88. Wilson, op.cit., pp. 214-15.

89. P.J. Vatikioitis, The Modern History of Egypt (London, 1969), p. 353.

drafted his letter as to impress upon the people that his action against Nahas Pasha was in fact motivated by his desire to safeguard constitutional rights of his people and to see them happy and prosperous:

As I am anxious to see my country governed by a democratic Ministry working for the fatherland and enforcing the laws of the constitution in the spirit as well as in the letter, giving equality to all Egyptians in rights and duties and bringing to the masses food and clothing, I have decided to dismiss you from office. (90)

By this time the whole Allied position in the war had greatly changed. 'The actual danger from the Axis on Egypt had long receded; the war was now being fought on the West-European continent with the Axis forces clearly in retreat'. Britain seemed no longer interested in the continuance of Wafd Government in Cairo. Moreover, now Egypt's other political groups, the Saadists, the Liberals and even the newly founded 'Kutla' were equally convinced of the benefits of siding with the Allies. (91) There was, therefore, no particular reason for the British Foreign Office to insist on the retention of Nahas Pasha in office. The King had thus chosen the right time to take his revenge. 'Conveniently the British Ambassador happened not to be in Cairo on that day'.

On Nahas's dismissal, a coalition government was set up under the leadership of Dr. Ahmed Maher Pasha. New elections were held in January 1945, but no single party could secure absolute

90. Text of King Faruk's letter of dismissal in The Times, 9 October 1944. See also Rashid al-Barawi, op.cit., p. 147.

91. John Marlowe, op.cit., p. 333.

majority to form government. The Saadists having received a majority of 125 against 74 of Liberals, 29 Kutla, 7 National Party and 29 Independents, (92) its leader Ahmed Maher was again asked to head a coalition government. The Wafd had boycotted the elections alleging that the Government was using its power under the state of emergency for obtaining falsified results. (93)

As the British had expected, the new coalition Ministry of Dr. Maher, soon after taking the oath of office, declared his desire for sincere cooperation with Britain and expressed the opinion that "it was due to friendship, rather than the legal requirements of the Treaty, that Egypt had faithfully discharged her obligations and pooled all of her resources with Britain; she would continue to do so until the war with Japan had been brought to an end". Surely, like his predecessor, he too was

92. See, Political Handbook of the World Parliaments, Parties and Press (1945), p. 54.

93. The Times' Cairo Correspondent's comment (1 August 1947) that 1945 election was 'at least as fair as any elections that have taken place in Egypt', was considered 'unfair to the Wafd', by Professor H.A.R. Gibb. See his article "Anglo-Egyptian Relations, a Revaluation", International Affairs, October 1951, p. 449. Wafd's refusal to participate in the 1945 elections was indeed a vital decision based on mature understanding and good sense of judgement. In an environment in which the King and the Government both were determined to keep the Wafd out of power and its own former members, now the dissidents, were doing everything to damage the reputation of the Wafd and tarnish the image of its leaders, by a malicious propaganda campaign, the Wafd would not have been able to swing the polls as before. Thus by not joining the elections in 1945, the Wafd leaders saved the party from running into the disrepute of having lost the elections, which could have been cited as a proof of its unpopularity with the masses.

anxious to secure a position for his country in the post-war Assembly of Nations. But a formal declaration of War against the Central Powers was an essential prerequisite for participation in the projected United Nations Conference at San-Francisco to be held on 25 April. (94) He had made up his mind to make a declaration to this effect. There was nothing now that Egypt was likely to lose by acquiring the status of a belligerent nation, on the other hand, Egypt had all the prospects of becoming a 'founder-member' of the world organization by making a formal statement of partnership with the Allies. He secured the consent of the Chamber of Deputies, meeting in Camera 25 February 1945, but when he was going to obtain a similar approval of the Senate he was shot dead by a young lawyer who belonged to the extremist Misr al-Fatah Party. (95)

His successor, Mohammad Fahmi En Nokrashi Pasha, however, adhered to the same policy. On 28 February, with the King's

94. As early as 17 October 1944, the British Prime Minister had stated before the House of Commons that 'the only countries which can be represented as of right at a peace conference are those which have participated in the war as belligerents'. H.C. Debates, 5th Series, vol. 403, col. 2195.

95. Thomas Russell, Egyptian Service 1902-46 (London, 1949), pp. 215-16. See also Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 26 February 1945. The late Prime Minister's friend and successor, Nokrashi, believed that the 'Muslim Brotherhood' had a hand in the crime. He had immediately rounded up the founder-head of the Ikhwan, Hassan el Banna and other known members of the 'extremist organization of the religious fanatics', but later released them for want of proper evidence. But he could never give up the idea that the 'Brotherhood' was involved in his colleague's murder. See Tom Little, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

assent, he declared a 'defensive war' against Germany and Japan, (96) which certainly enhanced his country's prestige and status in the comity of nations as a founder-member of the United Nations. (97)

96. The Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 27 February 1945; also Al Ahram of the same date and day. It should, however, be noted that under Article 46 of the 1923 constitution while the declaration of a 'defensive war' was a prerogative of the King, an 'offensive war' could not be declared without the consent of Parliament. See Helan M. Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and the Middle East (Durham, M.C., 1953), p. 79.

97. Ibid.

Chapter II

EGYPT'S DEMAND FOR THE REVISION OF THE 1936 TREATY: THE SIDKI-BEVIN DRAFT AGREEMENT

For Great Britain the World War II ended in 1945 in a blaze of glory. Her victorious armies were physically present throughout the Arab world, apparently in peaceful and friendly occupation. Her fleets and air forces, with those of the United States, controlled the Mediterranean. (1) For Egypt, the presence of these foreign troops was soon to come to an end. Having won the war they were to retreat to their respective countries. The post-war era held hopes of greater cooperation with the nations of Europe and the United States. The Egyptians in Cairo were no less jubilant than the Britons in London to see the termination of the war. The United Nations was a great hope and a great promise to uphold the freedom and dignity of all nations. They hoped to revise and recast their relations with Great Britain on the basis of mutual respect and friendly cooperation.

It was on this basis that the Egyptians had hoped to remove the restrictions on national sovereignty and independence imposed by the 1936 Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain. They had faithfully served the British during their most critical moment in the war at al-Alamain, and had helped to gain their full freedom by formally becoming a belligerent nation on 1st March 1945 which cost Egypt the life of its Premier, Dr. Ahmed Mahir.

1. John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs 1908-1958 (London, 1959), p. 400.

But the British had completely misunderstood the relative calm that existed during the years of active warfare as a result of rigorous press-censorship and Martial Law as Egypt's acceptance of the treaty stipulations and willingness to continue their relationship with her on the same basis. The Times of London, certainly undermined Egypt's nationalist sentiments and aroused its people's indignation by publishing an article on 10th of April of which the following passage intended to falsify their hopes of getting rid of Britain's domination and interference in their domestic matters:

(The Middle East Supply Centre) should be enlarged to include representatives of Russia and France, so that it can take its place among the other regional bodies which the United Nations may set up for economic planning. In the political field the case for the creation of regional commission representing the same four Powers is equally clear; for Britain, however great her responsibilities may remain, cannot sustain alone the burden of safeguarding international security and solving by herself their problems in which other powers are equally interested. Among these are the task of reconciling the strategic safeguards necessary to international order with the independence and self-respect of the Middle East countries; the provision of leadership and assistance in building up the strength and unity of the region until it is capable of discharging its own responsibilities for world security; the resolution of traditional rivalries among the Western Powers into that cooperation for the advancement of the Middle East which circumstances now demand.

To this Egypt's most respected political philosopher, Professor Tahe Hussain, replied that 'the Arab States would not be prepared to discard the tutelage of one state in order to accept that of four. They not only wished to be free of any kind of subjection, but aspired to play their own part in collective security and to share in the protection of strategic centres. They rejected the idea of economic control, but were desirous of

economic cooperation with Europe and the United States. The British, as also other Europeans and the Americans, were making a great mistake if they thought they could employ this outmoded type of language to the Arabs'. (2) (Italics Mine)

Similarly, the Wafd, the Ikhwan, the student organisations all condemned such disappointing suggestion being made in the British press. For the last ten years they had looked upon the presence of foreign forces in Cairo and Alexandria as derogatory to their sovereign status. The apprehension of its being further intensified was, therefore, highly infuriating. The withdrawal of press-censorship and the laws regarding arbitrary arrests, imprisonment and ban on public meetings, provided both material and opportunity for their political vehemence. (3) There was widespread resentment against the British.

The Wafd, in the prevailing inflammable atmosphere, however, found its chance to try to regain popular support by organizing impressive demonstrations against the British, demanding immediate revision of the 1936 Treaty which, they said, had completely lost its value and purpose after the war-exigencies had ended. An eminent Arab historian wrote:

In 1936, an Egypt free from British connections would have been weaker and more exposed to the danger and less considered by the world than she was; by now (1946), only an Egypt free from British connections could actualize the potentialities of her position. (4)

-
2. Al-Balagh (Cairo), 12 April 1945, in Survey of International Affairs 1939-46 (RIIA, London, 1951), vol. I, p. 267.
 3. Thomas Russel, Egyptian Service 1902-46 (London, 1949), pp. 214-16.
 4. Albert Hourani, "The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement: Some Causes and Implications", The Middle East Journal, vol. 9, 1955, p. 248.

The Egyptians were also highly irritated and annoyed to see that the British authorities in the Sudan were encouraging separatist tendencies, while they had been, throughout the last quarter of the century, insisting upon the unity of the Sudan with Egypt. In November 1943 the King and the Parliament had unanimously called for the complete evacuation of British troops immediately after the war and the Union of the Sudan with Egypt. (5) Even earlier than that Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd Opposition, had addressed a memorandum to Great Britain on 1 April 1940 in which he had ^{asked} for a promise that after the war all foreign troops should be withdrawn from Egypt, negotiations should be opened on the subject of the Sudan, and finally Egypt should be represented at the Peace Conference. (6) But contrary to their hopes, an Advisory Council for the Northern Sudan was established on 16 May 1944. The Governor-General of the Sudan had described the Council as 'the first concrete expression of a Sudanese nation'. (7) The Egyptian press and parties complained that the step had been taken without consultation with the Egyptian Government, that they should have been invited to send a representative to the opening ceremony, and that the Vice-President of the Council should have been an Egyptian. (8) On 26 August 1944, on the eve of the anniversary of the Treaty of 1936, Nahas had declared that he considered

-
5. K. Awad, "Egypt, Great Britain and the Sudan", The Middle East Journal, July 1947.
 6. Text of the Memorandum in Orient Moderno, May 1940, pp.228-31 See Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 2 April 1940.
 7. The Times, 17 May 1944; also Egyptian Gazette, 17 May 1944.
 8. al-Wafd al-Misri, 17 May 1944.

'Egypt and the Sudan as one nation'. He had also pointed out that the Treaty had referred only to the 'welfare' of the Sudanese as the 'primary aim' of the Condominium (Art. 2/1), but had not spoken of their right to self-government. (9) The popular Arabic daily al-Ahram complained that the Egyptian Government, legally a partner in the administration of the Sudan had remained unassertive while the British 'demonstrated their real authority by creating the Advisory Council'. (10)

The Egyptians now had serious doubts about Great Britain's intentions regarding evacuation of Egypt and the unity of the Nile Valley. The idea of 'regional arrangements' being mooted by Great Britain and others at the San Francisco Conference, was seen by many in Egypt as an attempt to deny Egypt full freedom to manage its internal matters and external relations according to her own national^{needs} and understanding of international complexities. The Egyptian delegation therefore strongly argued that the basis of such 'arrangements' should be 'geographic propinquity' and 'common interest'. (11) Speaking on his budget proposals on 9 May, Makram Ebied who, after his release from internment, was included in the Mahir Cabinet as Finance Minister, made it

9. The Egyptian Gazette, 21 September 1944.

10. al-Ahram, 10 September 1944.

11. Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco, 1945), vol. III, p. 451; vol. XI, p. 57. Similarly, an Egyptian delegate to the United Nations General Assembly in 1951 argued that regional arrangements under the Charter 'presupposed a certain propinquity not only of a geographical character but also of language, religion and customs'. See The Times, 23 November 1951, quoted in Survey, op.cit., p. 82.

absolutely clear that anticipating total withdrawal of British forces from Egypt, no provision was made for the building of the barracks for them as required by the obligations of the 1936 Treaty. (12)

The change of Government in London which placed Clement Attlee in power, gave the Egyptians new hopes about the fulfilment of their national aspirations. The Government and the Opposition both shared the view that the Labour Government would be more amenable than the outgoing Government of Sir Winston Churchill. (13) The Wafdist leader who was pretty anxious 'to establish himself and the Wafd as champion of Egyptian independence' immediately presented to the British Ambassador a Memorandum which recapitulated the demands set out in his earlier note to him in April 1940. (14) Later, on August 6, Egypt's Prime Minister, Nokrashi Pasha, endorsed the most essential points of the

12. The Egyptian Gazette, 10 July 1945.

13. New York Times, 3 August 1945.

14. The Memorandum contained the following demands:

- (1) ... that the British Government should promise withdrawal of the foreign forces from Egyptian soil after the termination of hostilities;
- (2) that Egypt would have the right to participate in the peace deliberations;
- (3) that Britain would enter into negotiations with Egypt to recognize ultimately the Egyptian suzerainty over the Sudan;
- (4) that the Martial Law would be abolished;
- (5) that the restrictions on the export of the cotton would be lifted.

See Z.M. Qureshi, Liberal Nationalism in Egypt (Delhi, 1967), pp. 137-38.

Memorandum as representing the demands of the entire Egyptian people. In his speech in the Senate, he said:

Egypt again has given proof of her faithfulness and has steadfastly adhered to her Allies during the war. The United Nations greatly appreciated Egypt's help to the cause of democracy and the far-reaching effects that this help had on the victory of the Allies. No better justification and no firmer ground could be found for the removal of the restrictions imposed on the country's independence and for the withdrawal of foreign troops. As for the unity of the Nile Valley, which includes both Egypt and the Sudan, the principles of this new era which have spread all over the world are sufficient guarantee of its achievement. This unity reflects the heartfelt desire of all people of the Nile Valley. (15)

Similarly, King Faruk who was now 'wholeheartedly committed to the aim of getting rid of the last vestiges of British tutelage', which had twice interfered in his conflict with Nahas Pasha between 1942 and 1944, reiterated the nationalist demand for evacuation and unity of the Sudan and Egypt. In his Speech from the Throne on 12 November, Faruk said:

Egypt is more resolved and united than ever to see an end of all restrictions to independence by the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and to reaffirm the unity of the Nile Valley. My Government is in contact on this subject with the British Government, and is actively pursuing this task so as to achieve the best results. Relations between the Egyptian and British Governments are excellent, and both are sincerely determined to cooperate and to develop them on the basis of equality. (16)

To follow up his demands for negotiations to revise the 1936 Treaty, Nokrashi Pasha sent a formal Note to His Majesty's Government on 20 December, saying that

15. The Egyptian Gazette, 7 August 1945.

16. *Ibid.*, 13 November 1945.

The Treaty was accepted by Egypt only under the pressure of necessity and 'as a testimony to the loyalty and sincere desire for collaboration which inspire her towards her ally'. The victory of the Allies had, however, rendered several of its provisions superfluous and without justification. After recalling Egypt's services rendered to Britain during the war, the Note continued: 'The presence of foreign troops on our soil in peace time is wounding to national dignity, and can only be interpreted by Egyptian public opinion as ~~the~~ the tangible sign of a mistrust which the British Government must regard as unjustified. It would be better for both countries that their relations should be founded on mutual understanding and confidence. Egypt, conscious of the needs imposed on her by the defence of her territory and of the responsibilities which her participation in the United Nations Organization entails for her, will shrink from no sacrifice in order to place her military potential on a state to enable her to repel aggression pending the arrival of reinforcements of her allies and of the UN. The Egyptian Government expresses their confidence that these views will be shared by their ally, and that the British Government will take steps to fix an early date for an Egyptian delegation to proceed to London to negotiate with them the revision of the Treaty. ... It goes without saying that the negotiations will include the question of the Sudan and will be inspired by the interest and aspirations of the Sudanese. (17)

The Egyptians in general were greatly disappointed to learn that the British Government did not take a serious view of the Egyptian insistence for the revision of the Treaty; they were already too much preoccupied with the major post-war problems. The Soviet-sponsored Communist uprising in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and Russia's direct pressure on Turkey to revise the Montrieux Convention in her favour, were indirectly mentioned as compelling reasons to postpone consideration of the question of relations with Egypt. (18) Replying to a query from the Opposition

17. Text of the Egyptian Note in The Times, 31 January 1946; see also Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), 30 January 1946.

18. Ibid.

in the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Bevin had said: "H.M. Government will, at the proper time, approach the question (of the revision of the 1936 Treaty)." (19) His suggestion to look into the possibility of preliminary talks with the British Ambassador was, therefore, purposely vague and non-committal.

The Wafdists described the Labour Government's policy of 'sleeping over' the Egyptian requests as an expression of unwillingness to leave Egypt to the Egyptians. They organized large-scale demonstrations in which students and labour organizations took leading part.

Opposition to the British presence, however, became more violent and challenging with the emergence of Communists, and Muslim Brotherhood as organized and popularly supported groups. (20) Both, being primarily anti-British by definition, further incited mass-demonstrations against western imperialism. Deterioration in the general condition of the people; the post-war economic crisis; the emergence of a well-organized working class (21) as a result of rapid industrialization during the war; and the frustration of the educated unemployed, (22) further

19. H.C. Deb., vol. 423, cols. 701-790. See also vol. 432, cols. 616-20.

20. Rashid El-Barawy, "Egypt and the Sudan", India Quarterly, 1951, pp. 360-61.

21. Rashid El-Barawy, The Military Coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1952), pp. 125-48.

22. At the end of the war nearly 200,000 Egyptians were dismissed from their services in the British Army. See, W.J. Handley, "The Labour Movement in Egypt", Middle East Journal, July 1949, p. 240. Jean and Simmare Lacouture, estimated the number of unemployed over 300,000. In their opinion the

strengthened the national opposition to Britain.

The leftist elements in the Wafd as also the Ikhwan which had nothing in common but the hatred of the British had now become more 'activist' and 'radical' in their approach and programmes and both were to play a major role in all the future strikes and demonstrations for the attainment of national liberation, i.e. complete evacuation of all British and other foreign forces and the establishment of parity in the socio-economic standards of their people. The Marxist and Communist party agitators, though legally disallowed, had infiltrated several trade unions and student organizations, such as the 'Universities Alumni Association'. The Wafdists, in order to make their policy and programme more appealing to the masses, coupled their resistance to 'alien rule and/or influence' to the struggle for political and economic freedom from the native ruling classes. The 'Ikhwan' which had now become a fully developed organization with a political manifesto, 'introduced vast social and welfare schemes into their activities: insurance for workers, health care, and others. It was undoubtedly aspiring for political leadership mainly by fomenting nationalist agitation and appealing to religious sentiments of the masses'. (23)

22. (contd. from back page)

withdrawal of ban on imports after the war ended, hit hard Egypt's new industrial venture and commercial undertakings. Many local concerns closed down because they could not successfully compete with their foreign counterparts. Many Egyptians therefore became jobless. See p. 100.

23. Tom Little, op.cit., pp. 164-66.

Thus in January 1946, practically every party and group in Egypt (24) was raising its voice for the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty. 'Inflammatory editorials in their Press organs calling the people to combat and sacrifice fanned agitations. They publicized Britain's unwillingness to negotiate the end of their bases in the country'. On 30 January when Nokrashi Pasha's exchange of correspondence with the Foreign Office was published in the local dailies, the reaction generally was one of great resentment. The younger clientele of these groups: 'the students and workers' organizations' (25) were once again in the forefront, demonstrating against their government's 'slackness' in dealing with the British on the question of Treaty revision. They particularly objectee to the 'lenient tone of the initial Note' to Britain. (26)

These students organizations first sent a petition to the King "urging him to accelerate the Government's efforts in resolving the question of Anglo-Egyptian relations". Then, on 9 February, the day of the reopening of the Fuad I University, massive demonstrations against the British and against the Government were organized in Cairo and Alexandria, the demonstrators shouting

-
24. For example there were the 'Workers Committee for National Liberation', 'The National Committee of Students and Workers', 'The Federation (Congress) of Egyptian Trade Unions', 'The Centre of Scientific Research', etc., etc. The Wafd, the Saadists, the Kutla, the Ikhwan, and the Liberals were among the leading political groups with their own distinct programmes, organization and party publications.
25. Handley, op.cit., pp. 283-85.
26. Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 361.

'No negotiation without evacuation', which soon culminated in 'The Abbas Brigade Incident' in which 9 persons were officially reported killed and 84 injured after the demonstrators clashed with the Police. (27) This resulted finally in the fall of the Nokrashi Government on the 15th. The British Ambassador, Lord Killaran, at this critical juncture tried to persuade King Faruk to accept the resignation without delay as, in his opinion, Nokrashi had not been able to maintain order and 'proper environment' for negotiating the revision of the 1936 Treaty. (28) On 16 June thousands of demonstrators again gathered outside the Royal Palace shouting anti-British slogans such as: "To hell with Britain!", "Evacuation or Blood".

Sidki-Bevin Talks - Conclusion of Draft Treaty

The change of Government, however, did not serve the British purpose. The new Prime Minister Ismail Sidki Pasha, known as the 'strong man' of Egyptian politics, contrary to expectations,

-
27. The demonstration started from the University grounds in Giza and marched towards Asdin Palace. When they reached the Abbas Bridge over which they had to cross the Nile to the city, their route was blocked by a strong police force. They clashed with the police in which some were killed and many injured.
 28. Great Britain's intervention to obtain or retain an Egyptian Government amenable to British policy was referred to by Nokrashi Pasha himself in his speech in the Security Council. The British delegate's statement that the matter was an oral communication between the Ambassador and the King shows that Nokrashi's complaint was not without grounds. See UN Security Council, Official Records, 11, 13 August 1947, p. 1866.

'adopted a permissive policy towards political demonstrations'.

(29) Unlike the British Ambassador, Ismail Pasha could not fail to realize that the recent 'all-party agitation' was mainly directed against the presence of the British and other Allied forces in their country. And as soon as the restrictions on demonstrations imposed by Nokrashi Pasha were withdrawn, the National Committee of workers and students gave a call for a 'General Strike' for holding meetings and demonstrations on Thursday, 21 February 1946, and call it as the 'Evacuation Day'. The demonstration, however, turned into a serious rioting involving 15 deaths and injuries to 120 persons. (30) Again on 4 March, the same organizations commemorated the 'Evacuation Martyrs' Day', to pay homage to their sacrifices for the sake of liberating their country. A section of the mob became violent and in its anger set fire to a British Military Police Post and stoned to death two of its occupants. The day ended with a toll of 28 lives, leaving 340 injured. (31)

The British Charge d'Affaires Mr. R.J. Bowker, (32)

-
29. Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 362. Ismail Sidki Pasha who was asked by the King on 17 February to form a new Government was a member of the Egyptian delegation which negotiated the 1936 Treaty and, therefore, fully understood the purposes and motives implications of the Treaty. Under the circumstances he was a very suitable choice to initiate its revision. During a brief period of his Premiership in 1933 he had shown that he was a gifted administrator.
30. The Egyptian Gazette, 22 February 1946.
31. Al-Ahram, 5 March 1946. See also Survey of International Affairs - The Middle East 1945-50 (RIIA), p. 218.
32. Lord Killearn, the British Ambassador, was appointed on 18 February as Government Adviser in South East Asia, hence all diplomatic functions being discharged, until the arrival

(contd. on next page)

strongly protested at 'the Egyptian Government's failure to take timely and sufficient measures to prevent the riots'. This was indeed an attempt on the part of the British diplomat to suppress the fact that the rioting was caused by insensible and arrogant attitude of the British Army. Prime Minister Sidki strongly denied the British allegations. He told the Egyptian Senate and the world information media that

... the disorders were due to the fact that 4 British Army lorries attempt to cut their way through a crowd of demonstrators, who, he declared, until then behaved peaceably; he expressed astonishment at the British Protests, asserting that 'the Egyptian Government is entirely satisfied that it has done its duty in maintaining peace and giving the nation the liberty to raise its voice in demanding its national rights. (33)

Such was the political climate of his country and the state of relationship with Great Britain, when Ismail Sidki Pasha decided to hold 'exploratory negotiations' with Great Britain. Since it was a highly delicate matter, he wished to deal with it in collaboration with other national leaders. He invited almost all the leading personalities in Egypt's political life to join in his endeavour. The composition of the 'national delegation', however, proved to be a difficult task. The Wafdists demanded a majority representation with Nahas Pasha as leader of the delegation. This was an impossible demand. How could Nahas Pasha or any other person, however important or popular, be considered to

32. (contd. from back page)

of new Ambassador, by the Charge d'Affaires. The charge was repeated in the House of Lords by Lord Adison (Dominions Secretary) on 26 February. See, H.L. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 139, col. 873.

33. Al-Ahram and The Egyptian Gazette, 26 February 1946.

lead a delegation with the head of the Government, the Prime Minister, holding a secondary position! The Wafd had thus nearly killed the initiative taken by Sidki, but for his firmness. He excluded them outright and formed a delegation otherwise representative of all political parties and leading personalities. (34)

All of them believed in the necessity and advisability of reaching an understanding with Great Britain without further delay. (35)

Great Britain took more than three weeks to announce names of its delegation to be led in the final stages by the Foreign Secretary. (36) The earlier part of the discussion, according to

-
34. The Egyptian delegation finally formed on 8 March 1946 consisted of the following: 1. Ismail Sidki Pasha, Prime Minister and leader of the delegation. 2. Mohammad Sharif Sabry, 3. Aly Mahir, 4. Husain Heikal, 5. Mohammad Fahmi el Nokrashy Pasha, 6. Makram Ebeid, 7. Hafiz Afifi, 8. Ahmed Lutfi Syed, 9. Abdul Fatah Yahya, 10. Hussain Sirri, 11. Aly al Shamsy, 12. Ibrahim Abdul Hadi.
35. El Barawy, op.cit., p. 151.
36. It may be noted here that Britain's failure to announce promptly the composition of its delegation had aroused suspicion in Egypt's political circles. Sidki was embarrassed by the British Government's inaction; more so when finally on 30 March the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Campbell answered his inquiries stating that he himself was to head a delegation consisting of senior military experts and Embassy officials. The Wafdist Press and the extremists violently resented Britain's intransigence. Sidki, although immediately suppressed their activities by arresting some Wafdists and the terrorists of the Misr al-Fatah, and putting a ban on their newspapers, but he himself felt it strongly. He informed Sir Ronald that members of the Egyptian delegation were among the most distinguished figures in Egyptian political life and expected to negotiate with the British personalities of the same order. The people in Egypt, he added, believed and would not forget that the policy adopted during the last decade and especially during the war - a policy which did not leave a good impression - was planned and executed by the very Embassy officials whom you now wish to have as your political assistants. See Ismail Sidki, Mudhakirati (Cairo, Dar al-Hilal, 1950, trans. Emile Marmarstein), pp. 61-62.

the Foreign Office communication was however to be conducted on his behalf, by the Secretary for Air, Lord Stansgate. (37)

The British delegation arrived in Cairo on 15 April, (38) but the beginning of negotiations was however further delayed because of Egypt's demand that they 'should be preceded by a prior announcement that all British forces would be withdrawn from Egypt'. (39) The British delegation which had come to Egypt to search for an agreeable basis for maintaining the British troops there, was taken aback by such a firm and categorical stand of its counter negotiators. Sidki's simple and plain statement: 'You can have no agreement with Egypt - except on the basis of evacuation', was not therefore a 'pre-condition'. On the contrary, it was the British delegation which had flown to Cairo with a pre-determined objective which was diametrically opposed to what the Egyptians were seeking - the evacuation of their country. Lord Stansgate's top military advisers tried to apprise Sidki Pasha and his colleagues of the serious threat to the security of the

37. The appointment of Lord Stansgate was publicly welcomed by the Egyptian Prime Minister with the remark that 'as Mr. Wedgewood Benn defended the Egyptian cause in and out of British Parliament just after the first World War, when few other Britons spoke favourably on behalf of my country. Thus Wedgewood Benn's name is always remembered as a ray of hope in Egypt'. See Information Paper No.19, op.cit., p. 87, QUOTED FROM: The Times, 22 April 1946. Lord Stansgate was to be assisted by Sir Kinhan Cornwallis, British Ambassador to Iraq 1941-45, and now head of the Middle East Secretariat of the Foreign Office, and the three Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East, and the British Ambassador in Cairo.

38. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 16 April 1946.

39. The Annual Register 1946, p. 294. See also Survey (1946-50), op.cit., p. 120.

whole Middle East inherent in the Soviet cold-war pressure on Iran, Turkey and Greece. Explaining Egypt's importance as a military base, they urged the Egyptians to think of the defence of the region as a whole, not of the narrow interest of the Nile Valley, and that Egypt's own resources were inadequate to withstand the Communists' onslaught. The vision of the Egyptian delegation, representing all shades of political opinions, however, 'tended to be restricted to the narrow confines of their Nile Valley and a desire to put an end to the British occupation'. Moreover, the uneasy atmosphere of the cities and towns filled with student demonstrations, bomb explosions and risk of assassination would not permit any divergence from their basic demand.' (40)

Attlee seemed to have understood the situation well enough when he decided to assure the Egyptians that the British forces would be withdrawn from their territory and thus to break the deadlock in negotiating an alliance. He made the following statement on 7 May in the House of Commons which was hotly debated by the opposition:

It is the considered policy of H.M. Government in the United Kingdom to consolidate their alliance with Egypt as one between two equal nations having interests in common. In pursuance of this policy negotiations have been begun in an atmosphere of cordiality and goodwill. The Government of the United Kingdom have proposed to withdraw all British naval, military, and air forces

40. Lord Stansgate afterwards asserted that 'had we been able on our arrival to announce that in future British troops would only be in Egypt by Egyptian consent, we could have had a treaty in a month'. See "The Egyptian Point of View", The Listener, 25 January 1951, p. 127. But surprisingly, he did not do anything, even at this stage, about the Sudan question which was just as important to all the Egyptians.

from Egyptian territory and to settle in negotiations the stages and date of the completion of this withdrawal and arrangements to be made by the Egyptian Government to make possible mutual assistance in time of war or imminent threat of war in accordance with the alliance. (41)

Defending his step against severe criticism by the Opposition, (42) Attlee, in fact, only admitted the reality of the Anglo-Egyptian relations when he stated that without "a clear declaration to clear up doubts as to our position" the negotiations

41. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 422, cols. 781-2.

42. Churchill characterised Attlee's statement as 'very grave' one of the most momentous I have heard in this House. Anthony Eden, speaking ^{on} a motion of adjournment of the House, pointed out that the chief object of the 1936 Treaty was to safeguard the defence of the Suez Canal - so essential an artery of their Imperial life, and asked whether the Government had any plan for securing that end. Some Government supporters argued that the Canal could be well defended from bases not on Egyptian territory. The Opposition, however, stressed the impermanence and inadequacy of Cyprus, Palestine and Cyrenaica as alternative bases. Churchill and Eden also warned of the danger relying solely on a British right to reoccupy installations in a time of possible future international emergency: 'The Great Power with which we shall be in dispute would, of course, say to the Egyptian Government - 'We should regard any movement into the Canal Zone of British forces as an unfriendly act'. Can any one suppose that the Egyptian Government confronted with this situation and not desiring anyhow to have British troops as Air Force in the Canal Zone, will not refuse permission to reenter? Eden, unsatisfied by the explanation of the Government, strongly felt that 'fundamental principles' of the 1936 Treaty, 'have been thrown over without any substitute being provided in the interests of this country, of Egypt and of the Empire'. Churchill 'placed it on record that His Majesty's Government have not consulted in any way any other people in this country, and therefore entire responsibility for the course that they are pursuing must rest with them'. For complete account of the debate on Treaty Negotiations, in the House of Commons, see UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol. 423, 24 May 1946, cols. 701-790. For Churchill's speech in the Debate, see cols. 772-79; for Eden's remarks see vol. 422, cols. 849-54.

could not possibly succeed, and that they could not hope any alliance to continue or be fulfilled unless the Egyptians received at the outset an assurance that no foreign troops would be retained on Egyptian soil against their wishes. (43)

The basic difference of approach of the two parties was revealed in the course of debates in the Parliament on this vital question. The Conservatives viewed the whole situation from the point of view of Great Britain's interests alone, and they believed the withdrawal of British troops would seriously jeopardise their control of the Suez Canal. They did not favour any move from any quarter which, in their opinion, would weaken their hold over the Canal and Egypt's foreign relations. They remembered what Lord Lloyd, Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt during 1925-29, had advised them: "... the only place from which the Suez Canal can be economically and adequately defended is from Cairo." (44) Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden, therefore, thought of nothing but their country's position in the post-war balance of power. (45)

The Labour Party under Attlee's leadership, however, saw the situation from a different angle. They were equally concerned about the communications of the British Commonwealth and Empire and with the security of the Canal. But they thought that the objective could be achieved best only if Great Britain had an alliance with Egypt on the basis of respect for her sovereign

43. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 422, cols. 854-858.

44. H.L. Deb., vol. 75, cols. 1137-38.

45. H.C. Deb., vol. 423, cols. 701-790.

rights and national sentiments. Attlee reminded the Opposition that 'without the cooperation and goodwill of the Egyptians Britain's interests could not be protected and promoted for long. No 'treaty' or 'alliance' with Egypt could survive a serious calamity, against which it has been advised, unless it has been willingly accepted and endorsed by the people. He said:

We had said we were going to leave Egypt long ago, but we had not gone. Those things remained in the minds of the Egyptian people, and the presence of foreign troops in their capital offended national sentiments. It was true that troops from Britain, India, and the Dominions rendered a great service to Egypt in saving her from the aggression of Mussolini and Hitler ... it did not, however, alter the fact that the continued presence of troops in Cairo offended nationalist opinion. In order that the alliance should continue with the same mutual confidence and success as in the past, the complete freedom and independence of Egypt was essential. (46)

Bevin further confirmed his chief's statement by frankly admitting that if they had not put forward such a proposal, 'disorders in the streets would have it dragged out of us'. He reminded the opposition that in the new pattern of international behaviour, set-up by the UN, all countries, great and small had acquired a new status, (47) and are assured of their security without sacrificing their dignity or political independence. (48)

46. H.C. Deb., vol. 422, cols. 854-858.

47. Ibid., vol. 423, col. 782.

48. United Nations Charter, Article 2, para 1, recognises the principle of sovereign equality of all of its members. Para IV makes it obligatory for its members to 'refrain in their International relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state'.

But he also pointed out that Britain's withdrawal from Egypt should not create a vacuum:

If the Egyptian Government try to force a situation in which there is a vacuum - meaning that we have gone and that there is nothing there for security instead, regional defence or other organization - to that we can never agree. But I have offered ... a new basis of approach, in which I believe, perhaps partnership is the wrong term, but it is a joint effort for mutual defence not only in the interests of Great Britain and her Commonwealth, but in the interests ultimately of the contribution to what I hope will yet become a United Nations defence for the security of the world. (49)

Egypt's Response to British Offer

Egypt's Prime Minister, Ismail Sidki Pasha, welcomed (50) the statements of the Labour leaders, and began negotiations in Cairo on 9 May on the lines suggested by Attlee and his Foreign Secretary, i.e. an alliance in place of the Treaty, for mutual defence on the basis of sovereign equality. (51) But the

49. H.C. Deb., vol. 423, col. 788.

50. "Egypt and Britain are beginning negotiations in an atmosphere of friendship to settle the stages and the date of completion (of evacuation), and measures that the Egyptian Government will have to take to ensure mutual assistance in time of war or the threat of war. The Egyptian negotiators will be very careful to see that this cooperation is kept within the limits of the San Francisco Charter and within the interests of Egypt.

A new chapter is opening in the Anglo-Egyptian relations, in spite of the fact that in both countries there exist people who doubt very much the outcome of the new phase. ... I personally believe that this complete evacuation and an alliance with Britain within the San Francisco Charter are great blessings to Egypt."

The Egyptian Gazette, 10 May 1946; see also Clare Hollingworth, The Arabs and the West (London, 1952), pp.53-54.

51. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 10 May 1946.

negotiations between the two delegations could not, however, proceed smoothly because of the exclusion of The Sudan from the scope of the negotiations. The British had obviously intended to split the nationalist demands by insisting on taking up each issue separately. The whole of Egyptian press that had been watching the developments closely with hope and interest commented rather unfavourably on the British offer. The Wafdists, in particular, severely criticised the Government for having agreed to discuss the principle of an Anglo-Egyptian alliance as such without first obtaining the consent of the nation. (52) Others expressed suspicion of the conditions that Britain must have facilities in Egypt in case of war or threat of war. (53)

The 'tactical coalition' of the Wafd, the extreme nationalists and the Communists continued its campaign against the proposed alliance, and against the Prime Minister who was favouring it. The 'Ikhwans', on the other extreme, insisting on not having anything to do, whatever, with the British, were suggesting for immediate and total severance of relations with her, and called for launching 'Jihad' - holy war, to obtain full

52. For vivid description of the Wafdists' opposition to the British offer and to Ismail Sidki's acceptance of it, see Ismail Sidki Pasha's Autobiography, Mudhakarati (Cairo, Dar ul Hilal, 1950).

53. Commenting on the British offer of 21 May, Nokrashi Pasha informed the Security Council that it was a "draft of the treaty of alliance, together with a military treaty which incorporated in substance the burdensome and objectionable conditions imposed in the 1936 Treaty". See, UN Security Council, Official Records, 5 August 1947, 2nd year, No. 70, p. 1747.

freedom. All of them added fuel to the fire of mounting social unrest by organizing and encouraging 'stay in strikes' in business and factories to protest and to prevent retrenchment of employees regardless of fluctuations in the rate of supply. The state telegraph workers, government engineers and teachers, organized by the Communist-inspired Workers' Congress, sympathised with the strikers. (54)

Sidki, however, did not yield to the threat of a general strike in the country. He decided to face the situation by being bold and firm in his policies. (55) On 9 July, his Government approved a Bill which imposed heavy penalties for strikes by state employees; authorised the Government to arrest all such persons who were found fomenting trouble in any manner. (56) Many Wafdists and Communists were arrested, several educational and cultural organizations which were suspected of having connections with the Marxist and other radical groups were closed down; many publications were banned, al-Wafd al-Misri, and the Sawt al-Umma (The Voice of the Nation) were among the most popular ones. But all these measures did not help much to ease the situation. Some of his colleagues in the delegation also differed from him on the fundamental question of joint defence. (57)

54. See, "The Egyptian Point of View", The Listener, 25 January 1951.

55. See, Mudhakarati, op.cit.

56. Al-Ahram, 10 July 1946.

57. Although Great Britain had already conceded the principle of total evacuation in peace-time, there still were two points which seriously marred the chances of a successful agreement. Britain insisted on having an alliance which

Makram Abied publicly announced his determination to abide by the original demands. (58) Serious difficulties arose on the question of including a Special Protocol on The Sudan in the draft treaty to retain the 1899 Condominium. (59) Both Sidki Pasha and King Faruk in effect had acquiesced to the British insistence that there should be no change in the arrangements affecting The Sudan without prior consultation of the Sudanese themselves. Makram Abied and others objected to the dangerous separatist move and criticised the Government for having "thrown over board the Egyptian demand of the Unity of the Nile Valley". Thus being opposed from within the delegation itself, Sidki Pasha practically achieved nothing and towards the end of September, resigned from Premiership. (60)

57. (contd. from back page)

would entitle here the use of Egypt as a war-time base as soon as war appeared imminent in any part of the Middle East. Egypt, on the other hand, wished the return of the British forces only in case of an aggression against Egypt or one of her immediate neighbours. See, "Anglo-Egyptian Relations", Round Table, March 1951, p. 115. See also Vatikiotis, op.cit., pp. 362-3.

58. In a press interview reported in Al-Ahram of Cairo of 17 July 1946, Makram Ebied, leader of the 'Kutla' party, attacked the proposed Joint Defence Board as 'certainly some sort of marked protectorate ... particularly an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board or rather a joint Ministry of National Defence'. On Makram's refusal of Britain's mid-August offer, The Times of 30 September 1946 commented that the intransigent section of the Egyptian delegation led by the leader of the Kutla Party not only refused the British offer, but 'consistently exploited their official knowledge of the negotiations to publicize confidential discussions and secret documents in an endeavour to prove that they are more patriotic than their colleagues'.
59. See Information Paper No.19, op.cit., p. 92.
See also Appendix No.
60. Sidki Pasha resigned on 28 September.

At this stage of uncertainty in Egypt's relations with Great Britain and grave risk to public security, the King chose a rather uncommitted and uncontroversial person, his own uncle, Sharif Sabry, to succeed Sidki Pasha, hoping that he would be able to form an all-party cabinet which would also be able to resume negotiations with Britain and make a fresh attempt to obtain more concessions from the latter. But as the Wafdists were now determined not to modify their claim for the immediate proclamation of Egyptian sovereignty over The Sudan, and also their stand on the question of a defence alliance with the UK, (61) he could not succeed in his bid (62) and, therefore, the King decided to bring back Sidki to deal firmly with the local problems of law and order and to continue his negotiations with the British Government.

-
61. Prior to the resumption of office by Sidki Pasha, the Wafdist party issued a strongly worded manifesto abandoning hope in the negotiations, denouncing both the proposed military alliance with Britain and the Joint Defence Committee, insisting on the "Unity of the Nile Valley under the Crown" demanding the submission of Egypt's case to the United Nations, and calling on the nation to begin a struggle for 'Complete ^{freedom} struggle'. See Al-Misri, 14 November 1946; also see Egyptian Gazette, 2 October 1946.
 62. On 1 October, Sharif Pasha informed the King that he was unable to form an all-Party Government as His Majesty had desired. In a press statement, ~~Mr.~~ Sabry declared that his attempts had failed because of difficulties raised by the Liberals and the Saadists on the one side and the Wafdists on the other, the latter demanding an immediate dissolution of Parliament, fresh elections, and leadership of and a majority in the treaty delegation, whilst the former insisted that the present regime must stay. See, Egyptian Gazette, 2 October 1946.

His reappointment, however, assured him of Faruk's unreserved support and sympathy in his endeavours regarding the revision of the 1936 Treaty, and gave him the confidence to proceed without any significant change or modification in his policies. Soon after resuming his position, Sidki announced that he would go to London to "explain personally to Bevin the national ideals inspiring his government's policy and to assure himself that the British Foreign Secretary is fully informed of the reasons for the Egyptian attitude". (63)

The opposition violently attacked the government for its unilateral decision to bypass and ignore the 'Treaty delegation' and contact authorities of the British Government directly. The Wafd, the Kutla and others feared that, left to himself, Sidki Pasha would accept an alliance with the British without securing basic national objectives. Makram Ebied said that any treaty accepted or assurance extended by Sidki Pasha on behalf of the nation would not be binding on Egypt. (64) Following their verbal protests, anti-government and anti-British demonstrations broke out in Cairo on 15 October. The organizers, mainly the students and the workers also called for a general strike the next day, when the Prime Minister was due to leave for London;

63. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 2, 3 October 1946.

64. Replying to the opposition attacks, Prime Minister Sidki Pasha declared that his visit to London would not affect the treaty delegation because its purpose would not be to negotiate but to enlighten the British authority on the full facts. See Egyptian Gazette, 8 October 1946.

10 people were injured and a large number arrested in clashes with the Police. (65)

In London, Sidki and his Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi, met the British Foreign Secretary several times and after prolong discussions with him, signed a new draft treaty, of which the most important points were:

1. That all British forces would be withdrawn from Cairo, Alexandria and the Delta by 31 March 1947, and that the final evacuation of Egyptian territory would be completed by 1 September 1949.
2. That in the event of Egypt being attacked or the UK being involved in a war as a result of attack against countries adjacent to Egypt, both Governments, in close cooperation and after consultation, would take such action as might be recognised necessary until the Security Council had taken the necessary measures for the restoration of peace. To secure this, mutual cooperation and coordination of mutual defence, a Joint Board of Defence would be set up to advise both Governments on the measures to be taken for mutual defence when so required.
3. The joint policy for The Sudan to be followed by both governments 'within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the Common Crown of Egypt will have for its essential objective to assure the well-being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-government and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan'; and that until these objects should be attained provisions of the Condominium convention of 1899 would remain in force. (66)

It was on the basis of his understanding of this last paragraph that Sidki Pasha on his arrival in Cairo informed the people that Britain had agreed to accept the 'Unity of Egypt

65. Al-Ahram, 15, 16, 17 October 1946. See also Egyptian Gazette of the same dates.

66. Cmd. 7179. See Appendix No.

with Sudan under the Egyptian Crown'. (67) But this statement was promptly contradicted by the British Prime Minister. He explained to the House of Commons that "No change in the existing status and administration of the Sudan is contemplated". Referring to the Sudan Protocol he reiterated that the Sudanese would themselves have the right to decide their own future. (68)

The British interpretation of this provision clearly implied the possibility of the Sudan's separation from Egypt. It was a victory for the 'Umma Party' headed by Abdel Rehman El Mehdi who stood for a separate independent status for the Sudan. On the following day (29 October), however, official sources in Egypt released a paraphrase of the controversial 'Sudan Protocol' (69) which reasserted the Egyptian claim. The King's speech delivered at the opening of the new session of the Parliament also stated that "Egypt regarded the Sudan as a brother state, and one of Egypt's aim would be to develop their interests and prepare them for self-government as soon as possible." (70)

67. Egyptian Gazette, Al-Ahram, 27 October 1946; see also Observer, 27 October 1946.

68. H.C. Deb., vol. 428, cols. 295-6.

69. Jon Kunche characterized the Sudan Protocol as "Most wonderous jumble of nonsense and contradictions that were ^{even} graced a diplomatic instrument". Commenting on contradictory and ambiguous phraseology of the document, he writes: "It seems incredible that intelligent men could have drafted this protocol, and that leading statesmen of Bevin's and Sidki's calibre could have discussed and approved it." Seven Fallen Pillars (London, 1950), pp. 71-72.

70. The Egyptian Gazette, 15 November 1946.

These contradictory statements, however, led to much discussion and political excitement and to demonstrations in Egypt and the Sudan. The 'Independent Front' and the pro-Egyptian 'National Front' held rallies in the Sudan to protest and to defend respectively the Egyptian thesis of dynastic union. (71)

In Egypt the situation of law and order became extremely serious when it was disclosed that Sidki Pasha had signed the draft treaty in spite of opposition from 7 out of eleven members of the Egyptian delegation. The ailing Premier's position became most embarrassing when in response to El Mahdi's visit to London, Bevin sent a 'letter of interpretation' to be affixed to the Treaty, in which Sidki was asked to agree that the draft protocol amounts to an affirmation of the existing status of the Sudan'. (72) Next day the Governor-General of the Sudan also stated that:

His Majesty's Government are determined that nothing shall be permitted to deflect the Sudan Government whose powers and constitution remain unaltered by the recent conversations, from their task of preparing the Sudanese for self-government. (73)

This finally ended the negotiations and the following day, 9 December, Sidki Pasha resigned, on strong medical advice. (74)

His disappearance from the scene, however, did not change much the pattern of politics in Egypt. His successor, Mahmoud Fahmy En Nokrashy Pasha, formed a coalition cabinet of the

71. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question (London, 1951), pp.118, 134.

72. See Nokrashi Pasha's speech in the UN Security Council, dated 11 August 1947, Official Records, 2nd Year, No. 73, p. 1871.

73. The Egyptian Gazette, 10 December 1946; Daily Telegraph, 9 December 1946; also The Times, 10 December 1946.

74. Al-Ahram, 10 December 1946.

Saadists and Liberals, (75) and informed the Parliament of his determination to protect his country's vital interests. In his first address before the Chamber of Deputies on 16 December, he said:

... the whole nation "impatiently awaited the breaking of the last feather on its independence and dignity", and first among its objectives the government had placed those claims "which were graven on the heart of every Egyptian, evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley".

"In affirming the permanent unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown" [he maintained] "we simply expressed the unanimous will and wishes of the inhabitants of this valley. ... When I state that Sudan under the Egyptian Crown is a permanent unity, I hope that the whole world will understand that I am expressing the opinion of all Egyptians and all Sudanese. ... There is therefore no ground to suspect that we wish to colonize the Sudan, as the desire to dominate cannot exist between brothers". (76)

Nokrashi Resumes Negotiations -
UN Help Sought

Nokrashi Pasha resumed negotiations from the very point at which they were abruptly suspended due to Sidki Pasha's

75. Political Handbook of World Parliaments, Parties and Press, 1947.

76. In a further debate in the Chamber on 31 December in which Makram Ebied bitterly criticised the statement of the Governor-General of the Sudan, Sir Hubert Huddleston made by him on 9 December last, the Prime Minister declared:

"The Sudan to us is a life line. The permanent unity of Egypt and the Sudan is the desire of the people of the Nile Valley. I do not blame you for your annoyance with the Sudan's Governor-General's statement which advocates separation, and I have demanded that the British Government submit to me immediately their policy towards the Sudan and whether they support separation or not."

See The Egyptian Gazette, 17 December 1946, also 1 January 1947; also The Times, 24 January 1947.

resignation. He met the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Cambell^p, on 30 December and again on 4-5 January but both failed "to reach anything in the nature of an agreed interpretation" of the Sudan protocol. The British Ambassador insisted on the recognition of the Sudan's right of self-determination to attain full self-government. He stood firm by the policy of his home government that the Sudanese must have the right to choose complete independence or Complete union with Egypt. The Egyptian Prime Minister, on the other hand, insisted on the recognition of autonomous status of the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown. "No Egyptian or Sudanese will ever accept a division of the Nile Valley. I refute the charge that we want to colonise the Sudan and that we are imperialistic. What we want is unity under the Egyptian Crown. We shall educate the Sudanese until they have self-rule, but they must always remain under the Crown." (77) (Italics mine)

Consequently, the talks could not proceed further and were officially declared broken on 26 January. Nokrashi Pasha also announced that having failed to bring round the British Government to the Egyptian viewpoint, he feels constrained to seek the help of the United Nations by asking the Security Council to annul the 1936 Treaty.

The Egyptian Parliament endorsed his decision on 27 January by a vote of 175 to 115. (78) Sidki's and Nahas Pasha's opposition to the idea of appealing to the Security Council, and

77. Al-Ahram, 17 December 1946; The Times, 24 January 1947.

78. The Middle East Journal, vol. I, April 1947, p. 194.

the reported offer of mediation by the Governments of Syrian and Lebanon, (79) however, did not deter him from doing so on 8 July 1947. He seems to have obviously been forced to take this action by the British attitude of complete intransigence over the matter of the 'Unity of the Nile Valley', which finally killed the Egyptian hope of reaching an understanding. (80)

NOKRASHI'S NOTE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In his note to the President of the Security Council, Nokrashi pleaded that:

... the presence of the British troops on Egyptian territories against the unanimous will of its people, that their presence in time of peace constituted an offence to Egypt's dignity, an interference in her normal development, as well as an infringement of the fundamental principles of sovereign equality, and, therefore, contrary to the letter and spirit of the UN Charter.

He further stated that

in the Sudan, the British were instigating and encouraging an artificial separatist movement, 'notwithstanding that the Unity (of the Nile Valley)

79. Survey of International Affairs - The Middle East 1945-50, p. 130.

The British Government for their part were fully ready to let the case be discussed by the UN, but they also welcomed the Syrian and Lebanese offer to mediate between Egypt and Britain to avoid the proposed Egyptian appeal to the UN where the Soviet Union was surely to advocate the Egyptian cause in a bid to either win them to her side or at least to neutralize them in the increasing rift between the East and the West.

80. On 16 May 1947, Bevin had declared in the House of Commons that there would be 'no attempt to appease Egyptian Government at the expense of the Sudanese people ... whether they take this to the Security Council or elsewhere, we cannot go any further [than] the offer we have made.' See: H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 437, col. 1963.

is urged by the common interest and aspirations of its peoples'. Such a situation, in his opinion, constituted a "danger to international peace and security" which could only be avoided by 'total and immediate evacuation of British troops from Egypt including the Sudan, and the termination of the existing regime in the Sudan'. (81)

Demanding the termination of the 1936 Treaty, Nokrashi Pasha forcefully asserted:

... an alliance of this kind is but another form of subordination. It makes a relationship which is both unbalanced and undignified. It ~~gives~~^{ties} Egypt to British economy; it subjects Egypt to the vagaries of British diplomacy; and it imprisons Egypt within the orbit of British imperial power. (82)

With regard to the question of self-determination for the Sudan, Nokrashi spoke at length to establish that Egypt and the Sudan were one and the same country, geographically, ethnically, culturally and politically. He defined Mohammed Ali's action in the Sudan in 1820 as an effort to consolidate Egypt's various parts and unify its governmental institutions. He accused Britain of having divided them artificially for their selfish interests. (83) By raising the question of ultimate self-determination the British, in his view, simply intended to prolong their domination of the Sudan. The question of self-determination, he stated, did not arise at all. The Egyptians and the Sudanese were one and the same people and should like to settle their mutual relationship without any interference from the British. He concluded his arguments by assuring of his

81. UN Security Council Official Records, 17 July 1947, No.59, pp. 1343-45.

82. Ibid., p. 1756.

83. Ibid., pp. 1757-65.

government's most sincere desire to accord the Sudan "self-rule within the framework of 'unity under the Crown of Egypt'."

(84) (Italics mine)

The British representative Sir Alexander Cadogan questioned the jurisdiction of the Security Council to discuss the issue. Replying to Nokrashi Pasha's statements, he observed that the 1936 Treaty was still valid and that there was no evidence of a threat to the international peace and security. He summed up his remarks by saying that

his Government (Britain) has met 'in the most sympathetic manner' the Egyptian request for a revision of the Treaty and had offered to withdraw the British forces from Egypt on reasonable conditions; the Bevin-Sidki Agreement had failed to come into force, 'for only one reason namely that Egypt was not prepared to accord in the future to the Sudanese people the right of self-determination which it had claimed for Arabs elsewhere. (85) (Emphasis mine)

Sir Cadogan also cited instances and statements of Egyptian leading public men, (86) in favour of his argument that

84. Ibid., 193rd Meeting, 22 August 1947, p. 9.

85. Ibid., 176th Meeting, 5 August 1947, No.70, pp. 1767-84; see also No.75, p. 1985.

86. He quoted:

The then Egyptian Prime Minister while introducing the Treaty to the Chamber of Deputies:

"Goodwill and sincere intentions have largely helped in the reaching of this agreement, which realizes the nation's hopes, safeguards the interests of Great Britain and strengthens our relations, on a free and honourable basis of friendship, equality and alliance."

He also cited the Foreign Minister saying:

"This Treaty constitutes without any doubt a clear ratification of Egypt's international situation

(contd. on next page)

the treaty of 1936 was freely negotiated and accepted by the Egyptian people and their parliament, and hence did not constitute violation of the General Assembly Resolution of 14 December 1946 (87) or any other principle of the UN Charter as alleged by the Egyptian representative.

Contesting the British representative's argument on this point, Nokrashi said:

that Egypt was not a free agent in entering into the treaty of 1936. Not only was it under a military occupation, but it was also given to understand ... that its failure to accept the conditions laid down by the UK would mean a restoration of the Protectorate or something worse. In a most charge and ominous atmosphere, Egypt yielded to this pressure. It sought escape from the UK reservations of 1922.

86. (contd. from back page)

from both the legal and practical point of view. The Treaty makes Egypt's independence real, and enables it to advance with firmness and wisdom towards its glorious future."

Mohammad Mahmud Pasha, a former Prime Minister said:

"... the countries have, in fact, a common interest in safeguarding the peace of the world, in their reciprocal defence against all aggression, and in strengthening the relations which bind them together."

Ismail Sidki Pasha, also Egypt's Premier from 1930-33, said:

"Both personally and as the representative of one of the political parties, I approve of this treaty, in the negotiation and signature of which I have had the honour to participate."

See UN Security Council Official Records, 5 August 1947, 176th Meeting, 2 year, No.70, pp. 1780-81.

87. The General Assembly Resolution of 14 December 1946 recommended all members to undertake "the withdrawal without delay of their armed forces stationed in the territories of Members without their consent freely and publicly expressed in treaties or agreement consistent with the Charter and not contradicting International Agreements". (See Resolution adopted by the General Assembly during second part of its first session, No. 41 [17].)

Concluding that the Treaty was negotiated and signed under some duress, he also quoted Egypt's prominent men in public affairs. Referring to Mohammad Mahmud Pasha's statement, a part of which was narrated by Sir Cadogan, Nokrashi quoted the rest to support his argument:

The military obligations are in contradiction with the independence of Egypt, and were it not for our special circumstances, and were it not for certain advantages of the Treaty and for the international circumstances at present prevailing, that force us to take into consideration these hard facts and prevent us from concentrating on our hopes and aspirations, it would have never come to mind to accept this treaty.

Nokrashi also quoted Ahmad Mahar Pasha, then President of the Chamber of Deputies saying:

We are compelled to accept these conditions in view of the inescapable circumstances prevailing.

The Egyptian leader also stated how the President of the Senate, Hussein Heikal Pasha had reacted to the conclusion of the Treaty:

In case you wish to change the situation of which we are wearied ... with the hope that any change may bring blessings, then accept this treaty on condition that it should be revised at the earliest opportunity in such a manner as to remove anything that affects the independence of Egypt. (88)

The Egyptian Premier reiterated that 'the Treaty was not consistent with the UN Charter': "It is not an agreement between equals. It does not live up to the requirements of sovereign equality. It is based on sovereign inequality". "This was recognized by Mr. Bevin", he said, "when on 16 May 1946 he declared in the House of Commons that the recent negotiations had been directed towards placing the relations between Britain and Egypt

88. UN Security Council Official Records, 2nd year, 179th Meeting, 11 August 1947, No.73, pp. 1866-7.

on a basis different from that on which they are heretofore and which would have been more modern than before, in that the relations between the two countries would have been as between equals and not on the basis of cooperation." (89)

Thus in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination and accusations, the Council failed to arrive at a decision and shelved the issue. It could, however, be ascertained from the speeches in the Council that majority of the members of the Council supported Britain on the question of self-determination for the Sudan. Some of them suggested that Britain and Egypt should resume direct negotiations in consultation with the Sudanese. (90) Nokrashi outrightly rejected this proposal saying:

The Egyptian Government would work out the future of the Sudan in consultation, not with the British, not with the Sudanese while they are hampered by the British occupations but with the Sudanese acting of their own free will. The United Kingdom have no place in the matter and we shall not discuss it with that country.

89. Ibid., p. 1868.

90. On 20 August, the Brazilian delegate submitted a draft resolution recommending the two parties 'to resume direct negotiations and, should such negotiations fail, to seek a solution of the dispute by other peaceful means of their own choice'. The Chinese (Nationalist) delegate proposed to add to its preamble a paragraph noting that Britain had already partially withdrawn her troops from Egypt and was ready to negotiate on the completion of the evacuation; and he added: 'I cannot see how this Council can be a party to any arrangement which would deprive the Sudanese people of this right of self-determination which is the foundation of the Charter of the United Nations'. The US, French and Belgian delegates supported the Brazilian proposal.

The French delegate compared Nokrashi's repudiation of the 1936 Treaty with the repudiations practised by the Nazis before the war: 'Every Hitlerite aggression was preceded by a declaration announcing that the Treaty signed a few years or a few months before ... was now useless, an anachronism, and contrary to the trend of historic development'.

In this state of indecision the Council finally shelved the issue which reflected its unwillingness to consider the problem as constituting a serious threat to world peace.

When Nokrashi Pasha returned home, desperate and disappointed, he found the country inflicted with manifold troubles. There was political uneasiness and annoyance over his defeat in the United Nations. His opponents criticised him on the ground that his performance in the Security Council was not forthright and vigorous, especially on the Sudan question. The Wafdists severely criticised the Government for its 'half-hearted' presentation of the Egyptian case in the Security Council by relying mainly on the 'moral' aspect of the question. (91) Others criticised the Prime Minister for not clearly distinguishing between Egypt's 'acceptance of the principle of a treaty with Great Britain and their objections to certain provisions of the existing treaty, and thus giving an impression that 'Egypt was trying to repudiate an obligation rather than seeking a remedy for a grievance'. (92)

91. The leader of the Wafd Party, Mustafa al Nahas, in a letter to the Prime Minister, dated 23 September 1947, wrote that: "Though you declared in a speech before the Senate that both the treaty of 1936 and the Agreement of 1899 were no longer operative, you did not mention about it in your discourse in the Security Council." Not having insisted on this fact, he thought, was mainly responsible for weakening the Egyptian argument. See Mohammed Moustafa Ata, tran. M.yehia, Egypt Between Two Revolutions (Cairo, 1952), p. 85. See also, Rashid El-Barawi, The Military Coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1952), p. 155.

92. John Marlowe, op.cit., p. 347.

Some others in their grief and anger over the inconclusive debate in the United Nations, indulged in disruptive activities and mischief against the foreigners and the diplomatic missions of those countries which had opposed the Egyptian claims in the Council. (93) They seemed to have lost all faith in the integrity and impartiality of the world body. (94)

-
93. The Brazilian Legation in Cairo, for instance, received a letter from 'The Egyptian Terrorist Society' demanding immediate payment of £5 million as reparation for Brazil's impertinence in moving her resolution in the Security Council (20 August 1947) and on the night of 28th, 29th August two bombs were exploded outside the Legation, but without doing any damage. The Chinese and Belgian residents also received similar threatening letters. The American Consulate at Port Said was stoned and an attempt was made to burn the British Consulate. The angry students in Alexandria clashed with the Police. More than 1,000 employees of the Egyptian army workshop marched to Prime Minister's office to protest against Britain and USA, hailing at the same time the Soviet Union, Poland and Syria for their favourable stand in the Security Council. See The Middle East Journal, vol. II, January 1948, pp. 62-63.

The Polish representative had expressed the view that the Council could not be bound by the legal aspect of the question solely: a treaty which had 'outlived its purpose and exhausted its objectives' stood in the way of 'the justified national aspirations' and sovereignty of a member state. Poland would support Egypt's demand for the 'immediate, complete and unconditional' withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Sudan, but could suggest no solution at the present moment for the problem of the 'development of self-government and free political institutions' which should be the United Nation's primary objective in the Sudan'. The Russian delegate expressed identical views. In his speech on 28 August, Mr. Gromyko, criticised the Brazilian resolution as unreal, impracticable and unhelpful. "A fundamental drawback of the Brazilian resolution", he said, "is that its adoption would mean that the Security Council steps aside of its own free will and washes its hands of the question. If the Council limits itself to calling for renewed negotiations and does not state its own opinion on the question it would mean the Council avoids its obligations."

94. G.M. Dib, The Arab Bloc and the United Nations (Amsterdam, 1952), pp. 70-6.

All this criticism against Nokrashi Pasha and his government, however, was not proper and unbiased. The Wafdists took this stand in order to make a bid to recover their reduced prestige and to regain political power. In fact, it appeared that they wished to see no other individual or party to champion the cause of Egypt's national struggle. For Nokrashi's failure at the UN, the Wafdists were no less responsible. They unwisely stretched their personal and political rivalries beyond the borders of their own country by sending a cable to the President of the Security Council claiming that Nokrashi's delegation did not represent the Egyptian nation and, therefore, was not entitled to argue the country's case before the international body. (95)

The cable unquestionably undermined Nokrashi's position as Egypt's spokesman. Nevertheless, Nokrashi Pasha argued his country's case most sincerely and zealously and spared no effort to secure international sympathy for his claims. For this purpose, if he chose the 'moral respect' of the question, it was not improper or unwise. He knew that on legal grounds Egypt's case would be weaker. Notwithstanding the circumstances, the Treaty, in the eyes of law, was freely negotiated and signed by accredited representatives, later approved by the legal competent authority, the King and the Parliament, for the duration of twenty years. The United Nations in such circumstances could not do anything but to uphold the sanctity of the treaty on the basis

95. Abd al-Rehman al Rafii, Fi Agab al-Thaurat al-Misriyyia (Cairo; 1951), vol. III, p. 233. See also Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 364; also El-Barawy, op.cit., p. 155.

of 'Pacta Sunt Servenda'. (96)

On the question of the Sudan also, the leader of the Egyptian delegation was absolutely firm and clear. In his speeches in the Security Council, he repeatedly and vigorously asserted that Egypt and the Sudan were a single people and would mutually decide their future relationship, in any case under the Crown of Egypt. (97) It is unfair to say that on hearing the views of other members of the Security Council on the question of self-determination, Nokrashi became shaky in his standpoint and his later speeches lack earlier spark and firmness. (98) Neither any portion of his speeches gave any indication, as alleged, of Egypt's imperialistic designs in the southern part of the Nile Valley. (99) He only insisted on the maintenance of the unity of Egypt and the Sudan, self-government of the Sudanese and the restoration to Egypt of her rights in the administration of the Sudan in order to further the preparation of the Sudanese for self-government. The unity of Egypt and the Sudan, he emphasised, was the will of both the Egyptians and the Sudanese alike. (100) He had rejected the Australian suggestion to consult the Sudanese

96. This generally accepted principle of International Law means that 'treaties must be observed during the period for which they were made'.

97. See, Security Council Debates, op.cit., pp. 1753-65.

98. Mekki Abbas, The Sudan Question (London, 1951).

99. Rashid al-Barawy, op.cit., p. 140.

100. See Documents Section, Middle East Journal, vol. I, July 1947, p. 320.

in so far as their future was affected not because he had imperialistic designs in view, but for the fact that the Sudanese were obsessed by the presence of the British.

The decision to refer the question of their relations with Great Britain to the Security Council, however, was not well-timed. It was not adequately realized that the interests of smaller nations were generally subordinated to the interests of Greater Powers. In the recent post-war Power-alliances based mostly on ideological considerations, Great Britain was not likely to be left alone and isolated to face an embarrassing situation. The whole of Western Europe and the United States were already convinced of the British contention that Egypt, the Suez Canal and the rest of the Middle East were vital links in their new defence strategy. They would not have willingly let slip the Suez out of the British hands without being definite of her right to return to the area as and when a need arises to do so. Therefore, what happened in the Security Council was a foregone conclusion. The Americans were also not likely to oppose Britain's position in the Suez Canal because their position in the Panama was not much different. (101) Even the Soviet Union was not expected to take a clear and whole-hearted stand on Egypt's side. During a private meeting between Stalin and Bevin reportedly held on 24 March 1947, on the eve of the Moscow Conference, Bevin had been able to obtain an assurance from Stalin that Russia would

101. Harold L. Hoskins, "The Guardianship of the Suez Canal", The Middle East Journal, April 1950, p. 150.

remain neutral in the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. (102)

France was not friendly with Egypt at that time due to latter's stand against France over Tunisia. (103) Thus it should have been obvious that Egypt without the support of a major power would not be able to cut much ice with the Security Council.

The opposition to Nokrashi's Government became more vehement in demanding its resignation because he had failed to solve the country's serious financial and economic difficulties. Egypt accumulated a sum of nearly 4 million sterling pounds in London during the war. Britain blocked this money, and after great persuasion had released barely over a quarter of the total balance which did not help Egypt in stabilising her economy and foreign trade.

-
102. Soviet News, 15 May 1947. See also New York Times, 8 May 1947. The Soviet Ambassador's speech in the Security Council on 28 August which was acclaimed in Cairo as supporting the Egyptian case, was however non-committal and vague. His delegation abstained from voting on the Brazilian resolution. This abstention from negative voting could be regarded as a definite expression of her neutrality in the matter.
103. France had recently strained her relations with Egypt because the latter had sent an auxiliary cruiser to Tunisia without French authorization with grain to relieve a famine, and had also given a sanctuary to the Moroccan revolutionary Abdel Karim who had escaped to the Egyptian soil from the ship which was taking him to France. See, Information Paper No.19, op.cit., p. 106. See also Ann William, Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 1968), p. 70.

The outbreak of cholera epidemic in September and the number of resulting deaths reaching to thousands, (104) gave the opposition another point to denounce the government. They accused the Government of failing to prevent the spread of epidemic throughout the country and becoming a national disaster. Some alleged that the epidemic started from the British camps. (105) The infection became so serious and widespread that the whole of the state machinery virtually became standstill and the Government had to declare Egypt a cholera-stricken country which practically cut off Egypt from the rest of the world for the duration of the epidemic and reduced further her commerce and tourist industry.

104. See The Middle East Journal, vol. II, January 1948, p.63.

105. See The Times, 5 November 1947.

Though it is doubtful that the epidemic started from the British military base, but the very fact that the Egyptians implicated the origin of the disease to the British camps shows their disgust with the British. It was more a psychological point that they regarded the presence of the British forces as the source of every kind of evil, polluting their minds, their liberty and their health and hygiene.

Chapter III

THE PALESTINE WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON EGYPT'S NATIONAL POLITICS

A. Britain's Reference of the Palestine Question to the United Nations

Hardly had the Egyptian Government been able to breathe a sigh of relief after it had successfully combated and suppressed the epidemic within three months of its outbreak, a politically more dangerous crisis of perennial consequences came up.

On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the 'Partition of Palestine Resolution'. (1) The

-
1. Early in April 1947 Great Britain, being absolutely unable to maintain law and order in Palestine, where the Zionists and the Palestine Arabs were engaged in fierce battle to establish their nationalist claims, ultimately referred the case to the United Nations to find a solution of the problem. The latter body appointed a Special Committee to study and suggest a satisfactory solution.

The findings of this Committee were, however, not unanimous. There was a 'Majority Plan' which proposed partition of Palestine into an Arab State and a Jewish State with economic union, while Jerusalem was placed under the UN administration as an international city. The 'Minority Plan', on the other hand, suggested a single state with a federal structure.

The General Assembly was required to adopt either with a two-third majority in favour. During the discussion on the report, majority of speakers favoured the so-called 'Minority Plan', but when vote was taken, after 24 hours' adjournment, the decisive two-thirds majority was surprisingly found supporting the partition of Palestine.

This shift in voting behaviour of the delegates was decidedly due to the 'American official and unofficial pressure' and, in certain cases, compulsion upon the smaller member nations dependent on US aid. Luxemburg, Liberia, Haiti, the Philippines and Greece who had earlier opposed the Partition of Palestine, now either favoured or abstained from voting against it. For a detailed account of the subject

(contd. on next page)

British delegate had abstained from voting on the resolution because partition of the Arab homeland was totally rejected by Egypt and other Arab countries, and therefore also gave no assurance to implement it. (2) The Arabs believed that Palestine belonged to the natives - Arabs of Palestine - and only they were entitled to determine their future after the end of the Mandate. None else had any right or justification to promise or partition away any part of their territory to an alien group of people whose claims to the territory were based on doubtful remote historical connections. The British had already undermined the facts of Arab position in Palestine (3) when they promised in 1914 to establish a Jewish home in Palestine. The infamous Balfour Declaration was a masterpiece of ambiguity. It

1. (contd. from back page)

see Alfred Lilienthal, What Price Israel (Chicago, 1953), pp. 60-4; see also Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston, 1948), p. 63. For a debate on the question of voting on the partition of Palestine Resolution in the UN Assembly, see, US Congressional Records, 18 December 1947, p. 1176. Text of the Palestine Plan of Partition 1947 in UN Resolution No. 181 (II) of 29th November 1947. See, J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy In The Near And Middle East - A Documentary Record 1914-56 (London, 1956), pp. 281-95.

2. Al-Ahram, Al Akhbar ul Yaum, 29, 30 November 1947. The Times, 30 November 1947. See also, Rashid El-Barawy, Military Coup In Egypt - An Analytic Study (Cairo, 1952), pp. 157-58.
3. In 1917 the total population of Palestine numbered 700,000: 644,000 were Arabs and the remaining 56,000 were Jews. In 1948, the population of Palestine was 2,115,000 out of which 1,380,000 were Arabs and 700,000. In other words, when the State of Israel was established on the termination of the British Mandate the Arabs were still a two-third majority, in spite of thirty years of Jewish immigration under the auspices of the British authority.

contained contradictory pledges (4) to both the Arabs and the Jews because they needed the support of both the communities in World War I.

At the end of the War in 1919 the Palestinians had right-fully expected to become free and to be proclaimed a sovereign nation like the other former provinces of the defeated Ottoman Empire. But they were betrayed. The British declared them to be unfit to manage their own affairs, and hence assumed the responsibility to prepare them for self-rule under the new device of the 'Mandate System'.

During the entire period of the Mandate, the Arabs struggled to preserve the dominant Arab character of their fatherland and realize the national aspirations. The 1939 White Paper was, in a way, a recognition of their legitimate struggle because it sought to restrict the immigration of Jews into Palestine and banned selling or purchasing of land belonging to the Arabs to non-

-
4. On 2 November 1917, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour sent the following message to Edment de Roths Childs:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights or political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

The phraseology of this statement obviously intended to please the Zionists without annoying the Arabs. The former understood it a promise towards the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, while to the Arabs the words 'national home' for the Jews in Palestine could not mean the establishment of a Jewish political order in Palestine as it would certainly 'prejudice the civil and religious rights' of the Arabs.

Arabs. (5) This, however, did not help much the Arab cause because during and after the Second World War, the Zionists had found another Great Power to patronise the promote their claims about Palestine. The Government and the people of the United States of America became genuinely interested in the problem of the Jewish settlement. President Truman was particularly interested in the Jewish Vote he needed to win the forthcoming elections, but the people were generally interested on humanitarian grounds, to find a sanctuary for the persecuted Jews of Europe, the victims of Germany's man-slaughter. The Zionist organizations started illegally pouring them into Palestine despite serious restrictions on immigration. (6) This new influx of Jews caused the Arabs a serious concern. They feared that unrestricted flow of Jewish immigrants, wave after wave, would

-
5. In the 1939 White Paper the British Government declared that neither their undertakings to the Jews nor the national interests of Britain warranted that they should continue to develop the national Jewish home beyond the point already reached. The Government, therefore, decided: (1) "That the Jewish National Home as envisaged in the Balfour Declaration and in previous statements of British Policy had been established." (2) "That to develop it further against Arab wishes would be a violation of Britain's undertakings to the Arabs, and that such a policy could only be carried out by the use of unjustifiable force". (3) "That, therefore, after the admission of a final quota of 75,000 more Jewish immigrants should stop." (4) "That during this period of five years, a restriction should be placed on the acquisition of further land in Palestine by the Jews". (5) "That at the end of five years, self-governing institutions should be set up in the country. See British Parliamentary Papers 1939, Cmd. 6019, pp. 1-12.
 6. John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs 1908-1958 (London, 1959), pp. 279-81.

soon outnumber them, alter their social position and undermine their political claims. They protested against the Government and fought the Zionists in the streets of the towns and cities of Palestine. The latter had by now organized several paramilitary organizations, the 'Irgun' and the 'Hagana' and now a large number of trained young men to kill and terrorise the Arab population. The Arabs resisted with whatever little means they had. Law and order had been completely paralysed, and there was no security of life and property. The whole of Palestine was plagued with killing, looting and dynamiting buildings and houses. (7) The Arabs were already desperately looking for safer places. Villages and towns were being forcibly evicted to make room for the newcomers. A new problem of Arab refugees was being created by trying to solve the problem of Jewish refugees. (8) The British felt themselves quite disabled to enforce law and restore order. The Zionist terrorism was not sparing the Englishmen and officers. Two young sergeants in British uniform were hanged as a reprisal; a British Minister of State, Lord Moyne, was assassinated in Cairo by a fanatical Jewish youth, next the

-
7. Sami Hadawi, Palestine in the United Nations (Cairo, 1965), pp. 41-54.
 8. The Arab civil population of Palestine began increasingly to disperse under the pressure of Jewish terrorist attacks. The climax was on 9 April, the Zionists of Irgun Dai Leumi, the larger of the two terrorist organizations, raided the Arab village of Deir Yasin near Jerusalem and Massa some 250 Arab men, women and children, who were done to death with every barbarity. By the end of October nearly 650,000 Palestinian Arabs had become refugees. See, Sami Hadawi, op.cit., pp.14-54. See, also Annual Register 1948, p. 308.

King David Hotel which housed several British offices, was blown up causing grievous loss of life. (9)

It was in this frustrating state of disorder and lawlessness and want of security to their own people in His Majesty's service, that the British felt utterly helpless. The Attlee Government was, under the circumstances, rather unwilling to carry on the 'Whitemen's burden'. Their inability to find a solution of the Palestine problem which could be acceptable to both, the Arabs and the Jews; the new growing American pressure in favour of the Jews; (10) her own war-exhaustion coupled with

-
9. For a detailed account of the activities of the Jewish terrorists see, Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfilment (London, 1949). See also Angelina Hilu, Interaction of Political, Military and Economic Factors in Israel (Palestine Research Centre, Beirut); also, Abu-Gazaleh, Bassam, Terrorist Roots of the Herut Party of Israel (PRC, Beirut); see John Connell, The Most Important Country (London, 1957), pp. 7-8.
 10. In early 1945 President Truman urged Attlee that 100,000 Jews be admitted into Palestine. Expressing his inability to comply with the request of the American President explaining it will be highly resented by the Arabs and there will be serious administrative problems for the mandatory authority. Instead, however, he invited the United States to participate in a joint inquiry into the conditions in Palestine and problems related to it. The US accepted to share the responsibility of finding and implementing a solution acceptable to both the communities.

A Joint Committee of Inquiry was established which after several months of investigations, called for the issuance of 100,000 certificates for admission into Palestine of Jews who have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution".

Of all the other recommendations this was the most satisfactory from the point of view of the American President, who immediately started demanding its implementation. Britain, however, had her own limitations of considerations of national economic and defence interests to weigh before agreeing with the unrealistic recommendations. On the final assessment of their own vital interests and pledges to the Arabs, they

(contd. on next page)

serious financial crisis and mounting criticism from the opposition, finally impelled the Labour Government to ask the UN to find a solution and own the responsibility for doing so.

B. Partition of Palestine Plan

The solution which the UN had found in November 1947, however, was the one the British had long shirked. Their own Commissions (11) in the past had suggested partition as a solution, but they had rejected it on the ground that it contradicted the original British promise to guard the interests of both the communities, and said that Britain would take no action that was not agreeable to both the Jews and Arabs. (12)

10. (contd. from back page)

rejected the findings of the Committee on practical grounds. The Arab Higher Committee and the League of Arab States, with its headquarters at Cairo, had already warned "the Committee report doomed Palestine to be a land of bloodshed and misery." See International Events (Chatham House), May 1946, p. 286.

The US President, under the influence of his Zionist advisers of the White House, however, decided to back the Zionist cause in Palestine by all means and methods.

11. The Peel Commission appointed in 1930 recommended partition of Palestine which being unacceptable to both was undone by the findings of the Woodhead Commission in 1938 that Partition was absolutely unsatisfactory and unworkable solution'.
12. On 18 February 1947, the British Foreign Secretary had announced in the House of Commons that His Majesty's Government had found that "the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, that the obligations undertaken to the two communities had been shown to be irreconcilable." See, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 7088.

After the question of Palestine was referred to the UN, the British representative said at a meeting of the UN General Assembly on 15 May 1947, "We have tried for years to solve the problem of Palestine. Having failed so far, we

(contd. on next page)

Yet, even before the UN General Assembly had finally decided on the report of the Special Committee on Palestine, the British Government announced that they intended to give up the Mandate and withdraw their administration and all their forces as rapidly as possible. And eventually on 15 May 1948 they formally terminated their Mandated authority without making any arrangement for the peaceful and orderly transfer of authority. The same day David Ben Gurion proclaimed the establishment of the Jewish State of Israel as decreed by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947. (13) President Truman immediately recognized her as a new member of the family of nations, assuring thereby security of her existence. (14)

12. (contd. from back page)

now bring it to the UN in the hope that it can succeed where we have not. All we say is that we should not have the sole responsibility for enforcing a solution which is not accepted by both parties and which we cannot reconcile with our conscience. Official Records of the First Special Session of the General Assembly, April-November 1947, vol. III, pp. 183-4. See also H.C. Deb., 11-12 December 1947, cols. 1402-5.

Upon this statement, Sami Hadawi, a prominent Arab scholar, commented as follows: "To have taken the British Government thirty years to find out that the Mandate for Palestine was 'unworkable', after having created a problem in 1917 where none existed before, and after flooding the country with Jewish immigrants until they became strong enough to wrest the country from its original inhabitants; and then to wash its hands at this late hours and declare its unwillingness to enforce a solution, "not acceptable to both parties" under the pretext of conscience, does not speak well of either the British conscience or intelligence. Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest (New York, 1967), p. 77.

13. Text of the Proclamation in John Kinche, Seven Fallen Pillars (New York, 1953), pp. 227-8.
14. The United States in World Affairs 1948-49, p. 385; also The New York Times, 30 November 1947.

Israel a more solid position than was provided for by the partition, and to create a running sore in the heart of the Near East, British diplomacy had deliberately chosen to set the Egyptian bull against the Israeli 'muleta'. (19)

While all of these factors might have contributed in making Egypt's decision to join the Arab war against Israel, it is not doubtful that the absence of any or even all of them would have averted the war. During the last thirty years the whole question of Palestine had been so developed that recourse to arms was inevitable. The Palestinians had become more conscious of their national rights and were determined to protect these rights including that of self-determination. The Jews under the spell of Zionism, on the other hand, were seeking a national existence implying their resurgence as an independent political community within the same historical area.

The real issue was that the Jews wanted Palestine for themselves, although the country was already inhabited by Arabs. If the Jews were to achieve their ambitions, the Arabs would have to be either evicted or eliminated. In face of two such directly opposed objectives, neither side being prepared to consider any reduction of its demands, a reconciliation was unattainable.

The very logic of the unprecedented situation made it imperative for the native Arabs to protest and agitate against injustice. It was the Arabs whose land was being subjected to alien rule, whose culture and history was being suppressed, whose national identity and character was being undermined and, in fact, being replaced by another people, another culture which had nothing in common or even reconcilable with their own. The

19. Lacouture, op.cit., p. 102.

The British High Commissioner, General Cunningham, and Lt. General Macmillan, the British GOC in Palestine and a host of other senior officials left Palestine the same fateful day of 14 May, without delegating authority, assets and responsibilities to anybody. They virtually abandoned the country to its fate.

(Italics mine) The fight between the Arabs and the Zionists became more fierce to grab more of territory, buildings, stores and other assets. 'The remaining British forces stood by, intervening less and less frequently and less and less effectively, and preparing solely for their evacuation'. 'As they quitted police-posts, forts and strong-points there was usually a race between Jews and Arabs for their capture'. A senior British officer explained the policy by stating that

I have no desire whatever to involve my troops in these clashes (between Arabs and Jews). All I want is to secure the routes and sectors that I need to complete the British evacuation of Palestine. (15)

C. Egypt's Role in the Arabs' War Against Israel 1948-49

Prior to the formation of the League of Arab States Egypt neither had a particular desire of bothering about the affairs of other Arab countries nor she practically had any prospect of

-
15. Quoted in Walid Khalidi, "The Fall of Haifa", The Middle East Forum (Beirut), December 1959, p. 26.

In March 1948, Bevin had told the House of Commons that the aim of the Labour Government was to be rid of an incubus that was queering their relations with important allies. He said: "I do want to emphasize that we want to get into a position to enable us to get out of Palestine. That is the fundamental point of British Policy". H.C. Deb., 23 March 1948, vol. 448, cols. 2817-18.

having independent contacts with any or ~~either~~ of them, her foreign relations were controlled and guided by the British authority in Cairo in consultation with the Foreign Office in London. Some might have indeed felt strongly about the injustices being done to their fellow-Arab brothers in Palestine but they were helpless to do anything for them. They had their own problems of a continuing struggle for full freedom and national dignity. But now through her established position of leadership in the organization of the Arab States, she could deliberate with and influence other Arab leaders and the course of events in the common Arab affairs. It was under Egypt's influence and insistence that the Arab League had taken over the conduct of the Arab cause in Palestine. 'The headquarters of the Arab League being in Cairo, and Abdul Rehman Pasha Azzam, an Egyptian, being the permanent Secretary-General, the actions of the League at this time were very nearly those of Egypt'. (16)

Besides, there was now also present in Cairo the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husaini, (17) who equated Zionism with Western imperialism, and urged the Egyptians and all other Arabs to resist the implementation of the UN Resolution of November 1947. He explained to his listeners that "the United States was helping to create Israel ... not because of any

16. J.B. Glubb, Britain and the Arabs (London, 1959), p. 287.

17. The Grand Mufti had taken refuge in Germany during the war because the British were looking for him to put him behind the bars for his anti-Allied activities. He held the Germans in many ways. After their defeat he returned to Egypt and organized movements in support of the Jewish cause in Palestine.

interest in the homeless Jews but in order to get an imperialistic foothold in the Middle East". The Brotherhood gave the call of 'Jihad' and asked the Government to fight to protect and preserve the Islamic faith in Palestine. And thus they were able to transform the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine and particularly the support which the Western Powers gave the Partition Resolution at the UN into an Arab-Islamic Holy War against foreign domination and all those whom they disliked or distrusted. They worked diligently to excite their fellow-countrymen against the Jews of Palestine, against Great Britain that had created the troubles in Palestine in 1917 where none existed, against the United States which was trying to replace the British position in the Middle East by establishing her own economic and political hold, against the home-government that had failed at the UN, was undisguisedly inimical to the Ikhwan, and was feeling shy of facing the Zionists in battle.

The King supported the idea of military intervention not entirely because Haji Husaini's influence and persuasion but also because the declaration of war was likely to restore his shattered prestige, (18) and give him more authority to suppress his enemies and enable him to win new supporters and admirers. There were also some private individuals, traders and industrialists who had certain well calculated economic and commercial interests in pushing Egypt into a war with Israel. Some of them were to

18. In February 1948 Faruk was jeered at in public for the first time. All sorts of stories were being circulated about his personal life; his love of wine, women and gambling had made him quite unpopular. See Lacouture, op.cit., p. 101.

make real fortunes out of numerous military purchases. There were people who had good connections inside the palace and could convince the King that by declaring war against Israel, he had everything to gain, nothing to lose.

The Government headed by Nokrashi Pasha was already weakened by its failure at the UN and was being openly criticized and condemned by the Opposition. The Brotherhood was blunt and outspoken in its criticism of the Government and the Prime Minister in particular. In these circumstances, the Palestine crisis presented a situation to divert the attention of the embittered masses and silence opposition by imposing Martial Law in the country.

There is, however, another view which suggests that the British had purposely created a situation of tussle in Palestine by leaving Palestine abruptly. They were now seriously worried about retaining their possession of the Suez Canal, and so needed an issue of this sort to distract Egypt from the Suez problem'.

Nothing is so monotonous or irritating as the constant search, in the Middle East affairs, for the 'hand of Britain'. But in this case everything falls into place with remarkable ease. ... It was the British Government which, from 1917 Balfour Declaration down to the hasty evacuation in May 1948, ensured the birth of Israel in spite of pro-Arab sympathies in the Foreign Office. It is the same Government which in 1943 entrusted Nahas Pasha's Cabinet with founding the Arab League, in spite of suggestions put forward earlier by the very devoted and intelligent Nuri Sa'id. Finally, it was the same government which fixed the hour and day of the intervention, pressing on with the evacuation so urgently that neither the Arabs who favoured compromise - such as Abdullah of Jordan - nor the British experts such as General Spears who favoured the Arabs, were listened to while they advised caution and stressed the risks of the undertaking. Everything happened as though in order to distract Egypt from the Suez problem, to give ~~brail~~

Zionists too were aware of the inherent irreconcilability of their claims and contentions with the existing majority of Arabs. As such no amount of persuasion and promise of better economic future which would be the result of Jewish enterprise, skill and experience, would appeal to them. No self-respecting nation could accept economic benefits at the cost of its national dignity and identity.

Even at that late stage the Arabs were prepared to accept the Jews already in Palestine, (20) on the condition that further immigration stopped and that independence and a democratic constitution, guaranteeing political equality and decisions by majority, be accepted. This was obviously and totally unacceptable to the Zionists who had taken a pledge at Baltimore, USA, in 1942 to create a Jewish State. 'Jewishness' was in fact the romance and the sole justification of their demand for a state in Palestine.

The Arab rebellion of 1936 had convinced them that the ultimate issue would be decided by force. They had foreseen the British evacuation of Palestine and the struggle with the Arabs, and therefore had already started 'studying methods to be adopted for the physical eviction of the Arabs from Palestine. (21) 'During the last war, a Jewish brigade had been formed and had

20. In mid-May 1948 the total population of Palestine was 2,065,000 of which 1,415,000 were Arabs and 650,000 were Jews. See, UN Document A/364, vol. I, Ch. IV, p. 54. See also, Israel Government, Yearbook 1950 (Tel Aviv), p. 339.

21. J.B. Glubb, Britain and the Arabs 1908-1958 (London, 1959), pp. 282-3.

been trained by the British. It went into Europe and fought in the final stages of the Italian campaign. It had therefore obviously been trained to a level of efficiency comparable to that of European armies. In addition, when it was thought that the Germans might occupy Palestine, other Jews had been trained by the British in guerrilla tactics. Many thousands of Jews who had served as officers or soldiers in different armies during the Second World War had arrived in Palestine by 1948. With this material the Jews had built up the Hagana, into reasonable troops. In addition great quantities of arms had been smuggled into the country or stolen from the British Army, and large secret arsenals of weapons were located underground in the Jewish colonies. (22) In the words of Lacouture:

Fierce exchanges between the Mufti of Jerusalem and heads of different Arab Governments; terrorism on the part of Irgun; rivalry between Egypt and Iraq; the conclusions of the Anglo-American Committee in favour of another 100,000 Jews being allowed to immigrate into Palestine; the Secretary-General of the UNO's undisguised sympathy for Zionism; the last-minute change in the demarcation of frontiers to the detriment of the Arabs - everything seemed to encourage the Arabs in the direction of violence, especially as events were being directed by cleverer men than themselves. (23)

Egypt being a founder-member of the Arab League and being its leader was honour bound to defend the cause of Palestine. The partition of Palestine was a staggering blow to her prestige and therefore, a challenge to undo what the Zionists and their new patrons - the Americans - had achieved. And so, on 15 May

22. Ibid., p. 287. See also John Connell, op.cit., p. 9.

23. Lacouture, op.cit., pp. 101-2.

she sent her regular armies into Palestine to forestall the establishment of an Israeli State. Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan also rushed volunteers to Palestine to reinforce their brother in their struggle against the partition. It seemed that they had temporarily sunken their mutual differences, rivalries and fears, (24) to the extent of agreeing on a joint armed intervention against the Zionists.

-
24. The members of the League differed widely in culture and outlook. Each of them wished to enlarge its territory, power and position. Each of them was jealous and suspicious of the other. Each of them desired and made efforts to use the slogan of greater Arab unity to its own advantage by proposing to achieve this aim by conquering its neighbours and annexing them to itself. This mentality served to keep them all in a constant state of fear and anxiety.

As a result of this approach to the ideal of unity, Lebanon lived in a fear of annexation by Syria, while the latter was apprehensive of attack by Iraq. The increasing fame of the Arab Legion, the army of Jordan gave Syria further cause for apprehension. Amir Abdullah, after the withdrawal of France from Syria, seriously toyed with the idea of using force, but was strongly dissuaded by Britain. After Syria became an independent republic, Abdullah sought Syrio-Transjordan unity with himself ruler of both. Syria, on the other hand, wanted this unity on the condition that the President of Syria became the head of the enlarged state.

The Arabian Peninsula was still divided by dynastic hostility between the Sherifian and Saud families. Syrian fears of Iraq and Trans-Jordan resulted in a drawing together of Syria and Saudi Arabia.

Ibn Saud had serious apprehensions about Egypt's motives in creating a League of Arab States, which later were dispelled by a meeting with King Faruk of Egypt.

While Egypt was in favour of complete Arab unity, she desired it under her suzerainty. She therefore did not wish any other Arab governments to combine, lest, in doing so, they produce a new country equal in power to Egypt. Particularly was she afraid of a union of the Fertile Crescent; that is, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. If these four countries were to unite, they would produce a new State as influential as Egypt. The latter, therefore, endeavoured to keep them apart by creating mistrust between Syria and Iraq.

In this battle, Egypt as was expected, played an important role. For her the existence of an enemy state right across her borders was too big a danger to her security and a threat to her economy and political institutions. At first things went well for the Arabs. The Egyptian army advanced easily into the parts of Palestine awarded to the Arabs by the partition plan: (25) the South-West Negeb, the coastal plain through Gaza to Magdal and beyond. But then by a combination of terrorism (as at Deir Yasin, where 250 Arab villagers were murdered), of military dash and skilful utilisation of truces, the Jews had consolidated their grip on a far larger area of the country than they had been awarded.

At this state of serious reverses, Britain tried to restrain further Jewish advances as they were obliged to defend Egypt under the 1936 Treaty obligations. (26) But the Egyptians preferred to negotiate an armistice with Israel (27) rather than invoke the support of the British garrison in the Canal Zone under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and thereby perpetuate its continuity which was an abnoxious symbol of the incompleteness of their independence.

25. The United States in World Affairs 1948-49 (Council of Foreign Relations, N.Y., 1949), p. 387.

26. See, The Middle East Journal, vol. 4, 1950, No. 2, pp. 143-54.

27. Egypt signed an individual Armistice with Israel at Rhodes, on 24 February 1949. Text of the Armistice in UN Security Council Official Records, Sp. Supp., No. 3.

The conclusion of an Armistice with Israel, instead of a 'Peace Treaty' shows that Egypt did not accept these setbacks as her defeat. She only needed some time to prepare herself for a final struggle to liquidate Israel. (28) The Armistice enabled her to maintain a state of technical belligerency against Israel, to invoke economic boycott and blockade of passage through her territories and waters; to refuse recognition and to withhold the right of refusing exchange of legation with the enemy state.

D. Causes of the Arabs' Defeat

The Egyptians and other Arabs had plunged into the war mainly on the strength of emotional fervour and sentiments. Their preparations were far from being adequate. Numerically also the proportion of trained personnel was not imposing. Against a total of 65,000 better equipped and enthusiastic Zionists who fully understood the purpose they were fighting for, the Arabs had been able to muster only 21,500 ill-armed, ill-trained and unwilling and ignorant soldiers. (29) Comparatively, most prepared for war

-
28. Article 5 of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice signed on 24 February 1949, stated that the line demarcated in Articles 6-7 was "delineated in pursuance of the purpose and intent of the Security Council resolution of Nov. 4 and Nov. 16, 1948" was "not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary", and was delineated "without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of either party to the armistice as regards the ultimate settlement of the Palestine question." The basic purpose of the demarcation line was "to delimit the line beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shall not name."
29. Nasser's biographer, Robert St. John gave the following account of how Nasser felt disgusted and disappointed when he incidentally picked a soldier of his own battalion, during one of the cease-fires, just to find out whether his men understood what the war was all about, and found that he

(contd. on next page)

was the Arab Legion of King Abdullah of Jordan, but even his army consisted of only four infantry battalion and one recently formed battery of field artillery, together with an improvised 'home-guard' that was seriously under-equipped in many important respects. It had received from Britain six Twenty-five Pound guns a few months before, but its gunners had had only three months training and the Zionists for their part had manufactured large numbers of mortars and were skilful in their use; the Legion's fifty British armoured cars, though obsolete by British standards in 1941, were superior in quality but were greatly outnumbered by the eight hundred home-made armoured cars of the Zionists. (30)

The root cause of the Arabs' defeat, however, was the absence of adequate cooperative planning of the campaign by Arab States which in turn had been due to insufficient mutual trust and confidence. Secondly, whereas the Jews were struggling for

29. (contd. from back page)

had just no idea. The soldier even did not know whether he was in the battlefield or in the training right. Following few dialogues were exchanged between Major Nasser and his soldier:

Major Nasser: 'What are we doing here?'

The soldier: 'We are on manoeuvres, Sir.'

Major: 'Manoeuvres? where?'

Soldier: 'At El-Rebeki Sir'.

Nasser looked at the soldier, a Fellah from Upper Egypt incredulously. El-Reheki was on the road running from Cairo across the desert to Suez, hundreds of miles away. It was where the Egyptian Army used to hold its annual manoeuvres. See, The Boss (London, 1960), p. 65; also, Richard Hilton, Thirteenth Power (London, 1958), p. 106.

30. Survey of International Affairs 1945-50 (RIIA, 1954), p. 270.

their very existence, many of the Arab troops had 'little stomach' for the war. Moreover, whereas the Jews conducted the war with a coordinated organization, a unified and total conscription, the Arabs betrayed disunity, diversity of plans, improvisation, and, above all, slackness and lack of seriousness about winning the war. Musa-Alawi, a fairly well-known Arab writer, remarks that "in face of their enemy, the Arabs were not a state but petty states, groups, not a nation, each fearing and watching the other and intriguing against it. What concerned them most and guided their policy was not to win the war and save Palestine from their enemy, but what would happen after the struggle, who would be dominant in Palestine or would annex it to themselves." (31)

This attitude owed not a little to their illusions about their capability to easily uproot the new political entity. 'Abd ur Rehman 'Azzam, the Egyptian Secretary-General of the Arab League, thought that 'the strategic and technical position of the Arab Forces was particularly favourable ... so that they would have no great difficulty in bringing about a military decision to their advantage in a very short time'. (32) The Egyptian Prime Minister also seemed to have no doubt about the defeat of Israel. While asking the Senate's approval for the invasion of Palestine, the Egyptian Premier hoped that 'the war would last no more than two weeks before the Zionists were defeated.' (33)

31. Musa Alami, "Lessons of Palestine", The Middle East Journal, October 1949, p. 381.

32. Folk Bernadotte, To Jerusalem (London, 1951), p. 34.

33. John Kimche, op.cit., p. 199.

The Arabs thus being over-confident were mainly concerned about making the most for themselves out of the episode. That King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan intended to "annex to his kingdom as much of Palestine as he could occupy" was not a secret. He was even prepared to make some compromise with the Zionists over the division of Palestine territory. (34) President Nasser also said once that the Arabs were defeated because they were "several armies". "Had the Army been one, Palestine would have been saved." (35)

Other important factors were shortage of war material and stoppage of supplies of arms by UK in accordance with the UN request, (36) while Israel had been reinforcements in arms and volunteers from abroad, (37) mainly from Czechoslovakia. (38)

34. Marlowe, op.cit., p. 327.

Adjudged as traitor to Pan-Arabism he was done to death on the 20th July 1951 reportedly by a Cairo fanatic in the al-Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem. The Jordanian Court which sat in judgement on the crime found that a nephew and intimate counsellor of the Grand Mufti, al Hussaini, was one of the principal instigators and sentenced him to death. Sir Pierre Randot, The Changing Pattern of the Middle East 1919-1958 (London, 1961), p. 133.

35. President Nasser's Speeches (Director of Information, Cairo, 1958), p. 72.

36. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 451, cols. 187-8. See also UN Security Council Official Records, 3rd year, No. 76, pp. 6-9; also Document S/801.

37. George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (London, 1955), p. 223.

38. Marlowe, op.cit., pp. 350, 353. See also J.B. Glubb, op.cit., p. 289.

E. Impact of the War on Egypt's National Affairs -
Bid to Resolve Disputes with Britain

The Government of Egypt which was much more deeply committed over Palestine for reasons of her geographic proximity and political realities, and which unlike Jordan had not gained anything from the Palestine campaign (39) with which to appease public opinion, found itself faced with a dangerous domestic situation. The already discontented middle class found in this defeat an evidence of Government's weakness, corruption and misjudgement.

Their humiliating defeat in Palestine had a profound and immediate effect on Egypt's public life. Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha's efforts to conceal from public the disastrous course of the war had failed. They came to know about the inefficiency, corruption and cowardice in high places, which caused their showdown. (40) The shocking stories of misappropriation of war

39. Judea, Samaria and Hebson which included the old city of Jerusalem and other important towns like Nablus, Jericho, Lydda and Hebson, were held from 1949 onwards by the Arab Legion until they were captured by the Israelis in 1967 campaign. See map. For detailed account of the war, loss and gains on both sides from 15 May 1948 to March 1949 when the final armistice was concluded. See Survey, op.cit., pp. 270-94.

40. Nasser made an entry in his diary as to why the Ninth Egyptian Battalion was defeated: "The Commander of the battalion was on leave. The next in command was hit by a splinter and died immediately. The third in command took a car and fled with it, stopping only when he reached Ismailia on the Canal. The fourth in command left the battalion to go to General Headquarters." See Robert St. John, The Boss (London, 1960), p. 73. See also Peter Mansfield, Nasser (London, 1969), p. 42.

About corruption and bungling in the supplies of arms, medicines and general stores, official investigations revealed that a good number of people connected with the

(contd. on next page)

funds, of stealing of military stores and the neglect of the wounded (41) disgusted them with the Government and the King, who, in their opinion, intended to use the war to eliminate opposition and 'rule with an iron hand'. (42)

Frustration, humiliation and anger caused the outbreak of violence and destruction. Many ardent spirits desired to overthrow the entire political set-up that proved to be so incompetent to upkeep the nation's prestige and safeguard its territorial and ethnical integrity.

The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan ul Muslemin) who enjoyed great popularity and prestige with the general masses for her enthusiasm and record of personal service in the fight against Israel, was most active in the anti-Government and anti-West campaign.

40. (contd. from back page)

Palace were involved. Prince Abbas Halim, a cousin to the King was also accused of pocketing nearly half a million dollars of secret government funds given to him to cover his expenses on a trip abroad to obtain arms. Another person confident of the King who was reported to have collected several million dollars in bribes from munitions men who had been supplying Egypt with expensive, albeit defective, arms; that exploded on the face of the soldier. See, R.S. John, op.cit., p. 98.

41. Writing about the seige of Faluja, Nasser described the scene of war and the plight of his soldiers thus: 'Air raids were launched on our positions, forcefully and numerously. Our own air force disappeared completely. We never saw any of our Planes. Enemy artillery began throwing fire our heads, never keeping quiet for a moment. What bothered most was the number of casualties in our forces. The existence of the wounded in our midst was a tax on our nerves.'
42. Tom Little, op.cit., pp. 177-78. See also Mansfield, op.cit., pp. 42-3.

The lamentations of the Moslem Brotherhood were tinged with a sense of triumph, for some of its phalaxes had been sent to the front as volunteers and had so distinguished themselves by their fighting spirit that in this period, darkened by inefficiency, treachery and defeat, they shone like a beacon light of Pan-Arab patriotism. Thousands of people flocked to join the movement, until it was able to boost by 2,000,000 members. (43)

The news of the conclusion of the first Armistice at the end of a month's fighting was strange and upsetting for many people in Cairo. From the very first day of the outbreak of fighting, the Egyptians were being told through official announcements and press-release that their armies were marching ahead successfully and that very soon they will wipe out the enemy; victory was sure and they should prepare to welcome their brave soldiers when they return home 'after obliterating the State of Israel'. (44)

During the previous month's fighting, the press in Egypt and other Arab countries had created a world of fantasy by daily reporting an unbroken succession of victories. As a result, the public, especially in Egypt, were surprised and annoyed at the conclusion of the armistice, when everyday the press (and the radio) was describing more and more glorious success. The Politicians were criticised for agreeing to the truce, and accordingly decided to terminate it, regardless of whether such a course would, or would not, lead to ultimate victory. (45)

-
43. Tom Little, op.cit., p. 103. See also Christina Phelps Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (London, 1954), pp. 177-94.
44. Nasser's biographer, Robert St. John whose authenticity and accuracy of information has been confirmed by President Nasser himself and scores of other Egyptian officials, scholars and prominent journalists, tells us that Nasser was exasperated that the people were being told lies about the state of war. He records how Nasser felt when he heard that King Faruk had ordered the construction of a new boulevard between Cairo and Helipolis down which the victory parade would pass on the day the Egyptian Army returned home. This was misleading the people. The soldiers were nowhere near victory. The Boss, pp. 70, 73-74.
45. J.B. Glubb, Britain and the Arabs (London, 1959), p. 288.

Though the second round of the fighting had begun, it was no longer possible for the Government to persuade its people to have hope about its outcome and about its own competence to handle the problems of war and improve administration at home. Despite emergency regulation being in force, the opposition organized protest rallies, shouting slogans against the Government and against the West. During June and July a series of riots and attacks on foreigners and Jews occurred in Cairo and Alexandria. There was considerable loss of life and property. In one case on 20 June several Englishmen and Jews were killed when some houses were blown up. Among buildings and property destroyed by explosions were the premises of the two British and French newspapers on 12 November. The authorities had long known that the Moslem Brotherhood was playing a leading part in this, and on 20 November, when they discovered a large store of arms and explosives together with literature belonging to that body, they had in their hands ample evidence to prove its complicity. Matters were brought to a head by the death of the Police Commandant in serious riots in Cairo on 4 December, (46) and the Prime Minister, who now had proof of the Brotherhood's responsi-

-
46. Selim Zaki Pasha, Commandant of the Cairo City Police, was killed on 4 December 1948 when police were despatched to the King Fuad University to quell violent demonstrations by medical students, said to have been fomented by the Moslem Brotherhood. The students had been on strike for several days in protest against the refusal of the Governor-General of the Sudan to admit a party of Egyptian Lawyers into the Sudan, and following the expulsion of some of the students' leaders by the University authorities, professors' rooms had been wrecked, laboratories destroyed, and anti-Government demonstrations staged. The police called in to restore order, were met with grenades, one of which killed Zaki Pasha. Al-Ahram, 5 December 1948.

bility for the outrage, dissolved it by proclamation on 8 December and ordered the confiscation of all its property. He justified this in a statement declaring that it had been training youths for terrorist activities, extorting money by violence or threats, and inciting irresponsible elements of the population to create disturbances. Its definite avowed aim, as shown by the evidence in his hands, was the overthrow of the Government. (47)

Following his order of dissolution Nokrashi Pasha sealed its offices, arrested its prominent members and supporters and banned students' participation in political demonstrations. (48)

The Ikhwan already had an account to settle with the Prime Minister who publicly accused them of responsibility for his predecessor's murder and had been their 'staunchest enemy' since then. Now these repressive measures were, in their view, too much to go unanswered. Their answer came twenty days after the dissolution of their organization was announced. One of their student members, disguised as a police officer, shot and killed him as he was going up to his office in the Ministry of Interior. (49)

47. Annual Register 1948, p. 299. See also Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 366; also Information Paper No.19, op.cit., p. 117.

48. Al-Ahram, 15 December 1949; Egyptian Gazette, 15 December 1949.

49. The Middle East Journal, vol. 3, April 1949, No.2, p. 183. See also Maurice Harari, Government and Politics in the Middle East (New Jersey, 1962), p. 65.

His successor, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi, also belonging to the Saadist Party, however, did not allow the extremists and other trouble-makers to influence or to determine Egypt's domestic and foreign policy issues. He had assumed the office of the Prime Minister at a very critical moment in his country's political history. On the Palestinian front, his armies had suffered serious losses and the conclusion of a cease-fire for an unspecified period was imminent; in the Sudan the demand for self-government and an end of the Condominium was becoming violent and widespread; on the issue of the Treaty revision, though he was firm on evacuation, but he also realized the difficulties in securing it immediately because of the new international power-alliance; the suggestions to raise Egypt's status in the Suez Canal managing board, were reasonably attractive, but they needed personal boldness and the King's support.

In all these matters, Premier Hadi took some of the most determined steps. He first paid attention to the question of law and order without which stability of administration was not guaranteed. Continuation of ban on extremist groups and extension of the Martial Law were approved by the Parliament on 3 May. (50) This enabled him to deal firmly with all persons and parties involved in subversive activities. The Brotherhood, for example, ostensibly founded in 1930 for the propagation of religious and

50. The Egyptian Parliament, in view of the public order and security conditions in the country, approved on 15 May 1949 the government's request for the extension of Martial Law for another year. Al-Ahram, 4 May 1949; The Egyptian Gazette, 4, 5 May 1949.

social ideals, had become an organization whose real aim was the seizure of political power by removing the unpopular King and the existing so-called western-oriented secular leadership. They desired to establish an orthodox order based on the teachings of Islam in their original sense. (51)

The Communists collaborated with them only to exploit the state of chaos and uneasiness to their advantage. Neither of the two extremist parties, however, suited the Egyptian temper and political climate. Their most immediate need was a stable and honest government, not the search for an ideological basis.

-
51. The real power of the Brotherhood ideology lay in its criticism of Egyptian society. Western influence was attacked. The corruption in Parliamentary life and the palace was ridiculed. The society called for a new sense of unity based on Islamic principles and designed to rid the country of Western rule and influence. There was considered social content in the programme of the Brotherhood, for they favoured cooperative organizations, the founding of local industries, the better division of wealth, and education for the mass of population.

Their programme, on the whole, was a mixture of reactionary and progressive elements. Their ultimate goal was the creation of an Islamic order dominated by the religious law, purged of its impured elements. Hasan al-Banna, the founder, regarded class antagonism as a sign of the breakdown of Islamic unity. He favoured the abolition of usury, nationalization of natural resources, expulsion of foreign capital, and promotion of harmonious labour - management relations within an Islamic framework. On other important issues of modernity, such as the status of women, the use of Arabic in schools in place of European languages, and the teaching of Western sciences, the Moslem Brotherhood tended to be more conservative than others.

See, Hisham B. Sharabi, Government and Politics in the Middle East (London, 1964), p. 111; also Peter O. Collins and Robert L. Tignor, Egypt and the Sudan (New Jersey, 1967), p. 101. See also, Franz Rozenthal, "The Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt", Moslem World, vol. XXXVII, 1947, pp. 278-91.

Ibrahim Abdul Hadi's action against both the extreme leftists and the extreme rightists was the necessity of the time. He tightened the policy of suppression and swooped the Ikhwan and the Communists behind the bars. (52) There is, however, no conclusive evidence that his stringent and repressive policy included the murder of the Ikhwan's chief, Sheik Hasan al-Banna (53) on 13 February 1949. Nevertheless it appeared to be a state murder through the machination of the counter-terrorist movement
/organized by the Palace. (54)

52. Al-Ahram, 21 March 1949.

53. Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Moslem Brotherhood, was a devout Muslim who had been educated in Muslim schools and then at Dar-al-Ulum, the teachers' training school, for Arabic and Islamic subjects only. In a certain sense he was the spokesman of those like him who had little or no specialized Western training but who were eager to recapture their place of prestige in a changing Egyptian society. He disliked Western influence in Egypt. He was specially appalled at the degree of Westernization of Cairo and the decline of Islamic values among its educated citizens. Urban centres like Cairo and Alexandria, where Western influence was so strong, were always special objects of attack by the Moslem Brothers.

At Ismailia, where he worked as a teacher he felt the full force of Europe's position in Egypt. Being a Canal city, there was a large number of British soldiers and officers, their money and pleasure-seeking habits had largely spoiled the life of that city and which affected al-Banna's mind and thoughts.

54. Tom Little, op.cit., p. 178. See also St. John, op.cit., p. 89.

It is quite understandable that the King who was so anxious to get rid of his enemies, had patronized the activities of such an organization of professional bad characters.

Thus, by resorting to repressive methods, Hadi, though temporarily successful in restoring tranquillity in the country, he could not completely suppress the opposition. They acquired new names and adopted new methods of opposing the Government. Financial difficulties, initially caused by the Palestine war expenditure and borrowing from abroad, led to deficit budgeting. His proposals for new taxes were opposed by the landed aristocracy (55) which dominated the two houses of the Parliament. Spiralling up of prices of essential commodities like wheat and paraffin added to the dissatisfaction of the people with the Government.

The King was also now becoming apprehensive of his Prime Minister's intention to look into the matters of the Palace and the people closely connected with the King. (56)

The Wafd, which had during this intervening period consolidated its strength, organization and contacts with the people, now felt particularly confident of its prospects of winning the polls. The ban on Brotherhood and the Communists further

-
55. Prior to the land reforms undertaken by the revolutionary government of Abdel Nasser (Egypt had not become a republic till then), there was a wealthy landowning class, privileged, under-taxed, dominating the two Houses of Parliament, was, with their professional and official associates and hangers-on, owned nearly all the wealth and exercised nearly all the influence and patronage in the country. There was a small class of industrialists and financiers, mostly of foreign extraction, wealthy but less influential politically and socially than the landowners. See, Marlowe, op.cit., p.354.
56. Mohammed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (London, 1955), p. 15; also Rasheed el-Barawy, The Military Coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1952), pp. 161-3.

bettered her chances of success. Nahas Pasha, therefore, demanded that a new government should be formed to lead the country to solve its major national and international matters, a government that enjoyed people's support and commanded wider respect. (57)

In the army, a certain group of young officers, all between late twenties and early thirties, who called themselves Free Officers, also entertained serious doubts about the fair management of public affairs and particularly the conduct of war by the politicians, wished to a change in their country's political life and destiny. But they were working and aspiring to play a political role in the transformation of their country, secretly. The Prime Minister had some doubts about certain officers' underground activities but he could not extort any information even from a direct and personal interrogation of the key person of the Free Officers' Organization, Major Abdel Nasser. (58)

57. The Middle East Journal, vol. 3, April 1949, No.2, p. 185. See also Tom Little, op.cit., p. 104.

58. In May 1949, the Prime Minister sent for Major Nasser for questioning as he suspected some relationship between the Moslem Brotherhood and the clandestine movement in the army. Nasser's biographer, Robert St. John (p.91) describes the scene of interview as follows:

The Chief of Secret Police who sat beside the Prime Minister:

"We have information that you have formed a secret society".

Nasser shook his head: "We know that you are training your members for armed rebellion."

"How can possibly be true", Nasser asked. "I went to Palestine more than a year ago. I have been back for only a few weeks."

(contd. on next page)

After this historic interview, the Free Officers became more cautious and more secretive, but they continued their campaign against corruption and highhandedness in the administration of civil and military affairs by publishing and circulating pamphlets secretly. (59)

Ruling with a firm hand nonetheless enabled Prime Minister Hadi to restore the authority of the Government. Suppression of the Brotherhood and the Young Egypt Society considerably ended disorders in the country for a good many months "a fact which justified the view that they were behind most of the troubles in the post-war period." (

58. (contd. from back page)

"Do you know Mahmoud Labbib?"

Nasser hesitated. Labbib was an officer of the Brotherhood who had charge of initiating Free Officers desiring to take the Brotherhood vows.

"Yes".

"How do you know him?"

"We worked together organizing the Arabs of Palestine".

"Who introduced you to him?"

Nasser hesitated again. It was Sadar or Raouf. But rather than mention the names of any Free Officers, he said, "Captain Anwar el Seyani".

"His address?"

"You will have to ask Allah. He died during the war."

The Prime Minister lost his temper while Gamal remained calmly smiling. "You are making a fun of me. I could hand you over to the Police. Do you understand what I mean by Police?"

"Yes, I know, I know very well."

But the Prime Minister had no proof whatever.

See, "Gamal Abdul Nasser", Al-Musawwar (Biographical edition, Cairo, 1958), p. 71.

59. El-Barawy, op.cit., pp. 207-210.

He had undertaken no social reforms, but he had restored conditions in which the introduction of social reforms became possible. His methods had not been in accordance with the recognized methods of democracy, but he made the practice of democracy possible for his successors. (60)

EGYPT'S ENHANCED POSITION IN THE
SUEZ CANAL BOARD

In the calm won by repression, and before his exit from the turbulent scene of national politics, Ibrahim Abdul Hadi Pasha had successfully concluded in March an agreement with the Suez Canal Company making Egypt a "privileged partner". The new agreement which brought some benefits to Egypt in fact represented a compromise between the provisions of Egyptian Law regarding the Egyptian share in the management of the Company and its distributed profits and the views of the Board. Following were its main provisions:

1. The Egyptian Government will receive 7 per cent of the annual gross profits of the Company, with a guaranteed minimum of £E 350,000 annually.
2. Egypt is granted 5 additional seats on the Board of Directors bringing her total to seven. (Total members being 32).
3. Foreign employees will be replaced by Egyptians according to the proportion prescribed by the Egyptian Law.
4. Foreign pilots will be gradually replaced by Egyptian nationals who have graduated from the Egyptian Naval School.
5. The Company will appoint 50 Egyptian experts and civil servants; will establish a proportion of 4 Egyptians to 1 foreigner on its technical staff and of 9 Egyptians to 1 foreigner as regards its administrative personnel; and engage 20 more Egyptian pilots. There will be no dismissal or hinderance to promotion of present personnel.

6. All vessels displacing under 300 tonnes will be exempted from Canal dues (benefiting essential local Egyptian traffic in small vessels).
7. Large-scale construction schemes will be undertaken by the Company, £E 4,500,000 being earmarked for this purpose. A 6-mile Canal will be constructed parallel to the main canal, a workers' centre will be built.
8. A municipality will be established at Ismailia by the Egyptian Government, will take over the Abbasiya Canal, supplying drinkable water to the town.
9. The Company will waive repayment of a loan of £E 100,000 granted to the Port Said Municipality for city development. (61)

The terms of the agreement were not only of considerable immediate advantage to Egypt, but that also greatly helped President Gamal Abdul Nasser in making his bold and epochmaking decision to completely take over the Canal in July 1956. If the number of Egyptian technicians, pilots and administrative personnel had not been what it was provided under the 7 March 1949 Agreement, Nasser in all probability, would not have thought of taking such a challenging step and risk his own political career and the continuance of the revolutionary regime. In the intervening period of nearly seven years the Egyptians had become quite sufficient to handle the canal affairs satisfactorily.

The British Government accepted Egypt's enhanced position in the Suez Canal Company mainly for two reasons. Firstly, because "the terms of the agreement in no way prejudiced the interests of His Majesty's Government either as the largest share-

-
61. The Agreement with the Suez Canal Company was ratified by King Faruk of Egypt on 19 August 1949 following its passage by the Egyptian Parliament. See The Egyptian Gazette, 20 August 1949.

holder in the Company or as the largest user of the Canal."

(62) Secondly, the British Government hoped that by encouraging the Egyptians in their aspirations would help create a better, somewhat more congenial atmosphere for negotiations on more significant and urgent issue of Egypt's participation in a Western sponsored defence alliance to replace the existing Treaty. Earlier, the Cairo correspondent of The Times had reported that Egypt was in a mood to respond to Britain's gestures of goodwill and amity towards her. In his 25th January despatch he said:

The Egyptians desire for settlement of Anglo-Egyptian differences is now growingly apparent. The Palestine futility is restoring the innate sanity of the Egyptian people where Britain is concerned. ... The extremists have been listened to in the past, and Egypt has paid heavily in men and money. A revulsion is starting, and the wind is setting fair for settlement. The remaining obstacles are what they have long been. ...

Egypt's willingness to improve her relations with Britain was further reciprocated by the UK Government by signing with her a financial agreement on 31 March. It provided for an immediate release of £12 million from Egypt's pre-July 1947 sterling balances and for further releases, up to £18 million, as might be necessary to maintain the total of Egypt's balances on No. 1 account at £45 million. Britain was also to provide Egypt with £5 million in dollars, and it was agreed that the level of UK exports to Egypt might be £47 million in value or even higher.

After almost two weeks Egypt signed another agreement with Great Britain of which certain provisions were of great political significance in later developments of relations between the ^{two} countries. On 17 April the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom agreed upon Egypt's participation in the construction of a dam and hydro-electric Power station at Oswan Falls in Uganda, the outflow of the river Nile from Lake Victoria as part of a twenty-five schemes for the regulation of the White Nile. The project in which Egypt's initial contribution - an investment indeed, was to be £E 4½ million, was of great importance for the future development and prosperity of Egypt, the Sudan and Uganda as a whole. (63)

The British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin felt happy to inform the House of Commons that the Sudan would be a partner in the implementation of the project. Speaking on this aspect of the agreement, Bevin said:

I am happy to inform that the Egyptian Government have announced that they would welcome the participation of the Sudan in these projects for the control of the Hill which are now under consideration. The participation of the Sudan in these projects will be the subject of technical discussions between Egypt and the Sudan, the results of which will be embodied in agreements to be concluded in connection with these projects. (64)

Members of HM Government and the Opposition welcomed the statement as it suggested implied recognition of the Sudan's own identity. (65)

63. Al-Ahram, 11, 12 February 1949, also 20 April 1949.

64. H.C. Deb., vol. 405, cols. 617-21. See also Al-Ahram, 20 May 1949.

65. Ibid.

It was in this atmosphere of accommodation and better understanding, exhibited by Ibrahim Hadi's Government that Britain's Chief of Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir William Slim, and Sir William Strang, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, separately visited Cairo to explore the chances of bringing Egypt into the network of military arrangements ostensibly for the containment of Communist advances into the Orient. (66) They, however, found despite Egypt's present Government's friendly gestures, it was not advisable to deal with an unpopular government with little chances of success in the forthcoming general elections in January 1950.

As a result of his too rigid legalistic mannerism, his strict rather harsh administrative methods, his forcible suppression of opposition, his policies of reforms and additional taxation and his determination to cleanse the Palace of corruption and the moral corruptors, made him the most unwanted man in every quarter of Egyptian society. His was not obviously the government which could speak for the country as a whole in any negotiations with Great Britain. Nevertheless, both Egypt and Great Britain were anxious to find a satisfactory formula for their continuing relations. Only a government in Egypt which could speak for all the major parties could probably enter confidently into long-term treaty commitments. (67) But 'such a

66. The Egyptian Gazette, 19 March 1949.

67. Cmd. 8419, p. 3. ~~See Appendix No.~~

Government had not existed since King Faruk summarily ousted the Wafdists - almost certainly the strongest political group in the country in October 1944.' (68)

68. Harold L. Hoskin, "The Guardianship of the Suez Canal", The Middle East Journal, vol. 4, April 1950, no. 2, p. 151.

Chapter IV

EGYPT'S BID TO SETTLE ITS DISPUTES WITH BRITAIN THROUGH PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS JUNE 1950 THROUGH OCTOBER 1951

A. THE WAFD RETURNS TO POWER

Under such circumstances of uncertainty and uneasiness prevailing throughout the country, Faruk, like Ismail Pasha, shrewdly made a virtue of the necessity by favouring the demand of a constitutional and representative Government. He knew very well that at the polls the Wafd's victory was a certainty 'because of its countrywide organization' and mass popularity. Why not, therefore, make an ally of the Wafd well in advance? An alliance with the Wafd would not only help him rebuild his reputation as an adherent of the Constitution and a supporter of the nationalist claims, but would also put an end to internal political strife. He feared that continuation of the existing chaotic conditions and ministerial instability might lead to a coup d'etat as the one that occurred in Syria under Colonel Zaim or like the one recently attempted in Lebanon. (1)

At this moment there was secret contact between the Palace clique and the Wafd by which the idea was elaborated that if the party abandoned its enmity for the King, the two could come together and govern the country, the King with his prerogatives supporting the popular force of the Wafd. (2)

-
1. "Developments of the Quarter", The Middle East Journal, vol. 3, October 1949, No.4, p. 442.
 2. "The Egyptian Imbroglia", Round Table, March 1952, p. 118. See also, Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London, 1967), p. 104.

The Wafd, already sick of violence and terrorism in the country and also anxious to come back into the limelight, did not fail to respond to the King's offer of reconciliation. (3) It agreed to join a coalition Government provided Ibrahim Abdul Hadi Pasha was replaced by a neutral Prime Minister. Accordingly, on 26 July, the King obtained resignation from Ibrahim Pasha and appointed in his place Hussain Sirry (4) to form a new government including members from all major political parties. (5)

Sirry Pasha's main task was to restore normalcy and prepare for General Elections. He released most of the political prisoners and promised to abolish Martial Law. He also announced that the national elections would be held early next year.

Polling took place on 3 January and resulted in the return of 228 Wafdists, 28 Saadists, 26 Liberal Constitutionalists, 30 Independents, 6 Watani or old Nationalists, and one Socialist.

-
3. It is interesting to note that the Wafd, smelling an imminent return to power, publicised the party's abhorrence of violence, and its opposition to Communism, its undying loyalty to the Crown, and its firm attachment to Islam. See Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 484, footnote 14.
 4. Hussain Sirry Pasha, the new Prime Minister, was a non-party man who had held the post from Fall 1941 to February 1942, when the Germans were threatening Egypt from Al-Alamain. Known for friendly feelings towards foreigners in general, he also had the respect of the political parties because of his independent position. See Al-Ahram, 26 July 1949.
 5. Al-Ahram, 27 July 1949; The Egyptian Gazette, 27, 28 July 1949. See also, Vatikiotis, op.cit., p. 484, footnote 14.

Several Independents later aligned themselves with the Wafd. (6) Thus assured of overwhelming support of the House and also the King's blessings, Nahas Pasha formed his Government on 12 January. (7)

6. Survey of International Affairs 1951 (RIIA, 1954), p.261; also Annual Register 1950, p. 294.

7. The Wafd success in the election was not wholly due to its well-knit electoral organization in the provinces and its vast financial resources, but also because of the support of the Brotherhood and the Communists who wanted to avenge the Saadists for their severe treatment of them from 1946 to 1949. Political neutrality of the Government under which the elections were held also contributed to the spectacular victory of the Wafd.

Rasheed al-Barawy, who wrote a very authentic account of Egypt's July Revolution, gave the following reasons for the Wafd's sweeping the polls:

1. The Sirry Government gave some support to the Wafd.
2. The Moslem Brotherhood members mostly gave their votes to the Wafd.
3. Vested interests also helped the Wafd because they resented certain laws issued by the Saadist Government.
4. The enquiries made by Mohamed Aly Rateb, Minister of Supply in the Sirry Cabinet, into certain irregularities alleged to have been perpetrated by some Saadist Ministers.
5. The belief that Britain welcomed the advent of a Wafdist Government.
6. The state of insecurity and concern which prevailed in foreign economic circles as a result of unrest in the country.
7. The fact that the police and provincial administration officials favoured the Wafdist candidates in most constituencies as a retaliatory measure against the Saadists.

(contd. on next page)

B. NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITAIN RESUMED

The return of the Wafd Party with a clear majority in the Parliament was welcomed by the British Government, its Embassy and the British community in Cairo. They recalled that between 1936 and 1942-4, the Wafd, of all the parties, had been most cooperatively inclined towards Britain. Now, with its enhanced power and prestige, it would be able to act independently and confidently to resume treaty negotiations. They hoped that Nahas Pasha would 'realistically' appreciate the new complex of the post-war international politics and Great Britain's predicament. They felt optimistic about the Wafd's response to their proposal regarding the defence of the Middle East. In their optimism and expectations, they under-estimated, rather ignored that the Wafd leaders during the pre-election period had repeatedly avowed their intent of insisting on the complete evacuation of Egyptian soil by British forces and of uniting Egypt and the Sudan. They presumed that such assertions might have been made to counter opposition charges of their (Wafdists) being ready to sell out to Britain. Later events, however, proved that the British leaders had not taken account of the consistency and the seriousness of Egypt's nationalist demands. During the past fifteen years the

7. (contd. from back page)

It must, however, be noted that less than two-third of the qualified voters exercised the right of franchise; out of 4,105,182 only 2,959,741 went to the polls. Moreover, the Wafd did not receive a majority of the total votes cast; 1,135,642 as against 1,724,098 polled by the opposition.

Egyptians had acquired more education, more political awareness of their national rights, and had become more disgusted with the limitations upon their freedom. In 1950, they were more than ever, insistent to settle their disputes with the British on the question of the Suez and the Sudan. They would not have allowed any leader or government to compromise on Egypt's national honour and aspirations.

Nahas Pasha, contrary to British expectations, was not blind to the facts of his own country's political history, and also the existing conditions in which his party was put in office. He was sincere and determined to free his country from the obligations and limitations of the 1936 Treaty, which he had himself negotiated and signed under the pressure of the then existing circumstances. He was anxious to do away with the stigma of being a pro-British in the 1940s.

In the 'Speech from the Throne' at the opening of Parliament his Government promised to do everything possible to hasten the evacuation of both parts of 'Our Valley, Egypt and the Sudan'. The King said:

... the nation had unanimously proclaimed the necessity for the liberation of our Valley, Egypt and the Sudan, from all fetters on its liberty and independence, and that the Government would make resolute and effective efforts to speed up the evacuation of both parts of the Nile Valley and protect its unity under the Egyptian Crown. (8)

-
8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Records of Conversations, Note And Papers Exchanged Between The Royal Egyptian Government And The United Kingdom (Cairo, 1951), p. 3. See also The Egyptian Gazette, 17 January 1950; Al-Ahram, 17 January 1950.

Conversations with Britain on these issues were in fact informally initiated at the end of January, when Bevin broke journey at Cairo on his way back from the Colombo Conference. (9) Formal negotiations, however, could not begin before June when Field Marshal Slim arrived in Cairo with his advisors. (10) In his very first meeting with the Egyptian Prime Minister and other members of the Government, Marshal Slim emphasised that the relations, political and military, between Egypt and Great Britain should be viewed as part of the larger question of the regional security of the Middle East in which Egypt, because of vital strategic location, and the Suez Canal, occupied key position.

This was obviously a bad start. It became clear from the very start of the negotiations that there would be little room for a compromise. There was in fact no meeting ground between the political approach of Egypt and the sole military consideration of its counterpart. The latter asked Egypt to appreciate the danger of aggression from the Russian side and, therefore, became a partner in their effort to defend themselves against such an eventuality.

In fact this was exactly the same line of argument against which Al-Ahram had already warned:

The British strategists have come out again with their old theories of the importance of the Middle East in any armed conflict with Russia, and they demand Britain should hold tight to its position in

9. Al-Ahram, 28, 29 January 1950.

10. The Egyptian Gazette, Al-Ahram, 4, 5 and 6 June 1950.

the Middle East. They also plead with the new rulers of Egypt to think likewise and take a more realistic view of the whole situation.

It is paramount to saying that the strategists have been interfering with the Treaty talks ever since 1930 and their views have never changed. They claim they are only concerned with the military side and have nothing to do with politics or the national aspirations of nations. Their thoughts are only centred on how to win a new war, forgetting that a friendly nation is a stronger bastion than a strategic position. ... Britain during the war found out that a friendly and faithful nation which joins the British Camp is more valuable than a strategic position surrounded by a hostile people. (11)

The British delegate tried to dispel, what some people would like to call 'misgivings' about the British intentions. He told the Egyptian Prime Minister that the proposed alliance did not suggest Britain's military occupation. It merely sought cooperation in peace-time with the British garrison in the Suez Canal zone in joint preparation for defence 'on a footing of equality'. (12) He urged the Egyptian leaders to see the merit of the 'offer' in the perspective of the existing tensions in world politics. He stressed that 'the Soviet Union expected war with the West (the Capitalist States) and that in the event of war Egypt would be one of the Russian objectives, since he who holds Egypt holds the Middle East', (13) its routes, waterways, strategic highlands and its fabulous riches. The Marshal warned that Russia seriously intended to get into Africa, and Egypt's neutrality would be violated the moment the war begins. Egypt,

11. Quoted in The Egyptian Gazette, 12 January 1950.

12. Conversations, op.cit., p. 12.

13. Ibid., p. 11.

he added, had 'neither men nor the experience' to defend herself against the avalanche of Soviet air attack

'The danger (of Russian invasion) is a real one'.
'If war comes, one of the Soviet interests is this country: Egypt. Egypt, in the Middle East, is like France and Belgium in Europe. If there is war in Europe, Belgium and France would be in it. Anyway, Egypt will be in war right from the beginning'.

'You say that by having British troops in Egypt, you attract the Russians to come and drive them out. What they want is Egypt. You are the country with wealth and resources. Anybody who wants to hold the Middle East, must hold Egypt. You have ports and everything, and will be the centre of target for Russia. Egypt cannot hold that by being neutral.

Field Marshal Slim further pointed out:

'Only two countries can remain neutral; either one so great and Powerful, and Egypt is not; or one that is small but possesses something useful for both sides, like Sweden, and Egypt is not.

You cannot remain neutral. If you want to defend yourself, you must be ready for defence. The only way is to have an Ally. Obviously, that Ally is Britain. (14)

C. THE PROPOSED ALLIANCE SUGGESTS CONTINUATION OF OCCUPATION OF EGYPT

The Egyptian leaders, however, did not accept the British point of view and the arguments based on it. Replying to Marshal Slim, Prime Minister Nahas Pasha said that the Egyptian people were angry and resentful and would be absolutely unwilling to accept new conditions, which aimed at maintaining foreign troops in Egypt under any name or in any form. "I can never be convinced, nor convince the people that the maintenance of a foreign army

14. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

in peace time means anything else but a sort of occupation and incomplete sovereignty".

The Prime Minister also reminded the Field Marshal how his Government and the people had cooperated with the Allied cause in the two World Wars:

The people were behind me, serving you and putting all their services at your disposal; they will help you with their hearts and souls as they did in the first World War. They gave you their crops and put their railways, means of communications and other services at your disposal, hoping for the fulfilment of the promises of evacuation and complete independence. But none was fulfilled. (15)

Nahas Pasha then said rather bluntly:

... why should we stand on your side, get ourselves killed, destroy our lands and lose our resources, if we do not know for sure that this third time our demands are satisfied. (16)

Commenting upon Marshal Slim's remark that Egypt would be the object of the Soviet attack, he said:

I like you to know that no power on earth can convince Egyptian people that Egypt will be meant for itself for attacks or aggression. What will cause this attack is the presence in our land of foreign troops which will be the target for Russian aggression. The presence of these troops will be the excuse which the Russians will make to attack Egypt. (17)

15. Conversations, op.cit., p. 13.

16. Ibid. Makram Ebied's organ, al-Kutla also disapproved the

17. British offer of an alliance for joint defence in the same manner. It wrote: "If we are courted as allies, we must first be shown wherein Egypt's interest in such an alliance lies - unless it is a question of involving her in a war in which Britain would be a combatant and Egypt would have no concern. We have already experienced that sort of alliance in the last war. We were ruined and starved to feed the Allied armies. We are still suffering many setbacks on account of that ally. Lord preserve us from such alliances". See, Information Paper No.19, op.cit., p. 121.

17. Conversations, op.cit., p. 13.

The Egyptian Government's attitude on the question of continued presence of the British troops was based, as the Prime Minister argued, on their previous experience. If the existence of a threat of war justified the maintenance of British troops in the Canal Zone, the occupation would last for ever, because the danger could never disappear.

This danger came in the past from Germany, then from Germany, Italy and Japan in the last war; it is said to come from Russia. In fact, it is a vicious circle. It will be always possible to say there exists a danger of war from one of the big powers. Therefore, Egyptians cannot accept the occupation of their country because of such an argument. (18)

Moreover, the people of Egypt regarded British occupation as a standing fact while the danger of Russian invasion was merely a matter of threat, and that too only from the Western point of view. It was not really easy or even desirable for any government in Egypt to convince the people that the continuation of the British occupation was necessary to repel that supposed danger. Nonetheless, the Government was prepared to discuss any plan of military cooperation provided evacuation of Egypt was preceded. With the British soldiers stationed within the country, the Egyptians could never believe that the proposed new alliance was different from the existing one. Many times in the past Britain had promised to evacuate Egypt. (Foreign Secretary Bevin had agreed with Sidki Pasha on complete withdrawal of British forces by September 1949.) But they continued to be stationed there on some excuse or other. This had weakened the Egyptians'

18. Ibid., p. 18.

faith and confidence in their promises, that the British troops would leave their country. (19)

The Egyptian leader summed up his view point by adding that once the British withdrew from Egypt his Government and the people would be most willing to "work together hand in hand and with all our hearts and souls." Further, in his effort to persuade the British negotiators to understand Egypt's mind, Nahas Pasha pointed out to them that "the support and loyalty of the Egyptian people" would be "much more useful to Britain in war time than to maintain this limited number of her troops in the Canal Zone". "With the advance in military strategy and weapons, the stationing of this limited number of troops in the Canal Zone has become futile from the military point of view". (20) (Italics mine)

Furthermore, answering the analogy which the British military expert had drawn between Egypt and his country regarding the presence of foreign troops ⁱⁿ and England, (21) the Egyptian

19. Ibid., pp. 19, 21.

20. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

21. During his conversations with Prime Minister Nahas Pasha in their first meeting held on Monday, 5th June 1950, Field Marshal Slim had suggested that the presence of the forces of one nation in the territory of another ally was demanded by the vastness of any major war in the future. In his view no nation, big or small, could stand alone against the Soviet 'monster'. "We have to be united and march together politically, militarily and economically. This is not easy because we all have to give up some of our cherished rights and traditions. Each one of us has to accept the other one's troops and installations in his own territory, and to put his troops under another command. We, the British, accepted the presence of the American troops in England, and American bases in London. We accepted that our troops in Germany be under French Command...." See, Conversations, op.cit., p. 11.

spokesman said:

- (1) There can be no question that the presence of these forces does not, in any way, prejudice British sovereignty, in view of the fact that the two States are equal.
- (2) The situation in Britain is temporary and occasioned by an emergency, but in Egypt it is considered a continuation of 60 years of occupation.
- (3) Should Britain ask the American forces to leave, they will, no doubt, leave immediately. This is not the case with regard to the British forces in Egypt.
- (4) There is also difference in the way the British and the Egyptians view the presence of foreign troops in their country.

The Prime Minister then firmly reiterated that his Government 'would not accept the stationing of British troops on her soil either in time of peace or imminent threat of war or an apprehended international emergency'. He also suggested that the problem of the Middle East defence could be satisfactorily dealt with only by strengthening the military potential and preparedness of the Egyptian forces by supplying them necessary weapons and equipment. Thus 'strengthened, Egypt would not only be able to defend herself against armed aggression from any quarter, but would also be willing to cooperate with Britain in her overall plan to defend the Middle East. In such an eventuality British troops would be welcomed and be granted all facilities that would be necessary for the conduct of war. (22) (Italics mine)

22. Ibid., p. 19.

The British representative, on the contrary, insisted that Egypt should view the problem from the 'defence angle, instead of that of occupation'. With a tone of finality, Sir William Slim repeated that Egypt could not be defended without British troops. "The danger", in his view, "against Egypt is twofold: By way of air and by way of land." For the proper defence of Egypt the (two) forces should be integrated in peacetime". We have to be integrated before the attack starts. The first air-attack should be met with cooperation between us." If we suddenly bring British help, it would be too late, it should be there and ready before the start. (23)

It is clear from the above citations of references from the conversations between the representatives of the two countries that there was a fundamental difference in their way of approaching the problem of revising their mutual relations. There was logic and consistency in the arguments advanced by the Egyptian side. They rightly insisted that in order to be able to negotiate freely on matters of their mutual interest, including defence of Egypt, they should first get rid of limitations on her sovereignty. Equality of national status was to be a pre-condition to become equal partner in the proposed alliance with Great Britain.

They were insistent on complete and immediate evacuation of British forces, but at the same time they were not denying or refusing to cooperate with them in a defence arrangement with them. Evacuation, if then agreed by the British, would

23. Ibid., p. 20.

undoubtedly have given the Wafd government "an excellent argument" to bring the people round the idea of favourably considering proposals for joint defence with Britain or any member of the Western camp. A free Egypt would not have had the obsession of accepting an 'arrangement' against its will. With evacuation, the psychological effect of the new alliance would have been generally detrimental to the position and prestige of the Government. (24) They were naturally and justifiably more concerned about the realisation of their national aspirations, while their counterpart seemed only interested in preserving the Western military position in this part of the world.

Marshal Slim was unable to appreciate the political advantages of evacuation that Egypt was assuring him, after its completion. Being essentially a military expert, he could not value the wholehearted support and sympathy of a willing people as compared to a limited advantage of technical nature which he expected to derive from the presence of 'limited foreign troops' in a land where they are hated by the natives. In his arguments he showed no concern for the feelings of the Egyptian people. He told Nahas Pasha:

If the British troops withdraw from Egypt, it will have a disastrous effect on the cold-war against Russia. Arab countries, Turkey, Iran and the dominions will be horrified. Our Allies in America will think we have deserted them. (25)

-
24. Egypt's Foreign Minister Mohammed Salah Eddin Bey told the British Ambassador on 10 August 1950: "I would like it to be understood that the Wafd derives its influence over the people from their faith in that it safeguards the country's rights as planned in 1919, the first and foremost of which being the question of immediate evacuation." See, *ibid.*, p. 49.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

At a later stage of these conversations between the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom, the British Ambassador His Excellency Sir Ralph Stevenson made two controversial points in his opening statement on 14 August 1950. Answering an earlier question of Egypt's Foreign Minister as to why the presence of foreign troops in Egypt in peace time was necessary while alliances with other countries were concluded without that requirement, he said that the reason was "the geographic position of Egypt and her possession of the Suez Canal which is a vital communications' link, in which all maritime nations are interested." "It is impossible for us to risk that link being cut." He then drew an analogy with Panama Canal and said that the United States was solely responsible by treaty rights, for the defence of the Canal, and on that basis justified Britain's insistence on assuming the defence of the Suez Canal.

For the Egyptians there was nothing new in these arguments. They had heard it many a times before. The British had used the same argument to justify their occupation of Egypt in 1882, and since then in all negotiations about its termination. The presence of British forces on Egypt's soil nevertheless had always prejudiced her sovereignty, and, therefore, she had every right to resent this violation and protect against it. To an Egyptian the independence of his country was much dearer than the importance the British attached to the Suez Canal. Moreover, the experience of the last war had shown that the Suez Canal was not militarily and even commercially inevitable. This was evidenced by the fact that the most of the shipping to the Far

East via the Cape of Good Hope. And, in any future war, there was the possibility of the Canal being completely put out of order for a long time. It was obvious, therefore, that Egypt herself was the real object and the Suez Canal only.

Moreover, the British Ambassador's argument suggested that the domination of some states over the others, whether they like it or not could be justified merely because the interests of one country happened to affect the other. This meant that every big state could insist to have defensive bases on the territory of smaller states that happen to be on her communication route. Egypt, a member of the United Nations, could never agree to such a position. This was violating the principle of sovereign equality enunciated in the Charter. If such a standpoint is allowed to prevail, there would be chaos in international relations.

Salah Eddin Bey rejected Sir Stevenson's plea of defence against Communist aggression on the ground that the presence of foreign troops in Egypt would defeat its own purpose by creating a psychological environment that is more favourable to Communist propaganda. In his own words:

... the greatest weapons exploited by Communist propaganda in Egypt and in all countries occupied by foreign forces is this some occupation and the economic and social effects resulting from it. This propaganda finds a fertile soil in the minds of nationalists so much so that it is feared that they might generally confuse nationalism with Communist propaganda. Experience in Egypt has shown that all pamphlets of Communist propaganda which were seized mostly make use of this weapon. In fact it almost makes use of it to the exclusion of other ideological weapons. (26)

D. THE SUDAN - A CRUCIAL POINT
EGYPT'S CONTENTION

To this state of confusion, misunderstanding and insistence that characterised the present negotiations between the Governments of Egypt and Great Britain was added the question of the Sudan. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, in his statement of 26 August, demanded that Britain should immediately recognize the rights of Egypt in the Sudan. He argued that the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown was just another legitimate aspiration of the people of the whole of the Nile Valley.

In a more elaborate treatment of the Sudan problem as an important item of relations between Egypt and the UK, the Egyptian Foreign Minister asserted that together with the Sudan, Egypt formed one single country under one single Crown, the Egyptian Crown. This unity, he said, was natural and was supported by history since remote and ancient times. The Nile linked them together. They were not separated by any physical boundaries. In addition, the people of Egypt with their 'compatriots', the Sudanese, were bound together by ties of common origin, language, religion and customs, etc. 'Britain had nothing to do with the Sudan before the occupation of Egypt'. After the occupation, she 'forced the Egyptian Government to withdraw from the Sudan, then she forced her to reconquer it jointly with British, and then she forced her to conclude the 1899 Agreement which provided for a joint administration of the Sudan, without British occupation of Egypt, none of this would have taken place and Britain would

not have been in the Sudan today'. It implied therefore that Britain neither had any valid claims nor any responsibility in regard to the Sudan. Moreover, she herself admitted, more than once, that she was acting there in the name and on behalf of Egypt, and not for herself or on behalf of the Sudanese. (27) Egypt thus based her contention not only on her natural rights but also on her legal position.

The Foreign Minister of Egypt then complained that the British administrative personnel had been trying to antagonise the Sudanese by various subterfuges and manoeuvres against their Egyptian compatriots preparatory to separating the Sudan from Egypt and to isolate the Southern from the Northern areas of the Sudan as a prelude to separating the South from the North with the ultimate intention of colonising the whole of the Sudan, South and North alike. Salah Edden Pasha also referred to the incident of 1924 when Great Britain took advantage of the assassination of the Sirdar and put Egypt bag and baggage out of the Sudan and went further with their aggression as to threaten interference with Egypt's Nile Waters. Commenting upon the question of self-determination for the Sudan, he said:

Now that national consciousness has awakened in Egypt and the Sudan, the British adopted a new tactics to meet the new circumstances. They repeatedly declare their concern for the welfare of the Sudanese and demand that they should be consulted and be given self-government leading eventually to self-determination.

It can be seen, therefore, that when Egypt in the early days of occupation could not question their

27. Ibid., p. 142.

actions, they made use of Egypt's name and acting on her behalf to dominate the Sudan. When we demanded the independence of Egypt and the Sudan, the pretext of acting in the name of Egypt became of no use to them. They had to turn to another pretext which was this time that they speak in the name of the Sudanese and defend their interests. It is obvious that the two pretexts are contradictory for indeed there is a great difference between administering the Sudan in the name of the Egyptians and demanding from the Egyptians in the name of the Sudanese that the Sudan should ultimately have the right of self-determination. (28)

Thus from the Egypt's point of view, the problem of the Sudan was a matter between the two Arab brothers of the Nile Valley and the British had no historical, legal or moral right to interfere between them. They believed that Britain never had Egypt's interest at heart when they acknowledged that they administered the Sudan in Egypt's name and on her behalf, nor did they have the interest of the Sudan at heart when they claimed that they were endeavouring to give it self-government and self-determination. But it was a pretext to continue their single-handed administration of the Sudan for as long as possible under cover of the will of the Sudanese. (Italics mine)

The Foreign Minister clearly warned that the question of evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley were absolutely linked together. They cannot be dealt with separately. Evacuation of Egypt would not be complete without evacuation of the Sudan at the same time.

If Britain dislike Egypt linking the question of evacuation with that of the Sudan, Egypt on her part cannot deviate from linking these two questions together. In fact she has always done so and both questions were dealt with in all the negotiations

which took place between Egypt and Britain. Indeed, certain negotiations, such as those of Zaghlul-MacDonald and Nahas-Henderson, failed on account of the Sudan. In the negotiations which paved the way for the 1939 Treaty, the two questions were dealt with together and provisions concerning both were included in that Treaty. It is no innovation, therefore, that we should insist today on linking together the two questions.

THE BRITISH STAND

Though the British spokesmen did not dispute that they should withdraw from the Sudan as they were already contemplating to withdraw from Egypt. There were, however, two major points on which they differed with Egypt. Firstly, whom should the authority be handed over - the Sudanese or the Egyptian Crown. They did not accept Egypt's claim that Egypt and the Sudan were one and the same people and that they had the same destiny. They believed and insisted that the Sudanese, like the Egyptians, or any people for that matter, have the right to be first free and then to choose on their own free will their future status. The British Ambassador said that 'the legitimate owners of the Sudan' were the people who lived there - the people of the Sudan. But they were not yet politically mature enough to look after their country's business successfully. (29) It might take a decade or more to prepare them for self-government and to decide about their relations with Egypt.

29. Ibid., pp. 71-2. In August 1950, there were only 120 political officers in the administration of the Sudan. As to standard of education there were only 3% of the Sudanese literate. See British Ambassador's statement of 26 August, Ibid., p. 73.

Sir Ralph Stevenson refuted the charge of the Foreign Minister that Britain had her own vested interests in the Sudan, namely, holding it indefinitely. He said:

Britain has no economic or strategic interests in the Sudan and she does not care either way whether Egypt and the Sudan be one country or not. (30)

Nonetheless, Sir Stevenson felt that Great Britain could not absolve herself of her responsibility towards the peoples of the Sudan. We cannot leave them in a state of chaos and unpreparedness; "We cannot divest ourselves of our responsibility in this case whatever the legal, historical or even moral considerations may be".

Bevin further made it clear that His Majesty's Government did not accept the Egyptian premise that Egypt's defence and the Sudan question were inseparable. He suggested that of the two questions immediately facing both Egypt and Britain, the Sudan was less pressing than the question of defence. (31)

E. BRITAIN'S NEW PROPOSALS FOR THE SOLUTION

After prolonged exchange of ideas, Great Britain, taking note of the Egyptian position in regard to the two basic issues of their mutual relations, presented certain proposals for the consideration of the Egyptian Government. (32) The British

30. Ibid., pp. 72-73.

31. See 'Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Foreign Office, London, on 4th, 7th, 9th and 15th December 1950, in Conversations, op.cit., pp. 77-83, 84-104.

32. For text of the British Proposals, see Ibid., pp. 108-110. Also Cmd. 8419, pp. 24-5.

proposals were as follows:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are prepared to resume negotiations for the revision of 1936 Treaty of Alliance in accordance with the provisions of Article 16 of that Treaty.

His Majesty's Government in the U.K. are aware of the Egyptian Government's great difficulties in the matter. They cannot however in view of their commitments to their allies in the North Atlantic and in the Middle East, accept the responsibility of making any arrangements which prejudice their ability to contribute to a successful defence of this region against an aggressor. Such a defence will only be possible if in the future the Egypt base continues to function in such a manner as to be immediately available in war and if the air defence of Egypt is assured.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government in the U.K. proposes that the 1936 Treaty of Alliance be revised so as to provide for the following:

- a) The phased withdrawal of British troops from Egypt beginning within one year of the conclusion of an agreement on Revision of the Treaty and ending in 1956. (It should be noted that rate of withdrawal of the combatant troops and of General Headquarters depends largely on the rate at which accommodation can be provided for them elsewhere).
- b) The processive civilization of the base which it is suggested should be completed by 1956, essential British civilian personnel being introduced as military personnel are withdrawn. The base thereafter to be entrusted to the Egyptian Armed Forces for security purposes but to be operated in accordance with British military policy under the overall administrative control of an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board. (HM Government in the U.K. would be prepared to pay rent for base installations and sites).
- c) The creation of a long-term Anglo-Egyptian coordinated air defence system in which these should be both Egyptian and British components.
- d) The Provision at an early date of arms and equipment on training scale for the Egyptian forces and thereafter the provision of whatever further arms and equipment may be necessary in equal priority with other nations with whom Great Britain has working defence agreements (HM Government in U.K. would also be

prepared to render any assistance required by the Egyptian Government in the training of Egyptian forces.)

e) In the event of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency, Egypt would agree to the return of British forces for the period of emergency and would grant to them and to the forces of Britain's allies all necessary facilities and assistance including the use of Egyptian ports, aerodromes and means of communications.

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot accept the validity of the view that the question of The Sudan is inseparable from that of the defence. Nevertheless HM Government would be prepared to discuss the question of The Sudan if the Egyptian Government that this would be useful.

It is the main aim of HM Government to enable the Sudanese to attain self-government at the earliest practicable opportunity and it would be impossible for them to accept any understanding with Egypt which interferes with this objective.

In any event HM Government suggest that discussion of The Sudan should be deferred until at least a preliminary exchange of views of defence has been completed.

F. EGYPT'S COUNTER-PROPOSALS

The Egyptian Government found the British proposals utterly disappointing as they were not consistent with its claims and contentions. They regretted that what they had been trying to explain to the Government of the United Kingdom over the past 10 months was not fully appreciated by those who prepared the British proposals. And so the Egyptian Government felt compelled to reject them "in toto". (33)

The British proposals, from Egypt's point of view, were particularly disappointing in regard to the following points:

33. Conversations, op.cit., pp. 111-12.

1. The date at which evacuation of British troops was to begin and the time set down for completing that evacuation.
2. The rate of withdrawal of the combatant troops and General Headquarters being made dependent on the rate at which accommodation can be provided for them elsewhere.
3. The time taken in handing over the base to the Egyptian Armed Forces and the stipulation that the base be operated in accordance with British military policy under the overall administrative control of an Anglo-Egyptian Control Board.
4. The creation of a long-term Anglo-Egyptian coordinated defence system.
5. The exceedingly slow rate suggested for providing the Egyptian forces with necessary arms and equipment.
6. The return of British Forces to Egypt in the event of imminence menace of war or apprehended international emergency.
7. Separating the question of evacuation from that of the unity of Egypt and The Sudan under the Egyptian Crown.
8. Offering "the earliest practicable opportunity" as a pretext for putting off the time at which the Sudanese may enjoy self-government.
9. Finally the suggestion that HM Government would not consider any suggestion or position which is not agreeable to Britain's other allies, was particularly offending to Egypt's national honour and dignity.

In its counter-proposals the Egyptian Government firmly reiterated once again its position as a basis of resuming negotiations for settlement of outstanding problems between them. Egypt's counter-proposals (34) were as follows:

34. For Text of Egyptian Government's Proposals, see Conversations, op.cit., pp. 112-3; also Cmd. 8419, pp. 25-6.

1. The evacuation of British troops. Egypt to begin immediately upon concluding the agreement and the necessity of completing this evacuation by land, sea and air within a period not exceeding one year.
2. The base to be handed over to the Egyptian Armed Forces immediately upon the completion of evacuation in accordance with the preceding paragraph.
3. Special priority for the provision of necessary arms and equipment to be given to the Egyptian Army at the earliest opportunity considering that Egypt is situated in a sensitive strategic area.
4. The Unity of Egypt and The Sudan under the Egyptian Crown and self-government for the Sudanese within two years in the framework of this unity.
5. British Forces and British Officials to be withdrawn from The Sudan and the present regime in The Sudan to be terminated immediately upon the expiry of those two years.
6. The conclusion of an agreement between the two parties whereby British forces may return to those places to which in the agreed opinion of the two Governments, it is necessary that they should return for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Egypt in the event of an armed aggression upon her or in the event of UK's being involved in was as the result of an armed aggression on the Arab countries adjacent to Egypt. (Emphasis mine)
7. In the event of their returning in Egypt in accordance with the preceding paragraph, British troops will begin to withdraw from Egyptian territory immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. This withdrawal to be completed by land, sea and air within a period not exceeding three months.
8. The Treaty of Alliance signed in London on 26th August, 1936, together with the Agreed Minutes, notes and Conventions, also the two Agreements of 1899 regarding The Sudan to be abrogated immediately upon the entry into force of the new agreement.

G. BRITAIN'S OBJECTION AND AIDE-MEMOIRES

These proposals, in turn, were found unsatisfactory and incompatible with Britain's interests, strategy and

international commitments. The British Ambassador objected that one year for completing evacuation was physically impossible. Similarly, the evacuation of all British officials from The Sudan in two years was, in his opinion, utterly impracticable. "The Sudan cannot get on without the British officials." (35)

Similarly, referring to paragraph 6 of the Egyptian proposals, the British spokesman objected that it severely delimited the scope of their defensive strategy, as the last part of this paragraph referred to Arab countries adjacent to Egypt which only meant Transjordan and thus obviously excluded an attack on Turkey or an attack on the Middle East through Turkey or Iraq.

The last paragraph of the proposals clearly warned the British Government that in case of unreasonable delay on her part to answer these proposals, the Government of Egypt would be at liberty to abrogate the 1936 Treaty and to put an end to the 1899 Agreement. (36) The British Ambassador in Cairo protested

-
35. For British Ambassador's objections to the Egyptian Proposals of April 24th, 1951, see, Conversations, op.cit., pp.113-14.
36. The Speech from the Throne dated 16 November 1950 had referred to the denunciation of the Treaty with Britain in following words: "The Government considers that the 1936 Treaty has lost its validity as a basis for Anglo-Egyptian relations, and it deems it inevitable that it should be abrogated. It is also necessary that future relations should be founded upon new principles ... immediate and complete evacuation and the unification of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian Crown. My Government further proclaims that it will not deviate from its insistence on these principles. ... My Government is therefore proceeding without hesitation or undue delay with the task of realizing these national objectives, sparing no effort to achieve". See, Annual Register 1950, p. 296.

against what he termed as an ultimatum by the Egyptian Delegation. Later on 8 June he handed to the Egyptian Foreign Minister an Official Communication in which HM Government had noted 'with disappointment that whereas their own proposals represented a very considerable modification of the position laid down by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the Egyptian proposals do not appear to differ in essence from the claims put forward by the Egyptian Government some eighteen months ago'. (37)

On the question of The Sudan, the British Aide-Memoire made it once again explicit that it was distinct from the urgent issue of the Middle East Defence. In the Annex to this statement of Principle, they however stated that they were prepared to discuss The Sudan issue on the basis that the Sudanese has a right to 'full self-government and thereafter choose freely for themselves their form of government and the relationship with Egypt'. (38) The British Ambassador further added that during the past five or six years had largely developed a national consciousness and a national movement, represented by the Umma (Nationalist) party. Therefore, he asserted, the Sudanese must be treated as a national community. "No alteration can take place without having consultation with them and they must have the right of self-determination.

37. Text in Cmd. 8419, pp. 27-8. See Appendix No.

38. Ibid.

H. EGYPT'S OBJECTION AND AIDE-MEMOIRES

The British stand was obviously not likely to bring the two Governments any nearer. Seen from Egypt's angle Britain's insistence on the Sudan's right of self-determination was aimed at creating a wedge between the children of the Nile Valley.

"The question is a question of unity of Egypt with the Sudan. When you have a united country, the question of self-determination does not at all arise." (39)

The Egyptian Government objected as 'unwarrantable' the comparison which the British note had drawn between the British and the Egyptian attitude: 'for, whereas the Royal Egyptian Government claim inviolable national rights which cannot be bartered away', the British Government were pursuing 'exaggerated interests, and when rights and interests are at variance, rights should be made to prevail'. (40)

In its Aide-Memoire of 6 July, the Government of Egypt declared that they could not continue merely talking and repeating their position indefinitely. 'Hitherto these talks have lasted over a year without a glimpse of hope towards reaching the desired agreement. ... It is obvious that HM Government in the UK lose nothing by this procrastination but it has become extremely difficult for the Royal Egyptian Government and Egyptian public opinion to contemplate any further prolongation of this (unsettled) state of affairs'.

39. Foreign Minister Salah Eddin's comment upon the British Ambassador's statement which he made at the time of presenting the Aide-Memoire. See *ibid.*, p. 118.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

The Egyptian Aide-Memoire firmly and finally reasserted that they regarded the question of evacuation and the unity of Egypt and The Sudan as one indivisible whole and therefore it was inevitable that both the issues 'be simultaneously settled and covered by any agreement to be concluded between the two Parties'. Egypt could not agree to anything that failed to provide for this natural and historical unity. The dependence of the Egyptians and the Sudanese on the waters of the Nile (which the British 'Note' had acknowledged and emphasized on that basis, the need to have friendliest relations between them) was not the only link that bound them together from 'time immemorial'.

There is the community of race, language, religion, culture, customs and interests as well as the geographical unity, the economic unity, etc., etc. In the presence of all these strong and inseverable ties it is gross injustice for the British Aide-Memoire and its Annex to speak of two countries and two peoples instead of speaking of one country and one people indivisible, inseparable.

The Egyptian Government finally put forth the under-mentioned principles on the basis of which they were prepared to make their last attempt to settle the controversy with Great Britain, after which they were determined to take independent action:

- a) The unity of Egypt and The Sudan under the Egyptian Crown.
- b) Self-Government for the Sudanese within the framework of this unity in two years.
- c) British forces and British officials to be withdrawn from The Sudan and the present regime in The Sudan to be terminated immediately upon the expiry of these two years.

- d) In the event of the principles outlined in (a), (b) and (c) being accepted, the Royal Egyptian Government agree to setting up a tripartite Commission in order to help attain the goal in (b)

After receiving the Egyptian Government's Aide-Memoire, Ambassador Ralph Stevenson made an important statement which made it clear that the British Government was not ready to concede Egypt's demand for complete evacuation. The Ambassador said:

The Egyptian Government must realise that they are faced with two alternatives: (1) to cooperate in a valid and effective scheme of defence which might prevent Egypt being invaded at all, (2) having two invasions, one from the North-East to occupy the country and the other from the West by the Western Powers to expel the aggressor. That is an absolute certainty. ... (41)

This showed that the British Government was not at all prepared to change or modify its stand vis-a-vis the Egyptian aspirations. Salah Eddin was justified when he complained that the above remarks of the British Ambassador were 'couched in the language of war, force, invasion while as Members of the UNO we should talk the language of peace, security, recognition of rights and justice and respect of the sovereignty of nations and the integrity of their territories'. (Italics mine)

He also clearly pointed out that his Government were obliged to make a full statement before the Parliament on the talks. As representatives of the nation they had a right to know before the present session was prorogued whether or not the talks had reached a successful conclusion. He, therefore, demanded

41. Cmd. 8419, pp. 30-31; Conversations, op.cit., pp. 122-23.

that HM Government send a reply to Egypt's counter-proposals concerning evacuation without further postponement. To this the British Ambassador answered that HM Government were trying to find 'some common approach', but they were 'much preoccupied at present with other problems'. (42)

On a closer examination of the British attitude, one finds that they refused to see the urgency for the settlement of the controversy that was being so insistently demanded by the Egyptians. Sir Stevenson's plea of his Government's preoccupation with other issues so obviously suggested that they did not consider Egypt's problems important enough to attend to them despite lapse of several months. To the Egyptians this statement was most humiliating and also challenging to take independent action. Moreover, it was quite evident that the promised 'new approach' would involve Egypt with the NATO powers, (43) which they seriously despised and disapproved, hence they could not see anything hopeful in this information. Foreign Minister Salah

42. Ibid., p. 123.

43. This was quite manifest from the speeches of Britain's prominent leaders during the election campaign. Sir Winston Churchill emphasised the gravity of international situation and stated that it was necessary to rearm in order to parley with Communist Russia, and that there must be no running away from the challenge in Persia or Egypt'.

Similarly, from the Labour Party's platform, Morrison repeated what he had been saying as Britain's Foreign Secretary: "In Egypt we have to protect our life line and keep our promises to the Sudanese; the question of the Suez can be settled by the Middle East Defence Pact". See Newspapers reporting of election-broadcasts of prominent political personalities of Britain. The Times, 5, 7 and 8 February 1950, also of 17, 18 and 19 February 1950.

Eddin replied:

I am aware that the British Government are pre-occupied to a great extent with the problems confronting them in Iran but the troubles of the British Government are endless ... and if we delay the settlement of questions pending between us on account of the troubles confronting Britain in other parts of the world, we shall never finish.

He then asserted:

The Egyptian question is no less important in itself and in so far as it is concerned with the cause of universal peace than any other international problem. Indeed it may be of greater importance than many of these problems. This, at least, is how we view it and indeed to us it is a question of life or death.

The two months which have elapsed since we handed to you our counter-proposals are sufficient, in fact more than sufficient to get a reply from you to these counter-proposals whatever your other preoccupations might be. ... The Egyptian Government cannot possibly go on with these talks for another long period. ... Should the talks fail and are consequently broken off ... the Egyptians would lose every confidence in the possibility of coming to an understanding with you through negotiations. (44)

I. DEADLOCK IN TALKS - BRITAIN'S RESPONSIBILITY

The climax, however, reached when Herbert Morrison, Great Britain's Foreign Secretary, accused Egypt of 'uncompromising insistence on demands which bear no relation to present-day realities'. Speaking in a Middle East debate in the House of Commons on 30 July, Morrison said that the problem of the presence of British troops is not now a purely Anglo-Egyptian problem. We are a Power bearing responsibilities in the Middle East on behalf of the rest of the Commonwealth and the Western allies as a whole. ... The destinies and civilization of our

two countries are bound up together and it is unrealistic for Egypt to pretend that she can avoid danger by refusing to allow us to share in the defensive organization of the area. Moreover, she can no more stand alone in the defence of her territory than we can in the defence of our country. ...

'In common with our North Atlantic Commonwealth Allies, our people have assumed a great burden in time of peace in order to make the world safe for those countries with whom we share a common heritage and civilization. ... We want to plan our relationship on an entirely new basis. If Egypt rejects that invitation we cannot allow that to prejudice the fulfilment of our international responsibilities'. (45) (Italics mine)

On the question of the Sudan also, Morrison blamed the Egyptian Government of 'certain prejudices which prevent her from approaching in a realistic frame of mind'. Their insistence on the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown, in his view, was unrealistic. If the Egyptians had agreed to the British view-point and thus surrendered their claims regarding the Sudan, the Egyptians, in Morrison's judgement, would have been the most cooperative, sober, reasonable, realistic and what not.

The British Foreign Secretary also chose the occasion to condemn Egypt's embargo on the passage of shipping to Israel (46)

45. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 491, cols. 973-75.
See also, The Times, 31 July 1951.

46. Under a decree of the Egyptian Government intended to prevent oil supplies from reaching Israel through the Suez Canal, which was brought into effect on 19 July 1950, masters of north-bound tankers passing through the Canal

as an act of 'injustice and unreasonableness, and an act of defiance of the Security Council resolution on the free passage of shipping in the Suez Canal. (47)

Such provocative statements and quite uncalled-for remarks made by British officials and other public-men helped Britain in no way but they did consolidate Egypt's suspicion

46. (contd. from back page)

were required to furnish guaranteed declaration regarding the destination of their cargoes including their final destination at the port of disembarkation, and on arriving there to obtain a further declaration from custom officials, countersigned by the nearest Egyptian Consulate, certifying that their cargo was being discharged there and was intended for local consumption.

Britain, France, USA, Norway and the Netherlands protested against these regulations as unlawful.

Replying such protests, the Egyptian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Abdel Rehman Pakky Pasha, declared on 23 March that Egypt would not stop to exercise her "absolute right in conformity with International law of searching vessels passing through "Egyptian territorial waters" as long as she still considered herself in a state of war with Israel.

Similarly, Egypt's representative in the Security Council defended his Government's action as lawful. He argued that under international law Egypt was fully justified in imposing the blockade. An armistice, he pointed out, was not a temporary peace, the condition of war remained, and belligerents retained "such rights as the right of blockade, the right of capture of neutral vessels attempting to break a blockade, and the right to seize contraband of war. The stoppage and inspection of ships bound for Israel was, he declared, necessary for Egypt's self-preservation in face of Israel's hostility. UN Security Council Official Records, 26 July 1951.

47. UN Documents S/2298/Rev.1, 15 August 1951. In his statement in the House of Commons on 21 March 1951, Morrison had said that "the continuance of restrictions on the free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal so long after the conclusion of the Armistice between Egypt and Israel contributed to the maintenance of a state of tension and unrest in the Near East." See H.C. Deb., 21 March 1951.

of her unwillingness to relinquish her control over Egypt and the Sudan. The Egyptian Foreign Minister felt it necessary to severely condemn Britain's policy of justifying their occupation on the ground that there existed some threat to world peace. Speaking before the Wafd dominated Chamber of Deputies, he declared that the ever present possibility that Great-Power rivalries might flare up into a worldwide conflagration was no justification for asking Egypt to

... tolerate indefinitely an occupation violating our sovereignty and independence. ... British occupation of Egyptian territory is a standing reality, a stark violation of our independence, a wound to our national dignity and a vestige of hateful British imperialism which must be effaced. As to the threat of war against which we are warned from time to time, it is no more than a possibility which, pray God, would never materialise. Indeed it will never materialise if sovereign equality between nations prevailed and if each major power respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of smaller and weaker nations thus setting a good example of international conduct regardless of actions taken by others. (48) (Emphasis mine)

He finally assured the Deputies and the people that their Government was fully conscious of the pledge it gave in the last 'Speech from the Throne'. In his view, Morrison's recent statement before the Commons, (49) had 'closed the door on current talks' between the two Governments. Egypt now could justify her taking independent action to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty before the next 'Speech from the Throne'. (50)

48. Conversations, op.cit., pp. 140-41.

49. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 491, cols. 973-5. For full text see Appendix No.

50. Conversations, op.cit., p. 148.

The Egyptian Government was indeed justified in concluding from Morrison's aforesaid statement that it was futile to continue the negotiations 'without a glimpse of hope'. The Government also could not have ignored that the spontaneous effect of his statement on the Egyptian Press and public opinion was extremely bad. (51)

The statement as a whole constituted a definite negation to Egypt's national rights and was completely irreconcilable with the Egyptian viewpoint. They had been demanding immediate evacuation by land, sea and air of British forces from Egypt and the Sudan and the unity of both under the Egyptian Crown. Their Foreign Minister had told Bevin in 1950:

Our foreign policy is very limited one, and can almost be resolved in these two questions of evacuation and that of Unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown. (52)

The statement of the British Foreign Secretary, on the other hand, irrespective of the style and the manner in which it was formulated, insisted that evacuation was not advisable in view of the mounting tensions in the East-West relations, while Unity of the Sudan with Egypt was completely refused on the ground that it denied the Sudanese the right of self-determination. What, in fact, a politically conscious Egyptian ordinarily understood from the text of the statement in question and, therefore, resented, was as follows:

51. Al-Ahram, 31 July, 1 August 1951.

52. Conversations, op.cit., p. 148.

1. The continuation of the occupation of Egypt by British forces.
2. Joint defence in Peace time.
3. Justification of the above two points by a new British claim, namely, that Britain bears responsibilities in the Middle East on behalf of the rest of the Commonwealth and the Western Allies as a whole.
4. The denial of the Unity of Egypt and the Sudan. ...
5. Separating the Egyptians and the Sudanese by various means and pretexts and using the Sudan - dual in name but British in fact - to achieve this end. (53)

Egypt's expression of determination to rid herself of the limitations on her sovereignty and the agitational mood of its people apparently caused some stir in Government and political circles in Great Britain. Morrison hurriedly sent personal messages to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Egypt telling them that he was 'urgently considering a definite new approach to the solution of the defence question', and asked them to restrain from doing 'anything which might prejudice the possibility of reaching a settlement satisfactory to both sides'. (54)

But the same 'personal messages' to the Egyptian leaders also told them that he was 'leaving for a short holiday' and that he intended to take advantage of that to ponder over 'our common problems'. Obviously, His Majesty's Government in the United

53. Press statement released by the Royal Egyptian Embassy in London, dated 20 August 1951. For full text see Conversations, op.cit., pp. 159-60.

54. Text of Morrison's personal messages to the Egyptian leaders in Records of Conversations, op.cit., pp. 155, 156.

Kingdom was treating the question of her relations with Egypt in the normal course of things. Egypt, on the contrary, was growing impatient. The people were counting days. The Government knew that its survival very much depended on securing from Britain favourable terms for the revision of the Treaty, and the sooner it was done the better. It was mainly on this point that Government could hope to balance its inability to control rising prices and to stabilise the nation's economy and foreign trade. Moreover, even these 'personal messages', Ambassador's Press statements, and the Foreign Office's explanation, emphasised only the 'question of defence' and had carefully avoided to mention anything regarding the Sudan. No Egyptian could fail to see that Great Britain was still unprepared to accept that the Sudan question was 'indivisible from the question of the British evacuation. The Egyptian Prime Minister in his reply to Morrison reiterated that his Government and the people of the Nile Valley were not prepared to consider the two issues separately. He also reminded him that the long-awaited British proposals could be considered provided they arrived 'before the ending of the present parliamentary session, and were based on the realization of Egypt's national demands'. (55)

The promised 'new proposals' could not be delivered to the Egyptian Government before 13th October. But by then Egypt had decided to unilaterally denounce the Treaty. The Government

55. Text of Nahas Pasha's reply dated 26 August 1951 in Documents on International Affairs 1951 (RIIA, London, 1954), p. 462.

and the people were growing tired of waiting to hear of some new British proposals to supersede the Treaty. They had waited for them for a number of years, and they could have probably waited for some time more, despite their characteristic impatience, if the British had shown some inclination to accommodate their viewpoint and to harness their nationalist objectives. On the contrary, all that the British Government had shown was an unsympathetic, rather hostile and rigid attitude towards the interests of Egypt and the Arab world in general.

On the question of Egypt's right to blockade the Suez Canal to ships carrying contraband material (56) to her enemy - Israel, the British representative at the UN had actively supported Israel's contention against Egypt. Condemning Egypt's action, Sir Gladwyn Jebb said that freedom of international shipping and commerce was a matter of utmost interest to Britain and all maritime nations, and they must therefore view with grave concern any restrictions on the passage of vessels through the Suez Canal. For Britain the ban on the passage of oil tankers to the Haifa refinery, he pointed out, had involved

56. Israel and her Western supporters had purposely publicised that Egypt's action amounted to blockading the Suez Canal and putting serious restrictions on the rights of shipping guaranteed under the 1888 multilateral Convention. In fact, as explained by Egypt's representative in the Security Council, Egypt merely intended to invoke her rights under International Law to 'visit and search' only a few merchantmen in connection with only a few war materials. See, Fauzi Bey's statement before the Security Council. SCOR, 553 Meeting, 16 August 1951, p. 19.

great inconvenience and considerable financial loss, apart from the effect of the refinery's virtual inactivity on almost the whole of Western Europe. He could not accept Egypt's claims concerning the Suez Canal convention and belligerent rights, and considered that the Council need not become "entangled in the mesh of these legal issues." "The Armistice in Palestine had not been meant merely to lead to a pause in the fighting, but to put an end to the hostilities and to guard against their renewal, and the Council had understood it to mean the ending of restrictions imposed by both sides." (57)

Mohammad Fawzi Bey of Egypt defended his country's action by declaring that she was still at war with Israel and thus her restrictions on shipping in the Suez Canal were within her legal rights. The draft resolution (58) sponsored by the British delegate which sought to remove those restrictions not only violated the principles of the laws of nations, it 'attempted to impose a political settlement on Egypt, which the Council was not empowered to do'. (59)

57. SCOR, 552nd Meeting, 16 August 1951, pp. 1-4.

58. UN Document S/2313.

59. 'Any arbitrary resolution of the Council denying Egypt its belligerent rights would be an attempt by the Council to impose on Egypt a political settlement. The Council is not empowered to enforce political settlements'. Fawzi then cited the undermentioned from the speech of the US representative, Warren Austin at the 253rd meeting of the Council on 24 February 1945.

"While we are discussing the problem of Palestine, it is of primary importance to the future of the UN that the precedent to be established by the action taken in this case should be in full accord with the

(contd. on next page)

Co-sponsoring the draft resolution, the US representative had said that 'by removing the restrictions Egypt would make a positive contribution to the relief of tension in the Middle East. (60) To this the Egyptian representative replied that it was Great Britain whose policies were solely responsible for the present tension and uneasiness in the Middle East.' (61)

This brief statement contained important and irrefutable facts of history of British policy in the Middle East. Its encouragement of political Zionism and its allowing the Zionists to unlawfully receive great amounts of arms and great numbers of fighting personnel, including those from Cyprus and other parts under British control, (62) represented 'an overflowing contribution to the state of tension and turmoils' in the Middle East. As a result of this policy, the Jewish State of Israel came into being in Arab Palestine and from where thousands of Arab families were forcibly ousted to live in destitution and privation.

59. (contd. from back page)

terms of the Charter under which we operate. The interpretation of the terms of the Charter given in the Palestine issue will seriously affect the future actions of the UN in other cases.

The Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council to enforce political settlement."

See, SCOR, 553rd Meeting, 16 August 1951, p. 23.

60. SCOR, 552nd Meeting, op.cit., p. 9.

61. Ibid., pp. 16-17.

62. Ibid., 553rd Meeting, p. 17.

To the Arabs and the Egyptians in particular, the questions of Holy Places, the Arab refugees and disputes of territorial nature, remaining unsolved "no attempt at pacification will yield enduring results." They considered the present Suez Canal question as 'but a reflection of the whole of Palestine question'. (63)

Thus Britain's unreserved and enthusiastic support of Israel's claims to freedom of passage in the Suez Canal virtually ended all prospects of reaching a settlement with her. It had now become clear to every Egyptian that Britain really did not wish to retain Egypt's friendship. The 'hate imperialists' campaign started by the left-wing press and persons was already becoming widespread. It is worthwhile to mention here that the Government of Nahas Pasha, persisting in its resistance to the British proposals for joint defence, had recently allowed the so-called 'progressive people' and their publications to carry on their campaign vigorously against any association with the Western Powers. Al-Katab was the official organ of the 'Egyptian Committee of the Partisans of Peace', which was most vociferously writing against any alliance with the West.

It is understandable that the Wafd leaders were anxious to secure the diplomatic support of the Soviet Union to counter-balance the pressure of the West. The United States' had already indicated to the Egyptian Foreign Minister that if Egypt agreed to take part in the proposed defence organization, his Government was prepared to press Britain to adjust her position

63. Ibid., p. 13.

to the Egyptian requirements. The price demanded by US envoy for his Government's support was too much and totally contradictory to the fundamentals of Egypt's stand on the question.

In the Security Council debates (64) also the American delegate had openly sided with the British delegation on the question of unrestricted shipping to and from Israel. He was a co-sponsor of the draft resolution calling upon Egypt to lift the ban against Israel. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had timely intervened to secure a postponement of voting on the Western countries' resolution. The Egyptian Government gratefully appreciated the Soviet delegate's hinting at using veto if the said resolution was pressed for a vote. Foreign Minister Salah Eddin greeted the event as a 'turning point towards the path of right and justice and real stability in the Middle East'; the Government organ al-Balagh generously praised the Russian diplomacy and assured them that 'Egypt's gratitude would be multiplied should this support be continued (65) at other Council sessions'. The Egyptian press generally described

64. Ibid., 552nd Meeting, pp. 8-9.

65. The Egyptians were utterly disappointed to find that the USSR was not sincere in its attitude towards Egypt. It did not suit their policy at that stage to completely identify themselves with the Arabs. Therefore, when the above-mentioned draft resolution was put before the Council for vote on 1 September, the Soviet delegate quietly abstained. In a state of shock, the pro-Government Journal d'Egypte immediately wrote that whereas Russia had deceived Roosevelt and Churchill for three years, 'with us the devil's forces lasted only three days' - the paper headed its editorial 'The Devil is always a Devil'. See, Christian Science Monitor, 8 September 1951.

the USSR as 'Egypt's only friend' and 'noble ally in the common struggle against imperialism'. (66)

On the day of the anniversary of the British entry into Cairo (14 September 1882) the 'Partisans of Peace', the Socialist Party of the Fallah and the Muslim Brotherhood (67) organized protest rallies throughout Cairo and Alexandria and demanded immediate action in regard to the 'hated' Treaty with Britain. Their demands undoubtedly voiced the feelings of the nation as a whole. Al-Balagh was urging them to muster their confidence and take bold steps to realize national objectives. It cited the example of the people of Iran who successfully defied the British on the question of sharing benefits of their oil. 'It is only the weak whom they oppress. Their prestige in the East is finished'. It was a call to the people of Egypt to fight for their rights. 'Rights are obtained not granted', was the popular slogan. They drew inspiration from the Persian example. (68)

The Government of Egypt under such circumstances could not wait any longer. With the inclusion of Turkey and Greece

66. New York Times, 1 September 1951; Manchester Guardian, 31 August 1951.

67. Al-Ahram, 15 September 1951; Egyptian Gazette, 15 September 1951.

68. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1944-1956 (London, 1963), p. 172. See also, Ann Lambton, "The Impact of West on Persia", International Affairs, January 1951.

into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (69) it had become evident that the pressure on Egypt to join with the West in their plans for common defence of the Middle East would increase. In June a conference of British Commonwealth Defence Ministers had emphasised the importance of the defence of the Middle East as a part of the defence of Western Europe and the United States. (70) In the Western strategic thinking the three northern states of the Middle East were defined as "shield" which had to sustain the main thrust of Soviet Power and protect the weaker areas behind. To the South lay the Arab States and Israel, in a region endowed with rich petroleum deposits and traversed by multiple land, sea and air communications which made it a natural "bridge" between Europe, Asia and Africa. (71) It was therefore obviously vital for them that this aggregation of resources, strategic positions and communications routes was denied to the USSR and made readily available to the West. The control of the Suez Canal was necessary for the successful functioning of the protective barriers that the West was already building around the Soviet bloc.

69. The Council of the NATO, consisting of Foreign Ministers of the 12 Atlantic Pact countries, met in Ottawa from 16-20 September and unanimously agreed to admit Greece and Turkey to the NATO. The Council agreed that 'both Greece and Turkey, despite their official clarification as 'Near Eastern States', were politically associated with the European, and not the Asian section of the non-Communist community.

70. New York Times, 27 June 1951.

71. The United States in World Affairs (New York, 1952), p. 263.

Chapter V

PRELUDE TO THE JULY 1952 REVOLUTION

A. EGYPT'S ABROGATION OF THE 1936 TREATY

Hopelessly waiting for the British proposals, under such pressing circumstances, would not have helped Egypt in her struggle to eliminate Britain's political influence from its territory. Moreover, the prospects of the Conservatives coming again into power had made the question of treaty revision all the more urgent. They could not hope the Tories to agree to wind up their military bases in Egypt and to redefine their mutual relations on the basis of sovereign-equality, trust and cooperation. The Colonial Office under the Conservatives would never agree to relinquish Britain's dominance over Egypt and the Sudan. The Egyptians remembered that it was only a couple of weeks ago that Churchill, who was certain to become the new Prime Minister after the general elections, had criticized Labour Government's dealings with the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal as "unprecedented British submissiveness". Further, asserting that the British power and influence had declined throughout the Middle East, he had suggested that the situation could only be retrieved by the joint cooperative action of the United States and the United Kingdom and, in the Mediterranean, by France and Turkey. In other words, he proposed the use of 'big stick' against Egypt and other countries of the area. (1)

1. H.C. Deb., 30 July 1951, vol. 491 , col. 9726

For Egypt it was the question of 'now or never'. Postponing the issue of the Treaty revision any further would have caused a serious setback to her national aspirations. As late as 6th of October, Morrison was still "hoping to be able to make a communication to the Egyptian Government after a few days". On this vague message the Wafdist al-Balagh rightly remarked:

No one waits for farreaching proposals from a weak Cabinet on the eve of an election campaign in which it is doomed to defeat. Such a Cabinet cannot be expected to resolve the Egyptian question in so short and critical a time. ... There is no chance of the British proposals being made before the elections, unless this new proposal is worse than its predecessors. (2)

Thus compelled by circumstances and their own strong nationalist fervour to get rid of the 'most uncherished and abnoxious' Treaty, the Prime Minister of Egypt made the epoch-making statement before the Chamber of Deputies on 8 October 1951. He declared that 'the due time for the arrival of the new proposals, referred to in my reply to Mr. Morrison's personal message, is over. The conversations between the two Governments must cease because it is clear that they are futile':

Since the continued efforts for the realization of the country's demands by negotiation has proved a failure, it is time for the Government to fulfil its promise pronounced in the last speech from the Throne, and take the necessary step for the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the two Conventions of 19th January and 10th July, 1899, concerning the administration of The Sudan.

For this purpose he placed four draft decrees before the Chamber for its approval.

2. Quoted by Bourse Egyptienne, 5 October 1951.

The first decree that abrogated the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 Condominium Agreement, was worded as follows:

Law No.80, 1936, ratifying the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Egypt and Great Britain and which was signed in London on August 26, 1936, shall be rescinded. Thus, the provision of this Treaty and the agreement attached thereto concerning exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces stationed in the Kingdom of Egypt, as well as the provisions of the Condominium Agreements of January 10 and July 10, 1899, regarding the administration of The Sudan cease to be operative. (3)

The second and third decrees abolished Articles 159 and 160 of the Egyptian Constitution and substituted for Article 159 the following:

The provisions of this constitution shall apply to all the Egyptian kingdom. Although Egypt and The Sudan are one nation, the regime of rule in The Sudan shall be defined by a Special Law.

Article 160 was amended to read: "The King shall be titled King of Egypt and the Sudan." (4)

The fourth decree provided that:

"The Sudan shall have a special constitution to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly representing the inhabitants of the Sudan, and to be enforced as soon as sanctioned and promulgated by the King." It was also laid down that the proposed new constitution would provide for "democratic parliamentary Government" through an elected Chamber or Chambers; that separate legislative, executive and judicial authorities would be established; that a Sudanese Cabinet would be directly responsible to the Sudanese Parliament; that Ministers would be appointed and dismissed by the King of Egypt; that all legislation would be approved by Parliament and sanctioned by the King; and that "foreign affairs and matters connected with defence, the army, and currency" would be a responsibility of the Egyptian Crown. (5)

-
3. Text of the decree in Appendix No.
 4. Full Text in Appendix No.
 5. Ibid.

Defending the Government's decision to denounce the Treaty and the Condominium, Nahas Pasha cited as many as 18 instances where unequal partners have resorted to unilateral denunciation of international agreements. Among these mentioned in this connection quite a few were related to more recent history. For example, on 16 March 1935, Germany abrogated that part of the Versailles Treaty affecting her. Again, in March 1936, Germany abrogated the Locarno Treaty. Similarly in December 1938, the Japanese Government abrogated the Nine-Power Agreement signed in Washington in 1922. Likewise in June 1939, Germany abrogated the German-Polish Declaration of 1934. In the same month Germany abrogated the 1935 naval agreement with Great Britain.

In all these and other such numerous cases, the other party always contested the validity of the unilateral action but the abrogation nevertheless was effected and in all instances was legally fruitful. The only difference in the present case was that Egypt did not have necessary force to back her action. Therefore, Egypt based her defence on her 'natural rights, outstanding justice and lofty principles embodied in the United Nations Charter. (6)

He argued that the circumstances under which the Treaty was signed by Egypt had completely altered and hence there was no justification for continuing it. In fact, with the victory

6. Nahas Pasha's Speech of 8 October. Text in The Record of Conversations, op.cit., pp. 168, 177. See also, Al-Ahram, 9 October 1951.

of the Allied nations in the last war, not only the menace of the Axis Powers had disappeared but a new international organization was created to suppress every other menace to universal peace and security.

Nahas Pasha argued that faithful observance of the Charter of the United Nations on the part of the member-nations, would make all such defence arrangements superfluous and unnecessary. He said:

The UN Charter, signed in San Francisco in June 1945 ... established a new basis for international relations, totally different from the basis of the 1936 Treaty. It forbids war as means of settling international disputes and demands their settlement by peaceful means. It also prohibits aggression on the independence of member states and the integrity of their territory. It stipulates that all countries are entitled to decide their own destiny and provides for equal sovereignty between member states. It also provides that should there be any contradiction between the obligations of member states under the Charter and those of any other instrument, then the Charter must supersede. (7)

As the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of August 1936 was concluded during the British occupation, Egypt did not have then complete freedom of choice. Therefore a treaty^{that} had been extracted from the Government of Egypt by compulsion and intimidation of the situation, (8) could no longer be considered valid after those

7. Ibid., p. 168. See also UN Charter, Article 2, para 3.

8. Explaining the meaning of pressure due to the occupation of their country, Nahas Pasha said: "We do not mean by that Egypt had been compelled materially to conclude a treaty. What we want to point out is that we felt the moral pressure caused by occupation and its interference in the country's affairs, which was prejudicial to its interests and the fact that the capitulations increased the stranglehold.

circumstances had so drastically changed.

Thus having affirmed that Egypt's action was justified the Prime Minister emphasised that the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 agreements meant the automatic reversion of the Sudan to its pre-1899 status, removal of all British rights in that territory, and the re-establishment of the "Complete Unity of the Nile Valley". The proposed new constitutional arrangements for the Sudan were designed to replace the then existing system. They were in accordance with 'the natural unity which has joined Egypt and the Sudan from the earliest times.'

The Egyptian Prime Minister concluded his historic speech with the remark that "it was for Egypt that I signed the 1936 Treaty, and it is for Egypt that I ask you to denounce it." (9)

The draft-decrees and the Prime Minister's statement were received by the members of the Chamber with wild and prolonged cheers and were approved unanimously. Leaders of the opposition praised Nahas Pasha for his bold and timely step to free the Egyptian people from the limitations on their political freedom and national status. They pledged their full support for the Wafdist Government's action. (10)

8. (contd. from back page)

We wanted to get rid of all this. We wished to find an opening which at the same time was the first step towards unity and independence'. See Nahas's Speech of 8 October, Record of Conversations, op.cit., p. 177.

9. Ibid., p. 179.

10. Al-Ahram, 9 October 1951; The Egyptian Gazette, 9, 10 October 1951. See also, The Times, 9 October 1951.

B. BRITAIN'S NEW PROPOSALS PROMPTLY
REJECTED BY EGYPT

Five days after the draft-decrees to unilaterally denounce the Treaty of Alliance and the Condominium Agreements had been introduced in the Egyptian Parliaments - the long-awaited British Proposals were delivered to the Government of Egypt. They were promptly rejected on the ground that they underlined the same antiquated, imperialistic approach. They expressed not even the slightest intention of complying with Egypt's requirements. On the question of the Sudan, Britain still insisted on the principle of self-determination for the Sudanese, while the Four-Power Proposal appeared to the Egyptians a plan to perpetuate rather intensify the presence of foreign troops in their country. The USA, Britain, France and Turkey had invited Egypt to join the proposed Middle East Command (11) as a founder member. Britain had also indicated that they would waive the 1936 Treaty if Egypt accepted the offer. It was further clearly stated that the details of the organization of the Command and its relationship to the NATO would be worked out in consultation with all the Powers concerned. Egypt's contribution in the proposed Command was to be:

- I. to furnish to the command such strategic defence and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable for the organization in peace time;

11. Text of the Four-Power Proposal in, Department of State Bulletin, vol. 25, 22 October 1951, pp. 647-8. See also, British Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 8419, 1951, pp. 43-46.

- II. undertake to grant the forces of the Middle East Command all the necessary facilities and assistance in the event of war, the imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency including the use of Egyptian ports, airfields and means of communications;
- III. permit the establishment of the Allied Supreme Command's Headquarters in her territory.

The Four-Powers also suggested that:

- (a) the present British Base in Egypt would be formally handed over to Egypt on the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied Base within the Middle East Command with full Egyptian participation in the running of the base in peace and war;
- (b) that the strength of the Allied Forces would be determined between the participating nations, including Egypt;
- (c) an Air Defence Organization including both Egyptian and Allied Forces would be set up under the command of an officer with joint responsibility to the Egyptian Government and the Allied Command.

A careful study of these proposals, however, shows that they were completely divorced from the existing political environment, generally characterised as 'nationalist revolt against the West'. The whole of new approach as it was manifest in the latest move of the British and her allies seemed extremely one-sided. One gets the idea that these proposals were made in a state of perfect tranquillity and friendship, that Egypt simply had no demands of her own to be taken account of and to be satisfied in any offer made to her. To the Government and the people of Egypt who were clamouring for full national independence and were determined to free their country from the presence of the unwanted alien forces, this 'new approach' was 'ridiculous' and a mockery of their national objectives. They

felt that they were being bossed in their own country. To them Great Britain and her 'friends and partners' seemed to have assumed that they had the right to impose on them a defensive system favourable to themselves because of the apprehension of the area falling under the influence of the Communist Powers.

The attitude of the British Government remained unchanged after the Conservatives came to power as a result of general elections held on 25 October 1951, (12) Anthony Eden, the new Foreign Secretary, had earlier made it absolutely plain: "We could not meet the Egyptian demand and that it was no good the Egyptian Minister (Salah Eddin Pasha) expecting it." (13)

Similarly, Winston Churchill had referred to the draft-decrees of 8 October in his pre-election broadcast in a language which expressed his disapproval of them. He did not fail to throw a hint as to what he would do if returned to power:

... A great country like ours cannot escape from dangers of war and violence merely by running away from them. I warned you what happened would bring its consequences elsewhere - and I mentioned Egypt. Curiously enough, as I was preparing to address you here, the news came through that the Egyptian Prime Minister had denounced the 1936 Treaty, which affects the Suez Canal, and the Sudan Agreement. Another blow has fallen upon us even more grave and injurious than that which affected us at Abadan. It is a grievous misfortune for the whole of the western Allies in Europe, or in Atlantic Pact, when Britain falls flat on her face as if she were a booby. But this is not the real Britain, it is only the

12. The Times, 26 October 1951; Manchester Guardian, 26 October 1951.

13. Anthony Eden, Memoirs - Full Circle (London, 1959), p. 228.

grimace of an exhausted and divided Administration upon whose conduct the nation will soon be able to pronounce. (14)

There was thus no scope or alternative left for a negotiated settlement. The Egyptian Parliament then finally endorsed the bills with overwhelming majority denouncing the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the Sudan Condominium Agreements of 1899. At the same time the Government announced that the Four-Power Proposals were also being rejected. The Egyptian reply to the Western offer was worded as follows:

The Egyptian Government cannot consider these proposals, or any other proposals concerning the differences outstanding between the United Kingdom and Egypt while there are British forces of occupation in Egypt and the Sudan. These proposals hardly differ from the proposals already delivered on April 11 and June 8, and rejected by the Egyptian Government in their entirety and in detail. (15)

The Egyptian Parliament promptly approved the Government decision and also unanimously agreed to amend their constitution in respect of Articles 159 and 160 so as to define the constitutional status of the Sudan and to change King Faruk's title to that of King of Egypt and the Sudan.

C. BRITAIN'S REACTIONS TO THE ABROGATION OF THE 1936 TREATY

Apparently, the Wafd Government had thus 'fulfilled their pledge' and had "placed on record in the annals of the

-
14. Winston Churchill's Broadcast dated 8 October 1951. See, The Times, 9 October 1951; Manchester Guardian, 9 October 1951.
 15. Al-Ahram, Al-Gamhuria, 16 October 1951; also The Times, 16 October 1951.

Nile Valley glorious deeds that will go down to posterity." (16) In the words of the Prime Minister of Egypt unanimous approval of these measures had shown that the Egyptian nationalism was 'stronger than events'. Overwhelmed by the sense of joy, over his 'achievement', Nahas Pasha thanked the Parliament and said:

You have taught those who boost of democracy an admirable lesson in respect of rights. You have taught them that people can lose their patience if they wait too long. You have taught them that rights are not granted or given - that they are won by struggle. You have taught them that aggressive material force cannot stand in the way of rights. You have given practical proof that Egypt, newly vested in democracy, knows more about it and venerates it more than those who claim that democracy has developed among them. ... Material force and political intrigue cannot prevent small nations from overthrowing imperialism, and I pray God that the country may be purged of every trace of foreign occupation and that the unity of the Nile Valley may be realized under King Faruk. (17) (Italics mine)

These 'bold actions' on the part of Egypt, however, did not really shake off Britain's position vis-a-vis the Suez and the Sudan. By proclaiming Faruk 'the King of Egypt and the Sudan' (18) did not in fact unite the Nile Valley. Being unilateral in character and obviously against the vested interests of the other party, they remained devoid of any practical value. Great Britain had promptly announced that it

16. Nahas Pasha's speech in the Egyptian Parliament on 17 October 1951. See Al-Ahram, 18 October 1951. See also John C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle East (New York, 1958), pp. 43-45.

17. Ibid.

18. Article 2 of the Draft Law. See Appendix No.

had no intention of recognizing the Egyptian action. (19)

Replying to the Egyptian note which formally communicated to them on 27 October what their Parliament had passed on the 15th instant, the British Government declared that the 1936 Treaty contained no provision for its unilateral denunciation, hence they regarded 'the Treaty and the Condominium Agreements of 1899 as remaining in force and intend fully to maintain their rights under those instruments'. The reply also contained a warning that the Egyptian Government would be held responsible for any breach of the peace and any damage done to the life or property that might result from their 'purported' abrogation of those instruments.

The 'King's Speech' delivered on the opening of the new Parliament on 6 November, clearly defined Great Britain's official policy on the question of their relations with Egypt. It said:

My Government regard the abrogation by the Egyptian Government of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance of 1936 and the Sudan Condominium Agreements of 1899 as illegal and without validity. They are resolved, in conjunction with the Governments of the United States, France and Turkey, to press forward with their proposals for joint defence armaments in the Middle East. In the meantime they will maintain their position in the Canal Zone under the terms of the 1936 Treaty and will safeguard the international highway. Nothing can be allowed to interfere with the rights of the Sudanese to decide for themselves the future status of their country. (20) (Emphasis mine)

19. See Foreign Minister Herbert Morrison's election speech at Acton on 15 October, in The Times, 16 October 1951.

20. H.C. Deb., 6 November 1951, vol. 493, col. 51; also British and Foreign State Paper 1951, vol. 158, pp.128-31.

Similar was the tone and content of the speech of Britain's new Prime Minister Winston Churchill:

In Egypt and the Sudan we are pursuing the policy adopted by the late Government. (21) ... We are resolved to maintain our rightful position in the Canal Zone in spite of the illegal and one-sided Egyptian action over the 1936 Treaty. We shall do our utmost to safeguard the Canal as an international highway using, of course, no force than is necessary. (22)

The United States, France and the European members of the British Commonwealth of Nations supported the stand of Great Britain. Official statements in Washington, for instance, upheld the validity of the Treaty and the Sudan Agreements. "The US Government", Secretary Acheson pointed out, "believes that proper respect for international obligations requires that they be altered by mutual agreement rather than by unilateral action of one of the parties." (23)

-
21. Herbert Morrison made the following statement of policy in his election broadcast on 17 October 1951:

... We are perfectly ready to negotiate with Egypt. But Britain will not be dictated to. The Suez Canal is vital to us, to our sea-going trade, to the life of the Commonwealth, to the defence of the Middle East, to the safety of the whole free world. The Sudan is important for different reasons. We have given our pledge that the Sudanese people shall move forward to self-government under our guidance. We stand by that pledge. We cannot, and will not, betray the people of the Sudan. (Italics mine)

We have got troops already in the Canal Zone. They will stay there until we can negotiate a new agreement for the defence of the whole Middle East. But we shall not sell the future freedom of the Sudanese for any defence agreement whatsoever.

See The Times, 18 October 1951.

22. H.C. Deb., 6 November 1951, vol. 493, col. 79.
23. Department of State Bulletin, vol. 25, 22 October 1951, p. 647; 29 October 1951, pp. 686, 702-3. See also, Al-Ahram, 18 October 1951.

Such expression of firmness on the part of Great Britain and her allies to defend their position in Egypt and in the Sudan and the subsequent reinforcement of the British troops in the Canal Zone by bringing paratroopers from Cyprus, created a highly embarrassing situation for the Egyptian Government. (24) The latter could neither possibly undo their action nor in fact they could substantiate it smoothly and rapidly in the face of British threat of using force to prevent them from going ahead. The British troops as a matter of fact had already occupied the Suez and Ismailia towns and begun to move British women and children to the military zone. They also hastened to take control of the bridges over the Canal. All this they had done on the 16th of October, two days ahead of the Royal assent to the laws passed by the Egyptian Parliament on the 15th.

Though anti-British demonstrations had begun in Cairo and Alexandria as soon as the decrees were announced in the Egyptian Parliament, they were not likely to assume the seriousness they acquired as a result of Britain's provocation. The Egyptian Government would have been able to bring the situation under control under the emergency rules which had been clamped all over Egypt on the 17th, but for Britain's so-called

24. Al-Ahram, 18 and 19 October 1951; The Times, 18 October 1951. According to John Connell, The Most Important Country (London, 1957), p. 31, the number of British troops in the Canal Zone rose from 10,000 permitted under the 1936 Treaty, to 80,000 combat troops of high calibre.

'precautionary steps' - that is, reinforcement of their troops and the latter's capturing certain key points in important towns in the Suez belt. (25)

In reply to the British Note of October 16 and 19, the Egyptian Government claimed that the clashes in Ismailia and Port Said on those dates had been caused by the appearance of British military vehicles in the streets "challenging the sentiments of the people"; that British troops had fired "at random" on the public, killing and wounding innocent persons; and that "assaults and robberies" by British soldiers had been reported. Whilst admitting the possibility that British subjects had been robbed and molested, the Egyptian Note of 27 October pointed out that as no complaint had been made to the competent Egyptian authorities, it had been impossible to investigate and bring guilty persons to justice. Apart from the action taken by the British "on the pretext of restoring order in the Canal Zone", there had been wider operations, such as the occupation of public buildings, railway installations, ports, bridges and strategic points, the seizure of means of transport and the detention of public officials, which could have "no other purpose than the invasion on a prepared plan on the whole Zone, its subjection to military law, and its separation from the rest of Egypt. In persuasion of this plan the British had attacked Egyptian army positions, although Egyptian army had done its utmost to avoid collusions, and were bringing daily reinforcements into Egypt by sea and air. The British action in the Canal Zone, the Note declared, constituted "an act of aggression in violent contradiction of the terms of the UN Charter ... and a clear attack on Egypt's territorial integrity and sovereignty. (26)

25. Al-Ahram, 19 October 1951.

26. Foreign Minister Salah Eddin repeated these same charges before the United Nations General Assembly held in Paris on 16 November 1951. For the text of his speech see Record of Conversations, op.cit., pp. 183-4.

For text of the Egyptian note of 27 October 1951, see Command Papers 8419, pp. 46-7. See also The Times, 19 and 29 October 1951.

Thus with the movements of the British troops, the Extremist-terrorist activities became widespread and more violent. And, once such activities began, there was no end to them. Vociferous students and youngmen, incited by the extremist organizations found in the subversive activities a way to express their suppressed resentment and pent up frustrations.

The Government of Egypt had first sincerely tried to maintain law and order inside the country. They had had no intention of making a resort to devices of pressure. The Minister of Interior had even called the demonstrators as traitors. (27) The local police had no hesitation to open fire on the mobs of their own kith and kin demonstrating in Cairo and Alexandria. They even assisted British troops at Port Said.

The Government of Egypt could not have allowed the people to take the law in their own hands and freely roam about in the streets and outskirts of the cities killing, looting and burning human beings and destroying their property. Such a state of lawless would have led to their ouster from authority. The King would have blamed them for failing to maintain law and order and removed them on that account from office, as he really did later on. The successor Government, probably a coalition or a non-party government headed by one of King's

27. Al-Misre, 5 December 1951; The Times, 5 and 6 December 1951.

favourites would have yielded to the British pressure. The Wafd, therefore, had reasons to decide not to give in to the pressure of the extremists and radical nationalists for trying to forcibly push out the British occupation.

After the incidents of 16 October, the British officers and men behaved most irrationally and indulged into all sorts of brutality and violence in order to terrorise the people and thus to demoralize them to further insist on their evacuation. (28) Lt. General Sir George Erskine, GOC, British troops in Egypt, sent the following message to the forces under his command:

... if the Egyptians tried to force the British from the Canal Zone "we shall resist most strongly; we are not going to be forced out or knocked out.... I have planned to meet the situation. You must be ready to protect yourself and to go to the help of your comrades if they are attacked. I have sent a message to the Governors of Suez, Port-Said, and Shakia telling them that I do not regard abrogation of the Treaty as relieving them in any way of their duty to maintain law and order ... but I must tell you that they have already started attacking us in Ismailia, and with public excitement at its present level, I must further warn you that hostile and criminal elements of the population may try to attack individuals and parties. I want you to do all you can. ... We are not looking for trouble, but we shall deal with it firmly if we meet it.

You must trust me and Air Vice-Marshal Brown to watch over the security of the British forces and to take such measures as are required. We shall trust you to do your duty with courage and common sense. I am confident that together we can handle the situation effectively. ... Our job is quite clear. We stand on our rights under the treaty. (29)

28. See Al-Ahram, 17 and 18 October 1951.

29. The Times, 31 October 1951.

Following this statement, the British forces captured 'all public utilities and key communication ports in the Canal Zone in public interest'. They also 'banned all Egyptian troops from entering the Canal Zone except those in transit to and from the Gaza area in southern Palestine, who would be allowed to pass through if 24 hours' notice was given. British troops were also posted on all roads leading into the Canal Zone.

The same day, British troops occupied El Ferdan bridge after mercilessly killing its Egyptian guards and taking many prisoners. According to the War Office announcement in London, there was no casualty on their side. (30)

This was too much of alien interference with matters essentially within Egypt's domestic jurisdiction. A part of their territory was practically severed from the jurisdiction of the local authority. The movement of citizens was seriously restricted in their own country. Their army was disallowed to enter the Canal Zone, and the Egyptian Government itself had to ask for permission '24 hours in advance' for sending supplies via the Zone to its soldiers on the armistice-frontiers with Israel. Thus for the first time after the last war, the people of Egypt saw how the presence of British troops constituted a limitation on their national sovereignty and rightful legal authority. The British troops during those days were really behaving like the army of occupation. It was indeed for this day that the British had not provided the Egyptian army with

30. Al-Misri, 17 October 1951; The Times, 19 October 1951.

military means and training. (31) After their reinforcements from Cyprus, the British troops in Egypt were masters of the situation. British armoured cars and military vehicles moving about in the streets in battle formation were too grave a provocation to the people and their Government to bear without strongly reacting to it. (32)

D. ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE BRITISH

Thus it was under 'grave provocation' that the Government of Egypt decided to face facts and adopt 'administrative measures' for the enforcement of its plans'. (33)

Soon after the incident of 16 October, about one thousand auxiliary police were despatched to Ismailia to help maintain a state of peace in that province. The Government further encouraged a move for non-cooperation with the British forces in the Suez Canal Zone. The Minister of Social Affairs Abdul Fattah praised the nationalist sentiments of the Egyptian workers in the service of the British and assured them to provide new

-
31. Minister of Interior Fuad Sirajud Din's Press Statement reported in The Times, 27 October 1951.
32. Al-Misri, Al-Ahram, 20 October 1951. Al Mokattam described the British as 'Pirates' who had 'lost their heads'. Al-Misri demanded that Egypt should join the Soviet bloc to help to realize her national demands, and Al-Ahram declared that a list of "British Crimes" in the Canal Zone was being compiled "for broadcasting to the world". Nahas Pasha said to a big crowd that "the enemy had lost their heads in a wave of madness and fear which had led them to commit aggressive acts."
33. Al-Ahram, 24 October 1951.

jobs and grant maintenance during the period of their struggle against foreign domination of their country. (34)

Responding to the call of the nation and inspired by their own national feelings nearly all of the 80,000 native civilian workers serving the British in the Canzl Zone withdrew from their jobs. (35) This massive withdrawal of the civilian employees immediately caused the British great inconvenience and virtually paralyzed the working of the Suez Canal. Labourers brought in as substitute from Cyprus, Malta and East Africa (36) could not cope with the huge work of the Company and the British garrison.

British G.H.Q. at Fayid announced on 23 October that all transportation of oil from Suez by road, rail and water had been suspended with immediate effect, and that all rail traffic to and from the Canal Zone had likewise been stopped until further notice. A military spokesman explained that measures had been taken because of the refusal of the Egyptian Port workers at Adobeya and Suez to return to work. (37)

The Ministry of Communications also issued orders to all Egyptian railway staff lent to the British military authorities in the Zone to withdraw their services immediately. (38)

34. Al-Misri, 21 and 31 October 1951; The Times, 31 October 1951.

35. Mohammad Neguib, Egypt's Destiny (London, 1955), p. 94; also Rasheed El Barawy, Egypt Between Two Revolutions (Cairo, 1952), pp. 173-4.

36. Survey of International Affairs 1951 (RIIA, 1951), pp. 283-4.

37. The Times, 24 October 1951.

38. Al-Ahram, 19 October 1951.

The next move in this regard was the boycott of British goods and dismissal of all British officials and teachers in the service of the Egyptian Government. (39) A bonfire of British books was blazed in Cairo's main square.

The Egyptian State Council approved a general mobilization Bill providing, in case of war or threat of war, for the conscription of all Egyptians between 18 and 50; setting up a High Council of War (comprising the Ministers of War, the Interior, Commerce, Communications and National Economy, and the Chief of Staff) under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister.

The Government asked the citizens to learn to use fire-arms and appealed to the rich to provide arms to the poor. Previously they had allowed the people to carry arms on their person 'for self-defence'. (40)

The Egyptian Government also encouraged the formation of "Liberation battalions" by providing them training facilities. On 20 December 1951 a parade was held at Fuad I University in Cairo of 50 undergraduates armed with sten guns, to mark their "passing out" as guerrillas for the Canal. (41)

39. Al-Misri, 29 October 1951. Among the dismissed British subjects there were nearly 200 teachers, 33 doctors, 24 specialists in Public works and Communications and some military and air advisors. See, Survey of International Affairs 1951, p. 285.

40. The Times, 31 October and 14 December 1951.

41. Al Misri, 21 December 1951.

At the same time the Ministry of Interior restored the property and funds of the extremist Muslim Brotherhood Organization and allowed them to hold their meetings and resume their publications. (42)

Lifting the ban from the Brotherhood was a clear indication that the Government was now determined to solicit the support of all factions of the society to resist the British "aggression". This is how Nahas Pasha described the British military actions since 16 October. (43) In an Official Note to Britain, the Egyptian Government placed full responsibility for the clashes on 17-18 November on the 'irresponsible' and 'arrogant' British soldiers. The Note described the clashes as:

Criminal acts of aggression which surpass in horror and savagery all those previous committed by the British occupation forces against the peaceful population and police officials in the Canal Zone. (44)

It was in this atmosphere of suspicion, fear and hatred that the ghastly incident of 25 January 1952 took place in Ismailia. Though it is undeniable that certain subversive and

-
42. Al-Misri, 16 December 1961. The Brotherhood had been banned in December 1948 by the Government of Ibrahim Abdul Hadi Pasha for its subversive activities which included the murder of Premier Nokrashi Pasha. The ban had been lifted on this organization in April 1951 but stringent restrictions on 'its activities had been in force. Now the Government removed all restrictions to gain their support in their struggle against the British. See Annual Register 1948, p. 299; 1951, p. 288.
43. Al-Ahram, 14 December 1951.
44. Al-Misri, 21 November 1951. British reply to the Egyptian Note in The Times, 25 November 1951.

seditionous elements had infiltrated into the 'Liberation Squads' and they were trying to exploit the Anglo-Egyptian crisis for their own ends, Egypt's attitude, actions and reactions against British provocations, was motivated and predominantly guided by nationalistic objectives and enthusiasm. It was in their country that a foreign army was staying against their wishes; was interfering in their national affairs and was flouting the local authority. It was within Egypt that the British armed forces had established their own 'Kingdom' inside the Canal Zone to which even the Egyptian officials and army personnel had no free excess.

If Egypt in those days was in revolt, it was for their national freedom. They had tolerated their subjugation under the British for so long, they were now trying to get rid of it. They had tried to achieve it by passivity, having failed they were now determined to assert their legitimate national claims by force. There was nothing wrong or bad or unprecedented about it. The UN Charter guaranteed every nation full freedom and equality of sovereign status. And, this was precisely what the Egyptians were striving to achieve while the British condemned them for demanding freedom from their colonialism.

Speaking in Cairo Nahas Pasha publicly denounced the Four-Power Middle East defence plan as "worse than colonialism", accused the UN of furthering the ambitions of "greedy great Powers at the expense of smaller nations"; he declared:

We thought Britain would return to her senses, especially when Labour came to power, but we had only promises. The Wafd did its best to negotiate with the British, who always put forward some pretext for 'common defence' which is colonization

in disguise. ... The British troops had attacked and robbed people, surrounded towns, chased men, killed women and children, and captured policemen. (45)

It was a struggle between the forces of nationalism and imperialism in its unconventional cloak. Egypt's struggle should therefore be seen from a nationalistic point of view. Their blowing up the rail tracks, bridges and British military depots; throwing acid and hand grenades from roof-tops and balconies on the British armed patrols, their occasional rioting and killing of British soldiers in encounters and of some isolated individuals and cutting wires of communications and channels of supplies were natural psychological reactions of a long suppressed and humiliated people. In many parts of Asia and Africa the nationalist forces had found that the imperialists understood only the language of force.

The Egyptians had hoped that Britain would "eventually realize the consequences of her attitude ... and would submit to the logic of rights and justice. (46) Instead the British preferred to use force and suppressive measures. They bulldozed and raised to the ground the village of 'Kafr Abduh' which was a strong-point of the 'freedom fighters' arguing that it was a 'military necessity'. (47)

45. Al-Misri, 14 November 1951.

46. Speech from the Throne, dated 15 November 1951. See Al-Misri, 16 November 1951; also The Egyptian Gazette of the same date.

47. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 8, 9 and 10 December 1951. See also The Manchester Guardian, 10 December 1951.

This act of 'atrocities' sparked off the Egyptian resentment to the highest pitch. Ibrahim Faraq Pasha, acting Foreign Minister, described the incident as 'symbolizing the unspeakable atrocities acts of brutal force perpetrated by British occupation forces in the fatherland. (48) Salah Eddin Pasha wrote to the Secretary-General of United Nations Trggve Lie, protesting against the demolition of 75 houses at Kafr Abduh which, he declared, had been carried out "heedless of political, legal or human rights of inhabitants", and which he described as "an extremely serious and flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the U.N." (49)

The Egyptian Cabinet held an emergency meeting and unanimously resolved to recall their Ambassador from London "as a protest against aggression by the British forces in the Canal Zone." (50)

Nahas Pasha declared in a broadcast to the nation that Egypt would not stand idle in the face of British aggression and that British "tyranny" would have "far-reaching consequences". (51)

48. Ibrahim Faraq Pasha's letter to the British Ambassador, dated 13 December 1951. See The Times, 15 December 1951. also Al-Misri, 9 December 1951; The Egyptian Gazette, 13 and 14 December 1951.

49. The Times, 12 December 1951; The New York Times, 12 December 1951.

50. Al-Ahram, 14 December 1951. Also The Mideast Mirror, 15 December 1951; The Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. 3, 1952, p. 49; The Times, 13 December 1951.

51. Al-Misri, 12 December 1951.

The 'Supreme Guide' of the Moslem Brotherhood, Hodeiby Bey issued a statement calling on his followers to intensify the campaign against the British. (52)

By the close of the year hatred of Great Britain was apparent everywhere in Egypt. The National Liberation Army mainly consisting of enthusiastic students and other youngmen, organised resistance movements and fought pitched battles with the British regulars. Demonstrations and strikes became daily scenes in all major towns of the country. The situation seemed to her practically getting out of control. Nevertheless, Great Britain still seemed adamant on maintaining its position despite 20,000,000 people of Egypt determined to put them out. (53)

On returning from London on 31 December 1952 after consultation with the Government, General Robertson made a statement which further embittered the already existing tension and made the Egyptians more steadfast in their basic demand of evacuation of their country and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown. The statement, given below, was not merely a restatement of British policy but also threatened to silence the Egyptians by force if they continued their present struggle:

As the Foreign Secretary has made plain on many occasions HM Government are determined to press forward with the Four-Power proposals. ... Until such an arrangement is made HM Government will uphold our position in the Canal Zone and maintain the freedom of International waterways of the Canal, not for any reason of selfish interest but as our contribution to the defence of the free world.

52. Al-Misri, 17 December 1951.

53. The Egyptian Gazette, 3 January 1952.

He warned:

It would be a great mistake for any one to imagine that pressure and terrorism with their inevitable consequences, will in any way affect our resolve. If necessary we shall go on month after month, for many months, if need be shall meet force with force. ... We have sufficient force at our disposal and we have the support of other countries. No one should be misled into thinking that we shall be turned from our policy by the passage of time or murderous episode. (54)

Prime Minister Nahas Pasha replied in matching tone of determination and finality. He in fact expressed the feelings of the entire Egyptian people when he replied General Robertson's statement by saying:

We are not worried by such threats and we are ready to use force in reply to force. We are determined to attain our aims and to realize our national claims. (55)

Thus encouraged by the firm backing of Churchill's Government, General Erskine became bolder and ordered complete evacuation of all civilian population of the village Kafr Abduh and also the entire locality overlooking the Sweet Water Canal from which British convoys had been reportedly ambushed. This caused great hardship and misery to 'hundreds of Egyptian families' - all this "to arouse security to his forces." (56)

The Egyptian Government strongly protested against the British operations which Sirajuddin Pasha later described to a Press Conference as "out of all proportion to the alleged

54. The Egyptian Gazette, 1 January 1952; The Times, 1 January 1952.

55. Al-Ahram, 1 January 1952.

56. The Egyptian Gazette, 7 January and 24 January 1952. See Survey of International Affairs 1951, p. 287.

provocation: the British had thrown women and children "destitute and half clothed" into the streets and taken them to prison camps, had desecrated a mosque and a cemetery, had "loosed savage dogs on unarmed people" and had killed wounded, or flogged large numbers of the Egyptians. He added that as events had passed beyond the stage where mere protests were adequate, forcible resistance would be the only alternative. (57)

Against this official threat, the British Commander in Ismailia wished to clear the city of all armed Egyptian personnel including the police and gendarmerie posted there. In fact he planned a straight-forward occupation of the city. He, therefore, first moved his troops into the town and trained guns on police headquarters and then handed in an ultimatum to the Egyptian sub-Governor demanding that the Police should surrender without arms, evacuate the government buildings and compound and depart from the city. But surrender in this manner would have been a shame. The men surrounded by British tanks and troops were policemen by profession but they were Egyptians too.

There was hardly any chance of their resisting the British show of tremendous force with bare rifles for any length of time but they did possess sufficient courage and spirit of sacrifice to face the situation boldly. The Minister of Interior encouraged them by telephonic message 'to resist to the ^{last} bullet'. So they turned down the ultimatum and fought the onslaught of the British armoured cars until 50 of them were dead and 100

57. The Egyptian Gazette, 24 January 1952; The Times, 23 and 24 January 1952.

wounded and the building shattered to pieces by bombardment from heavy guns of the British tanks. (58)

E. CAIRO PUT ON FLAMES

The news of the tragedy caused an spontaneous and unprecedented outbreak of violence in Cairo. (59) The entire population was insensed at the British action. The young enthusiasts of Al Azhar and the Cairo University, the infuriated Buluq en Nizam and the extremists organised mass-demonstrations and demanded 'arms to fight for the Canal', and 'reprisals for the fate of their comrades at Ismailiya. (60) The orthodox 'Ikhwans' and the Communists, though diametrically opposed to each other in their ideological context, joined hands for a common purpose. (61)

The nationalist campaign against the British took serious turn in the afternoon of the 'Black Saturday' - the 26th of January 1952 when a section of the excited demonstrators resorted to violence and started destructive activities. The British owned or patronised clubs, shops, Casinos, bars and cinemas were

-
58. The Egyptian Gazette, 27 January 1952; Al-Misri, 27 January 1952. See also Survey of International Affairs 1951, p. 288; Mohammad Jeguib, op.cit., p. 100; Laconture, op.cit., p. 106. John Connell, op.cit., p. 33; also The Times, 26 January 1952.
59. See, "Exchange of Notes Between Great Britain and Egypt", Document Section in Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. III, March 1952, pp. 80-82.
60. Al-Misri, Al-Ahram, 27 January 1952.
61. S.A. Morrison, Middle East Tensions (New York, 1954), Chapter VII; also Walter Z. Lacquer, Nationalism and Communism.

ablazed and gutted, including the world-famous Shepherds Hotel. It was almost a state of anarchy wherein looting, rioting, killing and chaos became the order of the remaining hours of the 'terrible day'. By the time the Egyptian troops entered the city to bring the situation under control, over 750 establishments had been burnt or destroyed, at least thirty people lost their lives in which 11 were British and other foreign nationals, and several hundred others were injured. (62)

These acts of violence and sabotage by individuals and small groups were not merely an outburst of 'emotional nationalism' but the culmination of nearly seventy years' of unequal and uncherished relationship between Great Britain and Egypt. A number of Western scholars, historians and journalists (63) have, however, tried to define this expression of Egypt's hate and anger over the entire British conduct - past and present, as only an indication of the common man's dissatisfaction with the working of the local administration and its inability to successfully deal with the problems of high prices and shortage

-
62. For a fuller account the events of 26 January which is now nicknamed as 'Black Saturday' and for an analysis of the factors causing delay in bringing in the army to control situation, see Laconture, op.cit., Chapter XII; also St. John, op.cit., Chapter VII; Survey 1951, pp. 288-90. Also, "Crisis in Egypt and Persia", World Today, September 1952, The Times, 26 January 1952.
63. H.Wood Jarvis, Pharaoh to Faruk (London, 1956), Chapter 33. P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt (London, 1969), Chapter 16; Richard Hilton, The Thirteenth Power (London, 1958), Chapter 12; Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London, 1967), Chapter 7; Jean and Simone Laconture, Egypt in Transition (London, 1958), Chapter 12.

of essential articles of domestic needs such as oil, sugar and bread; that the Wafd leaders had deliberately and purposely fanned up the trouble to divert the attention of the masses from the corruption and unsatisfactory handling of administration; that the King was again looking for an opportunity to break his alliance with the Wafdists and dismiss their government which the latter could avoid or at least get postponed for some time by fomenting a crisis against the British; that the King, in his turn, was intending to use the breakdown of order as a pretext to oust the Government and, for this purpose, he delayed sending troops into the streets of Cairo to restore order.

While these were the facts of Egypt's domestic politics, they were not the dominant factors responsible for the crisis in her relations with Britain towards the end of January. To the Egyptians, settlement of outstanding questions of their relations with Great Britain was more important than such petty issues of local marketing process and control of prices. Egypt was afire with the desire for full freedom and restoration of national dignity. During the past several years, the success and survival of Governments had depended more on its ability or failure to fulfil the promise of realising national objectives. The Wafd in 1951-52 was so strong and popular that its survival could not have been affected by temporary shortage of some consumer goods or allegations of unfair practices in the administration.

Such charges had been brought earlier also against the Wafd Government by its dissident member, Markra Ebied, but despite that the Wafd had been returned to power by overwhelming majority in the last elections. Its success at the polls was not because of its promise of social reforms and economic improvements, but mainly because of its pledge to secure complete withdrawal of alien army and influence from their country.

To suggest that the 1951-52 revolt of the people against Britain and the West was merely the result of their disappointment with the King and the Government to give a clean administration, is to belittle or underestimate their nationalist fervour. Certain irresponsible and unpardonable acts on the part of certain irresponsible characters who always join in such a campaign, nevertheless, do not change its nationalist character of motivation.

What happened in Cairo on 26 January, though morally bad, was not a pre-planned revenge. The targets were not earmarked in advance. The whole thing was an spontaneous expression of accumulated resentment of the people. The sufferings and victimisation of their fellow-countrymen in the Suez Canal area at the hands of the British troops were the immediate and grave provocation that led to violent manifestation of their disapproval and protest. The Wafd's responsibility was that it had not fully anticipated the nature and extent of British reactions to its decision of abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and, therefore, made no provision for the protection and care of the

inhabitants of the Suez Canal Zone. Many who fled from their homes after the British forces had turned the whole area into a virtual theatre of war, described how they were subjected to innumerable atrocities committed by desperate British troops, many innocent people killed, their homes pillaged, their places of worship desecrated which aroused the listeners of Cairo to cries of revenge. (64)

F. DISMISSAL OF NAHAS PASHA AND THE END OF MONARCHY IN EGYPT

The burning of Cairo and the alleged failure of the Government to prevent 'acts of genuine nationalist sentiments' being turned into acts of terrorism, gave King Faruk the desired chance to dismiss Nahas Pasha's Government on 27 January and call on Ali Maher, reputed 'strong man' of Egyptian politics, to form a new Government. (65)

Ali Maher's first important task was to restore order in public life and arrange for security for all and thus to prevent British troops from moving into Cairo to protect the life and property of British and other foreign nationals in the

64. See, Bourse Egyptienne, 24 January 1952, quoted in Survey 1951, p. 289. Also The Times, 24 January 1952. See also Mustafa Ala, Egypt Between Revolutions (Cairo), Chapter IV; also Al-Misri, 10 February 1952.

65. Al-Ahram, 28 January 1952; The Times, 28 January 1952. Ali Maher had been Prime Minister of Egypt in 1936 and 1939-40. He had had Faruk's confidence through many vicissitudes since the beginning of his reign in 1936. For details see, The Middle East in the War, op.cit., pp. 33-40, 199-212.

town. He tried to win the support and sympathy of the nation by assuring that he would strive "to achieve the evacuation of British troops and the unity of the Nile Valley - the two national objectives which all previous governments had at heart." (66) At the same time he expressed his readiness to reopen discussion with the four powers on the question of Middle East defence. (67) Answering Press reporters on 30 January and again on 4 February, he said:

We are ready to consider any understanding Mr. Eden might propose. ... It is my wish that a healthy atmosphere for a better understanding should prevail between Egypt and Britain and Powers of the Free World. The Middle East Command and the inter-Arab Security Pact will be matters for discussion with the Egyptian National Front (which consisted of the Saadists, the Liberal constitutionalists and the Wafdists). Both these questions will, naturally, be in the framework of the UN Charter. (68)

He also agreed to try and punish all those found guilty of neglecting their duty to prevent violence or participated in it, and promised compensation to those who suffered during the recent 'rioting'. He also ordered the withdrawal of all 'National Liberation Squads' and other volunteers from the

66. Ali Maher's statement of policy made before the Chamber of Deputies on 28 January 1952. See Al-Misri, The Egyptian Gazette, both of 29 January 1952.

67. Mideast Mirror, 2 February 1952, p. 2.

68. Al-Ahram, 5 February 1952; The Times, 5 February 1952; also, Survey of International Affairs 1952 (RIIA, 1955), pp. 203-4; Mideast Mirror, 9 February 1952; Middle East Journal, vol. III, February and March 1952, pp. 63, 97.

Canal Zone and to resume regular transport services and other facilities to the British troops.

It was a good start and there were hopes that the two Governments would renew conversations and would arrive at some acceptable solution of their conflicting issues. Great Britain had not failed to appreciate the gesture of the Egyptian Government. The British Commanding Officer had withdrawn restrictions on civilian movement in the zone and released many Egyptians taken into custody since October last. (69)

The reappointment of Amer Pasha to his former position as Ambassador in London, from where he had been recalled by the Wafdists in December last was quite an indication that he seriously meant business. (70) He received the British Ambassador in a very cordial and friendly manner when the latter called on him. Both discussed the possibility of opening formal negotiations for a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Both agreed to begin with a 'clean slate'. The British diplomat was understood to have been advised by London to assure in advance that every Egyptian suggestion would receive 'most careful consideration' by His Majesty's Government. (71)

69. The Times, 6 February 1952; Al-Misri, 5 and 6 February 1952; Mideast Mirror, 9 February 1952.

70. Middle Eastern Affairs, 1953, p. 97; Mideast Mirror, 23 February 1952, pp. 1-3; Mustafa Ala, op.cit., p. 112; El-Barawy, op.cit., p. 180; Tom Little, op.cit., p. 110.

71. Mideast Mirror, 1 March 1952, p. 2.

On the Egyptian side, there was a marked change in their basic approach to all the outstanding issues involving relations with Great Britain. Maher's Government showed its readiness to consider the question of evacuation, and the Sudan's unity with Egypt in the context of regional strategy and security. The preceding Egyptian Government had not been prepared to consider regional defence until its demands had been fully accepted.

The statement made by the influential legal adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Wahid Raafat Bey was of great importance in this regard. He frankly stated that the Egyptian question no longer concerned Egypt and Britain alone. He was obviously advocating that regional security Pact should replace bilateral arrangement, i.e., the 1936 Treaty. He referred to the proposal of the Iraqi Premier, Nuri Pasha, that the Arab League Security Pact should be opened to permit the association of other Powers.

He believed that a defence pact for the Middle East based on the following principles could be acceptable to the Government and the people of Egypt:

1. The British forces should evacuate the Canal Zone within a period not more than 12 months from the day the pact was signed.
2. The military base which is now occupied by the British should be handed over to the Egyptian forces.
3. The Egyptian authorities would be responsible for maintaining the base in readiness for use immediately there is foreign aggression.
4. The help of foreign experts, regardless of their nationality, could be sought for the maintenance of the base.

5. A regional defence Pact between the Arab States on one side and America, Britain, France and Turkey on the other, should be concluded.
6. These Western Powers should supply the Arab forces with all war material and equipment.
7. A defence council to coordinate military plans should be formed.
8. Troops of a foreign allied country should not occupy the land of another country except in time of war and should evacuate immediately the war is ended.
9. Aid given by the Arab States in war-time should be restricted to the Middle East region alone. (72)

This statement seemed to have narrowed the field of dispute because it confirmed that there existed a certain degree of unity of intentions on both sides.

But Maher's disagreement with the King on the question of dissolution of the Parliament, led to the postponement of negotiations with Great Britain, as he had resigned from Premiership on 1 March. (73)

His successor, Ahmed Neguib El Hilali, a former Minister of Education in 1937 and again in 1942, who had broken with the Wafd party after 1950's election, agreed with the King to dissolve the Parliament, exile Sirajuddin and place entire responsibility of the events of 26th January and those preceding that day on the Wafdists. (74) He put many persons on trial

72. Al-Ahram, 28 February 1952; also Mideast Mirror, 1 March 1952, pp. 2-3.

73. Al-Ahram, 2 March 1952; Anwar El Sadat, op.cit., p. 106; also Survey 1952, p. 204.

74. Al-Ahram, 2, 3 and 8 March 1952; The Egyptian Gazette, 25 March 1952. See also Report of the Prosecutor-General of investigations of the 'Black Saturday' which held the

and sent many to jail including Ahmed Husain, founder leader of the Arab Socialist Party.

These measures were bound to alienate all political parties from the Government. Ali Maher had wished to avoid this situation by declining to take such unwelcome measures at a time when 'the prospect of reaching agreement with Great Britain were much nearer than at any time in the past'. It was mainly for this purpose that he had created a 'United National Front' and asked for the unanimous support of both the Houses of the Chamber. He had thus tried to prevent 'disunity' by retaining the Parliament. Though he denounced the negligence of those generally responsible for the situation, he took no action against them, and did not agree to break the Wafd. Hilali lacked Maher's political grasp and created rift in the national unity. This weakened his position in dealing with the British successfully, despite the fact that he shared and pursued the policy of his predecessor.

Thus, the exploratory discussions on Egypt's political relations with Great Britain between Premier Hilali and Ambassador Stevenson began in a confused domestic atmosphere. After the abrogation of the Parliament, new elections were to be held within two months of the dissolution. And, in the elections, the Wafd's victory was a foregone conclusion. The Palace and prominent figures in Egypt's social and political circles were

74. (contd. from back page)

Wafd Government responsible for failing to anticipate and to take precautions against those incidents. See, Mideast Mirror, 15 March 1952, pp. 1-5; El Sadat, op.cit., p. 106.

also not appreciate ^{and} Hilali's programme of eradication of corruption from public life. (75) Hilali's Government was, therefore, a weak Government of uncertain tenure with no support from the Palace or the parties. The masses too were not particularly impressed by his promises of a clean and stable administration because of his severe punitive actions against popular leaders for their participation in the recent 'national agitation'. (76) The British Ambassador was aware of the weaknesses of Hilali's Government and, therefore, wouldn't go to the extent of making real and conclusive deal with him.

Nevertheless the two Governments tried to prepare a ground for further talks under more suspicious circumstances in future. During several meetings held in Cairo and London between March and June 1952, both sides adopted an attitude of accommodation and adjustment with each other's objectives and commitments to their respective peoples. (77) For a while it

-
75. Anwar El Sadat writes in his book Revolt on the Nile that Karim Tabet, Faruk's press officer, and Elias Androos, of the Palace clique, could think of no better plan to ask the United States Ambassador, Jefferson Caffery, to help them overthrow Hilali. This move was characteristic of the political morality of the last days of the old regime, when it was considered quite natural to invite the intervention of a foreign power in Egyptian affairs. This story was told to Galal Hammasy, my colleague of the newspaper Al-Gomhourya, by the distinguished diplomat himself at a farewell dinner on his return to the United States." p. 107.
76. Al-Ahram, 19 May 1952; Mustafa Ala, op.cit., p. 112. Also Robert O. Collins, Egypt and the Sudan (New Jersey, 1967), p. 130; also The United States In World Affairs 1952 (New York, 1953), p. 237.
77. See Mideast Mirror, 22 March to 30 June 1952. See also Egyptian Gazette and Al-Misri (Cairo) and The Times (London), of the same period for editorial comments and articles from political reviewers; also see Survey 1952, pp. 205-8.

seemed that London was willing to consider the evacuation of the Canal Zone on the ground that Hilali Pasha was understood to have accepted in principle the idea of:

1. Joint planning of defence measures which would become operative in the event of an international emergency threatening the security of Egypt;
2. Anglo-Egyptian cooperation in air defence; and
3. the employment of British technicians in the Canal Zone. (78)

Similarly on the question of the Sudan it was indicated from the British side that Britain had no objection to the Egyptian Crown having sovereignty over the Sudan and Egypt "as long as the Sudanese agree." Sir Stevenson gave the impression that what HM Government refused to do was to make a unilateral statement committing herself to a recognition of that sovereignty. It, therefore, seemed probable that if the two sides agreed on a practical method of ascertaining the Sudanese opinion, the controversy would be resolved to the satisfaction of all.

The Egyptian Government, however, could not modify its demand of recognition of the King's title to the Sudan now with the proviso that the Sudanese should have the right to determine their relations with Egypt eventually.

Their talks, however, could not continue further because of new political and legal complications having been created by the developments in the Sudan. The Sudan administration

78. The Times, 28 March 1952; Al-Ahram, 10 May 1952.
Also US in World Affairs 1952, p. 237.

presented to the Legislative Assembly, on 2 April, a draft statute of self-government based on the work of the constitutional commission which had been set up in March 1951. This draft statute had provided for immediate elections of a legislature and the formation of an all-Sudanese Government, but reserved substantial discretionary powers to the British Governor-General during the period of transition until the Sudanese people exercised their right freely to determine their future relationship with Egypt and Great Britain. (79)

The new constitution was subject to the approval of both Egypt and Great Britain, the co-domini, after its acceptance by the Assembly in Khartoum. But from the Egyptian point of view the co-domini status for both Egypt and Britain had been done away with by the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 Condominium Agreements in October last. The Government and the entire people in Egypt were committed to uphold their constitutional position. They could not lawfully assume responsibilities in that capacity and consider the value or otherwise of a constitution which had been formulated under an administration whose de jure rights they considered to have vanished under their own acts of abrogation.

The Government of Egypt was seriously annoyed at the turn of events and straightaway refused to recognize the validity and propriety of the Governor-General's action. (80) The Al-Ahram

79. Text in Documents on International Affairs 1952 (RIIA), p. 290; also Cmd. 8767, Appendix 2, pp. 12-45.

80. Al-Misri, 4 April 1952.

warned that "the next few days, nay, the next few hours" would prove decisive in Anglo-Egyptian relations. (81) The Egyptians generally believed that the announcement by the Governor-General of the proposed new constitution at such a time was a direct affront to the Egyptian Government and showed that the Sudan Government's British chief saw no reason to obey the British Government or the latter was itself party to this intransigence. Most columnists in the dailies of Cairo and the pro-Egyptian Khartoum Press felt that the London Foreign Office had its hand in timing the presentation of the draft law before the Khartoum Assembly. (82) They felt that Britain was intent on carrying out its policy of separating the southern region from the north of the Nile Valley. They argued that there was not much point in proceeding with talks on the Sudan when the Sudan administration was proceeding with its own anti-Egyptian policy as was evident from its latest actions.

It would be of some interest to mention here that the American Ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson Caffery, whose main interest was to see that both Egypt and Great Britain reconcile their differences in the overriding interest of the defence of the free world, seriously urged British recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan which would be merely nominal until the Sudanese people had exercised their right of self-determination. But the Foreign Office accepted the view of the Sudan's

81. Al-Ahram, 30 April 1952.

82. Mideast Mirror, April, May and June 1952.

Governor-General that the niceties of 'nominal sovereignty' were too subtle for a politically immature people, and that the question of the King of Egypt's title during the interim period should be made the object of 'immediate consultation with the Sudanese'. (83).

Neguib el Hilali had sincerely hoped and tried to consolidate his position by coming to terms with Great Britain, but as the latter was not prepared to modify her stand on the question of the Sudan, he failed in his objective and resigned on 28 June. Domestic pressures, including Palace-intrigues against him, (84) were no less important factors impelling his unceremonious exit from politics. (85)

After Neguib el Hilali's resignation the question of Egypt's relations with Great Britain and other matters of external nature were pushed into abeyance until a new revolutionary Junta of younger army officers came at the helm of affairs in late July 1952. Meanwhile, problems and intrigues of national politics dominated the scene. The King and the political leaders remained preoccupied with asserting their positions against each other. The King was exasperated to learn *that* his 'true-self' has been exposed to the people and that his

83. New York Times, 21 May 1952; Survey of International Affairs 1952 (RIIA, 1953), p. 206. Also Cmd. 8767, ~~see also~~ pp. 7-8. See also Mideast Mirror, 9 February 1952, p. 4.

84. Tom Little, op.cit., p. 111; El-Sadat, op.cit., p. 107; also Rasheed El Barawy, op.cit., pp. 180-2.

85. Al-Ahram, 29 June 1952; The Egyptian Gazette of the same date.

subjects hate him for his sinful life and irresponsible conduct of public affairs. (86) The new officers made him abdicate from the throne and exiled him from the country to which he really never belonged.

With his sailing away from the shores of Alexandria on board 'Al Mahroussa' on 26 July the past of Egypt, dominated by self-centred monarchs and corrupt politicians, was drowned into the sea. Egypt was reborn that day to begin its new life. (87)

86. For full description of King Faruk's shameful private life and highly irresponsible, corrupt and dishonest conduct of the affairs of the state in which nobody's life, wealth and honour was safe, see Rasheed el Barawy, op.cit., Chapters 12 and 13; Laconture, op.cit., Part II, Chapter I; Tom Little, op.cit., p. 111; also Survey 1952, p. 211; Mustafa Ala, op.cit., pp. 116-22.

87. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 27 July 1952. See also The Times, 27 February 1952; also Mohammed Moustafa Ala, Egyptian Between Two Revolutions (Cairo, 1952), p. 122.

Chapter VI

THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROSPECTS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES WITH BRITAIN - THE SUDAN

A. EGYPT'S NEW LEADERS' ATTITUDE TOWARDS GREAT BRITAIN

By the middle of July 1952 the question of Egypt's relations with Great Britain had remained totally unresolved. The failure of Great Britain and Egypt to negotiate a new treaty after the Great War, and the former's attitude of postponing the issue by insisting on latter's joining in a common defence alliance, had created a deadlock in their search for a new basis of their relationship. But this stalemate could by no means help the new Egyptian Government devote its attention to the problems of local politics and socio-economic reforms.

The 'burning of Cairo' had unequivocally demonstrated the Egyptians' unwillingness to further tolerate the presence of 'alien armed forces' in their country. Britain's stubborn and obdurate action against a handful of Egyptian auxiliary police in Ismailia, and the other so-called 'precautionary measures' which included traffic restrictions and night curfews, personal searches, expulsion of families and even demolition of houses in the Canal Zone, had also brought home to the Egyptians the unpleasant fact that the presence of British forces was not only a limitation on their sovereignty but also national honour.

The revolutionary regime of the Free Officers (1) was fully convinced of the necessity of removing all such limitations and interference in their domestic affairs. They paid immediate attention to the problem of Egypt's relations with Great Britain. They had realized that the social revolution could not begin unless Egypt was completely free from local corruption and political interferences from the British garrison in the Suez Canal Zone. As Nasser wrote:

Every nation undergoes two revolutions: the first, political, in which it recovers its rights to self-government from an imposed despot, or an occupying army; the second, social in which the classes of society struggle against each other until an equilibrium is established and justice is secured for all citizens. (2)

-
1. The Free Officers Organization had come into existence long before the coup d'etat of July 1952. Many of the leaders of the movement were late-1930s graduates of the Military College. Many had classmates. In their official posts they enjoyed opportunities to meet together and discuss Egyptian affairs.

Very early in their careers they expressed dissatisfaction with the old order. The 1942 crisis and the humiliation of the Army in 1948 Palestine campaign quickened their discontent, but it was not until 1949 that a formal organization came into existence. Although they believed that the old order must be supplanted, at this time they did not see themselves as the instrument of change. The Free Officers Organization was set up, in part to protect the younger and more radical men in the army against the intrigues of the King. In part, it was also established to debate and circulate the ideas of the young officers more widely throughout the army. It had both a civilian and a military wing for popularising its ideas, although the civilian wing soon fell into disuse. Only the extraordinary breakdown in political and economic order in 1951 and 1952 convinced the Free Officers that the army must play a predominant role in the politics of Egypt.

For a detailed account of the Free Officers Movement see Lacouture, op.cit., Part 2, Chapter I; Robert St. John, op.cit., Chapters 5-8; Robert O. Collins, op.cit., Chapter 5;

(contd. on next page)

In the first phase of the revolution, the Free Officers had succeeded without violence in getting rid of the detested and despised monarch and scores of corrupt persons and politicians. Faruk had been permanently sent into exile (3)

1. (contd. from back page)

Joachim Joestin, Nasser, The Rise to Power (London, 1960), Chapter 6.

2. Gamal Abdul Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo, 1954), p. 26.

3. On 26th of July 1952 the Junta presented the following ultimatum to King Faruk which demanded him to abdicate in favour of his infant son Fuad II and leave the country before sunset the same day: "whereas the total anarchy in which the country has of recent months been thrown, and which has spread to all domains, is a result of your bad administration, your violations of the Constitution, and your disregard of the will of the people to a point where no citizen could feel secure in his life, dignity and property.

"Whereas your persistence in this course has compromised the name of Egypt among the nations, and treacherous and corrupt persons have, under your protection, continued to amass shameful fortunes and to squander public funds while the people remained a prey to hunger and poverty.

"Whereas these facts have been brought to light by the war in Palestine, the traffic in defective arms and ammunition to which it gave rise, and the judgments pronounced by the Courts on those responsible revealed your intervention - intervention which distorted truth, shook confidence in justice, encouraged traitors in their crimes, enriched some and corrupted others.

"Therefore the Army, representing the Power of the People, has authorized me to demand that Your Majesty abdicate the Throne in favour of the Heir Apparent, His Highness Prince Ahmed Fuad on this day, Saturday, July 26th, 1952, and that you leave the country before 6 P.M. on this same day.

"The Army holds Your Majesty responsible for any consequences which may result from your refusal to conform to the will of the people.

Sd. Mohamed Neguib
Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces.

See El Sadat, op.cit., pp. 125-26

and all others who were involved in malpractices were tried and punished by special tribunals. (4) All political parties had been suppressed (5) and the existing Constitution had been abrogated to pave the way for the drafting of the new one. (6) But the process was far from being complete as long as the 'alien armed forces' were present inside the country.

They sincerely wished to weed out corruption, bribery, favouritism and abuse of authority from the Government and politics of their country which, in their opinion, were holding back the wheels of progress and social uplift. They wished to eradicate these evils and to see their country become a truly modern nation in the real sense of the world. But this was not possible without solving the problem of adjustment of their relations with Britain. They had no love for the British but they also realized that some business-like adjustment was necessary.

In their pre-revolution circulars which were secretly distributed among the army personnel they had totally disapproved of any compromise or concessions being made to the British or any other foreign power. In one of their circulars issued when the first Neguib el Hilali Government was formed and emphasis was shifted from foreign to domestic issues, the F.O. said:

-
4. Al-Ahram, 8 September 1952.
 5. The Egyptian Gazette, 1 August 1952, 2 October 1952.
 6. John Marlowe, Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1900-56 (London, 1956), p. 389.

There have lately been several conspiracies by Anglo-American Imperialism for the purpose of undermining the nationalist movement and diverting the people from armed struggle against imperialism in the Canal Zone to domestic questions. After the Wafd Government had cut off negotiations and taken the drastic step of abrogating the treaty and after having rejected the imperialistic 4-State Middle East Defence Pact, imperialism plotted and provoked the January 26 events.

The Aly Maher Cabinet took the reins of Government and decided to resume negotiations with the British.

Imperialism and Egyptian traitors hoped that Aly Maher would make a complete surrender by accepting the 4-State Middle East Defence Pact, dissolving parliament, ordering the internment of thousands of patriots and using Martial Law as means for the prevention of the people.

They have, however, been greatly disappointed as Aly Maher has not acquiesced in their demands.

It was therefore, deemed necessary that a so-called "purification" movement should take place before facing imperialism. This was taken by Ahmed Neguib el Hilali who openly declared that the principal task of his Government was the elimination of corruption, forgetting that imperialism was the main cause of such corruption and that it would not be possible to stamp it out unless the country got rid of imperialism.

Among the objectives of the Free Officers is the launching of a campaign against corruption in all its aspects ... but we should not combat such evils unless we have been completely freed from imperialism. Any other step should be tantamount to unpardonable treachery to the fatherland. (7)

In another important 'circular' the inner circle of the Free Officers urged all the Officers in the Egyptian army to struggle for the emancipation of their country from the yoke of imperialism as they alone possessed the means and the ability to fight for their country's freedom and national

7. Rasheed El Barawy, The Military Coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1952), pp. 199-200.

honour. The 'circular' dated 22 March made the following general appeal 'To All Officers':

Your own freedom is entirely dependent upon the freedom of the people. You should therefore, carry on the struggle for freedom everywhere.

You should remember that the traitors, who are in command of the Army are also in league with imperialism.

It is, therefore, your duty to turn on the enemies of the Fatherland and force them to respect our liberty, our dignity and our patriotism which they have violated in order that they might serve their own personal ends.

'Down with imperialism!
'Down with any alliance with imperialism!
'Down with Joint Defence and with any collective security pact under imperialism!
'Down with Martial Law! (8)

Another 'circular' issued on 'the anniversary of the bombardment of Alexandria by British imperialists' (9) against the nationalist uprising of Col. Ahmed Orabi in 1882, reiterated that a determined, united struggle by the army and the people was the only way to secure their freedom and basic human rights. The 'circular' cautioned the then Prime Minister, Hussein Sirry that

The Egyptian people and the Free Officers have already declared they will never agree to any further negotiations, to any alliance or defence pact with imperialistic blocs but that they demand

8. Ibid., p. 201.

9. For a vivid account of the riots in Alexandria on 11 June 1882 given by Col. Ahmed Orabi's associate in the revolt Ahmed Bey Rifaat, see W.S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (London, 1895), Appendix II.

liberty, full independence, complete neutrality and armed struggle for the liberation of the Fatherland. (10)

These 'circulars' and slogans clearly indicated that the principal aim of the revolution was that Egypt should occupy her rightful and natural position among the civilized and free countries of the world. Such an aim, they thought, could not be attained without unconditional evacuation. But after assuming the reins of authority, these young spirited officers, however, soon realized that total renunciation by violent methods and insistence on the acceptance of their own terms and conditions for reaching a settlement would not practically help them realize their objectives. A helpful change in their attitude and moderation in their approach on all issues involving Great Britain was necessary. Without such moderation the realization of the objectives of their revolution would have been delayed as the social revolution was so much dependent on the settlement of vital issues between Egypt and Great Britain.

B. CAUTION AGAINST BRITISH INTERVENTION

The leaders of the revolution had not ignored or underestimated the chances of British intervention if the latter misunderstood their intentions. (11) In their very first pronouncement they wisely assured all British and other foreign

10. Rasheed El Barawy, op.cit., p. 204.

11. Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London, 1967), p. 151.

nationals "that the Army considers itself entirely responsible for the protection of their persons and property." (12) They also sent an official Note to the British Embassy at the earliest moment informing that "what had just happened in Egypt was a purely internal affair". The Note also contained a warning that "any attempt at intervention would be considered as interference in the country's domestic affairs and would have serious consequences." (13)

The Military Attache at the British Embassy (14) gave an assurance that 'Her Majesty's Government had no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of Egypt'. (15)

After the end of the Great War, Britain's position was not what it was at the time of the rebellion of Colonel Ahmed Orabi towards the end of the 19th century. She was now much too weak and exhausted to assert itself against the surge of assertive nationalism throughout Asia and a considerable part of Africa. With the advent of the United Nations Organization, the attainment of independence by India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, the emergence of USA and the USSR as the super powers and the ensuing cold war, imperialistic fronts had begun tottering everywhere, and smaller nations were rapidly acquiring

12. Text of the Proclamation broadcast to the nation on the morning of 23 July 1952, in El Saadat, op.cit., p. 119.

13. Rasheed El Barawy, op.cit., pp. 32-3; also Gregory Blakland, Objective Egypt (London, 1966), pp. 176-77.

14. Ambassador Ralph Stevenson was then on leave.

15. Anthony Eden, Full Circle - Memoirs (London, 1959), p.240.

political awareness of their national rights and status. The pre-war international balance of power had undergone a drastic change, and the new strategy of the post-war era was compelling every 'big nation' with interests and stakes abroad to win friendship and sympathy of maximum number of nations and cultivate closer, dependable associations through mutual cooperation in the fields of economic growth and defence arrangements.

In the present case there was apparently no cause or pretext on the basis of which Britain could justify their intervention. The revolutionary regime of the Free Officers had not only assured the safety of life and interests of all foreigners; but had not allowed any untoward incident to take place. The transfer of power had been swift and without any violence or bloodshed. The King and the 'corrupt regime' had surrendered without any resistance and the masses had generally welcomed the change. (16) The Free Officers - the engineers

-
16. Mideast Mirror of 2 August 1952 reported that all political parties in Egypt expressed their support for the Army move and subsequent events. They all welcomed the abdication of King Faruk.

Mustafa el-Nahas who returned to Egypt from Europe on 28 July, expressed his pleasure and satisfaction over the great task performed by the Egyptian Army.

Ibrahim Abdel Hadi, leader of the Saadist Party stated that 'no true patriot could help declaring his fullest support for a movement aiming at the real purification of public life'.

Hassan el-Hodeibi, Supreme Guide of the Moslem Brotherhood said that he 'welcomed such great and unparalleled events which marked a new milestone in the country's progress - thanks to the steps taken by Army leaders'.

(contd. on next page)

the coup d'etat had not allowed even demonstrations of rejoicing and felicitations lest they might lead to disturbances.

Even from the logical point of view, Britain would not have been justified to let her forces stationed in the Canal Zone interfere because according to the 1936 Treaty upon the application of which Britain still insisted but which Egypt had abrogated, it was stipulated that the British forces did not have the character of an army of occupation and, therefore, they had no right to interfere in matters which did not concern them or threatened them with any danger.

The revolutionary regime had also assured that there were no 'personal motives' behind their action. Their only motive was to clean the administration and democratise political institutions. Great Britain was a democracy and had fought two major wars to preserve democracy and make the world safe for its expansion and development. It was obvious, therefore, that any move on Britain's part to interfere in Egypt's internal affairs was not only bound to meet strongest resistance by the Army and the people but also the charge of opposing the promise and prospects of Egypt's becoming a democracy. The United Nations^{also} could have condemned Britain for violating its Charter guaranteeing against such interference. (17) Besides, the hitherto uncommitted nations would have developed serious aversion to the West and would have lost all confidence and hope in the newly created international body to preserve peace

17. UN Charter, Article 2/4

and political freedom of big and small nations. This could have compromised the position of the West and undermined its role and efforts to contain Communism, and the prevalent cold-war atmosphere wouldn't have remained that cold.

In short, Britain's intervention in Egypt at this time would have been completely inconsistent with the spirit of the times and could have led to grave consequences.

On the other hand, an attitude of restraint, in fact, the acceptance of the new order was not to be without definite returns. The new regime was not committed on any issue pending settlement with Britain. The King, whose interests and honour were always a limitation and a drawback in dealing with the British on the question of the Sudan, was no more on the scene. It could, therefore, fairly be expected that the young Egyptian Officers who were thinking more in terms of solving the immediate problems of their country and not calculating their actions in terms of future careers for themselves. It was, therefore, an opportune moment for putting the relations between the two countries on a better and more reasonable footing. As Sir Anthony Eden observed, "the Free Officers' Organization of which General Neguib was a 'put up' leader, was a better bet than either King or Wafd. He must be given his chance to clean the Egyptian stable." (18)

The Free Officers, led and inspired by Gamal Abdel Nasser, a sober calculating and reasonable young man in his

18. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 242.

early thirties, gave some serious thoughts to the problem of their country's relations with Great Britain. The previous Governments had not been able to give the country a sound economic system. Egypt's foreign exchange earnings and reserves were at the lowest. Stock-piles of cotton purchased by the last Wafd Government for the purpose of selling out at higher price to foreign buyers incurred huge losses as the world prices for cotton had gone down. (19)

For the implementation of their programme of economic reforms, to boost-up foreign trade, to raise agricultural output and to start modern industries, to reduce poverty and unemployment, the régime desperately needed finances for investment. Local resources being inadequate, they were compelled to look for resources outside the country. Capital from American sources was not acceptable because of political strings being attached to them. Private investors both in America and Europe were reluctant because of instability and 'antics of the previous Governments'. (20)

They realized that their movement would lose all its appeal and motivation if it failed to deliver something sound and worthwhile in terms of economic betterment and improvement in public services. Abolition of titles of Pashas and Beys, (21)

19. Al-Ahram, 19 August 1952. See also Mideast Mirror, 23 August 1952, pp. 3-5.

20. John Marlowe, *op.cit.*, p. 391.

21. Mideast Mirror, 2 August 1952.

even arrests and punishments given to the 'corrupt' persons of the previous administrations did not and really could not bring a social change. Neither ^{the} redistribution of the big estates, (22) although a progressive step, was not likely to make any substantial contribution towards raising the material standards without modernization of agriculture and expansion of the irrigation system, and without providing necessary tools and fertilizers.

Procurement of foreign aid and technical cooperation without unacceptable political conditions, was their urgent necessity. Consolidation of the revolution, therefore, demanded of them an early solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. Though it was apparent from their repeated pronouncements and official statements that they would not recede from 'Egypt's well-publicized' demands vis-a-vis Great Britain, at all events as regards evacuation of the Canal Zone', were nevertheless prepared to behave in an objective, realistic manner by resorting to methods of negotiations.

-
22. The Agrarian Reform Law limited land holdings to 200 feddans, plus another 100 if the owner had children. The surplus was expropriated against compensation and redistributed to small holders (usually the sitting tenants) against purchase by instalments. The price for expropriation, and the price of purchase was based on the current land tax valuation. A little later, the large estates belonging to the members of the Royal Family were expropriated without compensation and similarly redistributed. By this means about half a million feddans of cultivated land was translated into small holdings.

Britain's Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson who had now returned to Cairo, made the following statement welcoming the change in Egypt's political order and its programme to improve the image of their country. He said:

There is by no means any evidence that the new Egyptian Government will modify Egyptian demands but there have been indications from the Army of a more realistic approach to its own needs and relationship with the West.

This has given rise to the hope that a more practical approach to Egyptian and Middle East defence, permitting evacuation of British troops, will be possible. (23)

The new regime's moderation and realism in approaching the Anglo-Egyptian problems, however, was not the only factor influencing Great Britain's attitude towards them.

The entry of Turkey into the NATO (24) had given the British considerable relief as the system of Western military alliances had been thus extended right into the Middle East. They could expect the new ally to influence and indirectly pressurise Egypt and her neighbouring countries to follow her example.

Secondly, Britain had not yet fully recovered from the war-time financial exhaustion. Though the 'Recovery of Europe' programme and other forms of American aid had greatly helped her improve her position, she was finding it hard to maintain all of her forces in the Middle East in peace time. Thus financial considerations were impelling HM Government to think about reducing their forces in this part of the world.

23. Mideast Mirror, 16 August 1952, p. 7.

24. Department of State Bulletin, 10 March 1952, pp. 367-68.

Thirdly, the character of the proposed defence system for the Middle East had been changed. The Middle East defence organization was to be "a planning organization", and a (25) 'Middle East Command' as originally conceived. -To quote Anthony Eden:

These considerations, and particularly the first two (cited above), have made it necessary to review in detail our whole strategy in the Middle East. This review is now proceeding, and it may well emerge that a base in Egypt, although desirable, is no longer absolutely essential to our interests. Hitherto the basis of our policy towards Egypt has been the advice which we have received that it is essential to maintain in peacetime the Egypt base if the Middle East is to be successfully defended in war. If this policy is to be modified - and I must emphasise it has not yet been modified - we may find it easier to come to terms with Egypt. (26)

As a practical expression of their new policy, His Majesty's Government announced its decision to transfer the joint headquarters in the Middle East to Cyprus. (27) Earlier in October, the British Government had agreed to make an advance of £5,000,000 to Egypt "as a demonstration of its goodwill towards the new regime." (28)

At the same time the British military authorities announced that their military posts at the El-Ferdan bridge were being withdrawn and were being replaced by Egyptian army units.

25. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 244.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Mideast Mirror, 11 October 1952, pp. 1-2;
Al-Ahram, 10 October 1952.

The strategic importance of the bridge to the Egyptian forces was evident by the fact that it provided the only direct access to the Sinai Peninsula, and handing it back to them was certainly an earnest of British confidence in the revolutionary Government of Egypt. (29)

The Egyptian Government reciprocated these gestures of goodwill and willingness to reach an understanding with Great Britain at the earliest moment. Restrictions on visas and resident permits for aliens were relaxed and conditions for foreign investment in Egypt were considerably liberalized. (30)

They also decided to give aid to those of British nationals who suffered injury and to the relatives of those who lost their lives in the Cairo riots of last January. (31)

C. EGYPT'S NEW LEADERS SPLIT ISSUES -
HOLD NEGOTIATIONS WITH BRITAIN ON THE
QUESTION OF THE SUDAN ALONE

In this atmosphere of growing confidence and mutual trust of each other's good intentions, the Governments of Egypt and the United Kingdom made a serious bid to settle their outstanding disputes. But, unlike the past, they decided to split the issues and consider one issue at a time.

29. Ibid.

30. Al-Ahram and The Egyptian Gazette, 5 August 1952.

31. H.C. Deb., 6 November 1952, vol. 507, cols. 379-80;
also Mideast Mirror, 8 November 1952, p. 4.

The most urgent was the problem of the Sudan. It was at the same time most important also. It was on this issue that all previous attempts at settlement had floundered. The question of the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone was no less important. Nevertheless, the 1936 Treaty on the basis of which the British troops were stationed in this area was, by its own terms, heading towards expiration in 1956, and the United Nations was least likely to endorse its further extension against the will of the Egyptians. Moreover any settlement regarding evacuation of the Canal Zone, when finally reached, was to take several months to be completed. Besides, the British had already on several occasions indicated their agreement, in principle, to the demand of evacuation but it could not be acted upon primarily because it was linked with the question of the Sudan.

The question of settlement of the Sudan problem had become more urgent because the 'statutory period' of six months during which the condominium Governments were to study the draft statute of 2 April, was to expire on 8 November. The Sudanese Parliament would have then approved the draft statute and would have practically severed the Sudan from Egypt without the latter's trying to prevent this situation from taking place.

Britain's position on the question was quite clear as she had already favoured the Sudan Government's proposals for self-government, (32) subject to certain reserved powers in the

32. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 242. See also, The United States in World Affairs 1952 (New York, 1953), p. 239.

hands of the Governor-General and complete independence at the end of the three year period.

The denunciation of the 1899 Condominium by the Wafd Government in October last had created a politico-legal anomaly for Egypt. After the decree of abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the Sudan Agreements had been affirmed by the ex-King on 18 October, Egypt's status of the Condomini had ended. Egypt, thereafter, was not entitled to recognize or deal with the Sudan administration or its Governor General as their de jure rights had vanished. Nevertheless, the Governor General and his administration in the Sudan remained intact because Great Britain had refused to recognize the validity of Egypt's unilateral abrogation.

Under the circumstances, it appeared that Egypt was effectively excluded from any decisive share in shaping the future destiny of the Sudan, and this would have obviously meant complete suppression of Egypt's aspiration in regard to the Sudan. (33) For the revolutionary Junta headed by Mohamed

-
34. Egypt desired for a permanent union with the Sudan not merely because of historical connections, religious, linguistic and ethnic affinities, and mutual economic interests. Nor her desire was based upon the fact that unity of Egypt and the Sudan was an established political reality before the British appeared in the Upper Nile Valley. In fact, the most important consideration has always been that Egypt must possess the strongest guarantee that its water supply is not interfered with.

The British were not trusted to give such guarantees. British authorities had themselves given the best expression to Egyptian anxiety in this matter. A distinguished British Officer was quoted in the House of Commons on 28 March 1895, as saying: "If I were the Mehdi, I would make Egypt pay

(contd. on next page)

Neguib, son of a half-Sudanese mother and himself born and brought-up at Khartoum, Egypt's present position vis-a-vis the British in relation to the Sudan was most unenviable and also challenging.

Neguib had realized that only by participation could Egypt acquire any influence in the land of his birth. 'The Sudan was dear to him; and he had the wisdom to treat it as a separate issue'. (34) The elimination of the King and the suppression of the Wafd gave him the freedom and the courage to renounce claim to the Kingdom of the Sudan. He understood the people and the problems of the Sudan better than any of his predecessors, and he was fully convinced that

the ultimate future of Egypt's relations with the Sudan depends more upon the attitude of the Sudanese than the British. (35)

For this reason he was less interested in the theoretical assertion of unity than the creation of conditions which would make effective cooperation possible. (36)

33. (contd. from back page)

for every quarter of water which runs from the Nile." A great British engineer, Sir Collin Scott carried the point further: "As for diverting the Nile in the Sudan and depriving Egypt of its water what the Mehdi could not do, a civilized people could do. It is very evident that the civilized possessor of the Upper Nile Valley holds Egypt in his grasp ... and if poor little Egypt had the bad luck to be at war with the people in the upper waters, they might flood Egypt or cut off the water supply at their pleasure." Quoted from Leonard Wolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa (London, 1919), p. 155.

34. P.M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London, 1961), p. 159.

35. Mideast Mirror, 25 October 1952, pp. 2-4.

36. Ibid.

Proceeding with this policy, the revolutionary government of Egypt began conversations with Sudanese political leaders of the 'Independence Group' and accepted the proposition of immediate self-government for the Sudan to be followed in due course by self-determination. (37) Thus what had appeared half-hearted tactical moves in the twilight of the monarchy became a vigorous policy under the Junta. Its adoption of the principle of self-determination for the Sudanese actually placed the initiative in their hands.

D. EGYPT'S BID TO FIRST BEFRIEND
THE SUDANESE

Naguib's obvious strategy was to first concentrate on getting the British out of the Sudan by leaving the question of future status in relation to Egypt open for the time being. He now talked about 'independence and freedom of the Nile Valley' and not, as his predecessors had done, of unity.

In his bid to befriend the people of the Sudan and to do away with any misgivings about Egypt's intention, he appointed a Sudanese as Governor of the Aswan Province of Upper Egypt, and another to the prestige position of deputy-rector of the Al-Azhar University. He also invited Sir Syed Abdul Rehman al-Mahdi, son of the Mahdi and leader of the Umma Party to Cairo for talks

37. Neither of these steps was, however, completely new in November 1951, before the coup d'etat, the Egyptian delegation to the UN had declared itself not to be opposed to the principle of Sudanese self-determination, while representatives of the Umma Party had been invited by the Egyptian Prime Minister, Naguib el Hilali, to Cairo in June 1952.

of mutual interest. (38)

Consultations with the Mahdi's delegation proved most helpful in the realization of the 'grand strategy'. He virtually staged a 'diplomatic coup' when he signed an agreement with the Patron of the 'Umma' on 29 October the most striking feature of which was the Egyptian recognition of the Sudan's right to choose independence of any connection with Egypt. Such a decision was however to be preceded by immediate home-rule to enable the Sudanese to acquire experience of statecraft and to pave the way 'to free and untrammelled self-determination'. (39)

In order to realize these objectives, the Egyptian Government ^rproposed to amend the Sudan Draft Constitution by creating a 'Higher Constitutional Authority' consisting of the present Governor-General of the Sudan, one Egyptian, one Briton, two Sudanese and one Indian or Pakistani. The Governor General of the Sudan was required to seek the advice of this body in the exercise of his functions in accordance with the proposed amendments. Furthermore, the decisions of the committee were to be carried out, notwithstanding the conflicting view of the Governor General on the same issue.

The effect of this historic agreement was to give Egypt greater influence in Sudanese affairs than what she has had

38. Mideast Mirror, 18 and 25 October 1952.

39. Full text of the Agreement in Mideast Mirror, 1 November 1952, pp. 2-4. See also The Times, 30 October 1952.

since 1924, when, after the assassination of the Sirdar of the Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, the Egyptian administrator and troops were sent out of the Sudan. Precisely the implementation of the agreement was to mean:

1. Egypt regained full rights as a condominium power which she had herself lost by the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty on 8 October 1951.
2. She would have equal position with Britain on a commission with mandatory powers over the Governor-General.
3. She almost certainly put a time limit to Britain's legal status in the Sudan as the elections were to be held by 31 December.

Some Egyptians indeed might have criticised (which they could not do openly because of the press censorship having been reimposed recently) that General Neguib had dropped the prior claim to complete unity with the Sudan; but this claim was theoretical and, despite the insistence of former Egyptian Governments that unity existed, it had never existed as a political fact. In fact, insistence on it as a prior condition of Sudan settlement had tended to increase the political separation of the Sudan from Egypt. Neguib's agreement with the Umma leaders enabled Egypt to reestablish her legal rights in exchange for a theoretical unity.

The pro-Egypt Unionist leaders also accepted the said agreement because it was not merely a practical step taken towards the end of the British domination in their country, it was a sound evidence of 'brotherly feelings' for the Sudanese. It was also hoped that during the transition period of three years they would be more free to campaign for unity with Egypt.

There is, however, a view that the Unionists as represented by the Ashigga Party were, in any case, never so strongly pro-Egyptians as at one time seemed to be the case. 'Most of their members were more concerned with preventing the leader of the Umma, Syed Sir Abdul Rehman el Mahdi Pasha, a posthumous son of Mahdi, from making a bid for the Crown of an independent Sudan'. They were not thinking in terms of permanently and completely identifying or merging themselves with the Egyptians. In the course of time they were to chalk-out an independent national existence for themselves. (40) The immediate effect of the 'agreement' nevertheless was satisfactory and was generally welcomed in the Sudan:

Groups which mistrusted self-government and self-determination when these were advocated by Britain, were more favourably disposed when Egypt espoused these aims, and the British administration in the Sudan found its own weapons turned against it. (41)

E. EGYPT'S NOTE TO BRITAIN
SETTLEMENT OF THE SUDAN - EXCLUSIVE ISSUE

On the basis of the agreement reached between the Sudanese political leaders and the Egyptian Government, the latter handed on 2 November, a 'Note' to the British Ambassador in Cairo, (42) Sir Ralph Stevenson. Some of the significant points of the 'note' were as follows:

40. R.C. Monat, Middle East in Perspective (London, 1958), p. 242. See also P.M. Holt, op.cit., p. 160.

41. P.M. Holt, op.cit., pp. 159-60.

42. Text of the Egyptian Note in Egypt No.2 (1953), Cmd. 8767. See also Mideast Mirror Supplement, 8 November 1952, pp. 1-3.

- (1) The Egyptian Government firmly believes in the right of the Sudanese to self-determination and the effective exercise thereof at the proper time and with the necessary safeguards.
- (2) To attain the abovementioned object there should begin forthwith a transitional period envisaging two objectives,
 - a) to secure full self-government for the Sudanese,
 - b) to provide the requisite free and neutral atmosphere for the Sudanese to exercise self-determination.
- (3) The transitional period being a preparation for the effective termination of the dual administration shall be considered as a liquidation of that administration.
- (4) The Egyptian Government declares that the sovereignty of the Sudan shall be kept reserved for the Sudanese, during this transitional period, until self-determination is achieved.

These points were substantially in accord with the agreements signed with the Sudanese political parties, and were based on the provisions of the Self-Government Ordinance. Following new points were also embodied in the text of the 'Note':

- (1) The Governor-General should, during the three years transition period, be advised by a Five-man Commission consisting of one Egyptian, one British, two Sudanese, one Indian or Pakistani.
- (2) Sudanization of all Government services should be completed by the end of the three year period.
- (3) The Governor-General's powers of veto should only be effective if supported by both co-domini, instead of only one of the co-domini, as provided in the Ordinance.
- (4) The Governor-General's special powers over the Southern Sudan as provided in the Ordinance, should be abolished during the transition period.

- (5) In the absence of the Governor-General, the elder of the two Sudanese on the Commission, should act in his place. (43)
- (6) At the end of the transition period, the Sudan Government should draw up a draft law for the election of the Constituent Assembly to be approved by the Parliament.
- (7) British and Egyptian Military Forces should withdraw from the Sudan at least one year before the elections of the Constituent Assembly assuring freedom and impartiality of the election).
- (8) The decision on the future of the Sudan should be made:
 - a) either by the Constituent Assembly choosing to link up the Sudan with Egypt in any form;
 - b) or by the Assembly choosing a Sudan completely independent of the UK, Egypt or any other country.

F. BRITAIN'S RESPONSE - NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUDAN BEGIN

The contents of the Egyptian 'Note' were such that HM Government was morally obliged to accept them as a basis for formal negotiation with the Government of Egypt on the question of the settlement of the Sudan question. Sudan's right of self-determination was the cornerstone of British policy, for Britain had always argued that it was not within the powers of Britain to recognise, over the head of the Sudanese, Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. (44) Now Egypt had formally announced to

-
43. In the Agreement of October 29, 1952, the successor of the Governor-General, was to be nominated by Britain and appointed by Egypt, should that post become vacant during the transition period.
 44. For statements of the British leaders since the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations began on the subject of revision of the 1936 Treaty in 1946, see, H.C. Debates, 5th Series, vol. 421, col. 218; vol. 432, cols. 619-20; vol. 493, cols. 1176-78, and vol. 495, col. 824.

espouse the same cause and was asking Britain to take practical measures towards the realization of this objective without delay. Britain could not possibly have backed out of its pledges to the Sudanese and commitments to its own people. (45) Moreover, the revolutionary government of Egypt had shown remarkable courage and statesmanship in drafting their 'Note'. They had excluded the mention of any other issue in the 'note', which was a clear indication they were prepared to negotiate a settlement of the Sudan question 'separately from, and preliminary to, negotiations, on evacuation from the Canal Zone'.

The Egyptian 'Note' obviously marked a great advance and there was every reason to think that a solution of the Sudan aspect of the Anglo-Egyptian question would pave the way for talks on the Canal Zone issue and regional defence.

Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons that on the basis of the Egyptian note of 2 November, "showing a readiness to accept the principles of self-government and self-determination in the Sudan ...

... it ought to be possible for this country, the Sudan and Egypt to reach an agreement which will be of enduring value, and, if we can do that, we can at least hope for the wider agreement which is in the minds of many Hon. Members in this House. (46)

The British Foreign Secretary also noted the improvement which had taken place in Anglo-Egyptian relations under the new Government and paid tribute to the "courageous efforts of

45. Tom Litt, *op.cit.*, p. 153.

46. H.C. Deb., 6 November 1952, vol. 507, col. 380.

General Neguib and his friends (the Free Officers) to cut through the tangle of maladministration at home and international disputes, which was the legacy of previous Egyptian Governments." (47)

In this congenial atmosphere of reciprocity simultaneously prevailing in London, Cairo and Khartoum, the British Ambassador, Sir Stevenson held several rounds of negotiations with the highest persons in command in Egypt - General Neguib and his advisors. (48)

The most arduous debate was about the proposed Governor-General's Commission. Although there was full agreement on the formation of this Commission, the real point of difference of opinion was the extent to which it would be given mandatory powers. The British side considered it impracticable and inadvisable to transfer the Governor-General's 'special responsibility' for the 'non-Moslem' and 'primitive' south. They also considered it unworkable that the Governor-General should not be left with his special powers to handle an emergency arising from a collapse of public order or government.

On the other hand, the Egyptian Government and the National Unity Party of the Sudan (49) considered the mandatory

47. Ibid.

48. First round of their formal talks began on 20 November. The two delegations met again on 24, 26 November and 9, 22 December 1952.

49. The Sudan's various pro-Unity Parties, namely, Ashiqqa, the Sudan Congress, the Graduates' Conference, the Nationalist Front, the Unity of the Nile Valley Party, the Liberal Constitutional Party, met in Cairo with General Neguib and consequently agreed to amalgamate themselves into a single 'National Unionist Party' with Ismail El Azhari as its President.

powers of the Governor General's Commission as security which they required against British administrative influence during the transitional period and were quite reluctant to see any modification of these powers.

Another important point on which their views differed was related to the conditions under which the elections could be held. Sir Stevenson declared that HM Government 'would like the elections to be held forthwith (probably to deny Egypt and the UNP the time to educate and influence the Sudanese to vote in their favour) and leave other points at issue to be decided by the new Sudanese Parliament. (50)

Speaking in the House of Commons on 8 December, Anthony Eden answering a question as to when elections in the Sudan were likely to be held, said:

Personally, I should have liked the elections to have taken place before some of the other complicated matters were settled, but we have not been able to agree on that, and that may have the effect of delaying the elections. (51)

The Egyptian Government refused this proposal and considered it important to reach an agreement on all matters in the said Note as a whole and as quickly as possible in order to decide the whole problem. General Neguib said: "We insist on every letter in the Sudan agreement being accepted, we can accept nothing else." (52)

50. Cmd. 8767, p. 9.

51. H.C. Deb., 8 December 1952, vol. 509, cols. 15-16.

52. Mideast Mirror, 22 November 1952, p. 1. See also Add El Fattah I.S. Baddour, Sudanese-Egyptian Relations (Hague, 1960), pp. 160-1.

General Neguib was reported to have told the correspondent of az-Zaman:

I should like the whole world to know that the Egyptian Government will not abandon and will not change any provisions in the Egyptian-Sudanese Convention to which Egyptian and Sudanese political parties have rallied unanimously and which political and religious chiefs of the Sudan have blessed. I have explained to the British and American Ambassadors that the convention concluded between the Government of Egypt and the Sudanese parties is the minimum which they can accept as a solution of the Sudanese problem, and that the duty of the UK is to accept that convention as it stands, without rejecting or without modifying any of its clauses. (53)

Egypt's position was further strengthened by successfully concluding an agreement on 10 January 1953 with the four principal Sudanese parties, (54) which, having heard from the Egyptian Minister for the Sudanese Affairs, Major Salim an account of the principal points of difference between the British and Egyptian Governments, (55) adopted a number of 'final' and 'irrevocable' resolutions and declared that they would all boycott the forthcoming elections.

The Sudanese Parties signatories to this document have agreed that the aforesaid points shall constitute the basis for the Sudanese self-government statute. Failing this, these parties have unanimously agreed to boycott the elections held under any other statute.

53. Quoted by The Times, 22 December 1952.

54. The Umma Party, the Socialist Republican Party, The National Unionist Party and the National Party.

55. Mideast Mirror, 27 December 1952, p. 1.

The Parties have also agreed to meet to arrange and carry out measures for boycotting elections in such eventuality. (56)

The Khartoum Parties' agreement obviously weakened Great Britain's negotiating position. A further setback was caused by the publication in Egypt of a "top secret" letter from Sir James Robertson, the Civil Secretary of the Sudan Government, addressed to the Sudanese leaders and Sudan Government officials.

The letter was essentially a defence of the British and the Sudan Government's position and particularly emphasised that Britain had not delayed agreement on the Sudan. It also emphasised the differences in the various texts of the agreements Egypt had earlier signed with the political parties in the Sudan and her Note of 2 November to Britain. The British argument was that many of the points of difference were matters which should have been left to the Sudan Parliament to decide and the future of the Sudan as a whole was better assured by safeguards for the South which would allay fears or dissatisfaction there. (57)

56. The Khartoum Agreement clearly emphasised that the Self-Government Ordinance should be amended in accordance with the terms of the October 29 Agreement signed between the Egyptian Government and the various Sudanese Parties. Text of the Khartoum Resolutions of 10 January 1953, in Cmd. 8767, pp. 51-53; The Times, 13 January 1953; Al-Ahram, 11, 12 January 1953; Mideast Mirror Supplement, 17 January 1953.

57. Text of Sir James Robertson's 'top secret' letter in The Mideast Mirror Supplement, 17 January 1953, pp. 1-5.

Thus, when the negotiations were resumed on 12 January, the Egyptians were more confident and insistent on the full acceptance by the other side of its 9th November 'Note' as the basis for settlement of the Sudan problem. They firmly rejected Britain's 'draft agreement' because it contained special provisions concerning the southern provinces of the Sudan. (58) Thereafter several meetings were held (59) between the Government of Egypt and the British Ambassador, but assisted by high-powered advisors (60) until they were finally able to reach an agreement on the 12th February 1953.

THE SUDAN AGREEMENT

The historic agreement recognized the right of the Sudanese to self-determination, and, to enable them to exercise that right in a free and neutral atmosphere, it provided for early free and secret ^{elections} ~~relations~~ to a Sudanese Parliament and for a transitional period of self-government to continue for a maximum of ^{five} ~~the~~ years during which the sovereignty of the country should be kept in reserve until the self-determination had been achieved.

58. Cmd. 8767, pp. 53-55. The Times, 15 January 1953.

59. 12, 17, 28 January 1953 and 8 and 12 February 1953.

60. The Egyptian Government was represented by Maj. Gen. Mohammed Neguib, then Prime Minister, Dr. M. Fauzi, Foreign Minister, Wing Comd. Hussein Zulfiqar Sabry, Major Salah Salim, Dr. Hamed Sultan and Zeyn El Husny. The British Government was represented by the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson, Mr. M.G. Crosswell and Mr. R.B. Barroughs. Mideast Mirror, 31 January 1953, p. 2.

Some of the most important points in the Agreement were:

1. Elections for a Sudanese Parliament to be held as soon as possible and supervised by an international commission.
2. Powers of the (British) Governor-General to remain as provided for in the Self-government Ordinance, but the Governor-General to be supervised and controlled by a five-member international Commission formally appointed by the Egyptian Government.
3. Formation of a Sudanization Committee with the object of 'Sudanizing' the administrative services during the three-year period.
4. Provision for the election of a Constituent Assembly within three years to make arrangements for self-determination.
5. Withdrawal of British and Egyptian troops from the Sudan before the election of the Constituent Assembly. (61)

The Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan, put an end to one of the long-standing disputes between the two countries. The problem of the Sudan had for several decades been the 'stumbling block' responsible for the impediments of all previous efforts concerning Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. With the amicable settlement of this problem it was rightly expected that a new era of Anglo-Egyptian understanding would soon be heralded in. It was hailed as a prelude to immediate and 'propitious tackling' of Anglo-Egyptian differences over the Canal Zone.

In a statement before the House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden said:

61. Full Text of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Sudan in Appendix No.

I am glad to be able to report that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo has now signed an agreement between Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government concerning the introduction of self-government for the Sudanese, to be followed by self-determination ... the recognition of the right of the Sudanese to order their own future developments, constitute a reasonable settlement of this question which has for long bedevilled our relations with Egypt and contributed so much uncertainty to the future of Sudan itself. I hope indeed that the outcome of these negotiations may prove to be a happy augury for the future well-being of the Sudanese. I hope too that it may have its beneficial influence on Anglo-Egyptian relations. (62)

Similarly, General Mohamed Neguib expressed the hope that the Sudan agreement would help expedite the settlement of the remaining differences between Britain and Egypt. In a broadcast to the nation the same night, he said:

With the help of God an agreement has today been reached between the Egyptian and British Governments for liquidating the administration of the Sudan Condominium and for setting up self-government in preparation for the exercise by the Sudanese of the right of self-determination in an atmosphere of complete freedom. ... This agreement opens a new era in the relations between the Egyptians and their Sudanese brothers. ... It also opens a new era in the relations between Egypt and Great Britain, an era destined to re-create trust between them and to have a good effect on the outstanding questions between the two countries. (63)

This agreement, however, could not have been possible if the 'revolutionary regime' of Egypt had not been bold enough to break with the approach and methods of the previous Egyptian

62. H.C. Deb., 12 February 1953, vol. 511, cols. 602-6.

63. Al-Ahram, 13 February 1953. See also Documents on International Affairs 1953 (RIIA, 1956), pp. 327-28.

Governments who invariably combined the two issues and insisted on the Unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian Crown. (64) Indeed the Free Officers' Government made a major compromise by accepting self-government for the Sudanese and their right to decide their future national status.

This bold attitude greatly facilitated the British to concede the Egyptian view point on other related matters. According to Charles Cremeans, Egypt's willingness to compromise "persuaded British officials and the American diplomats that they were faced with a new kind of regime with which the West might be able to do business." (65)

Another factor which greatly helped both sides in reaching the final agreement on the future of the Sudan, was the "friendly pressure" of the United States on both Governments. (66) General Neguib acknowledged and thanked the American Ambassador Jefforson Caffery for his 'helpful and encouraging attitude' during their recent negotiations with Great Britain. (67)

64. Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East (London, 1963), p. 176.

65. Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and the World (New York, 1963), p. 139.

66. J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol.II (Princeton, 1956), p. 335. See also The United States in World Affairs 1953 (New York, 1955), p. 294.

67. Mideast Mirror, 14 February 1953, p. 4;
Al-Ahram, 13 February 1953.

The American Ambassador at Cairo welcomed the conclusion of the Sudan agreement and said:

The signing of an agreement on the Sudan by Egypt and the United Kingdom, two nations whose friendship is cherished by the United States, is a happy occasion and a good omen for the future. (68)

Two days later, the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, sent a congratulatory note to the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, which clearly brings out that Dulles was hoping that the settlement of the Sudan would remove one big obstacle to better relations with the West and would induce Egypt to join in a military association with the West.

Achievement of the Sudan accord by the British and Egyptian Government is indeed gratifying to the United States. ... This amiable accord may well be the first step towards the establishment of more fruitful associations in an area of critical importance to the security of the free world. (69)

The British and the American views on the question of Middle East defence and requirements were identical. This was proved beyond doubt by Dulles' concern about the threat of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. In the first address to the American nation he stated:

In the Middle East we find that the Communists are trying to inspire the Arabs with a fanatical hatred of the British and ourselves. That area contains the greatest known oil reserves that there are in the world, and the Soviet interest is shown by the fact that Stalin, when he was negotiating with

68. Al-Ahram, 13 February 1953;
Mideast Mirror, 14 February 1953, p. 5.

69. Department of State Bulletin, 23 February 1953, pp. 305-6.

Hitler in 1940, said that the area must be looked upon as the center of Soviet aspirations. If all of that passed into the hands of our potential enemies, that would make a tremendous shift in the balance of economic power. And furthermore this area also has control of the Suez Canal and that is the portion of the world ... which has long been guarded and called the life-line, which made it possible for Europe to be in communication with Asia. There are difficulties at the present time between the question of the defence and control of the Suez Canal. (70)

70. Ibid., 9 February 1953, pp. 213-14.

One is hard put to discover what Communist 'inspiration' he had in mind, since he never did explain. It is possible he referred to Communist agitation mainly for home-consumption. Nevertheless, the frequent reference by American political to Arab nationalist demands as Communist agitation was not only puzzling, but extremely resented to by the Arabs.

Chapter VII

THE REVOLUTION AND THE PROSPECT OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE SUEZ ZONE ISSUES WITH BRITAIN

A. EGYPT ANXIOUS TO OPEN TALKS ON THE SUEZ CANAL QUESTION IMMEDIATELY. BRITAIN NOT SO ANXIOUS

The conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on Sudan was expected by Britain and the United States to partially solve the difficulties referred to by Dulles in his above noted address. Nevertheless, relations between Egypt and Great Britain remained tense after that. The Egyptians, now more than ever, were becoming impatient with what seemed to them British delaying tactics in regard to the question of British evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone. (1) In fact the same day the Sudan accord was reached, General Neguib stated in a Press Conference that he hoped the accord would 'pave the way for immediate talks on the British withdrawal from the Canal Zone'. (2) Three days later, Dr. Mohammad Fawzi, Egypt's Foreign Minister, reported that his Government had officially informed the British Ambassador at Cairo, that Egypt was ready for talks on British evacuation. (3) As there was no immediate and satisfactory response

-
1. Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., p. 175. See also The Times, 5 March 1953.
 2. Mideast Mirror, 14 February 1953, p. 4;
New York Times, 13 February 1953.
 3. Al-Ahram, 15 February 1953; The Daily Telegraph, 16 February 1953.

from the British Government, the Free Officers resorted to threats of guerrilla action against the British forces in Egypt. (4)

The Egyptian Government made it quite plain from the very start of their informal consultations with the British Ambassador, and also made public statements, that they would require 'unconditional British agreement to withdraw all troops from the Canal Zone within a stated period, expressed

4. The New York Times of 27 February was in fact referring to a statement made by Col. Nasser to a Correspondent of the New York Herald Tribune in the mid-November 1952. The statement as reproduced by Al-Akhbar on 29 December 1952 was as follows:

"We are quite prepared to be reasonable. The British have promised us during the past 70 years to evacuate the Canal Zone but are still there. Egypt will no longer tolerate procrastination and dilatory methods."

"If the Government of the new regime has reason to believe, after its sincere efforts, that Egypt's liberation from the British occupation is not in sight, I assure you that the military leaders will relinquish their official position to lead the people in a struggle against the British. This will not be an officially declared war but it will rather have the character of strong resistance movement in which guerrilla methods will be adopted. Hand-grenades will be thrown in the dark; British troops will be assassinated in the streets and the struggle will be undertaken by Commanders who will make the British pay a high price for the occupation of our country." (Mideast Mirror, 3 January 1953, p. 5).

On 3 January, Ridwan, the Minister of State, repeated the threat uttered by Col. Nasser, cited above, and on the next day Major Abdul Hakim Ameer asserted the Government's primary aim of driving the British out of Egypt and the Sudan. General Neguib also told a large group of students that the revolution had been staged in order to expel imperialists. Major Salim threatened the British of drastic action, including sabotage and boycotting even if Great Britain were involved in a great war'. (The Times, 6 February 1963; for references see Survey 1953, pp. 162-63).

in months rather than in years," (5) as a prelude to discussions about a possible new agreement for mutual defence. (6) Unless unconditional withdrawal of the British troops was an accomplished fact, they were not willing to discuss anything with Great Britain or any other nation. Great Britain, on the other hand, was pressing to make an agreement on the troops and installations in the Canal Zone a part of wider agreement on the defence of the Middle East, in other words, "to make British withdrawal conditional upon a new treaty of alliance." (7)

In its 'Note' of 27 February 1953 the British Government, stating its terms for negotiations on the future of the Canal Zone, insisted on Egyptian agreement to the return of British forces in case of war, and that British or NATO technicians should remain behind to oversee military installations there. The Royal Air Force was to be allowed also to share with the Egyptian Air Force eight bases in the Canal Zone. It was also suggested that if Egypt accepted these terms, substantial American and British economic aid would follow. (8)

The difference between the parties was really one of confidence. Neither trusted the other sufficiently to desert the entrenched positions in which they had dug themselves. Egypt maintained the right of a

-
5. Al-Ahram, 10 and 11 March 1953;
Mideast Mirror, 14 March 1953, p. 2.
 6. John Marlowe, *op.cit.*, p. 398; The Times, 19 March 1953.
 7. Survey 1953, p. 164.
 8. New York Times, 27 February 1953.

sovereign state to choose whether or not to have foreign troops on its territory; Great Britain took its stand on possession, on the 1936 Treaty, and on the necessities of the cold war. (9)

With these rival aspirations being incompatible, there was little likelihood of a rapprochement between the two Governments, at least in the foreseeable future. Another source of friction between the Egyptians and Great Britain were the elections in the Sudan. Both sides charged each other with bad faith. The Egyptians accused the British of coercing, bribing and intimidating Sudanese officials, who were favourable to unity with Egypt. (10) The British denied these charges, and counter-charged the Government of the RCC with interference in the Sudan elections. (11)

Britain hoped that the Sudan would eventually join the British Commonwealth. In his statement issued in Khartoum on 25 March 1953, Selwyn Lloyd, British Minister of State, had stated that membership of the British Commonwealth 'was not inconsistent with independence'; 'that an independent Sudan might suggest any relationship it cared for'. (12)

These reported statements spontaneously created a stir in Egyptian official circles and hardened their attitude on the Canal Zone issue. General Neguib who was then touring the upper Egypt, strongly reacted by telling pressmen:

9. John Marlowe, op.cit., p. 398.

10. Mideast Mirror, 14 March 1953, p. 1.

11. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 520, cols. 102-4.

12. Mideast Mirror, 28 March 1953, p. 1.

We want unconditional and total evacuation.
There will either be evacuation or annihilation.
We will live free or die honest. The whole world
knows our view point. (13)

Another Egyptian leader, Wing Commander Abdel Latif Boghdadi, a member of the RCC and a close confident of Gamal Abdel Nasser, made the following forthright statement on the Canal Zone issue on 31 March:

We ask all Egyptians, everywhere, to be prepared to strike when the time comes because you are able to strike the tyrant and oppressor. You dealt a splendid blow in the past, you will strike again if necessary, without hesitation. ... Nothing will dissuade us until we see the last of the forces of evacuation.

Egypt would not resort to negotiations whatever the circumstances. Evacuation must come first and it should be unconditional. We shall accept no conditions. Once evacuation has been realized we shall negotiate with whom we like for the interest of our country alone.

The day of struggle is coming, there is no doubt about that. Be prepared for it. Prepare yourself and your children how to fight before you teach them how to read and write. Freedom has a price and we shall pay that price however dear it might be. (14)

In a similar tone, Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that the continuation of occupation was incompatible with the revolution. "Since we took over responsibility, we have been struggling to destroy the foundations of imperialism:

In the south, the struggle has ended with the recognition of the Sudan's right to self-determination. Here in the north we will not boast as others did of 'negotiations'. We will only say

13. Ibid., p. 5.

14. The Egyptian Gazette, 1 April 1953; also Mideast Mirror, 4 April 1953, pp. 6-7.

'Get out of our country. Only the sons of the Nile will defend the Canal'.

"We shall not bargain over our rights";

"We will accept nothing but full freedom". (15)

In an interview with an American Correspondent, General Neguib explained about British attempts to get the Sudan to join the British Commonwealth and accused Great Britain of a long series of broken promises over the Canal Zone; and a few days later he condemned the British attitude as illogical in the face of Egypt's known determination to insist on unconditional evacuation. (16)

Despite these 'bellicose' declarations by some Egyptians in positions of responsibility, the official attitude towards the Canal Zone problem was that Egypt intended to reach a settlement by negotiations. Their insistence on "unconditional evacuation" as the basis of discussions with Britain was merely intended to express their total opposition to commit Egypt to Middle East defence as part of an agreement on evacuation.

In Britain, however, the tone and substance of the statements increasingly built up the opinion that it would be useless and perhaps dangerous to enter into negotiations with the Egyptians in their present mood. (17)

15. Ibid.

16. The Times, 9 April 1953, quoted in Survey 1953, p. 165.

17. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 512, cols. 2064-65; H.L. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 181, p. 351. Members of both Houses of the British Parliament expressed their disquiet by pressing the Government not to conclude any agreement without parliamentary sanction. Such headlines as "Hopes of success

On his way back from the Sudan, Selwyn Lloyd called on General Neguib in Cairo and referred to the damaging effect of these recent speeches. (18) It is, however, surprising that the British leaders and diplomats should have failed to realize that much of the contents of these 'bellicose' statements of the Egyptian leaders were meant for local consumption. At the diplomatic level there had been indications that Egypt desired to secure the maintenance of the Canal Zone base and was willing to discuss the retention of technicians to ensure it. (18) Obviously the hardening and confusion of opinion in Britain could be attributed to their inability or unwillingness to reconcile those diplomatic hints with the public utterances of the Egyptians that there could be no negotiations before evacuation.

Churchill's Government being weak in the House of Commons as a result of conflicting opinions on the Canal issue within its own ranks, was not eager to initiate negotiations. "The Churchill Government", wrote Elizabeth Monroe, "also dallied because it needed time in which to bring round its own right-wing supporters to the need for a new policy. The Suez Canal had long held a special place in British esteem; Anthony Eden had once called it "the Swing door of the British Empire",

17. (contd. from back page)

in Cairo Fade" and "Deadlock Over Suez" appeared in the British newspapers. The Daily Telegraph wrote: "There was not the slightest chance to have defence talks leading to anything." The Daily Telegraph,

18. Gamal Abdel Nasser's Statement of Policy, The Egyptian Gazette, Al-Ahram, 11, 12 April 1953.

and to the Conservatives who were soon christened the Suez Group - it was as sacred as British soil. Members of the group called for much party cossetting, for a body of Conservative opinion, of unknown size, was against following the precedent set by Labour Government in India, Burma and Palestine and at Abadan, and scuttling "from the Canal Zone". (19)

Thus with the rising tide of criticism and adverse comments in Britain upon the statements of the Egyptian leaders, it became apparent that talks on the Suez Canal issue would be delayed from the British side. This was confirmed by the announcement that Field Marshal Sir William Slim would proceed to Australia to take up his new assignment. (20) Earlier in February his departure was postponed "in order to advise the British Government in the course of talks on the Canal Zone." (21)

The military Junta of Egypt, on the other hand, was much too anxious to begin the conversation with the British. Having compromised on the question of self-determination for the Sudan, they had hoped to achieve something spectacular and spontaneous on the question of complete evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone.

-
19. Elizabeth Monroe, op.cit., pp. 175-76; also New York Times, 16 December 1953; see also Mideast Mirror, 21 February 28 March 1953.
 20. Manchester Guardian, 20 March 1954; Mideast Mirror, 28 March 1954, p. 4.
 21. The Times, 24 February 1953.

At this point, Nasser broke more than two months of "glowering inactivity" by a bold but conciliatory statement of policy of the revolutionary Government and urged the British Government to begin negotiations for a just solution. In an interview given to the correspondent of the Observer on 11 April 1953, (22) he said that by a "just solution we mean the evacuation of British forces from the Canal Zone" and no discussion on Middle East defence. He expressed Egyptian lack of trust, which he ascribed to the delays in beginning discussions to the British attempts to link the question of the Canal Zone with question of regional defence. He also sought to excuse the more flamboyant statements of the Egyptian leaders by pleading the necessity "to prepare the Egyptian people for the consequences" of British intransigence. He then explained that:

A revolutionary regime inevitably makes enemies at home among the corrupt and privileged group whose power it attacks. Then there are communists who seek to disrupt everything constructive.

These elements seek to discredit us in any way they can. In the circumstances we cannot hold out our hands like beggars to Britain when what we are demanding is what every Egyptian believes to be his right. (23)

In the manner of a realist, Nasser frankly admitted that Egypt 'could not maintain such an immense base' unaided and that, since the base had been a British base, "British

22. Observer, 12 April 1953; Al-Ahram, 12 April 1953; New York Times, 13 April 1953.

23. Ibid.

technicians would be needed." (24) Further inciting Great Britain to compromise, he gave a clever turn to the problem of 'regional defence'. He stated that since the Arab States were all weak and very anxious to strengthen their defences, they could not find better friends than the West to help them do that. (25)

Nasser, however, refused to yield on the future use of the base by the West since any commitment of this would be 'premature' in his view, 'before getting satisfactory solution of her problems with Great Britain'. He also did not fail to remind the British leaders that in the last war "Egypt contributed more than she was compelled to do under the treaty," (26) and warned:

If there is no settlement, you cannot count on such cooperation again. All we are saying is that if Britain does not intend to reach a just settlement, you cannot count on us in peace or war. In fact, you will find us bitter enemies. We can try to be friends. But you cannot expect us to hold out our hands like beggars for what we know to be our national rights. (27)

This statement was quite significant in so far as it recognized the need 'to maintain an efficient base', and indicated that in refusing to negotiate on the Middle East defence, the Egyptian leaders did not want a strategic vacuum in the area. It clearly implied a desire for contact with the West, since the "friends" who could help were undoubtedly to be found among the Western Powers. His criticism of the

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

'disruptive intentions' of the Communists so obviously hinted at that. Moreover, in the presence of the orthodox Muslim Brothers' no Egyptian Government, however strong and progressive, could have thought of identifying itself in any manner with the communist world.

Gamal Nasser had thus in effect made it clear that there was a negotiable position.

The significance of the statement was noted by the British Press in a series of editorial comments, all of which recognized that it had taken the matter a helpful step forward. The Daily Telegraph which had taken a strong line against Egypt on the Canal Zone question, (28) modified its attitude to some extent and advocated a reciprocal gesture from Her Majesty's Government. (29)

At this point, therefore, London had to choose between 'inactivity' and negotiation upon a restricted basis, tacitly trusting that in the latter case the conclusion of an agreement on the Canal Zone would be followed by discussions and agreement on regional defence. (30)

London finally chose to negotiate. Churchill immediately called General Sir Brian Robertson, C-in-C of the Middle East, back to London for consultations, and three days later announced that they would soon begin discussions on the Canal Zone question. (31)

28. The Daily Telegraph, 27 March 1953.

29. Ibid., 12 April 1953.

30. Survey 1953, p. 165; The Times, 12 April 1953,

31. The Times, 16 April 1953.

The announcement was broadcast simultaneously by the Cairo radio, however, emphasising that the negotiations were expected to deal with the technical problems involved in the evacuation of the British and the subsequent maintenance of the Suez Canal Zone. (32)

The announcement also put an end to weeks of uncertainty, during which the atmosphere had shown menacing signs of deterioration. This period had included tentative approaches by both sides to find a basis for discussions and an attempt on the part of Britain and the United States, to persuade the Egyptian Government to engage in tripartite discussions in which the question of evacuation was to be dealt with as a part of the wider problem of Middle East defence. (33) The Egyptians had promptly rejected any official US role in the Suez talks. (34)

B. FIRST ROUND OF TALKS BEGAN AND ENDED TOO SOON.
BRITAIN DECLINED UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL

On April 27, General Mohamed Neguib and his Foreign Minister Dr. Mahmud Fawzi of Egypt sat down with Ambassador Ralph Stevenson and General Sir Brian Robertson of Great Britain

32. Al-Ahram, 16 April 1953; Mideast Mirror, 18 April 1953, p.1.

33. New York Times, 15 March 1953.

34. Ibid., 17 and 19 March 1953. The US Ambassador, Caffery, made a press statement on the 18th saying that the US did not wish any official role in the talks unless she was asked by both sides. United States in World Affairs 1953 (New York, 1955), p. 295.

to try to 'hammer out' a definitive agreement. They tried to find a common ground, but as their basic contentions differed widely, their talks proved abortive. After their sixth meeting concluded on 6 May, their brief communique made no mention of the date for the next meeting. It meant that the first approach towards a settlement had failed.

The Egyptian negotiators wanted a clear statement of the British intention to withdraw before proceeding to discuss in Committees matters which they regarded as comparatively minor points: for Egypt the political decision to withdraw was paramount and all else ranked as consequential military details. But for Britain these other matters of essence of the agreement and the British negotiators refused to give a pledge to withdraw without first discussing the security of the Canal Zone, i.e., the number and terms of service of the retained British technicians and the availability of the base in the event of war or threatening war.

With regard to the technicians there were two competing views, the one that they would be seconded to the Egyptian army for service under its orders and the other that they would be responsible for the maintenance of British property under orders from London. (35)

EGYPT'S REACTIONS

Egypt had entered into negotiations with the hope that Britain would formally recognize the principle of "total and unconditional evacuation". They had spoken about this fact over and again as the only basis for negotiations. Lastly, on the very eve of the negotiations Col. Nasser had repeated that Egypt's objective was 'complete independence' and at the same time she was ready to cooperate with her "friends". But the existence of British troops in Egypt was the main

35. Survey 1953, p. 166; Tom Little, op.cit., p. 155.

hinderance to friendly relations between the countries. (36) Even in his 11 April statement which is credited to have induced the British to come to the negotiating table, had not concealed this fact. Now Britain's attempt to 'construct a technical agreement through a series of committees which would work from ground up' was, therefore, quite naturally disappointing and irritating. Nasser explained:

We refused to enter into any details without agreement on the basic issue, because there is no need to draw ourselves in committees and details only to find ourselves in the end without a clear and agreed objective. (37)

C. CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE: MAIN CAUSE OF BREAKDOWN

The breakdown of negotiations before they had really got into motion was not so much the result of difference on the question of control of the technicians who should maintain the base in operational condition after the withdrawal of the Combatant troops, but reflected a deep crisis of confidence. "The British", in the words of John Connell, "wanted to trust the Egyptians but could not; the Egyptians were obsessed with the sacred significance of the battle against imperialism." (38)

The British wanted to believe that the Egyptians, and their Arab allies, could one day be persuaded to realize that the common enemy was Communism and that practical arrangements must be made to hold it at bay. The Egyptians, on the contrary,

36. Mideast Mirror, 2 May 1953.

37. Ibid., 9 May 1953.

38. John Connell, op.cit., p. 43.

believed that the real enemies were Western imperialism and Zionism.

The danger of Soviet penetration in the oil-rich Middle East was indeed a real one but even as late as 1953-54 it was comparatively remote and in suspense, while the presence of unwanted British forces and the menace of Zionist expansionism were facts of life. Therefore, the two points of view, so utterly divergent from each other, could hardly be reconciled, without either side willing to giving up its insistence. For Egypt, all that she insisted upon was a matter of rights; for Britain, her stand was a matter of precautions. Rights certainly have a priority over precautions against 'assumed' dangers.

General Neguib's reaction over the failure of the talks was more vehement and forthright. He said:

We have washed our hands of the talks by which the British desire to draw us into a vicious circle where would never end, as happened before. But we have never agreed to deviate from the policy which we have laid down for ourselves. We entered the talks knowing full well that we wanted and determined to say what we wanted briefly and clearly. And we demanded it with determination so that the other side may know that we tolerate no bargaining.

I don't know how such a simple and just demand could be subject to dispute, delay or division. I do not know that prompt acceptance of this demand will be an important factor to stabilization and peace. It is impossible to go back and waste the blood and suffering the people expended to make the country theirs - theirs to own, defend and plan for. (39)

39. Al-Ahram, 10 May 1953; Mideast Mirror, 16 May 1953, p. 1.

The Egyptian leader concluded his remarks by adding that Egypt did not want a "cheap independence" for which she had not paid. "Some of the price we have already paid and we are fully prepared to pay in full. Independence cannot be granted on paper but only achieved by payment with blood." (40)

The crisis in Egypt's relations with Britain arising from the deadlock in the talks on the Suez Canal became more serious and alarming when Sir Churchill found it necessary to retort at General Neguib by telling the House of Commons that "if Egypt used force in the Canal Zone, British troops would use force in self-defence." (41) His 'retort' was unfortunate as it created the impression that he still regarded Egypt virtually a British colony and that the very thought of evacuation hurt him. The Egyptians remembered what he had said in one of his war-time speeches, "I have not become Prime Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." (42)

But the pattern and forces of international politics had undergone several significant changes since the end of the last war. With the advent of the United Nations and the emergence of assertive nationalism in the hitherto subjugated communities, and the new technological achievements, the British

40. Ibid.

41. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 515, cols. 885-89; also Documents (RIIA) for 1953, p. 342.

42. Quoted in John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London, 1961), p. 74.

Empire had already started receding to its own narrow confines. He was now the Prime Minister of a country that had not yet fully recovered from the strains and exhaustions of the last war and was closely dependent on American economic and military cooperation, while the new Republican Government of the United States, headed by General Eisenhower, was 'keen' to restore good relations with the Arab world. (43) Churchill could not have ignored these facts. Moreover, the Egyptian Government had decided to maintain peace and security throughout the country. They had completely ruled out sabotage and had warned their people against it. In a broadcast on 20 May, Neguib told the people to restrain until the Government decided to begin a national struggle; "of course, the Government will fix the time for the battle." But he also warned that "we are not going to be reckless." "We are very anxious not to repeat the mistakes of those who preceded us. The disaster of Palestine will not be repeated, nor the tragedy of the Canal which took place after the abrogation of the Treaty in 1951." (44) Therefore, there was apparently no cause or necessity to use force against the Egyptians. The atmosphere in the cities of Egypt remained calm and there was no overt sign of anti-British feeling. Even in the Canal Zone, the number of incidents reported were, if anything, slightly fewer than in normal times. Nevertheless, there was tension and several

43. Department of State Bulletin, 23 March 1953, p. 431.

44. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 20 and 21 May 1953.

families left Cairo 'against potential dangers'. (45) Gamal Abdel Nasser described the existing state of Egypt's relations with Britain as 'a war of nerves'. (46)

The possibility of resuming negotiations was further put off by the flare up of a new crisis over the disappearance of a British airman from the Ismailia area in the Canal Zone. General Festing, Commanding Officer of the British troops in Egypt, took an 'extremely serious view' of the incident and sent a strongly worded note to the Sub-Governor of Ismailia and demanded that the airman should be returned immediately. The note read:

Lt. General Festing reserves the right to take such action as he considers necessary if the aircraft-man A.V. Rigden, is not returned to the British authorities ... by 09.00 hours on Monday, July 13, measures will be put into force which will cause serious disruption and inconvenience to the Egyptian community in the area of Ismailia. (47)

The disappearance of an 'airman' was not so serious an incident as to justify the action of General Festing. The language and the actions proposed in his letter could not be described but an 'ultimatum'. Egypt's reaction was naturally of vehement denunciation. Major Salem denied that the Egyptian authorities had any knowledge of Rigden's disappearance and

45. The Daily Telegraph, 21 May 1953; The Times, 21 May 1953.

46. Al-Ahram, 24 May 1953. Also New York Times, 14 May and 15 July 1953.

47. The Times, 13 July 1953; Mideast Mirror, 18 July 1953; Al-Ahram, 12 July 1953.

denounced the note as a 'new aggression on Egyptian sovereignty and independence'. (48)

Despite such grave provocation, the Egyptian Government was determined to prevent any untoward incident to happen inside Egypt. Maintenance of law and order was their primary aim when they declared a state of emergency and posted heavy armed guards at the foreign legations and public buildings, and put additional police force in and around the city. They were not prepared to allow panic and lawlessness to weaken their position and authority. The revolutionary regime thus had made a favourable impression in official and non-official circles in London and Washington of its intentions of peacefully negotiating differences instead of stirring mob violence as its predecessors had done.

After the Rigden crisis passed off with the withdrawal of British forces back to their barracks in the Zone. (49) Selwyn Lloyd expressed that HM Government was willing to resume discussions on the Canal Zone, if Egypt so wished. (50)

48. Al-Ahram, 12 July 1953.

49. As warned in General Festing's 'ultimatum', on the failure of Egyptian authorities to return A.V. Rigden by 9 o'clock on the 13th of July, the British forces in the Canal Zone had erected half-a-dozen check-posts, sent out patrol cars and began a search of all road and rail passengers and vehicles into and out of the Ismailia region. Barage traffic on the Sweet water Canal was also subjected to restrictions and search. These restrictions and check-posts were withdrawn as the situation improved in Ismailia after the 16th July.

50. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 517, cols. 2060-1.

D. THE UNITED STATES MEDIATES

It seems most probable that behind this new initiative there was American pressure, (51) to come to terms with Egypt. Secretary Dulles seemed to have personally observed the gravity of the Anglo-Egyptian relations during his visit to Cairo and other capitals of the region in May. (52)

It was after this trip, that the US administration decided to help bring about a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian impasse, though by process of 'behind-the-scene diplomacy'. It was hoped in Washington that if the Suez dispute were solved satisfactorily, the last and major stumbling block in the way of creating a Middle East defence system would have been cleared. The British Government also seemed to have taken into account the fact that 'a peace-time station' could not be maintained continually under 'a state of seige'. Moreover, the 1936 Treaty was due for revision in 1956 - so near at hand - and the British would then be illegal occupants, liable to unconditional evacuation. Anthony Eden admitted in his memoirs that an agreement with Egypt at that stage was desirable in the interest of the United Kingdom. (53)

51. New York Times, 14 May 1953.

52. Anthony Eden, Full Circle - Memoirs (London, 1960), p.260.

53. Sir Anthony Eden has described the various influences that forced Britain to reach a settlement with Egypt in this manner: "Many influences were at work on Anglo-Egyptian relations that summer, the most powerful was self-interest. Time and modern needs were bringing changes. The Suez Canal remained of supreme importance, the base was yearly less so. The tangled mass of workshops and railways in an

The Egyptian Government, though willing and eager to open negotiations, was however reluctant to take the initiative on account of the recent incidents in Ismailia. (54) London understood the situation and therefore decided to take the initiative by sending back Sir Brian Robertson, joint leader of the British delegation to the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations to Cairo on 19 July. On his arrival the General made the following important and encouraging statement mentioning about Egypt's right to full sovereignty:

Much has happened in the world and in Egypt during the time I have been away, (55) but nothing has happened to detract from my conviction that an amicable agreement between Britain and Egypt to resolve outstanding questions, eminently to the advantage of both countries; an agreement taking full account of Egyptian sovereignty.

This statement was important as it indicated a shift in the British view and thereby helped restore confidence needed for the resumption of contacts. The Egyptian side responded favourably. Two days after the arrival of Sir Robertson, the Revolution Command Council issued a statement which indicated

53. (contd. from back page)

area the size of Wales was cumbersome and dependent upon Egyptian labour. It did not seem likely that in this nuclear age we should ever need a base on the past scale. ~~Smaller~~ bases, redeployment and dispersal would serve our purpose better. The Minister of Defence, Lord Alexander, favoured agreement, so did the Secretary of State for War, Anthony Head, and most military opinion. A treaty seemed to them a method of resolving an outdated commitment. Service in the Canal Zone was also a poor recruiting agent." Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 260.

54. Observer, 19 July 1953; Mideast Mirror, 25 July 1953.

55. General Sir Brian Robertson had left for London after the first formal contact with the Government of Egypt became deadlocked on 6 May 1953.

that Egypt was prepared to discuss practical matters 'which the British negotiators had wanted to discuss in April and May last'. (56) It obviously meant the narrowing of gaps which had separated the two sides in May. (57) Cairo's leading and reliable Al-Ahram quoted General Neguib saying "If the British came forward to us with a request for resumption of the talks on the basis of immediate and unconditional evacuation we shall be prepared to do business with them." (58) The use of the word 'business' implying absence of rigidity was indeed encouraging.

First informal contact between the two sides however could not be established before 30th of the month when the hospitality of the Cairo Embassy of Pakistan enabled them to meet at a Dinner. (59)

The party was a means to overcome the first hurdle to any resumed negotiations. The two sides in a brief joint-communique expressed the hope that their first informal contact at the Dinner Party would lead them to further explore the possibilities of an agreement. (60)

56. Al-Ahram, 22 July 1953; The Daily Telegraph, 22 July 1953.

57. Mideast Mirror, 25 July 1953.

58. Al-Ahram, 30 July 1953.

59. The Pakistan Charge d'Affaires, Syed Husain Tayeb, who was also the Chairman of the Sudan Governor-General's Commission in Khartoum, had invited Sir Robertson and Robert Hankey along with all the members of the Egyptian delegation to the May talks, at a dinner at his residence for the purpose of providing a 'neutral' ground for the two sides to meet informally. Al-Ahram, 31 July 1953.

60. Al-Ahram, 31 July 1953.

Thereafter, the two sides met several times, and seriously tried, though still informally, to explore the possibilities of an agreement between their two Governments on the question of the Suez Canal issue. In all fifteen meetings were held, the last taking place on 21 October. During the first few meetings held before Sir Robertson went to London for consultations with Sir Winston Churchill, both sides talked with restraint and cordiality and there seemed good prospects of reaching some understanding. So far they had been discussing, rather 'bargaining', to use Peter Calvocoressi's expression, about the number, control and duration of employment of British technicians and the availability of the base in future. (61)

61. The 6th 'informal' meeting between Britain and Egyptian negotiators on the Suez Canal base issue was held and agreed on:

1. An Egyptian Officer would be "Commander of the base".
2. A British deputy, receiving orders from London, would be "technical supervisor".
3. About 4,000 British technicians would be retained, until Egyptians could be trained to take over the skilled jobs.
4. The British garrison would be evacuated within 18 months after the signing of the agreement. Issues to be still settled included availability of the base for the return of British or Allied armies in the event, or threat, of war.

Middle East Journal, vol. 8, No.1, 1954, p.73;
see also The Observer, 27 September 1953.

After his return from London, General Robertson, insisted that 'the British soldier-technicians' must have some form of emblem, even if only a badge on their overalls and a flag at their headquarters, as token of their loyalties and reminder that they were still subject to military discipline. Secondly, the British also asked for the right of re-entry to the base in the event of an attack not only upon a member of the Arab League but also upon Turkey or Persia. The British negotiators made another 'funny' suggestion, i.e., if Egypt was not prepared to retain the 'technicians' for a longer period (they had suggested 7 years against Egypt's suggestion for 3 years), Great Britain would give way provided Egypt agreed to their 'right of re-entry in the event of a threat of war instead of merely in the event of an attack'. (62) (Italics mine).

The Egyptian leaders felt the change of attitude in the British negotiators and warned their people and the world at large against "too much optimism" about the outcome of the 'present informal discussions'. (63) A sharp conflict of opinion had now arisen on the question of 'uniform' for the technicians. The British were so much insistent on the technicians wearing the army uniform and carrying weapons that they were reported to have 'offered to give way over Turkey

62. The Observer, 27 September 1953; The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1953; also Mideast Mirror, 17 October 1953, pp. 2-4 and 24 October 1953, p. 7. (Emphasis mine).

63. Mideast Mirror, 10 October 1953, p. 2; The Times, 4 October 1953.

in return for Egyptian concession over the uniforms'. (64)

The Egyptians could not agree to this because the very sight of continuing presence of British military personnel was totally averse to their national pride, and meant only a partial fulfilment of their basic demand of 'Complete evacuation', a continuing conflict of dual authority in the same area.

The Junta would have indeed found it awfully difficult to defend themselves against the criticism of right-wing extremists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and to convince the people that they had indeed terminated the occupation, if British uniforms were still to be seen in the Canal Zone. (65)

In the words of Tom Little, "it was a small point compared with the number of technicians, the duration of the argument and the conditions governing reactivation of the base, but it showed how little the British understood the mind of Egypt", (66) And finally, the two sides issued an agreed communique that 'it had not been possible to reach agreement'. (67) (Italics mine)

64. Survey of International Affairs 1953, p. 172; see also Manchester Guardian, 23 September 1953.

65. Coral Bell, Survey of International Affairs, 1954 (RIIA, 1957), p. 192.

66. Tom Little, op.cit., pp. 155-56. See also The Observer, 1 November 1953.

67. Mideast Mirror, 24 October 1953; The Times, 22 October 1953; Al-Ahram, 22 October 1953.

E. NEGOTIATIONS SLOWED DOWN:
SPLIT IN THE RCC

Although the joint communique had not closed the negotiations, the Government of Egypt could not devote enough time and attention to the discussions which somehow 'languished' for some more weeks. Elections in the Sudan and the widening of tussle for 'power' between General Neguib and Nasser and the consequent split in the Council of Revolution, (68) delayed the process of reaching a negotiated settlement with Great Britain.

68. At the time of July 1952 coup the military junta had had no idea of setting up a permanent military dictatorship in Egypt. They simply aimed at removing 'the old gang' in the hope and expectation that this removal would liberate the forces of reform which, they assumed, were being stifled by the corruptions of the 'old gang'. Mohamed Neguib had been selected by the young officers as a respected senior officer to act as the titular leader of the coup. But it was not long before Abdel Nasser and the more radical and more perceptive members of the junta realised that reform was not merely a matter of purging corruption. Slowly, probably reluctantly, but inevitably, they came to realise that there could be no reform without revolution. But Mohamed Neguib, who held great titular power in his hands and who, moreover, had won great popularity in Egypt in his role as a father figure, and considerable respect abroad by his role in the Sudan negotiations with Britain, appears to have held to the original idea of the coup and to have continued thinking in terms of a fairly rapid reversion to constitutional life. He came to regard Abdel Nasser and the more radical members of the RCC as young hotheads and was no longer willing to accept his role as a figurehead. He began to claim the right to veto the decisions of the RCC. By the end of the year, there was more or less open disagreement between Neguib on the one hand and Abdel Nasser and the majority of the RCC on the other.

The first 'showdown' came on 24 February 1954 when it was announced by the RCC that Neguib had been relieved of the posts of President, Prime Minister, and Chairman of the RCC and that Abdel Nasser had replaced him as Prime Minister and Chairman, leaving the Presidency vacant.

(contd. on next page)

F. NASSER WINS AGAINST NEGUIB AND RESUMES
NEGOTIATIONS IMMEDIATELY WITH MORE
CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE

After Nasser emerged victorious from the 'Neguib crisis' negotiations with the British Ambassador, Sir Ralph Stevenson (69) were resumed without delay. (70) Both sides started afresh with a note of hope and a promise of better understanding and accommodation of each other's contentions and claims. On the

68. (contd. from back page)

This announcement, which attributed Neguib's removal to his attempts to monopolise power, was greeted with widespread popular demonstrations of sympathy with Neguib. Within a few days, Neguib was invited by the RCC to return to Presidency. He accepted and, almost immediately, announced dates for elections and for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, abolished martial law and the Press censorship, and reinstated himself in the Premiership and in the Chairmanship of the RCC. Neguib had, to all appearance, won the day. The RCC announced the intention to dissolve itself, to grant full political rights, to hold free elections, and to allow an elected National Assembly to choose a President. All political internees (except for Communists) were released.

But behind the scene Abdel Nasser, organising his relationship with the Army, with the police, and with the workers' syndicates, was preparing to strike back. This was the decisive moment for the Egyptian Revolution. On 29 March the RCC rescinded all the liberal decisions they had taken only a few days before. A fortnight later, Abdel Nasser once more replaced Neguib as Prime Minister and Chairman of the RCC leaving Neguib, for the time being, with the Presidency. Abdel Nasser accomplished this without opposition either from his colleagues in the RCC (except for one, who resigned) or from the Army, and without overt opposition from public opinion. From henceforward he was the real master of the country.

(See The United States in World Affairs 1954 (New York, 1956), pp. 339-40; John Marlowe, op.cit., pp. 406-7; Lacontures, op.cit., Part III, Chapter 3.)

69. Sir Ralph Stevenson returned to Cairo after a long leave in January 1954. See Al-Ahram, 1 January 1954.
70. The United States in World Affairs 1954, p. 339.

Egyptian side Nasser appeared more ready to make concessions on points on which he had stood firm in the autumn of the previous year. He agreed to allow the British re-entry in the event of an attack not only on an Arab country but also on Turkey. (71) On the British side, after prolonged debates and uproarious scenes in the Parliament, staged by a section of the right-wing conservatives which was against evacuation from the Canal Zone, (72) the Government was asked to decide that civilians instead of soldiers should man the base installations, bearing no mark of their nationality.

One of the most important factors which seemed to have directly influenced the Conservative Government was the persistent advice of the military leaders and strategists that the base could not be held in a hostile environment. (73) Sir Winston Churchill himself was fully convinced, after he had had discussions on this issue with President Eisenhower in Washington, that to keep a large concentration of men and material in the

-
71. The Times, 22 July 1954; Mideast Mirror, 31 July 1954. The conditions for an agreement on Suez were among the points of difference between General Neguib and Col. Nasser. Just before the first dismissal of General Neguib, Gamal Nasser is understood to have informed the American and Australian envoys in Cairo that Egypt was prepared to concede the point on Turkey. See New York Times, 21 March 1954; also The Times, 17 March 1954.
72. H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 524, cols. 827-9, 2450-71; vol. 530, cols. 1356-8, 511-21, 554-61, 522-27.
73. Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 260; also "Developments of the Quarter", The Middle East Journal, 1954, p. 446.

Canal Zone was a doubtful expedient in an age of atomic warfare." (74) It demonstrated that the British Prime Minister identified himself with his Foreign Secretary's policy of trying to achieve an agreement with Egypt. (75)

G. HEADS OF AGREEMENT SIGNED

This was in fact the turning point in the discussion about the Suez Canal base then going on in Cairo. Further impetus was added by the arrival in Cairo of Antony Head, the British War Secretary, with 'wide powers' to come to terms quickly. (76) His choice was quite an indication that the Cabinet in England had finally accepted the advice of the Committee of the Chiefs of Staff who believed that the Suez base

-
74. The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (Council of Foreign Relations, New York, 1956), pp. 339-40. Sir Winston Churchill made considerable use of this argument in answering his domestic critics. On 13 July, two days after the Cairo talks began, the storm broke out in Westminster. The Army Sub-Committee of the Conservative Party's Defence Committee held a 90-minute meeting, which was addressed by Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War, Butler, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir Winston Churchill. Anthony Head talked about the strategic necessity of redeployment of forces in Cyprus, Libya, Iraq and Jordan in view of the radius of devastation a hydrogen bomb would produce if dropped on the Suez Canal. Butler then spoke about the financial burden involved in running the base - some £150 million a year, being unbearable in the circumstances. After the so-called 'Suez rebels', led by Captain Waterhouse voiced the opinion that British prestige in the Middle East would be irreparably damaged by complete withdrawal from the Suez Canal, the Prime Minister remarked: "You cannot maintain prestige with folly."
75. See Anthony Eden, op.cit., p. 260.
76. Ibid.; Mideast Mirror, 31 July 1954; Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 24 and 25 July 1954; The Times, 24 July 1954.

was no longer tenable, under the 'changed circumstances'. (77) Matters were discussed and decided upon with astonishing speed. On the night of 27 July, the two Governments initialed the 'Heads of Agreement', (78) embodying the principles and the main details of the terms under which the British troops were to be withdrawn from Egypt and the Canal Zone military base maintained a state of preparedness.

The official communique expressed the conviction of the two Governments that the agreement 'by removing sources of friction and mistrust will help to bring about growing improvement in the relations between their two countries'. It further declared that the signatories had 'no aggressive purpose in reaching the agreement but that the agreements contemplated will contribute to the maintenance of peace and security, which is the objective of both their governments." (79) (Italics mine) The Heads of the Agreement provided:

- a) for the evacuation of all British forces from Egypt within twenty months of the signature of the Agreement;

-
- 77. This was later confirmed by Antony Head himself in his speech in the House of Commons on 29 July 1954. He said: "... the 'heads of agreement' which had been initialed in Cairo, and the correctness or otherwise of the Government's policy towards Egypt depended to a large extent on strategic considerations and, in particular, on a strategic review carried out by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed to by the Cabinet in the light of present conditions." See, H.C. Deb., vol. 531, cols. 724-31.
 - 78. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 28 July 1954; The Times, The New York Times, 28 July 1954; Mideast Mirror, 31 July 1954, p. 3.
 - 79. Ibid. (Emphasis mine)

- b) for British bases in the Canal Zone to be maintained by the British civilian contractors for a period of seven years;
- c) for British forces to reoccupy the Canal Zone in the event of an attack by any outside power on Egypt, or any other country which was a party to the Arab collective Security Pact of 1950, or on Turkey. (80)

Details of the procedure and various technicalities regarding maintenance of the base in the most efficient working order, including facilities and protections to be provided to the British Civil Contractors and labour were worked out in the same spirit of cooperation and compromise. After about two months of patient and painstaking discussion, the two Governments finally signed the most important document regarding the evacuation of the Suez Canal base on the 19th day of October 1954. (81) From the British side the signatories included Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. (82)

H. TERMS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT (83)

The main provisions of the 'epoch-making' agreement were precisely the same as set out in the 'Heads of Agreement' in July last. Ratifications were exchanged at Cairo after nearly six weeks. (84)

888

- 80. Text of the Agreement in Appendix No.
- 81. Al-Ahram, The Egyptian Gazette, 20 October 1954.
- 82. The Times, 27 September 1954.
- 83. The Egyptians would not have it called a 'Treaty' because of the distasteful association the word had for them.
- 84. Al-Ahram, 7 December 1954; The Times, 7 December 1954.

It consisted of 13 articles, two annexes, including appendices, 17 exchange of notes elaborating the provisions of the main agreement. This curious structure of the agreement apparently was necessitated by the number and complexity of the technical problems to be disposed of in detail. Thus the essential provisions were set and organization of the base elaborated in the annexes and various legal, financial and other useful arrangements were dealt with through exchange of notes. Article 11 of the main agreement provided that the annexes and appendices to the agreement were an integral part thereof; each of notes consisted a subsidiary agreement.

Article 2 declared the termination of the 1936 Treaty, without specifying the times of termination. This formula was devised to avoid raising the issue of Egypt's unilateral abrogation on 15 October 1951 which was not recognized by Great Britain.

Article 1 of the main agreement provided for the withdrawal of British forces from the Egyptian territory in gradual stages, in accordance with the schedule set forth in Part (A) of the Annex. I. This withdrawal was to be completed entirely within twenty months of the date of signing the agreement (19 October 1954). (85)

Other provisions of Annex, I contain detailed provisions for the progressive transfer of responsibility for security and maintenance of installations from British to Egyptian control. (86)

85. At the time of the ratification of the agreement on 6 December 1954, it was found that the withdrawal was actually proceeding ahead of schedule. See Christian Science Monitor, 29 December 1954.

86. For example a 'hand-over document' of each installation was to be prepared by the British forces in such details

(contd. on next page)

Article 3 of the 'agreement' provided that certain parts of the Canal base were to be kept in efficient working order and capable of immediate use in case the need for reactivation of the base arose.

In Annex. II and appendices, thereto, it was provided that Great Britain would maintain and operate certain installations for the duration of the agreement, whereas Egypt was required to 'maintain in good order' other specified installations.

Section 5 of Part A provided that upon the withdrawal of British forces from the base, the Egyptian Government would assume responsibility for the security of all base installations and equipment.

Section 6 provided that the UK Government would maintain and operate the installations listed in Section (2) A and the British equipment therein by concluding contracts with one or more British or Egyptian commercial firms called thereafter as Contractors.

These Contractors according to Section 8 were given the right to employ British technicians up to a total of 1,200 but not exceeding for those recruited outside Egypt a total of 800, as well as Egyptian technicians and such local labour engaged in Egypt as might be required.

Subject to certain specified exemptions, companies and partnerships acting as contractors, as well as their personnel, were to be subject to Egyptian law with respect to their activities in Egypt.

Section 6 provided that the British Government was authorized to attach temporary personnel to H.M.'s Embassy in Cairo for the purpose of inspection of the installations referred to in Part I. The maximum number of such personnel was to be agreed upon between the two governments.

Article 4 of the 'agreement' dealt with reactivation of the base. It stated that in the event of an armed attack by an "outside Power" or any country which at the date of signature of the present agreement

86. (contd. from back page)

as may be agreed upon between the respective headquarters and to be handed over to the Egyptian authorities in advance of the transfer to enable the latter to assess the security and maintenance problems and to make appropriate arrangements to deal with them. (Annex. I, Part B, Section B).

(19 October 1954) was a member of the Arab Collective Security Pact or on Turkey, Egypt agreed to afford to the UK such facilities as might be necessary to place the base on a 'war footing' and operate it effectively'.

These facilities included the use of Egyptian ports which were to be found 'indispensable' for carrying out the above mentioned purposes.

Article 6 provided for consultation between Egypt and HM Government in the event of the threat of such attack. The agreed minute attached to the agreement sought to define the expression "outside" as used in Articles 4 and 6, as any country other than those referred in Article 4. Thus the agreement was not to become operative in the event of an attack by a member of the Arab Collective Security Pact upon another member or Turkey or an attack by Israel or any of these Powers.

Article 5 provided that in the event the base was reactivated in accordance with Article 4, the British occupying forces "shall withdraw immediately upon the cessation of hostilities". The agreed minute expressed the understanding that Article 5 meant that such withdrawal would commence as soon as hostilities ceased or be completed without delay.

Article 8 explained that two Governments recognized that the Suez Canal was an integral part of Egypt and was waterway "economically and commercially and strategically of international importance", in which the freedom of navigation was to be maintained as guaranteed by 1888 Convention.

Article 10 affirmed that the right of membership and privileges guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations and the obligations arising thereto, were to remain absolutely unaffected by signing the agreement. It amounted to recognition and a promise of Great Britain to uphold the sanctity of equal sovereign status of Egypt.

I. EGYPT'S RESPONSE AND REACTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT

The 1954 'Suez Canal Base Agreement' was hailed both by the Egyptian and the British Government as a satisfactory compromise. The signing of the agreement was an occasion of

great rejoicing for the people of Egypt, because, at last long, 72 years of British occupation had come to an end. (87) It was the fulfilment of their greatest national aspiration - completeness of political freedom. They had conceded on the question of Unity of the Sudan and Egypt primarily with the very object of reaching a settlement on the question of evacuation of the Canal Zone. Nasser, whose realism, straightforwardness and - as a matter of fact - approach was mainly responsible for the conclusion of the agreement, asked his people to see the agreement as the point of culmination of the nationalist struggle launched by Orabi and Saad Zaghlul, both pioneers of Egypt's freedom movement. In his nation-wide broadcast the same night Nasser spoke with enthusiasm. He said:

This is a turning point in the history of Egypt. With this agreement a new era of friendly relations based on mutual trust, confidence and cooperation opens between Egypt and Britain and the Western countries. It is the biggest single achievement in Egypt's national aspirations to date. I must pay a high tribute to the British side for their part in reaching the agreement. I want to mention in particular General Sir Brian Robertson for his friendly attitude towards Egypt. Now we want to get rid of hatred in our hearts and start building up our relations with Britain on a solid basis of mutual trust and confidence which has been lacking in our relations for the past several decades. (88)

In an interview with the Arab News Agency Col. Nasser further elaborated that the agreement signed with Britain met all the major requirements of Egyptian sovereignty. "A

87. New York Times, 28 July 1954; also The Egyptian Gazette, 28 July 1954.

88. Radio Cairo Broadcast, 19 October 1954. Reporting and Coverage in Al-Ahram, 20 October 1954.

succession of politicians of the old regime," he commented, "made much of their nationalism only succeed in making a bad situation worse." (89) He was thus trying to explain and emphasise that the Suez agreement could be concluded because the revolutionary regime, under his leadership, approached the problems of its relations with Britain in a somewhat more realistic manner and by being reasonable, i.e. by taking a balanced view of their own interests and those of others. In this context, reasonableness meant intelligent pursuit of one's own national interest avoiding a clash with the interests of another people. He defended his action by explaining:

Egypt has now secured the evacuation of British troops. This is the basic principle. She always struggled for, and, in achieving it, Egypt has made no concessions against this principle. The lengthy negotiations were intended to ensure that evacuation could be achieved without prejudicing either Egypt's inalienable rights or the mutual desire of Egypt and Britain to ensure the security of the Middle East. (90)

The agreement freed Egypt from the bondage of the 1936 Treaty and consequently strengthened the position of the Revolutionary Command Council vis-a-vis the inside opponents of the regime. With the signing of this 'most important document' Egypt's right to conduct its affairs, domestic as well as foreign, was restored.

89. See Mideast Mirror, 31 July 1954, pp. 6-8; also Al-Ahram, 28 and 29 July 1954.

90. Mideast Mirror, 23 October 1954, p. 7.

In his little book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser referred to the general decline of the British and French political influence in the Middle East and the need of a dynamic personality to integrate the local forces and channellise its vast, mostly untapped economic and man-power resources for prosperity and political discipline. Egypt, being comparatively more advanced, more educated and more populous than the rest of the region, was called upon to play that historic character. In his words:

We cannot look at the map of the world ... without realising Egypt's position on the map and her role by the logic of that position. Can we fail to see that there is an Arab Zone surrounding us? ... Can we possibly ignore the fact there is African Continent which we have been made part of by fate? ... Can we ignore the fact that there is an Islamic with which we are united by bond of religious principle reinforced by historical realities? ... It always strikes me that in this area in which we live is a role running around aimlessly looking for a hero to give it being. ... The role is not one of leadership or domination. It is rather a role of interaction with and response to all the factors mentioned above, which involves making use of the tremendous talent strength in the regions surrounding us to create a great power in this area which will then rise up to a level of dignity and undertake a positive part in building the future of mankind. (91)

To play this 'role' it was necessary that Egypt must have the freedom to make her decisions, and such freedom they could not have so long as Britain insisted on the continuing validity of the 1936 Treaty and so long as the 80,000-men strong British force stay within 'easy' striking distance of her capital.

91. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo, 1954), p. 30.

It was, therefore, an important and urgent task for the Free Officers to get rid of the intimidating presence of the British forces as soon as possible, even if it meant a little bit of bending down to, a little adjustment with, Britain on matters of lesser importance as compared to an agreement on principles. Nasser's acceptance of Turkey being included in the list of countries, an attack on which would justify Britain's re-entry into the base, was primarily motivated to facilitate the conclusion of an agreement on the question of evacuation as such. Nasser would not have conceded on this point without weighing the pros and cons. He was not unaware that the cold war was, until then, centred in Europe and the Far East, and the Soviet interest in the Middle East was not yet of the nature of positive assertion, or at least was not found to be able to interfere in their affairs. (92) Moreover in Egypt, according to his calculations, the people 'would not care much about Turkey - all that they would be overwhelmed with, would be the fact that at long last, the British were clearing out. The popular acclaim to the agreement and their 'wild rejoicing' in the streets of Cairo and

92. Soviet Union's somewhat mysterious lack of interest in Arabic speaking part of the Middle East in the post-war years was understood to be due to late Joseph Stalin's fear or caution that an aggressive policy in this region 'would attract American intervention; he preferred that America should be kept away, even if at the cost of tolerating the British presence'. See Guy Wint and Peter Clavocoressi, Middle East Crisis (Penguin Books, 1957). See also, Walter Z. Laquer, "The Appeal of Communism in the Middle East", The Middle East Journal, IX (Winter, 1955), pp. 20-25.

Alexandria, proved that he understood the mind of his countrymen. (93) Moreover, the inclusion of Turkey was to be readily welcomed by the Arab League. Iraq, an Arab League member, was already tied to Turkey through the Sadabad Pact.

Egypt's Minister of National Guidance, Saleh Salim defended the agreement by saying that an aggression against Turkey would result in world war, in which event Egypt would be greatly benefited by having Britain's support. (94) The Al-Ahram commented in its editorial:

Twenty million Egyptians today lift up their heads, proudly aware that their national dignity is now fully restored. Never in the history of the world has a whole nation been indebted to a handful of men, as we are today to the leaders of our Revolution.

-
93. Huge crowds assembled in Sharia Karr el Aini and the streets surrounding the parliament building, wildly cheered Col Nasser and his colleagues as they drove away after the ceremony.

Cairo itself was bright with coloured lights. Public buildings, houses and shops on main streets and squares were brightly illuminated.

(Egyptian Gazette, 20 October 1954)

Large crowds of people, mostly students and workers toured streets of Cairo, Alexandria and other big cities, carrying banners and dancing to the accompaniment of trumpets and flutes.

They shouted various slogans, including "Long Live Nasser - Hero of evacuation", "Long Live Independent Egypt" and "Long Live the RCC".

As a further sign of rejoicing military bands played nationalist songs in public parks and squares. A torch procession paraded in the main streets of Alexandria. Individuals shook hands hugged and embraced each other with a hearty 'Mubarak'.

(The Egyptian Gazette, 21 October 1954)

94. New York Times, 31 July 1954.

..... With faith in God, confidence in the people and in themselves, determination and will-power the leaders of the Revolution achieved their greatest objective and freed their country from foreign occupation.

We are now free and our next generation will be born free. (95)

The English daily, The Egyptian Gazette, acclaimed the accord as a great landmark in the history of Egypt.

Editorially it said:

Few acts in modern political history can equal in importance and successful conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. ... It will stand out in the annals of this country as the cornerstone of the new Egypt.

It has confirmed the wisdom of the policy of the Egyptian negotiators, who were determined that the evacuation of the British troops should be settled before any other major problem was tackled. This Treaty, for the first time in many centuries, gives Egypt full sovereignty and independence.

The agreement establishes between Egypt and Great Britain a relationship in accordance with the ideas and standards of the 20th century. ... A new basis has been laid for growing cooperation and goodwill which can only be to the advantage of both parties. (96)

The Al-Akhbar asserted:

The Anglo-Egyptian agreement marked the end of a long period of national struggle which began when foreign troops first occupied this country.

It is hoped that now the UK, the US and the Western democracies will place greater confidence in this country; and cooperate with Egypt for the sake of world peace and international welfare. ... Egypt, now having restored her national rights, is in a better position to collaborate with them to safeguard peace. (97)

95. Al-Ahram, 19 and 20 October 1954.

96. The Egyptian Gazette, 20 October 1954.

97. Al-Akhbar, 20 October 1954.

The Akher Sea wrote a very suggestive editorial pointing out that now Egypt would have a chance to lead other Arab brothers to evolve a 'realistic Arab policy towards world problems'. The editor, Mohamed Hassamin Heikal (now editor of the Al-Ahram), wrote:

We must all realize that the Agreement is only a step forward towards the realization of our aspirations. ... The battle has not ended ... only a barrier has been removed in our fight against social evils.

We must appreciate that the Evacuation Agreement has added to the responsibilities of both the Government and the people. ... We must now mobilize our all powers and resources in order to speed up the execution of our productive plans.

Greater attention is needed to reorganize the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, now that the restrictions imposed by the 1936 Treaty have been removed. There is urgent need to draw up a new foreign policy based on safeguarding our interests before any other considerations.

A conference of Arab Prime Ministers should be held in Cairo to explain to them the broad lines of Egypt's foreign policy and urge them to draw up a realistic Arab policy towards world problems. (98)

The editor of the Al-Gumhouria wrote:

On July 26, 1952, when Faruk was exiled the evacuation of foreign troops from both Egypt and the Sudan became possible, because the imperialists lost their agents and supporters who were swept out of power by the advent of the Revolution.

We must now spare no effort to build a great future for both Egypt and the Sudan. (99)

98. Akher Sea, 20 October 1954.

99. Al-Gumhuria, 20 October 1954.

It was nevertheless important that the leaders no less than the Egyptian press did not forget to mention that Egypt and Britain would be again friends, and they all hoped for a better and cooperative understanding between the two countries. The Al-Ahram's editorial was typically representative of the common Egyptian feeling towards Great Britain - their staunchest enemy until yesterday:

While we are celebrating today, the evacuation of British troops from Egypt, we must also celebrate the birth of genuine friendship between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

By regaining the friendship of Egypt, the United Kingdom has also regained the friendship of the Arab world. The United Kingdom is now in a position to develop her trade and economic relations with Egypt which deteriorated appreciably following the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. (100)

The way in which Egypt looked at the great event was most aptly described by Nasser himself in almost every talk, speech and interview he granted after signing the documents on the 19th of October:

The ugly page of Anglo-Egyptian relations has been turned and another page is being written. British prestige and position in the Middle East has been strengthened. There is now no reason why Britain and Egypt should not work constructively together. (101)

100. Al-Ahram, 21 October 1954.

British experts to Egypt before the abrogation, totalled £40 million; this figure decreased in the last two years to less than £20 million.

101. The Egyptian Gazette, 20 and 21 October 1954;
Mideast Mirror, 23 October 1954, p. 7.

J. GREAT BRITAIN'S RESPONSE AND REACTIONS TO
THE SUEZ CANAL EVACUATION AGREEMENT

In Great Britain, Her Majesty's Government stoutly defended (102) its decision to withdraw from the Canal base by arguing that the Suez agreement with Egypt was not an end in itself, but a necessary step towards creating a basis for collective security in the Middle East. (103) Nutting who initiated the agreement told the House of Commons that:

This Agreement serves the interests of both Governments; and that it is the intention of Egyptian Government as of Her Majesty's Government to make it work harmoniously. It marks a new and hopeful beginning to the process of rebuilding confidence between our two countries. I have been at pains to emphasise in all my discussions with the Egyptian Prime Minister and his colleagues is a two-sided matter. It is my hope that this confidence will now gradually develop. If that happens, then I believe we shall have taken a step which will serve the cause of stability and peace throughout the Middle East. (104)

The British Government had more than one reason to feel satisfied about the Canal Zone Agreement. Firstly, there was the obviously compelling factor of inadvisability of maintaining a huge base at a tremendous cost of over £50 million a year, the utility of which was now regarded to have been considerably

102. See H.C. Deb., vol. 531, cols. 724-822; 1607-13.

103. In the United States it was hoped that one consequence of the agreement would be the gaining of a new recruit for what John Foster Dulles in his contratulatory message to Colonel Abdel Nasser tactfully referred to as "great stability and defensive strength in the area." United States in World Affairs 1954, p. 341.

104. H.C. Deb., vol. 531, col. 1610.

diminished as a result of new concepts of defence-strategy and equipment. (105)

Secondly, they seemed now fully convinced that the base, however important it might still be considered by the friends of Waterhouse, the leader of the right-wingers, could not be fruitfully maintained in the face of dissent and protest of the people of the area.

Thirdly, Her Majesty's Government was not a loser if the terms of the agreement were studied carefully. The agreement in fact had preserved Britain's every 'essential requirement'. According to Nutting's own statement, "the most important point" of the agreement was that it gave them a legal right to maintain a base in Egypt. They were to have there, for the duration of the Agreement, a reserve of war-like stores and also full facilities for the running of the workshop which they badly needed for the maintenance and repair of their military equipment in the area.

Furthermore, the contractors who were to look after these facilities and were to maintain the base in 'efficient' working order, were to be British nationals. (106) Nevertheless, they were granted certain immunities, including custom exemptions for most of the equipment and material they imported for the

105. Britain's Minister of War Antony Head explained that with Turkey in the NATO, and with the 'northern tire arrangements involving Turkey and Pakistan, the old reliance on the Suez base is replaced by a new concept of area defense. New York Times, 30 July 1954.

106. Section 6 of Annex. II.

carrying out of their responsibilities. (107) More than half of the labour to be employed by them could be Englishmen. (108)

These were admittedly 'considerable financial and political concessions for a sovereign Government to make'. (109)

Fourthly, the withdrawal was to be completed over a period of twenty months, (110) and if any untoward incident, such as one defined in Article 4 of the Agreement, happened during that period, there would still be a sufficient number of British soldiers in the base to face the situation. Thereafter, provision was made for their re-entry into the base. (111)

Fifthly, certain more important installations like the one at Tel-el-Kebir were to be maintained by British contractors and technicians. While certain installations which were to be handed over to the Egyptians were assured by the latter to be maintained efficiently at their own cost. Moreover, at two air stations the servicing British technicians were placed under the control of the Royal Air Force. Overflying, landing and servicing facilities for the RAF were also provided in the main Agreement.

107. Section 8 of Annex. II.

108. Ibid.

109. Anthony Nutting's statement in the House of Commons. See H.C. Deb., vol. 531, 25 October 1954, col. 1608.

110. Article 1. See also Part A of the Annex. I.

111. Articles 3 and 4.

Sixthly, Egypt had agreed to waive all its financial claims arising out of the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty in October which amounted to a considerable sum. (112)

Above all, their failure to include Iran in the reactivation provision was significantly compensated for by Egypt's agreement to a commitment that the parties would engage in "mutual consultation" in the event that any state covered by the Agreement came under a "threat of an armed attack". (113) Apparently it was the view of the British Government that an attack on Iran would constitute a threat towards Iraq and thus the consultation provision could be invoked.

Anthony Nutting was, therefore, right when he said in the House of Commons that "the agreement gives us all we require ... while at the same time we have eliminated the main source of friction between ourselves and the Arab world." (114)

(Italics mine)

What more Britain could have at any rate hoped to gain from an agreement on the base which was going to be abandoned in any case in 1956. In that event Britain would have had no rights of re-entry or numerous other facilities which she had been able to secure under this agreement. Though the Egyptians were to have the base, it was to remain available for the general defence of the area.

112. Nutting's statement. H.C. Deb., vol. 531, col. 532; vol. 532, col. 222.

113. Article 4.

114. H.C. Deb., vol. 532, col. 222.

As a matter of fact, Britain's agreement to transfer her control of the base to the Egyptians demonstrated the possibility of harmonizing local and Western interests in a manner that would facilitate continued cooperation for common ends. In brief, it readjusted an outmoded relationship in a manner that brought substantial satisfaction to both sides - though Egypt's gain was almost entirely psychological.

Perhaps the most appreciative and perceptive comment on this historic agreement between Egypt and Great Britain was offered by their brief joint-communique itself, which they issued after signing the 'great document':

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Egypt and his delegation and Mr. Nutting, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, the British Ambassador and Major-General Benson, have signed today in Cairo an agreement in the Suez Canal base area designed to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new basis of cooperation.

The delegations have laboured intensively to achieve a clear, comprehensive agreement which constitutes a constructive measure in the cause of peace.

They now express, on behalf of their Governments, their sincere desire to work closely and actively together in fulfilling the agreement, and so to promote a new spirit and friendship between their peoples. (115)

K. EGYPT BECOMES A FREE NATION

Now that the Republic of Egypt had achieved relatively complete freedom of choice and actions at the international plain, Nasser and his associates gave preference to build up

115. Al-Ahram, 20 October 1954; Mideast Mirror, 23 October 1954.

Egypt's image as the leading nation in the area by improving her national economy and armed strength, rather than get lost into the intricacies of the cold-war. It is true that Egypt is too strategically located ever to escape the mesh of power-politics. And for that reason alone, Egypt's problem had not been so much the question of whether or not to be involved, but, in fact, with whom and for what purpose? Before the signing of the Agreement in October, they did not have the option even about the party to associate or to be more appropriate, to tie down themselves with. Now at least, the new leaders of Egypt had, for the first time after many centuries, the freedom to make their own decisions and exercise preferences.

The task of making the choice was however easy as it was limited to the Western bloc or the Communists. The revolutionary regime could not align itself with either without losing popularity and even power, depending on the extent of popular reaction to their decision.

For the fulfilment of the 'social revolution' meant eradication of poverty by means of increasing production and employment to the jobless. This depended on improved means of irrigation, technical education and rapid industrialization. The necessary capital, know-how, and equipment could come only from the Western sources. And, these Western sources were quite willing to oblige Egypt but on condition of closer military cooperation. (116) Egypt had had too long and too bitter an

116. President Eisenhower had written to General Nasser as

association with the West to welcome it once again, though in a different form, under different names. They knew that they were already being criticised by the extremists, notably the 'Brothers' for they had conceded the British the right of re-entering into the base. They saw the 'agreement' with so much of disfavour that one of their members tried to sabotage it by aiming at Nasser's life. (117) Moreover, ever since they had dislodged the old politicians from power, they had been reminding the people of the loss of Palestine and the humiliations they suffered in their first encounter with Israel, thus inculcating a sense of revenge against her and all others whom they held responsible for her creation in their midst and were now known to be her patrons and protectors. These were incidentally the same people who were in a position to help the Egyptians in the realization of their various plans and projects, including the construction of the Aswan High Dam. No Egyptian would have appreciated tying of their country with those same powers whose stand on Israel problem differed so markedly from their own.

Any identification with the other quarter, without having built up necessary environment and mental preparedness

116. (contd. from back page)

long as 15 July 1953 that the US was ready to provide Egypt with economic and military assistance once a Suez agreement was reached. Again on 2 October it was announced that Washington was now ready to begin implementing these pledges. Great Britain had already lifted its ban on the sale of arms to Egypt which had been imposed in 1951 following the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty by the Wafd Government. See, United States in World Affairs 1954, pp. 341-42.

117. Al-Ahram, 27 October 1954; The Egyptian Gazette, 27 and 28 October 1954.

to face facts realistically, would have been more dangerous. Going to Moscow for help at that stage would have been too drastic a step for any Government with a predominantly religious community as its body of citizens. Moreover, the Soviet Union was still not actively interested to enter into the Arab areas and thus bring the cold war so near to her own door step. Their main interest was in keeping the area neutral as far as possible. Moreover, the Revolutionary Command Council was not unaware that they were being severely criticised in the Soviet press for concluding the Canal Zone Agreement. The Izvestia had bitterly reproached the Egyptian leaders for having "jumped on the American bandwagon for their shortsightedness and weakness". (118)

The Budapest Radio had been openly accusing these leaders of independent Egypt of high treason and calling upon the Egyptians to revolt against them. (119) Radio Moscow had criticized the Suez Agreement as "the first step towards the inclusion of Egypt in the Western bloc." (120) The Free Officers, who now constituted the main body of the Government were resentful of the Soviet propaganda supporting the anti-Government elements - the Brotherhood against the Junta, Neguib against Nasser, the Wafd against the Liberation Rally. (121)

118. Izvestia, 8 August 1954 in Walter Z. Laquer, The Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959), p. 196.

119. Ibid.

120. Radio Moscow, 16 November 1954, in W.Z. Laquer, op.cit., p. 197.

121. Ibid.

Thus it was apparently most difficult for the Egyptians and to identify themselves with either of the two super powers. Nevertheless, the very fact of geography that made it impossible in the past to avoid entanglement with a Great Power, now suggested remaining aloof or non-aligned. A course of determined neutrality was most suitable for Egypt under the circumstances of Great-Power rivalries and contest for supremacy.

Egypt was afraid of Communism and had taken serious repressive measures against local communists, but fear of communism was not the only or even the most important issue in Egyptian politics. Egypt has no common frontiers with the Soviet Union, as has Turkey, nor, to quote Albert Hourani's words, "has her her history conditioned her to think of her greatest danger as coming from that direction." (122) Therefore, they viewed the problem of East-West relations and the necessities of area defence in a radically different light from the British and the Americans.

The overtures and the pledges made by the British and the American leaders, referred to above, therefore fell short of evoking a favourable response. Egypt, if correctly interpreted, was quite eager and willing to receive Western aid in arms and money, (123) but disinclined to undertake the pledges required by the Mutual Security Legislation or to take any other action that could seem to commit them to the Western cause.

122. Albert Hourani, "Anglo-Egyptian Agreement", The Middle East Journal (Summer, 1955), p. 253.

123. See, New York Times, 31 July 1954.

Egypt's views on the question of defence cooperation were set forth clearly by Nasser himself when he said:

After the Suez settlement there is nothing standing in the way of our good relations with the West, but this harmony, hammering for pacts will only keep alive the old suspicions in the minds of the people, and the Communists know well how to exploit these suspicions. (124)

This statement of the 'most important man of Egypt' suggested to the Western Powers to keep patience and meanwhile build up confidence in the people of the area. A 'Background Paper' published by the Council of Revolution further affirmed the Premier's views on the subject:

It is only by a period of complete independence during which mutual trust is built up between Egypt and the Western Powers that Egypt will be able to look without suspicion on any closer ties between this country and other powers. Cooperation based on trust and friendship, even though it is not specified by any written agreement, is better than a treaty that is regarded suspiciously by average Egyptian. (125)

This was a true expression of the Arab situation the merits of which were, however, not properly assessed by the policy-makers in London and Washington. They could not see the point that in shying away from the notion of formal defence arrangements with the West, the Egyptian leaders were 'ananimated' by a number of practical and ideological considerations.

124. Al-Ahram, 20 August 1954. See also, The New York Times, 20 August 1954. See also, The United States in World Affairs 1954 (New York, 1956), p. 342.

125. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Where I Stand and Why? (Press release of the Embassy of the UAR in Washington, 1959), p.4. See also The Times, 3 September 1954.

They were not immune to the suspicion that 'the Western Powers in pressing for defence cooperation were trying to secure a foothold in the country for their own purposes'.

Moreover, the danger of an outside aggression did not seem to them so very great. If, in their view, there was a threat to their security, it was not from the USSR but from Israel. It was now the central issue to which the two Great Powers - Great Britain and the United States - did not pay the attention it deserved. All future ups and downs in their relations with Egypt and other Arab countries were immediately and directly related to this central issue of Egyptian and Arab Politics vis-a-vis the Great Powers.

Chapter VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Egypt's struggle for freedom from foreign domination and interference can be traced back to the rise of Mohammad Ali - 'the founder of modern Egypt' - whose last descendant, King Faruk was sent into exile by a handful of nationalist military officers in July 1952. The manner and the circumstances in which Mohammad Ali was acclaimed by the people of Egypt as their political leader and guide (1) could be regarded the first expression of their national consciousness.

Among his successors who exploited the country's wealth and resources for their personal benefit and who staked Egypt's independence and national integrity by inviting British and French advisors and investors, Tawfik Pasha was politically the most infirm and incompetent. It was during his reign that the first organized nationalist agitation, led by Colonel Orabi, was forcibly suppressed and the country was occupied by the British in 1882. From that time to the day of signing the Suez Canal evacuation Agreement in 1954, the relations between Egypt and Great Britain were governed by the fact of Britain's superior military force and Egypt's constant, at times violent, struggle to get rid of the alien domination and the concomitant foreign interference in Egypt's life and politics.

On the eve of the First World War, Egypt's status was altered from 'occupation' to a 'Protectorate'. This change in

1. See, M. Rifaat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London, 1946), pp. 16-27.

Egypt's status vis-a-vis Britain's predominant position was merely a matter of formality. It did not bring any relaxation in the latter's policy of interference in Egypt's domestic affairs and suppression of emerging nationalist political forces.

After the conclusion of 'Peace' between the Axis and the Allies, the Egyptians demanded their total emancipation. But all that their nationalist struggle and sacrifices during the war, achieved was a declaration of partial independence in February 1922. Britain unilaterally decided to give Egypt a national government with a parliamentary set up, but, in fact, shorn of full sovereignty. Matters of foreign policy, defence, the problems and privileges of alien minorities and the management of the Sudan affairs remained the exclusive concern of the British Government. These in fact were the very limitations which demonstrated the incompleteness and the mockery of the Egyptian independence. Being thus incapacitated to express her personality in external matters, Egypt's status in the comity of nations remained indeterminable. Nevertheless, the Egyptians accepted it as the first step towards the attainment of complete independence.

In 1936, the world was again at the threshold of a serious crisis. With Hitler's rise to Power in Germany, the Axis challenged afresh the political hegemony of the victors of the First World War beyond their own geo-cultural limits. With a rapid rise in the tempers on both sides, the danger of a major

conflagration was becoming more certain and in any such large-scale battling, the possession of Egypt was to be seriously contested. Her geographic position as a bridge-head linking Europe with Asia and Africa was to be an invaluable strategic advantage in determining the outcome of the clash. Britain would have been unwise to forego this advantage by letting Egypt slip out of her control. Egypt, on the other hand, couldn't have been able to overthrow this control as long as the large contingents of British armed forces were physically stationed inside Egypt. It would have been, therefore, impossible for her to officially look or ask for the Axis' assistance without making Egypt itself a battlefield and thus causing incalculable destruction and misery to scores of her own people. Moreover if the Axis had intervened, and had succeeded against the British, Egypt would have only passed from one occupation to another without gaining her objective. If, on the ^{other} hand, such an intervention was denied or defeated, the Egyptians would have been subjected to serious British revenge. The safer alternative was, therefore, to agree for the time being to a closer alignment with Great Britain.

The conclusion of the 1936 Treaty between Egypt and Great Britain was thus accepted by the former under the pressure of circumstances.

After the end of the war in 1945, Egypt proposed to the British Government that the 1936 Treaty be revised as the circumstances under which it was concluded had been substantially changed.

True, that the Treaty was well received by the Egyptians in 1936, and Prime Minister Nahas Pasha was widely credited for being its chief architect, nevertheless, it was clear from the beginning that the arrangement was not to be regarded as a final and satisfactory settlement of accounts with His Majesty's Government of the four points reserved in the Unilateral Declaration of 1922, only one - the protection of foreigners and minorities - had been conceded by the British, but the other three - imperial communications, the Sudan and the defence of Egypt were still left to be their sole concern.

Egypt's acceptance of the Treaty, in fact, reflected the relative pressure - strength of Great Britain which she then effectively exercised in her treatment of Egypt. Once this pressure-capacity was modified in favour of Egypt, the effectiveness of the Treaty was to be determined by the willingness of the Egyptians to abide by it rather than by the narrow-legalistic concept of 'Paeta Sunt Servanda'.

In 1946-47 the pre-war balance of power was fundamentally changed. Militarily and financially exhausted Britain was no longer capable of wielding unquestioned authority over the dependent territories. India had been freed and bifurcated into two independent nation-states - India and Pakistan. The US and the USSR had emerged from the war as the strongest Powers both striving to outbid the other in wisdom and influence. The United Nations Organization had been established to try to prevent all future wars by encouraging settlement of issues between nations by pacific means. (2) Its Charter had explicitly

2. See Charter of the United Nations (Articles 2/3 and 33)

recognized the principle of 'freedom for all', (3) and the equality of their sovereign status. (4) Political domination or interference in any form against the wishes of the people concerned was prohibited. (5)

Such post-war developments naturally encouraged the nationalists of Egypt to demand for a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty to redefine their mutual relations as equal nations. The people of Egypt considered nothing as urgent and important as the question of realizing their complete political freedom. The fate of Governments and political leaders was determined by their ability to deal with the British successfully. Every other matter, including reforms in administration and economic system was treated secondary. (6) From the Egyptian point of view, no achievement in any field could be compared to their national right of full independence. The stipulations of the 1936 Treaty were a serious limitation on the full and free expression of her sovereign will and actions. The presence of hostile foreign troops on her soil was wounding to her national dignity.

In December 1945 the Egyptian Government made its first formal demand for a revision of the 1936 Treaty, frankly stating that the military situation which the Treaty had been

3. Ibid. Art. 1/3.

4. Ibid. Art. 2/1.

5. Ibid. Art. 1/4.

6. Egyptian Information Bureau, Modern Egypt - A Quarter Century of Progress (Cairo, 1952), p. 14.

designed to meet had ended with the war and, therefore, continuing their relations with Britain on the basis of a treaty which had become obsolete was unrealistic and insulting for the Egyptians. It reminded them of their uneven status vis-a-vis the other signatory, i.e. Great Britain.

The Labour Government in London was not averse to the necessity of revising the pre-war bilateral arrangements in view of the post-war developments in the world political climate and her own inability to effectively suppress the growing strength of the Egyptian nationalism. Prime Minister Attlee was quite inclined to look for a new basis of his country's relations with Egypt. He was convinced that Britain's vital interests in Egypt could be better preserved in a congenial and cooperative atmosphere rather than in a state of continuing animosity.

He seemed quite serious about reaching a settlement with Egypt as he immediately started to translate his words into bold actions. On 7 May he made a formal announcement that his Government had accepted the principle of complete withdrawal of British forces from Egypt in peace-time provided a satisfactory agreement was reached on the question of treaty revision as a whole. (7)

As a practical gesture of his really desiring a peaceful settlement, he ordered the withdrawal of British troops from

7. The Times, 8 May 1946. Al-Ahram and The Egyptian Gazette, 8 and 9 May 1946.

Cairo and Alexandria and to hand over the Cairo Citadel to Egyptian troops early in July 1946. (8) Such determined efforts indicated that Britain's Labour Government was prepared to reconcile the aspirations of Egyptian nationalism with Britain's vital strategic and economic requirements. Consequently, the political atmosphere in Egypt became more propitious than at any time before, for an agreement. The Egyptians who were already quite anxious for reaching an accord with London, willingly and without delay started negotiations with the leaders of His Majesty's Government. And for a time, it seemed rather certain that the two countries would successfully arrive at a new agreement to safeguard their mutual interests, but for a sudden change in the attitude of the British Government.

On returning home from London where he had initialed a draft-treaty with the British Foreign Secretary, the Egyptian Prime Minister and leader of his delegation, Ismail Sidki Pasha informed his people that Britain had agreed on the settlement of the Sudan question "within the framework of unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Crown of Egypt." It was merely on the basis of this understanding that Sidki Pasha had agreed to the British suggestion, rather insistence, to split the problem of evacuation of British troops from the question of the Sudan. By the terms of the draft-treaty the British Government had agreed to complete evacuation of Egypt by the end of 1949; while

8. Al-Ahram, 5 July 1946; The Manchester Guardian, 5 July 1946.

the question of the Sudan was to be settled in separate negotiations on the basis of unity of the Nile Valley.

The chances of a peaceful and mutually satisfactory settlement of the whole of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy were better under Ismail Sidki Pasha than at any time before or after he retired from public life, until Egypt underwent a revolutionary change in the middle of 1952. He was firm in his views and was quite willing to enter into an alliance in place of the outdated 1936 Treaty. He also enjoyed the confidence and support of the King, and thus, he was strong enough to sail through the storm of opposition criticism successfully and obtain the ratification of the draft-instrument. The King too would have had no hesitation in approving it.

But his position was seriously embarrassed and weakened by the public statement of the after-thoughts in Britain's policy. Attlee categorically refuted the Egyptian Prime Minister's interpretation and assertion of his understanding of the meanings of Sidki-Bevin draft-agreement. He claimed that 'no change in the existing status and administration of the Sudan is contemplated and no impairment of the right of the Sudanese ultimately to decide their own future'. (9)

The change in the minds of the Labour leaders seemed to have been due to the fact of stringent criticism of their policy from the Conservative Opposition in the House of Commons. (10)

9. H.C. Deb., vol. 428, cols. 295-6.

10. See H.C. Deb., 5th Series, vol. 422, cols. 781-2.

Attlee's statements and actions were hotly criticised as a tactical error to begin negotiations with a concession. Some who belonged to the group of die-hard colonialists thought it principally unwise to evacuate Egypt and quit the Sudan at all. A weak Labour Government, already over-strained by and preoccupied with the post-war domestic problems and a serious financial crisis, must have found it difficult to by-pass or ignore the compulsions and pressures of Britain's domestic politics.

If Great Britain had been able to abide by its own earlier declarations of intentions, the Sidki-Bevin 'draft-agreement' would have provided a reasonable guide-line for concluding a broad-based arrangement of mutual interest and advantage. The Egyptians would not have objected to the final agreement as it would have nearly fulfilled their primary nationalist objectives. Surely, they wouldn't have been unwise to let this opportunity slip and to suffer the anguish^{and} irritants of an unsettled and unenviable state of relations with Great Britain.

Ismail Sidki's resignation from his country's Prime Ministership was more an expression of protest against London's backing out of its pledges to regard the Sudan an integral part of Egypt. He had accepted the principle of an alliance with Great Britain which would provide for the use of his country as a war-time military base, but he wished the return of the British forces to Egypt to be made conditional on the actual declaration of war in the Mediterranean or Middle East area. Britain, on the other hand, now insisted to have Egypt available as a base

as soon as war appeared imminent anywhere in the world. This, obviously meant the the continuation of the British Forces in Egypt as there was no definite and agreeable criterion to determine whether or not war was imminent. Moreover, with the growing uneasiness in the East-West relations, there always existed a potential danger in every corner of the world as the contest for power and influence between the two rival blocs was not confined to any given area.

Similarly, on the question of the Sudan, the Egyptians were awfully disappointed to note that the British were trying to make the Sudan a separate political entity. They were convinced that the British were using the modern sophisticated expressions like 'self-determination' for the Sudanese, as a cloak for Egyptians exclusion from, and for the continued imperialist occupation of, the Sudan. To say that as long as the Sudanese were able to decide their future political status, simply meant postponing the issue indefinitely. The British were to determine when and whether the Sudanese have acquired sufficient political wisdom and experience to decide their destiny. If during the past several decades of her almost exclusive control of the Sudan, the rate of literacy could not be higher than three per cent, (11) it was not difficult to imagine how long the Sudanese would take to come of age.

11. British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson's statement during his conversations with the Egyptian Foreign Minister. See Record of Conversations, op.cit., p. 73..

Whatever might have been the compulsions and considerations of national and international political intrigues and complexities, the responsibility for the failure to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian controversy would rest more on Great Britain. The negotiations in 1946-47 failed mainly on account of the latter's unhelpful insistence on her own conditions.

In the autumn of 1947, the new coalition Government of Egypt, headed by Fahmy En Nokrashy Pasha, appealed to the United Nations Security Council against the 1936 Treaty. But "his own and to his country's dismay, he discovered that the interests of smaller nations could not be successfully defended, if a combination of the Great Powers thought of their contentions somewhat differently. The Egyptian Premier most strongly pleaded its case and used every argument that could appeal to the sense of justice of his 'distinguished audience', but as the British and the American Governments were more anxious to preserve and safeguard British position and presence in the area apparently to contain communism, the consideration of the Egyptian complaint and claims was put off indefinitely.

Further negotiations between Egypt and England remained suspended until the Wafd Party returned to power in 1950. In the intervening period, the Egyptian scene was dominated mainly by problems of internal politics and rivalries between the Palace and the political parties, most prominent of them, the Wafd. For a while the major target of Egypt's nationalist resentment seemed to be not Britain but Faruk and his henchmen in the army and

among the civilians. A short sentence in Nasser's Philosophy of the Revolution, recalling what a dying soldier-friend told to Kemal El Din Hussain at the time of their campaign against Israel: "Listen Kemal, Egypt is the field of our supreme war effort", was the motivating force of the July 1952 Revolution. It is, therefore, understandable that while the Arab-Israel conflict did not directly cause the collapse of the so-called 'Constitutional machinery' in Egypt, it contributed substantially to the chain of events which led to the dramatic take-over of authority by the nationalist military leaders.

In January 1950, the Wafdists returned to power with overwhelming majority in the Parliament. Their victory at the polls was however a clear manifestation of the people's desire to curtail the authority of the King and their determination to alter Egypt's relations with Great Britain on the basis of complete evacuation and unity of the Nile Valley. The Wafdists had identified themselves with this approach since 1941 when Nahas Pasha first addressed a note to the British Government asking for revision of the 1936 Treaty. They were chiefly responsible for the growth and expansion of nationalist opinion, and so they knew well that a resolute effort to resolve the 'great controversy' with Britain was the most important issue that would determine their popularity and tenure of office.

In June 1950 Nahas Pasha resumed negotiations with the British representatives. But the talks faltered and Egypt threatened to unilaterally abrogate the 1936 Treaty which, from the Egyptian point of view, had ceased to be a suitable basis

for Anglo-Egyptian relations. Throughout their lengthy discussions, dispersed over a year, they maintained their position on the demand of complete and unconditional evacuation both from Egypt and the Sudan. Britain, on the other hand, followed a policy of postponing the entire issue of their relations with Egypt. They took the plea of being too much preoccupied with other important international issues, presumably the Korean War and the crisis in Iran on the question of nationalization of oil. She insisted on the acceptance by Egypt of certain pre-conditions for revising their existing mode of relations.

Despite urgency, the Egyptians, however, showed patience and maintained peace in the streets despite occasional provocative statements by the British side. A number of explanatory 'Notes' and 'Aide-Memoires' were exchanged between the two Governments, but in effect leading to nothing practically realizable. Great Britain's insistence on viewing the whole problem of relations between Cairo and London not within its 'narrow confines' but as a part of the larger question of regional security. Britain, in fact, left no room for a compromise by pressing Egypt to agree in advance to join a Western-sponsored defence arrangement. For them (Britain and her allies) the danger of aggression from the Communist countries was not too far and unreal and, therefore, adequate military preparedness was an immediate necessity in order to deter such aggression. The British also declined to commit on the future of the Sudan without the Sudanese having the right to decide it by themselves.

There was obviously a wide gap between the political approach of Egypt and the military considerations of the British negotiators. Egypt was aspiring and struggling to restore her national dignity by removing all external restrictions on her sovereignty, while Britain was insistent on preserving her pre-war status and interests on the plea of new military necessity. It was, therefore, not a coincidence that the leader of the British delegation in the first formal talks opened in Cairo in June 1950, was a high-ranking military officer, Field Marshal William Slim.

The Egyptians understood that the British were seeking to perpetuate their military occupation under a new name and in a new form. They were, therefore, fully justified in rejecting the new British proposal for a joint-armed forces of UK, USA, France and Turkey to be maintained in Egypt in peace-time. In fact, the presence of foreign army in peace-time, could not mean anything else but a sort of occupation and a restriction on Egypt's freedom of actions at home and at the international level.

If, on the other hand, Britain had agreed to the unconditional withdrawal of her forces from Egypt, it would have given the Egyptians a great psychological relief and consequently, a tactical advantage to the British to later ask for a closer cooperation both in peace and in war. With the British soldiers stationed within the country, the Egyptians could never believe that the proposed new alliance was, in any way, different from the one they had denounced recently. Nahas Pasha himself

emphasised this psychological point when he told the British negotiator that once the British had withdrawn from Egypt, his Government would be most willing "to work together hand-in-hand and with our hearts and souls." (12) The British, however, missed the point. They failed to realize the invaluable advantage of support and sympathy of a willing people as against the limited technical advantage which they hoped to obtain from the presence of 'limited foreign troops' in strategic areas, despite the natives' disapproval and active opposition.

Great Britain's unresponsive and unhelpful attitude towards the needs and aspirations of the Egyptians was bound to harden their attitude on their basic national demands. They insisted that the question of evacuation and the unity of the Nile Valley were absolutely linked together and could not be dealt with separately. Moreover, the prospects of a Conservative victory in the forthcoming General elections in the UK, (13) were seriously apprehended to make things more difficult. They could not expect from a Conservative Government to concede to their demands.

Thus, in view of a greater likelihood of the impasse in the existing situation becoming more difficult with the change of Government in London, Cairo could not have continued the talks

-
12. Nahas Pasha's statement during his conversation with Marshal Slim, dated 5 June 1950. See Record of Conversations, op.cit., p. 11.
 13. The General Elections in the United Kingdom were held on 25 October 1951 which returned the Conservatives to power under Churchill's Prime Ministership.

indefinitely. Besides, public opinion throughout Egypt was getting more and more impatient. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists, despite being ideologically poles apart, had made a common cause against the corrupt monarchy and the continuing menace of British occupation. Both were in the forefront representing the inchoate fury of the masses, with the existing state of things. The various students' organizations and workers' committees, consisting mainly of young enthusiasts, could not be persuaded any more to accept the policy of wait and watch.

Thus the Wafd had been emboldened by the firmness of national unity and support of the Government for the realization of the national objectives. Early in October 1951, when it became apparent that the negotiations with the British were not likely to achieve results or appease popular excitement, Nahas Pasha felt himself strong enough and justified, to free Egypt from the bondage of the obnoxious 1936 Treaty by unilaterally abrogating it. The Egyptian Parliament approved the motion by a unanimous and enthusiastic vote. The parliament also contemptuously turned down the latest British invitation to join the proposed Middle-East Defence Organization. The fact that the newest British proposals, being essentially the repetition of earlier ones, were handed to the Egyptian Government five days after the latter had publicly denounced the 1936 Treaty and the 1899 Condominium Agreement, and refused to have any dealing with the British until their forces were withdrawn from both parts of the Nile Valley, were exasperating, as they betrayed Britain's want of understanding and appreciation of Egypt's

nationalist fervour.

After the passage of the Government motion of abrogation of the Treaty, there followed several weeks of sporadic violence and sabotage in the Canal Zone, accompanied by mass withdrawal of Egyptian labour from the huge British military bases. Britain's so-called precautionary measures - imposing curfews and blocading of important strategic points connecting the Canal Zone with the city of Ismailia and the supply routes to the Egyptian army in the Sinai desert, and, above all, the landing of several battalions of British Paratroopers from Cyprus and the closing-in of the British war-vessels to the shores of Egypt merely added fuel to the fire. Furthermore, the British Commander's orders to disarm the civilians and auxiliary police, and searching of private houses and mosques, was the gravest provocation.

General Erskine's ultimatum demanding the surrender of auxiliary force, confined to their barracks in Ismailia, was without any impelling cause or reason. These handful and ill-armed Egyptian policemen had done nothing to justify the British action. The British had no legal authority to take such measures. After 1936, Egypt was not, legally speaking, an occupied territory and, therefore, there was no basis on which Britain's resort to force could be justified. Moreover, the Egyptian police-men were the sons of the soil and were not devoid of nationalist sentiments. Why then would they have complied with the orders of an alien and incompetent authority to lay down their arms of self-defence. Surrender in this manner would have been a shame

for them. Surely, they didn't have sufficient armed strength to take up the challenge, but they did have sufficient moral courage and spirit of sacrifice to face the situation boldly. So, they turned down the ultimatum and fought the onslaught of the British armoured-cars until 50 of them were dead and 100 wounded.

This ghastly incident at Ismailia was bound to agitate the minds of the Egyptians. In a country that had been long struggling for her emancipation from the yoke of British imperialism, such impertinent manifestations of force were inevitably to arouse the nationalist temper to revengeful subversive activities. Morally, resort to violence could be, generally speaking, wrong and unappreciable. But under the circumstances of the present case, resort to violence was the natural weapon of the weaker of the two sides. In a frustrating situation existing in Egypt's relations with Great Britain, it was difficult to control the annoyance and anger of the youthful element charged with nationalist zeal. Therefore, what happened in Cairo on the 26th of January 1952, was a direct reaction of the most provocative and atrocious killing of their fellow-countrymen in Ismailia by the British army.

The agitation that started out to protest against the British was later joined by some irresponsible elements who turned the mob-frenzy into mob-violence against the British and other foreign establishments, and also of those wealthy Egyptians who were known to be the friends and followers of the British and their ways of life. Many shops of fashion-material,

restaurants, cinemas, clubs and hotels, including the world-famous 'Shepherds' were set on fire.

The Wafd Government, which had not been dilatory in inflaming anti-British sentiments, however, was no longer capable of bringing the situation under control. The civil administration and the police, being equally resentful of the previous day's incidents at Ismailia, could not be expected to forcibly suppress the popular agitation. In the beginning they deliberately restrained but later on when the processionists became sufficiently worked-up and violent, they were not able to control the worsening of the situation. Finally, the army was called in to take charge of the situation, but by then considerable damage had been done to life and property of foreigners and some wealthy Egyptians too. This state of chaos and lawlessness, gave the King the chance he had been looking for for some time, to dismiss the Wafd Government. The very next day of the 'Black-Saturday', Nahas Pasha's Ministry was relieved of office.

It would not be relevant in the context of this study, to analyse and determine the responsibility of the events of the 26th of January. What is, however, important is that it was the culmination of the pent-up nationalist emotions, disappointments and resentments against Great Britain's prolong obstinacy and totally unhelpful insistence on seeing Egypt's problems from the view-point of cold-war requirements and exigencies. In fact, the British never impressed the Egyptians of appreciating their national sentiments. They never seriously wished to make a

compromise with Egypt, instead, they only wished to further consolidate their existing position without regard to Egypt's disapproval and objection to the same.

After the dismissal of Nahas Pasha's Government, the King, whose shameful private life and utterly dishonest management of public affairs had been exposed to the people, now started behaving in the most autocratic and whimsical manner. In five months that preceded the spectacular take-over of the Egyptian affairs by the Free Officers in July 1952, five Governments were installed into power under Egypt's most distinguished personalities, but they all failed to put up with the sorry state of things.

In such circumstances of government instability and widespread unrest due to severe shortage of essential consumer goods and rising of price-level of every article of domestic use, the question of Egypt's relations with Great Britain was temporarily pushed into abeyance. Meanwhile, however, a secret organization of young army officers, most of whom had suffered the agony of mismanagement of the Palestine campaign, were preparing to eliminate Faruk and his corrupt favourites considered responsible for the decadence and humiliation of Egypt.

In July 1952 their preparations and plans of action were still premature for staging the epoch-making drama of the revolution, but Faruk's own hasty and unwise actions forced them to advance the date of the great event. Faruk knew that there was a certain group of junior-rank officers who were opposing

his authority and influence in the army.

In order to suppress them, he appointed his own relative Colonel Sherin as Minister of War while his Prime Minister favoured General Mohamad Neguib's name to appease the army. But the King seemed to have underrated the intelligence and confidence of the cool-headed shrewd tactician who was leading the Free Officers when he thought of breaking their organization by suddenly pounding over their heads and dispersing them to distant places. But before Faruk and his trusted 'senior officers' had had a chance to implement their plans, the army of the revolution silently captured them and put an end to their influence and authority for ever.

The initial reaction of the people of Egypt was of surprise but not of fear or shock. They were ultimately happy to see that the corrupt and unjust oligarchy of the Pashas was at last long toppled down.

Great Britain's reaction to these developments in Egypt's domestic affairs, was determined primarily by the wise and timely assurances, given by leaders of the revolution, to protect the life and property of all foreign residents in Egypt. In their earliest broadcasts to the nation, they repeated this assurance to disallow the British to make a move on that pretext.

Despite this assurance and strict vigilance to prevent rioting or sabotage against the British, if the British had tried to repeat the history of 1942 and interfere in Egypt's internal matters, the consequences would have been only 1/00

disastrous. Not only the people of Egypt and their army would have offered strongest resistance, but the entire world community would have unreservedly condemned them. The Western camp would have been weakened to prevent the expansion of Soviet influence in the whole of Asia and Africa, and very probably, the cold-war wouldn't have remained that cold. Moreover, the confidence of the smaller nations in the ability of the United Nations to prevent the 'Big Powers' from interfering in other's local affairs, would have been completely shattered.

Britain's attitude of restraint and in fact the acceptance of the new revolutionary order helped a lot in resolving her disputes with Egypt in a peaceful manner. Thus far, the King's interests and honour had limited the scope and chances of reaching a settlement with Great Britain. After Faruk's removal from the scene and finally after the institution of Monarchy was replaced by a Republican form of Government in June 1953, the prospects of reaching an agreement on all outstanding issues between Egypt and England became more definite than ever before.

The new leaders were not committed on any particular form or conditions of such an agreement. They could afford to start with a clean slate. They could be realistic and precise in their approach and dealing with the British as they were not aspiring to make politics their new career. They were essentially military men, not a political party and had no political manifesto of their own. Their objective was confined to freeing the country from corruption and to get the British out of Egypt

and the Sudan. But they did not wish to do all that by themselves. Their original plan was to leave the power in the hands of civilian authorities as soon as the administration was cleaned of corrupt persons and practices and the existing political parties were able to reform themselves. The parties, however, did not agree to do so as it reflected upon their integrity, capability and performance.

The leaders of the revolution, thereupon decided that the traditional political pattern was not capable of realizing the 'social objectives' of their revolution. They believed that Egypt desperately needed to reform its political institutions and reorganize the fabric of socio-economic activity; that the pace of the desired change had to be faster if Egypt was intended to catch up with the other rapidly developing nations of the world.

In fact, in a country like Egypt where the rate of literacy was not higher than 10 per cent, and where the average wage of the worker was as meagre as thirty cents a day; (14) where opportunities for instruction in modern subjects of science and technology were still negligible, where a relatively small number of wealthy landowners controlled immense quantities of land and formed an economic oligarchy with enormous political influence; (15) where the masses had been living for long under

14. Egyptian Information Bureau, Modern Egypt - a quarter century of Progress (Cairo, 1952), p. 4.

15. Out of a total number of 2.75 million proprietors, 70 per cent had less than half an acre each, while 2,115 had over 200 acres each. At the top of the pyramid of ownership

(contd. on next page)

alien political subjugation in which their political education and training in public affairs was carefully avoided lest they became conscious and demanding of their political rights, it would have been quite futile to create a facade of Parliamentary democracy. If the elections were held under the existing circumstances, the same intriguing class of self-centred rich Pashas would have returned to power and utilized their position and authority for their personal glorification and the prosperity of their own class. And, no Government of the old type would have given Egypt, what she now badly needed - reforms in every walk of life.

The return of old parties to power would have only meant the continuation of all the old ills of the Egyptian society, while as a matter of fact, it was the high-time for Egypt to undertake a complete overhauling of her entire set up. She needed to conserve every bit of her energy for her rapid regeneration and revitalization. Only a government under the Free Officers could be expected to make a break-through in her domestic reformation, and also boldly remove the stalemate in her relations with Great Britain without which Egypt could never really feel herself to be free from the age-old yoke of British imperialism.

15. (contd. from back page)

some 200 proprietors owned an average of 2,600 acres each, but some of them owned as many as 20,000 acres. The King and members of his family owned about 1/3 of the area that was expropriated under the Land Reforms plan of the military Government. See Nauris Harard, Government and Politics of the Middle East (N.J., 1962), p. 71.

For dealing with the British, as past experience suggested, Egypt needed a strong, stable Government which enjoyed popularity and commanded unchallenged authority. The Council of the Revolution, therefore, had good reasons to decide that it could not work through existing political parties and personalities, and to assume all power directly for a transitional period of three years.

During this period, the revolutionary Government, mainly because of its realism, foresight and straightforwardness, scored two spectacular and long-awaited diplomatic victories in its relations with the Government of the United Kingdom. These spirited youngmen seemed to have fully realized that no Egyptian Government, however authoritarian, could ultimately survive, if it was not able to meet the country's desire to be free and unoccupied. No plans of socio-economic reforms and no scheme of political development could evoke popular enthusiasm and cooperation unless Egypt truly became master of its ownself.

The abdication of the 'bad King', the abolition of the titles of 'Beys' and 'Pashas', the expropriation of landed estates exceeding a limit of two hundred feddans, and finally, the termination of the institution of monarchy in June 1953, were undoubtedly impressive measures for the purpose of Egypt's sociological transformation, but her political liberation was still to be achieved.

It was obvious that so long as the question of the Suez Canal base and the Sudan remained unsolved, the people of Egypt could not regard the change of order anything better than the

precious ones. Popular feeling against the presence of the British troops was so strongly resentful and frustrating that Egypt's new leaders decided to open negotiations with the British Government without further delay. But they did so with a marked difference. Having successfully eliminated the King and the parties from the scene of Egyptian politics; they had virtually no fear of violence of mobs or the machinations of political rivals, they were able to tackle the question of relations with Great Britain with some boldness. They showed some realism by agreeing to split the two outstanding issues and to consider them separately, each independent of the other. The result was that within a few weeks an agreement had been reached over the Sudan in February 1953.

The terms of the agreement over the future of the Sudan clearly showed that the new Egyptian elite was convinced that despite many cultural affinities with the people of the Sudan, there were, nevertheless, vital disparities between them and that the latter had a claim to be recognized as a separate national entity. They held that to deny the Sudanese the right of 'self-government' and 'self-determination', while insisting upon the same in their own case, betrayed contradiction and inconsistency in Egypt's political approach. They were intelligent enough to visualise the consequences of deliberately ignoring the rising tide of nationalist upsurge in the Sudan. They knew that even the pro-Egypt Unionists were not really thinking in terms of a perpetual and total amalgamation of their country with Egypt.

They were mainly interested in ousting the British, and, to achieve that end, they needed closer cooperation and guidance of their Egyptian brothers. Once the British were out, the Sudanese were to break with Egypt as well and emerge as a fully sovereign state - master of its ownself. The Ashigga, which represented the unionist trend was, in fact, more seriously interested in denying the Mehdis the possibility of making the Sudan their kingdom under the British patronage.

With this understanding of the Sudan situation, the military Junta of Egypt did not think it advisable to insist that the Sudan was a part of Egypt and must be treated as such. In their view, the hitherto followed policy of inextricably associating the question of evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone with the status of the Sudan only meant indirectly extending the lease of Britain's continued occupation of their own country. Therefore, by recognizing the right of the Sudanese to determine their own future, the members of the military regime exhibited more immediate concern to their own country's liberation.

The famous 'Khartum Agreement' between Egypt and the two main political groups, the 'Ashigga' and the 'Umma', which provided for immediate elections, a transition period of three years, speedy Sudanization of all services, and a referendum to be held at the end of the transitional period to decide whether the Sudanese should be independent or united with Egypt, was a remarkable diplomatic victory of Egypt over the British. By agreeing to the principle of self-determination for the Sudan, the Egyptians, virtually left no room for the British to postpone

the issue any further. The Egyptians had cleverly trumped the British ace, and thus made it inevitable for the latter to accept the new accelerated programme of self-determination for the Sudan.

The events in the Sudan politics that followed the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, proved that the young leaders of the Egyptian revolution had rightly understood the nature and the dimensions of the nationalistic fervour of the Sudanese. The first national Government of the Sudan headed by Ismail Azhari, leader of the Ashigga, openly resented Egypt's attempt to influence the Sudanese choice in favour of closer alignment with Egypt.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the real leader, guide and mentor of the Revolutionary Command Council, wisely reconciled with the situation in the Sudan without bitterness or resentment. Endowed with qualities of admirable statesmanship and political foresight, he immediately realized that the prospect of an independent and friendly Sudan was far better than the prospect of a subservient and hostile one. In December 1955, when the Sudanese Parliament unanimously declared that the Sudan was 'to become fully independent sovereign state', he was the first to accord full recognition to her new status. (16)

The signing of the agreement on the Sudan question was almost immediately followed by undertaking negotiations on the question of the Suez Canal Zone evacuation. But these negotiations

16. Al-Ahram, 2 January 1956; The Times, 2 January 1956.

took comparatively longer time and involved some serious debate on the terms and conditions of the agreement between the two Governments.

On the Egyptian side, a contest for power between General Mohammed Neguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, both representing divergent views on domestic matters, preoccupied the energies and the attention of the Government and the people so much that the negotiations with Britain over the Canal Zone had to be put off until the controversy ended with complete victory for Nasser.

Neguib's defeat was, in fact, the victory of the revolutionary forces with which Nasser was identified. Neguib had played no part in liberating Egypt from the tentacles of corrupt monarchy and selfish politicians. He was merely a titular head whom the young engineers of the coup had chosen to be their nominal leader in order to convince the Egyptians and the world at large that their action was not a youthful adventure. In this assigned role, Neguib earned stockpiles of mass-popularity and prestige. He was widely acclaimed as the deliverer, but only few knew that the real authority behind him was the Revolutionary Council. After the Sudan Agreement, however, Neguib unwisely decided to make himself the master of the situation. He developed secret contacts with the opponents of the revolution, particularly the Moslem Brotherhood which promised him to support him in his bid for power. He, therefore, insisted on rapid reversion to constitutional life and civilian control of the Government.

Nasser and his more radical and more perceptive colleagues in the RCC, on the other hand, felt that if the military junta prematurely relinquished the reins of Government, Egypt would sink back again into corruption and chaos. The old pattern of intrigues and rivalries between individual leaders and parties around them, would not only have adversely affected Egypt's socio-economic transformation, but also disabled her to get rid of Britain's domination. The Council of the Revolution obviously, could not have allowed that to happen, and so it decided to push the real leader of the revolution, Nasser, in the forefront by appointing him the Prime Minister of the country with full authority both to look into domestic issues and to deal with the British.

Thus armed with added strength and enlarged authority, Nasser, immediately resumed negotiations with the British representatives in Cairo, over the question of the Canal Zone, and after several weeks of hard bargaining, initialed an agreement which happily provided for immediate British evacuation from Egypt.

A closer examination of the main provisions of the historic agreement would clearly show that Egypt was not the looser in any sense, in any way. As his country's chief negotiator in this case, Nasser had undertaken certain well-calculated risks when he conceded to the inclusion of Turkey in the list of countries an attack on which would justify Britain's re-entry into the base, he was certainly not unaware that the cold war still far away in Europe and the Far East, and that the

Soviet Union was not yet strong enough to forcibly assert her position and interests in the Arabic-speaking area. Moreover, the people of Egypt, according to his calculations, 'would not care much about Turkey - all that they would be overwhelmed with would be the fact that at last long, the British were clearing out'. The popular acclamation to the agreement, and their 'wild rejoicing' into streets of Cairo and Alexandria, proved that he understood the minds of his countrymen well. Above all since an aggression against Turkey - a partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would have meant a world war, in which event Egypt was to be greatly benefited by having Britain's support.

The most immediate and the most profound effect of the signing of this historic agreement was that the twenty million Egyptians felt, for the first time in many centuries, that they were now a really independent and sovereign nation. It was an end in itself as well as the starting point for the realization of Egypt's other aspirations. The presence of the invisible British troops in their country for the last seventy-two years, was a barrier, the removal of which was sure to enable them fight against social evils.

For Great Britain also the peaceful conclusion of the evacuation treaty was not a bad bargain. Their experience of the past several decades of dealing with the Egyptians was not a happy one. The latter had persistently refused to accept anything at the cost of their independence and national dignity. After the World War II their nationalism had become more vigorous and

assertive. No amount of force used against them would have discouraged them in their endeavour to achieve their full freedom. If not in 1954, the Egyptians would have, any way, completely abandoned the 1936 Treaty when it would have automatically expired in 1956. In that event Britain would have had no rights of reentry and reactivation of the base for the purpose of the defence of the area. Under the present agreement, Britain, as a matter of fact, preserved nearly all of her 'essential requirements'. (17) In brief, she had more than one reasons to feel satisfied about the said Canal Zone Agreement. She had freed herself from the liability of maintaining a costly base without however, surrendering the right to use it when necessity arose.

By agreeing to evacuate the Suez Canal Zone, Great Britain in fact acknowledged that a military base, however important a link in the British communications, could not be effectively and fruitfully maintained in the face of total dissent and violent protest of the people of the area.

The Suez Canal Evacuation Agreement, ratified by the Parliaments of Egypt and England in October 1954, was one of the most important landmarks that turned the 'ugly page' of the history of Egypt's relations with Great Britain. As it finally ended Britain's military occupation of their country, there was now no grievance or bad feeling in the heart of the Egyptians against the British. Both, Egypt and Great Britain expected that

17. See Department of State Bulletin, 10 November 1954, p. 734.

henceforth their two countries would be able to work constructively together.

The two people could have really become great friends and cooperate with each other in the realization of their common objectives of peace and prosperity, if Great Britain had not unwisely tried to prevent Egypt from influencing and guiding similar movements for freedom and national honour in other Arab countries of the area. Britain's sponsorship of the infamous Baghdad Pact was so obviously motivated to challenge and counter-balance Egypt's expanding prominence and popularity throughout the Arab world.

Britain's denial of arms to Egypt for her self-defence against Israel's mounting war-like overtures and then the launching of the Anglo-French military aggression against her, in collaboration with her enemy, Israel, in 1956, were primarily motivated to snub Egypt and to disable her completely to strive and to participate in the awakening of the Arab world.

Great Britain's unfriendly and uncooperative attitude towards Egypt, however, betrayed their want of proper understanding not only of Egypt's national aspirations but also their inability to realize that only Egypt, by virtue of her greater political experience and better socio-economic and intellectual standards, and her larger and better organized armed forces, was capable of leadership of the Arab world. Also being centrally located between the Arabic-speaking part of Asia and Africa, Egypt was naturally destined to play the role of the 'Big Brother'.

In October 1954 Great Britain recognized the strength of Egyptian nationalism, and their own inability to suppress it any further, when they signed the agreement to quit the Suez Canal Zone, but they ignored that the new republican Government of Egypt represented the modern political trends which were bound to appeal and inspire every other Arab state desiring to come of age by denouncing imperialism and its evils.

In his 'Philosophy of the Revolution', Nasser had articulated the so-called Thesis of the 'Three Circles' - Arab, African and Islamic - in which Egypt had a major role to play. (18) Great Britain's inability or unwillingness to properly assess the value and the implications of the contents of this small book in the context of historical facts of their long but unhappy experience, led to disappoint the glowing hopes of Anglo-Egyptian cooperation to which Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War, had hinted at in October 1954. (19)

By sponsoring the Baghdad Pact in 1955, Great Britain aroused suspicions in Egypt which, aggravated by the perennial Egyptian and Arab dispute with Israel, and the Western role in the Palestine question, forced them to call up the very Soviet "devil", that the Western alliance was seeking to deter. From then on Egypt led the forces of opposition in the Arab world to the Western defence schemes and became one of the major

18. Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo, 1954), p. 30.

19. See, H.C. Deb., vol. 531, col. 1610. See also, The New York Times, 30 July 1954.

proponents in Asia and Africa of the policy of neutralism in the cold war. Needless to say such Egyptian action was very pleasing to the Soviet Union who eventually 'leaped over' the MEDO alliance to enter the Arab political scene in the form of economic and military aid from 1955 and on. (20)

20. See, Middle East Forum, vol. XLV, 1969, p. 56.

Appendix I

DRAFT ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY AND ACCOMPANYING PROTOCOLS

25 October 1946⁽¹⁾

Art. 1. The Treaty of Alliance signed in London on 26th August, 1936, together with the Agreed Minute, notes and the Convention of 26th August, 1936, concerning immunities and privileges which accompanied the said Treaty, shall cease to have effect upon the entry into force of the present Treaty.

Art. 2. The High Contracting Parties agree that in the event of Egypt becoming the object of armed aggression or in the event of the United Kingdom becoming involved in war as the result of armed aggression against countries adjacent to Egypt, they shall take, in close co-operation and as a result of consultation, such action as may be recognised as necessary until the Security Council has taken the necessary measures for the re-establishment of peace.

Art. 3. In order to ensure the mutual co-operation and assistance of the High Contracting Parties, and in order to permit of the effective co-ordination of the measures to be taken for their mutual defence, the High Contracting Parties agree to establish a joint Board of Defence composed of the competent military authorities of the two Governments, assisted by such other representatives as the two Governments shall appoint.

The Board is an advisory body whose functions are to study, with a view to proposing to the two Governments the measures

1. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1947, Egypt No. 2, Cmd. 7179.

to be taken, problems concerning the mutual defence of the High Contracting Parties by land, sea and air, including questions of material and personnel connected therewith and, in particular, the technical requirements of their co-operation and the steps to be taken to enable the armed forces of the High Contracting Parties to be in a position effectively to resist aggression.

The Board shall meet as often as may be necessary in order to carry out these functions. If need arises, the Board shall also examine, on the invitation of, and on the information supplied by, the two Governments, the military repercussions of the international situation, and, in particular, of all events which may threaten the security of the Middle East, and shall make in this respect suitable recommendations to the two Governments, who, in the case of events threatening the security of any one of the neighbouring countries of Egypt, will consult together in order to take in agreement such measures as may be recognised as necessary.

Art. 4. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to conclude any alliance and not to take part in any coalition directed against one of them.

Art. 5. Nothing in the present Treaty can in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon one or other of the High Contracting Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties agree that any difference on the subject of the application or interpretation

of the provisions of the present Treaty, which they are unable to settle by direct negotiation, shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, having due regard to the declarations made by both High Contracting Parties under Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the International Court.

Art. 7. The present Treaty is subject to ratification. Ratifications shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible. The Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications. The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty years from the date of its coming into force and thereafter it shall remain force until the expiry of one year after a notice of termination has been given by one High Contracting Party to the other through the diplomatic channel.

DRAFT SUDAN PROTOCOL

The policy which the High Contracting Parties undertake to follow in the Sudan within the framework of the unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common Crown of Egypt will have for its essential objectives to assure the well-being of the Sudanese, the development of their interests and their active preparation for self-government and consequently the exercise of the right to choose the future status of the Sudan. Until the High Contracting Parties can in full common agreement realise this latter objective after consultation with the Sudanese, the Agreement of 1899 will continue and Article 11 of the Treaty of

1936, together with its Annex and paragraphs 14 to 16 of the Agreed Minute annexed to the same Treaty, will remain in force notwithstanding the first Article of the present Treaty.

DRAFT EVACUATION PROTOCOL

The High Contracting Parties agree that the complete evacuation of Egyptian territory (Egypt) by the British Forces shall be completed by 1st September, 1949.

The towns of Cairo and Alexandria and the Delta shall be evacuated by 31st March, 1947. The evacuation of the remainder of the country shall proceed continuously during the period ending at the date specified in the first paragraph above.

The provisions of the Convention of 26th August, 1936, concerning immunities and privileges will continue provisionally to be applied to the British Forces during the period of their withdrawal from Egypt. Such amendment of the agreement as may be necessary in view of the fact that British troops will after 31st March, 1947, be withdrawn from the Delta and the two cities shall be settled by a subsequent agreement between the two Governments to be negotiated before this date.

Appendix II
DRAFT DECREE-LAWS (1)

I

A draft decree-law abrogating the 1936 Treaty and its Annexes, and the Condominium Agreements of January 19 and July 10, 1899, regarding the administration of The Sudan.

We Farouk I King of Egypt.

Upon what has been submitted to us by the Council of Ministers.

We order the following:-

The following draft law is to be submitted in Our name to Parliament:-

Article I. - Law No.80, 1936, ratifying the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Egypt and Great Britain and which was signed in London on August 26, 1936, shall be rescinded. Thus, the provisions of this Treaty and the agreement attached thereto concerning exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces stationed in the Kingdom of Egypt, as well as the provisions of the Condominium Agreements of January 19 and July 10, 1899, regarding the administration of The Sudan shall cease to be operative.

Article II. - Law No.13 and Law No.24, 1941, relative to exemptions and privileges referred to in the preceding Article are abrogated.

-
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Egypt), Records of Conversations, Notes and Papers Exchanged between the Royal Egyptian Government and the United Kingdom Government (March 1950 - November 1951) (Cairo, 1951), pp. 171-175.

Article III. - Our Ministers are hereby charged with the execution of this law, each in so far as he is concerned and with taking the necessary measures in this respect.

It will become operative as from the date of its publication in the "Journal Officiel".

Issued at Montazah Palace on Al-Moharram 6, 1371 (October 7, 1951).

FAROUK

II

A draft decree-law inviting Parliament to amend the Constitution to decide the constitutional position of The Sudan and to define the title of the King.

We Farouk I King of Egypt.

After taking cognisance of Royal Decree No.42, 1923, setting up a constitutional regime for the Egyptian state and of Articles 156 and 157 of the Constitution; and upon what has been submitted to us by the Council of Ministers.

We order the following:-

Article I. - Parliament is invited to consider amending Articles 159 and 160 of the Constitution to decide the constitutional position of The Sudan and to define the title of the King.

Article II. - The President of our Council of Ministers is hereby charged with the execution of this decree.

III

A draft decree-law providing that the King shall be titled King of Egypt and The Sudan.

We Farouk I King of Egypt.

After taking cognisance of Royal Decree No.42, 1923, setting up a constitutional regime for the Egyptian State; of Articles 156 and 157 of the Constitution; of the decree issued on October 7, 1951, proposing the amendment of some provisions of the Constitution; and of the two decisions of Parliament approving the necessity of such amendment and the subject matter thereof.

We order the following:-

The following draft law is to be submitted in Our name to Parliament:-

Article I. - Article 159 of the Constitution shall be cancelled and the following substituted:-

The provisions of this Constitution shall apply to all the Egyptian Kingdom. Although Egypt and The Sudan are one nation, the regime of rule in The Sudan shall be defined by a special law.

Article II. - Article 160 of the Constitution shall be cancelled and the following substituted:-

"The King shall be titled King of Egypt and the Sudan."

Article III. - The President of the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Justice are hereby charged with the execution of this law which will become operative as from the date of its publication in the "Journal Officiel".

IV

A draft decree-law providing that The Sudan shall have a special Constitution to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly representing the inhabitants of The Sudan.

We Farouk I, King of Egypt and The Sudan.

After taking cognisance of Law No. _____, 1951, abrogating the Treaty of August 26, 1936, and its annexes and also abrogating the Condominium Agreements of January 19 and July 10, 1899, concerning the administration of The Sudan and also after taking cognisance of Article 159 of Royal Order No.42, 1923, setting up a constitutional regime for the State of Egypt, amended by Law No. _____, 1951.

And upon what has been submitted to us by the Council of Ministers.

We order the following:-

The following draft law is to be submitted in Our name to Parliament:-

Article I. - The Sudan shall have a special Constitution to be drawn up by a Constituent Assembly representing the inhabitants of The Sudan and shall be enforced as soon as sanctioned and promulgated by the King. The Constituent Assembly will also draw up an electoral law to become operative in The Sudan after its ratification and promulgation.

Article II. - The rules and procedures of the Constituent Assembly shall be defined in a decree.

Article III. - The Constitution referred to in Article I shall contain the following fundamental rules:-

a) The establishment of democratic and representative rule

in the country, whether the representative body consists of one Chamber or two. One of the two Chambers at least shall be entirely elective.

The King's prerogative to dissolve the representative body or the elected Chamber only, if the representative body is composed of two Chambers, a new general election shall be held within a short interval of time to ensure the continuance of parliamentary control over the executive authority.

b) The separation of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities.

c) The establishment of a Council of Ministers composed of Sudanese. The King ruling through his Ministers and having the right to appoint and dismiss his Ministers. The Ministers being jointly responsible to Parliament or to the elected Chamber, at least for the general policy of the Cabinet and each for his Ministry.

d) The participation of the representative body with the King in practising the legislative authority including the introduction of legislation. Issuing of laws to be subject to approval by Parliament and sanction by the King.

The prior approval by the representative body of the levying of new taxes, their modification or abolition, floating of loans and the annual budget.

e) The guarantee of the independence of the judiciary authorities at all levels.

f) The guarantee within the limits of the law of the rights of individuals, public and personal liberties, liberty of belief, freedom of opinion, liberty of the Press, liberty of meetings and of association.

Article IV. - As an exception to the provisions of the preceding Articles, Foreign Affairs and matters of Defence, the Army and Currency, shall be exercised by the King throughout the country within the limits of Royal Order No.42, 1923, establishing a constitutional government in the State of Egypt.

Article V. - The President of our Council of Ministers is hereby charged with the execution of this law.

Appendix III

AGREEMENT ON SELF-GOVERNMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE SUDAN: BRITAIN AND EGYPT 12 February 1953 (1)

Art. 1. In order to enable the Sudanese people to exercise Self-Determination in a free and neutral atmosphere, a transitional period providing full self-government for the Sudanese shall begin on the day specified in Article 9 below.

Art. 2. The transitional period, being a preparation for the effective termination of the dual Administration, shall be considered as a liquidation of that Administration. During the transitional period the sovereignty of the Sudan shall be kept in reserve for the Sudanese until Self-Determination is achieved.

Art. 3. The Governor-General shall, during the transitional period, be the supreme constitutional authority within the Sudan. He shall exercise his powers as set out in the Self-Government Statute with the aid of a five-member Commission, to be called the Governor-General's Commission, whose powers are laid down in the terms of reference in Annex I to the present Agreement.

Art. 4. This Commission shall consist of two Sudanese proposed by the two contracting Governments in agreement, one Egyptian citizen, one citizen of the United Kingdom and one Pakistani citizen, each to be proposed by his respective Government. The appointment of the two Sudanese members shall be

1. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1953, Treaty Series No. 47, Cmd. 8904.

subject to the subsequent approval of the Sudanese Parliament when it is elected, and the Parliament shall be entitled to nominate alternative candidates in case of disapproval. The Commission hereby set up will be formally appointed by Egyptian Government decree.

Art. 5. The two contracting Governments agree that, it being a fundamental principle of their common policy to maintain the unity of the Sudan as a single territory, the special powers which are vested in the Governor-General by Article 100 of the Self-Government Statute shall not be exercised in any manner which is in conflict with that policy.

Art. 6. The Governor-General shall remain directly responsible to the two contracting Governments as regards:

(a) external affairs;

(b) any change requested by the Sudanese Parliament under Article 101 (1) of the Statute for Self-Government as regards any part of the Statute;

(c) any resolution passed by the Commission which he regards as inconsistent with his responsibilities. In this case he will inform the two contracting Governments, each of which must give an answer within one month of the date of formal notice. The Commission's resolutions shall stand unless the two Governments agree to the contrary.

Art. 7. There shall be constituted a Mixed Electoral Commission of seven members. These shall be three Sudanese appointed by the Governor-General with the approval of his Commission, one Egyptian citizen, one citizen of the United

Kingdom, one citizen of the United States of America, and one Indian citizen. The non-Sudanese members shall be nominated by their respective Governments. The Indian member shall be Chairman of the Commission. The Commission shall be appointed by the Governor-General on the instructions of the two contracting Governments. The terms of reference of this Commission are contained in Annex II to this Agreement.

Art. 8. To provide the free and neutral atmosphere requisite for Self-Determination there shall be established a Sudanisation Committee consisting of:

(a) an Egyptian citizen and a citizen of the United Kingdom to be nominated by their respective Governments and subsequently appointed by the Governor-General, together with three Sudanese members to be selected from a list of five names submitted to him by the Prime Minister of the Sudan. The selection and appointment of these Sudanese members shall have the prior approval of the Governor-General's Commission;

(b) one or more members of the Sudan Public Service Commission who will act in a purely advisory capacity without the right to vote;

(c) the function and terms of reference of this Committee are contained in Annex III to this Agreement.

Art. 9. The transitional period shall begin on the day designated as "the appointed day" in Article 2 of the Self-Government Statute. Subject to the completion of the Sudanisation as outlined in Annex III to this Agreement, the two contracting

Governments undertake to bring the transitional period to an end as soon as possible. In any case this period shall not exceed three years. It shall be brought to an end in the following manner. The Sudanese Parliament shall pass a resolution expressing their desire that arrangements for Self-Determination shall be put in motion and the Governor-General shall notify the two contracting Governments of this resolution.

Art. 10. When the two contracting Governments have been formally notified of this resolution, the Sudanese Government, then existing, shall draw up a draft law for the election of the Constituent Assembly which it shall submit to Parliament for approval. The Governor-General shall give his consent to the law with the agreement of his Commission. Detailed preparations for the process of Self-Determination, including safeguards assuring the impartiality of the elections and any other arrangements designed to secure a free and neutral atmosphere, shall be subject to international supervision. The two contracting Governments will accept the recommendations of any international body which may be set up to this end.

Art. 11. Egyptian and British military forces shall withdraw from the Sudan immediately upon the Sudanese Parliament adopting a resolution expressing its desire that arrangements for Self-Determination be put in motion. The two contracting Governments undertake to complete the withdrawal of their forces from the Sudan within a period not exceeding three months.

Art. 12. The Constituent Assembly shall have two duties to discharge. The first will be to decide the future of the

Sudan as one integral whole. The second will be to draw up a constitution for the Sudan compatible with the decision which shall have been taken in this respect, as well as an electoral law for a permanent Sudanese Parliament. The future of the Sudan shall be decided either:

(a) by the Constituent Assembly choosing to link the Sudan with Egypt in any form, or

(b) by the Constituent Assembly choosing complete independence.

Art. 13. The two contracting Governments undertake to respect the decision of the Constituent Assembly concerning the future status of the Sudan and each Government will take all the measures which may be necessary to give effect to its decision.

Art. 14. The two contracting Governments agree that the draft Self-Government Statute shall be amended in accordance with Annex IV to this Agreement.

Art. 15. This Agreement and its attachments shall come into force upon signature.

Appendix IV

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
AND THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING
THE SUEZ CANAL BASE
Cairo, October 19, 1954 (1)

.....

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and the Government of the Republic of Egypt,

Desiring to establish Anglo-Egyptian relations on a new
basis of mutual understanding and firm friendship,

Have agreed as follows:-

Article 1

Her Majesty's Forces shall be completely withdrawn from
Egyptian territory in accordance with the Schedule set forth in
Part A of Annex I within a period of twenty months from the date
of signature of the present Agreement.

Article 2

The Government of the United Kingdom declare that the
Treaty of Alliance signed in London on the 26th of August, 1936,
with the Agreed Minute, Exchanged Notes, Convention concerning the
immunities and privileges enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt
and all other subsidiary agreements, is terminated.

Article 3

Parts of the present Suez Canal Base, which are listed in
Appendix A to Annex II, shall be kept in efficient working order
and capable of immediate use in accordance with the provisions of

1. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1954, Egypt No. 2
Cmd. 9298.

Article 4 of the present Agreement. To this end they shall be organised in accordance with the provisions of Annex II.

Article 4

In the event of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States, signed in Cairo on the 13th of April, 1950, or on Turkey, Egypt shall afford to the United Kingdom such facilities as may be necessary in order to place the Base on a war footing and to operate it effectively. These facilities shall include the use of Egyptian ports within the limits of what is strictly indispensable for the above-mentioned purposes.

Article 5

In the event of the return of British Forces to the Suez Canal Base area in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, these forces shall withdraw immediately upon the cessation of the hostilities referred to in that Article.

Article 6

In the event of a threat of an armed attack by an outside Power on any country which at the date of signature of the present Agreement is a party to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States or on Turkey, there shall be immediate consultation between Egypt and the United Kingdom.

Article 7

The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford over-flying, landing and servicing facilities for notified flights of aircraft under Royal Air Force control. For the clearance of any

flights of such aircraft, the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the aircraft of any other foreign country with the exception of States parties to the Treaty of Joint Defence between Arab League States. The landing and servicing facilities mentioned above shall be afforded at Egyptian Airfields in the Suez Canal Base area.

Article 8

The two Contracting Governments recognise that the Suez Maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople on the 29th of October, 1888.

Article 9

(a) The United Kingdom is accorded the right to move any British equipment into or out of the Base at its discretion.

(b) There shall be no increase above the level of supplies as agreed upon in Part C of Annex II without the consent of the Government of the Republic of Egypt.

Article 10

The present Agreement does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 11

The Annexes and Appendices to the present Agreement shall be considered as an integral part of it.

Article 12

(a) The present Agreement shall remain in force for the period of seven years from the date of its signature.

(b) During the last twelve months of that period the two Contracting Governments shall consult together to decide on such arrangements as may be necessary upon the termination of the Agreement.

(c) Unless both the Contracting Governments agree upon any extension of the Agreement it shall terminate seven years after the date of signature and the Government of the United Kingdom shall take away or dispose of their property then remaining in the Base.

Article 13

The present Agreement shall have effect as though it had come into force on the date of signature. Instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Cairo, this nineteenth day of October, 1954, in duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages, both texts being equally authentic.

(L.S.) ANTHONY NUTTING
(L.S.) RALPH SKRINE STEVENSON
(L.S.) E.R. BENSON

(L.S.) GAMAL ABDEL NASSER
(L.S.) ABDEL HAKIM AMER
(L.S.) SALAH SALEM
(L.S.) MAHMOUD FAWZI

ANNEX I

Withdrawal of Her Majesty's Forces

(With Reference to Article I of the present Agreement)

Part A

1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 1 of the present Agreement, the following percentages of Her Majesty's Forces in Egypt on the 27th of July, 1954, shall have been withdrawn between that date and the dates indicated in the schedule below:-

<u>Date</u>	<u>Percentage of Her Majesty's Forces</u>
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 4 months. 	22%
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 8 months. 	35%
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 12 months. 	54%
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 16 months. 	75%
Date of Signature of the Agreement plus 20 months. 	100%

2. In connection with the above-mentioned withdrawal, the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall afford all necessary facilities for the movement of men and material.

Part B

Procedure for Standing Machinery, Staff Contacts
and Issue of Instructions to the Appropriate
Egyptian and British Authorities to Facili-
tate Withdrawal

1. For the period of withdrawal mentioned in Article 1 of the present Agreement, the British and the Egyptian Authorities

will each designate appropriate Headquarters in the Canal Area which will be responsible for the progressive transfer of responsibility for security or maintenance of installations from British to Egyptian control.

2. - (a) The British Headquarters for this purpose will be the Headquarters British Troops in Egypt and the Headquarters No.205 Group, Royal Air Force.

(b) The Egyptian Headquarters for this purpose will be the Headquarters Eastern Command.

3. The Headquarters mentioned in paragraph 2 will be the link between the British and the Egyptian Authorities on all details in connection with the transfer of responsibilities for the security and maintenance of installations from British to Egyptian control. The Headquarters will establish direct staff contacts as appropriate to carry out the task on the lines set out in this Annex. Through the medium of their respective Movements Staffs, they will arrange for all the facilities to be provided by the Egyptian Authorities for the British Forces under paragraph 2 of Part A of this Annex.

4. During the period of withdrawal, the Headquarters Eastern Command will gradually assume increasing responsibility for the control of the Canal Area as the commitments of the British Headquarters diminish.

5. The British Headquarters will draw up an outline programme of withdrawal from the various installations for which they are at present responsible. This programme will be discussed between the British and the Egyptian Headquarters so that the

Egyptian Authorities may make plans accordingly for the progressive assumption of their responsibilities. The Egyptian Headquarters may propose in discussion minor modifications of dates, timing or areas concerned.

6. It is desirable that the transfer of responsibilities from the British to the Egyptian Authorities should be carried out by complete zones. But in cases where this is not possible, it is agreed, in the interests of ensuring a clear division of responsibility, that installations and areas handed over will be of such a size as will avoid the mixing of British and Egyptian Forces and producing circumstances where responsibilities cannot be clearly defined.

7. Except as provided for in paragraph 8, the responsibility for the security and maintenance of an installation will not be transferred when:-

- (a) the installation is still operated by British Forces;
or
- (b) the installation forms part of a larger installation still operated by British Forces.

8. When an installation is handed over to the Egyptian Authorities for security or maintenance the withdrawal of British Forces from such installation will be complete and likewise the assumption of responsibility for the security or the maintenance of the installation by the Egyptian Authorities will be complete. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Authorities agree that they will, on request by the British Headquarters, assume responsibility for the security of a particular installation while a limited number of British technical troops are still engaged within the installation.

Such a request shall not be made unless the number of British guard troops available is inadequate to ensure security.

9. When an installation is to be handed over to the Egyptian Authorities for security or maintenance, the Egyptian Headquarters will be notified as far in advance as possible and a date for the handing over will be agreed between the British and the Egyptian Headquarters.

10. A hand-over document of each installation will be prepared by the British Forces in such detail as may be agreed between the British and the Egyptian Headquarters, and will be handed over to the Egyptian Authorities in advance of the transfer, so as to enable the Egyptian Authorities to assess the security and maintenance problems and to make appropriate arrangements to deal with them.

11. When any installation is handed over to the Egyptian Authorities for security or maintenance, all defence posts, emplacements, barbed wire fences, communications, perimeter lighting where applicable, and fire fighting equipment on an appropriate scale, connected with the protection of the installation will be handed over by the British to the Egyptian Authorities. In addition all available information including data as to the pattern, number and location of mines will be handed over. In order to ensure a smooth and efficient transfer of responsibilities, the British Headquarters will provide all possible assistance and give advice, where required, particularly as regards mines.

12. When an installation, not listed in Appendix A to Annex II, is to be evacuated by British Forces, the Egyptian

Headquarters will be notified as far in advance as possible.

13. During the period of withdrawal, British and Egyptian Forces will have unhampered use of the railways and main roads through each other's areas of responsibility. When large-scale movements are contemplated, previous notification will be given and the necessary traffic control arrangements made.

14. During the period of withdrawal, training areas will be agreed between the British and the Egyptian Headquarters.

15. In order to avoid interference between radio stations operated by the British Forces and the Egyptian Forces in the Canal Area during the period of withdrawal, the use of non-internationally registered radio frequencies in the Canal Area subject to co-ordination between the British and the Egyptian Headquarters.

Part C

Engagement and Security Screening of Workers

The following provisions shall apply with respect to the engagement by the British Forces in the Suez Canal Area of technicians and personnel and other local labour (hereinafter referred to as "workers") and the security screening of those workers:-

1. Employment offices at Port Said, Ismailia, Suez and Zagazig will register workers for employment by British Forces.

2. The British Forces Labour Engagement Units will be placed to conform with the location of the Employment Offices mentioned in paragraph 1 and there will be full co-operation

between these Units and Offices, and between the Central Labour Authorities of the British Forces and the Central Office of the Ministry of Social Affairs at Ismailia.

3. The British Forces Labour Engagement Units will give full details of occupational requirements when notifying vacancies to the Employment Offices.

4. Applicants registered at the Employment Offices will be screened by Officers of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior.

5. If, however, the Security Officer of the British Forces considers that an applicant is undesirable, this fact will be notified to the Employment Office concerned. The reasons will also be notified whenever possible.

6. No worker will be engaged by the British Forces unless he has been registered at and submitted by an Employment Office after screening by the Officers of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior.

7. The British Forces will trade-test applicants in skilled occupations as may be necessary and in accordance with present practice. If an applicant is not accepted, the Employment Office will be notified and brief reasons will be given.

8. Workers employed by the British Forces, who become redundant as withdrawal proceeds, will not be discharged until they have been considered for transfer to other units of the British Forces which may need additional workers in similar occupations. Notifications of such transfers will be sent to the Employment Offices concerned. When notice of termination of services is given to a worker, notification will be sent to the appropriate Employment Office.

9. As and when the services of workers are terminated by the British Forces, such workers will, in accordance with the Civilian Employees Regulations of the British Armed Forces in the Suez Canal Zone, be paid the leaving indemnities due to them and be given their appropriate notice or alternatively wages in lieu of such notice.

10. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 8 above apply to all workers, other than those of British nationality employed by the British Forces.

ANNEX II

Organisation of the Base

Part A

1. For the purposes of the present Agreement, the following definitions shall apply:-

- (a) "The Base" shall mean the installations listed in Appendix "A" to this Annex, including both land and buildings, but excluding the equipment therein.
- (b) "British equipment" shall mean all movable property, including such property fixed to permanent foundations, owned by the Government of the United Kingdom.
- (c) "British technicians" shall mean the civilian personnel of British nationality employed in Egypt by the commercial firms in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of this Part of this Annex.
- (d) "Aircraft under Royal Air Force Control" shall mean aircraft of Her Majesty's Forces and British civilian aircraft under charter to them.

2. (a) The Government of the United Kingdom shall have the right to maintain, and to operate for current requirements, the installations numbered as serials 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 16, 30 and

34 inclusive and 36 in the list at Appendix "A" to this Annex.

(b) Should the Government of the United Kingdom decide at any time no longer to maintain any of these installations, they will discuss its disposal with the Government of the Republic of Egypt.

(c) The approval of the Government of the Republic of Egypt shall be obtained for any new construction in any of the installations mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph.

3. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall maintain in good order each of the installations numbered as serials 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17 to 29 inclusive and 37 in the list at Appendix "A" to this Annex from the date on which the installation is handed over to the Government of the Republic of Egypt by the Government of the United Kingdom.

4. Within a period of twenty months from the date of signature of the present Agreement, the Government of the United Kingdom shall transfer to the Government of the Republic of Egypt ownership and possession of the installations and equipment listed in Appendix "B"

5. Following the withdrawal of Her Majesty's Forces, the Government of the Republic of Egypt as the sovereign government shall assume responsibility for the security of the installations and of all equipment contained therein, or in transit to or from the Base, in accordance with the provisions of Part "E" of this Annex.

6. For the purpose of maintaining and operating the installations referred to in paragraph 2(a) above and the British

equipment therein, ~~the~~ Government of the United Kingdom shall conclude contracts with one or more British or Egyptian commercial firms (hereinafter referred to as contractors)

7. - (a) The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall give full support to the contractors who shall be afforded such facilities as may be required to enable them to carry out their tasks.

(b) The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall designate an authority with whom the contractors can co-operate in carrying out those tasks. This authority will be the General Officer Commanding Eastern Command, or any person delegated to act on his behalf.

(c) A Board of Management shall be appointed by the contractors and established in the Base to co-ordinate the contractors' activities.

8- (a) The contractors shall have the right to employ British technicians up to a total of 1,200 but not exceeding for those recruited outside Egypt a total of 800; as well as such Egyptian technicians and personnel, and such local labour engaged in Egypt as they may require.*

(b) The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall give facilities for the entry into and exit from Egypt of British technicians and their families.

(*) British civilian technicians will be located at Abu Sueir Airfield and Fanara Flying Boat Station to assist in the servicing of aircraft under Royal Air Force control and in the take-off, flying and landing procedures in connection with the landing and servicing facilities mentioned in Article 7 of the present Agreement. So far as can be foreseen the number of such technicians located at Abu Sueir Airfield and Fanara Flying Boat Station will be 23.

9. The Government of the United Kingdom shall be afforded facilities for the inspection of the installations referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of this Part of this Annex, and the work being carried out therein. For this purpose, personnel, not exceeding eight in number, shall be attached to Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo. In addition, personnel, not exceeding five in number, may be attached temporarily to Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo.

Part B

Contractors and their Employees

1. Egyptian law shall apply to the activities in Egypt of companies and partnerships acting as contractors for the purposes of the present Agreement and to their personnel.

2. Nevertheless, any such company or partnership having its head office and the office of its principal activity outside Egypt, and having no other activities in Egypt at the date of signature of the present Agreement, shall, with respect to its activities pursuant to the present Agreement, enjoy the following exemptions:-

- (a) Such company or partnership shall not be required to effect any registration under the provisions of the Egyptian Commercial Register Law No. 219 of 1953 or be required to comply with the provisions of Articles 91, 92 and 93 of the Egyptian Companies Law No. 26 of 1954.
- (b) Such company or partnership shall not be required to pay Egyptian tax on profits including the tax on the presumed distribution of dividends under Article 11 of Law No. 14 of 1939.
- (c) With respect to British technicians recruited outside Egypt for the purposes of the present Agreement, any such company or partnership, as well as those technicians, shall be exempt from the following Egyptian laws:-

- (i) Individual Contract of Service Laws No. 317 of 1952 and No. 165 of 1953;
- (ii) Law concerning Compulsory Insurance in respect of Workmen's Compensation No. 86 of 1942, Workmen's Compensation Law No. 89 of 1950 and Law on Compensation for Industrial Diseases No. 117 of 1950, or any other Law which may require industrial insurance or compensation for industrial diseases; and
- (iii) Law relating to Workers' Syndicates No. 319 of 1952.

3. References to laws in the preceding paragraph include any enactment replacing or amending these laws.

4. The Government of the Republic of Egypt express their willingness to consider sympathetically the grant of exemption from any law that may impede the performance by the contractors and their personnel of their tasks pursuant to the purposes of the present Agreement.

5. - (a) With reference to paragraph 2, no activity shall be regarded as being outside the purposes of the present Agreement if it is done for the Government of the Republic of Egypt at their request.

(b) Subject to the consent of and on conditions agreed with the Government of the Republic of Egypt, a company or partnership referred to in paragraph 2 may, with respect to its activities pursuant to the present Agreement, continue to enjoy the exemptions referred to in paragraph 2 to 4, notwithstanding any new activities in Egypt outside the purposes of the present Agreement.

6. Any company incorporated under the laws in force in the United Kingdom solely to act as a contractor for the purposes of the present Agreement and having its head office outside Egypt

shall be treated in the same way and enjoy the same exemptions as companies and partnerships referred to in paragraph 2 notwithstanding that the office of the principal activity of such first-mentioned company may be in Egypt.

7. - (a) In accordance with paragraph 2 (c) of Part A of this Annex, contractors may, subject to agreement with the Government of the Republic of Egypt, build houses in so far as the requirements of their personnel are not covered by existing accommodation.

(b) Contractors may also hire houses subject to such conditions as may be agreed between them and the lessors.

8. - (a) Companies and partnerships incorporated or formed under the laws in force in the United Kingdom and engaged in activities pursuant to the present Agreement and British technicians employed by such companies and partnerships shall, with respect to those activities, be accorded in Egypt treatment no less favourable than that accorded to the nationals, including companies and partnerships, of any other foreign country.

(b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall not be construed as conferring any right or privilege which is or may be accorded only to Arab League States.

9. Companies and partnerships engaged in activities pursuant to the present Agreement and their British workers, employees and personnel shall, with respect to those activities, be accorded treatment no less favourable than that afforded generally to Egyptian nationals, including companies and partnerships. The provisions of this paragraph shall not confer any

special privilege which is granted to Egyptian nationals in special circumstances.

10. Any service rendered or supply furnished from installations listed in Appendix "A" to this Annex or at Egyptian airfields in the Suez Canal Base area by contractors to Egyptian authorities or by Egyptian authorities to contractors will be at cost price, i.e. at a price composed of the cost of the materials consumed, the labour used and a due allowance for actual overhead expenses in providing the service or supply.

Part C

(With reference to Article 9 of the present Agreement)

1. The supplies held in the Base will consist of the categories listed in Appendix "C" to this Annex. After the end of the period of withdrawal, the level of supplies in each category shall not exceed the figure quoted in the schedule. Except with the consent of the Egyptian authorities, supplies in one category shall not be replaced by supplies of another category.

2. For the purposes of paragraph 1 above the contractors will, after the period of withdrawal, give the Egyptian Designated Authority information regarding the disposition, composition and amount of the supplies held in the installations.

3. The procedure to be followed with respect to the import and export of British equipment being moved into or out of the Base is set forth in Appendix "D" to this Annex.

4. The Government of the Republic of Egypt shall accord

all necessary facilities for the storage and turnover of petroleum products to the contractor who maintains and operates the installations numbered as serials 30 to 34 inclusive in Appendix "A" to this Annex as well as the storage capacity leased to him by the Government of the Republic Egypt numbered as serial 35 in that Appendix. Petroleum products thus held on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom shall be in accordance with paragraph 1 above.

Part D

Imports and Exports

1. British technicians recruited outside Egypt may, on first arrival, import into Egypt free of customs duty their personal effects and household goods. Members of one household may, on first arrival, import into Egypt free of customs duty personal effects and household goods belonging to other members of the same household.

2. - (a) Provided that the supplies held in the Base do not exceed the level for which provision is made in paragraph 1 of Part C of this Annex, the contractors may import into Egypt and use for the purposes of the present Agreement, without licence, let or hindrance and free of any customs duty or any other dues or taxes. British equipment consigned by the Government of the United Kingdom which is either (i) within the categories of supplies referred to in that paragraph, or (ii) to replace equipment within any installation.

(b) Nevertheless, this exemption from customs duty, other dues and taxes shall not extend to:-

- (i) any petrol, oil or lubricants used by the contractors;
- (ii) any motor vehicles (other than tank transporters and their towing vehicles) used by the contractors outside the installations, or
- (iii) any office furniture or office supplies imported and used by the contractors.

3. No property imported into Egypt in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be sold in Egypt unless Egyptian customs duty and all other dues are paid at the appropriate rate.

4. The Egyptian authorities shall permit, without licence, let or hindrance and without fee or other charge, the export by contractors of any British equipment now in the Base, imported into Egypt or manufactured in Egypt for the purposes of the present Agreement, and the export by British technicians recruited outside Egypt of any property imported into Egypt by them.

Part E

(With reference to paragraph 5 of Part A
of this Annex)

Security

1. The installations shall receive from the Government of the Republic of Egypt as the sovereign Government the necessary measures for their security. Accordingly, the measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Egypt for the security of the installations handed over to the contractors shall not be less effective than those taken for the security of comparable Egyptian installations.

2. The measures to be taken by the Government of the Republic of Egypt for the security of installations handed over to the contractors shall include the upkeep of perimeter wires, perimeter lighting and defence posts and the provision of defence stores, communications and other necessary measures. Material for the replacement or maintenance of such perimeter wires, perimeter lighting and defence posts shall be provided by the Government of the United Kingdom.

3. Without prejudice to the general principles mentioned above, the contractors shall:-

- (a) take all reasonable measures necessary to prevent theft, sabotage and fire inside the perimeter of the installations, including the posting of internal security civilian guards; and
- (b) in particular ensure that, as far as facilities permit, stores are kept under lock and key, and and only the minimum in open stacks; and
- (c) without prejudice to the provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, comply with Egyptian general security regulations issued by the Egyptian Designated Authority and applicable to comparable Egyptian installations so far as they relate to the matters mentioned in those sub-paragraphs; in this connection the Egyptian authorities shall have the right to carry out inspections to ascertain that these regulations are complied with; and
- (d) co-operate fully with the Egyptian authorities in the maintenance of the security of the installations.

4. The appropriate Egyptian authorities and the contractors shall jointly establish and enforce a pass system to cover the entry into and the exit from the installations of persons, vehicles, equipment and stores with a view to reducing the risk of loss or sabotage.

5. The Egyptian authorities, being responsible for the general security of equipment and stores during movement, shall be given 48 hours notice when it is intended to move equipment or stores to or from installations except in cases where the Egyptian authorities agree to a shorter period of notice. Similar notification should be given to the Egyptian authorities in the case of stores awaiting movement at docks or railway sidings.

Part F

Engagement of Workers by Contractors and their Security Screening

The following provisions shall apply with respect to the engagement by contractors of technicians and personnel and other local labour (hereinafter referred to as "Workers") and the security screening of such workers:-

1. The Ministry of Social Affairs Employment Offices will provide full facilities to the contractors for the engagement of their workers.
2. The location of the installations will determine the Employment Offices with which contractors will co-operate.
3. The contractors will give full details of occupational requirements when notifying vacancies to the Employment Offices.
4. Workers engaged by contractors who have been previously employed by Her Majesty's Forces and have been screened by Officers of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior will not be screened again, but all other workers previously employed by

Her Majesty's Forces will be so screened before engagement by the contractors.

5. No worker, who has not previously been employed by Her Majesty's Forces or by a contractor, will be engaged by a contractor or be otherwise employed within an installation unless he has been registered at and submitted by an Employment Office after screening by Officers of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior.

6. A worker who has already been trade-tested by Her Majesty's Forces or by another contractor may be engaged by a contractor in a similar occupation without further test. In the case, however, of a new applicant who is submitted to a contractor and is rejected after trade-testing, the Employment Office will be notified and brief reasons will be given.

7. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 6 above apply to all workers, other than those of British nationality (who will be included in the agreed number of British technicians employed by the contractors).

xx

xx

xx

Appendix B

(With reference to Paragraph 4 of Part A of
Annex. II)

The following are the installations to be transferred:-

(a) All the airfields in the Suez Canal Base area occupied by Her Majesty's Forces. These are situated at:-

El Firdan.

Ismailia, excluding the area of HQ MEAF stated in
Serial 37 of Appendix A to Annex II.

Abu Sueir

Deversoir (excluding that part built on land which forms part of the concession of the Suez Maritime Canal Company).

Fayid.

Kasfareet

Fanara (Flying Boat Station).

Kabrit

Shandur, and

Shallufa.

(b) Navy House, Port Said.

(d) Adabiya Port, including heavy cranes.

(d) Royal Naval Boom Depot, Adabiya.

(e) The Delta W.T. Station.

(f) Moascar.*

(g) Serials 2,3,4,5,6,11,12,13,15,17-20 inclusive and 37 in the list of Installations in Appendix A to Annex II.

Appendix C

(With reference to Paragraph 1 of Part C of this Annex)

Level of Supplies

<u>Category</u>	<u>Level</u>
1. <u>Ammunition</u> , including all natures of ammunition, mines and explosives.	50000 (tons)
2. <u>Stores</u> , including bridging equipment, engineer and ordnance stores.	300,000 (tons)

(*) Ownership and possession of Moascar Area shall be transferred under the terms of paragraph 4 of Part A of Annex II to the present Agreement with the exception of the possession of the area referred to under Serial 36 of Appendix A to Part A of Annex II (and shown and outlined on the site plan attached thereto) which shall be reserved rent free for the accommodation of British technicians during the period of the present Agreement.

3.	<u>Unarmoured Vehicles.</u>	...	2,000 (number)
4.	<u>Engineer Equipments, including engineer plant and earth-moving equipments.</u>		500 (pieces)
	Railway Locomotives	...	30 (number)
	Railway Wagons	...	100 (number)
	Craft.	...	3 (number)
5.	<u>Air and Ground Fuels</u>	...	80,000 (tons)
6.	<u>Petrol and Water Containers</u>	...	1,300,000 (jerricans)
7.	<u>Equipment under Repair -</u>	...	
	Heavy and Light Armoured Vehicles		70 (number)
	Wheeled Vehicles		400 (number)
	Artillery Equipments		50 (number)
	Engineer Plant and Equipments		50 (number)
	Other Stores		1,500 (tons)

Appendix D

(With reference to paragraph 3 of Part C of
this Annex)

Procedure for Clearance of British Equipment through Egyptian Ports

The following procedure shall apply with respect to the import and export of British equipment being moved into or out of the Base:-

1. Movement of British equipment into or out of the Base shall take place in accordance with a Freight Movement Instruction issued to a contractor by the British authorities. A copy of the Freight Movement Instruction shall be given to the Egyptian authorities, in the case of British equipment moved out of the Base, before shipment takes place, and in the case of inward shipment before the arrival of the British equipment in Egypt. The Freight Movement Instruction shall contain details of the

consignment, including the Freight Shipment Order number by which each item is identified. The Freight Shipment Order number shall be marked upon the items shipped.

2. British equipment to be moved into or out of the Base shall, with respect to its transit between the Egyptian port and the installation concerned, be covered by a Convoy Note (in the case of road or inland water transport) or by a Railway Warrant, as the case may be. Copies of these documents, which shall bear the Freight Shipment~~x~~ Order number of each item, shall be given to the Egyptian Designated Authority.

3. In the case of outward shipment, Freign Requisitions shall be submitted by the contractors to a designated Freight Agent at the port of shipment. These requisitions shall contain the exact measurement of each item, and shall refer in each case to the Freight Shipment Order number. Copies of Freight Requisitions shall be given to the port authorities at the port of shipment.

4. Copies of Bills of Lading and of Ships' Manifests shall be available to the Egyptian port and customs authorities in the normal manner.

5. The designated Freight Agent shall, on behalf of the contractors, supply to the Egyptian port and customs authorities such information, documents and forms as are required to comply with the normal working procedure of these authorities.

6. Inspection by Egyptian authorities of British equipment moved into or out of the Base shall be in accordance with the following procedure:-

- (a) In the case of imports, inspection shall normally take place at the port of entry into Egypt, and, in the case of exports, in the installation in which the British equipment to be moved is held.
- (b) Inspection shall be carried out without unnecessary delay.
- (c) After inspection clearance shall be given to the British equipment either by affixing a mark upon it or by the issue of a document.
- (d) If articles arrive in tropical packing, the packages shall not be opened at the port of entry and shall be sealed by the Egyptian authorities.

Such articles shall be held on charge by the contractors in the installations. These articles shall not be unpacked unless in the presence of the Egyptian authorities.

- (e) Packages containing such articles and bearing unbroken seals shall be cleared for re-export without being opened.
-

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

1. P r i m a r y S o u r c e s

A. COMMAD PAPERS

- Cmd. 1131 (1920) Report of the Special Commission to Egypt.
- Cmd. 1617 Egypt No.1 (1921). Correspondence Regarding Affairs in Egypt.
- Cmd. 1592 Egypt No.1 (1922) Status of Egypt. Despatch to His Majesty's Representatives Abroad.
- Cmd. 2269 Egypt No. (1924). Egypt and the Sudan : Despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan Respecting the position of Egypt.
- Cmd. 3050. Egypt No.1 (1928). Papers Regarding Negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance with Egypt.
- Cmd. 3348. Treaty series No.17 (1929). Exchange of Notes in Regard to the use of the waters of the River Nile for Irrigation purposes.
- Cmd. 3575 Egypt No.1 (1930). Exchange of Notes Relating to proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement, March 31 and May 8, 1930.
- Cmd. 6360. Treaty series No.6 (1937). Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty in Respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty the King of Egypt, London, August 26, 1936.
- Cmd. 5861. Egypt No.1 (1938). Protocol for the Amendment of the Annex to Article 8 of the Treaty of Alliance, August 26, 1936.
- Cmd. 6244. Treaty series No.29 (1940). Convention Relevant to the Abolition of the 'Crisse de la Dette Publique Egyptienne.'
- Cmd. 6582. Egypt No.1 (1945). Correspondence concerning Egyptian Foreign Exchange Requirements for 1945.
- Cmd. 6720. Egypt No.1 (1946). Correspondence concerning the Prolongation of Existing Arrangements Regarding Egypt's Foreign Exchange Requirements.
- Cmd. 6792. Egypt No.2 (1946) Correspondence concerning the Prolongation of Existing Arrangements Regarding Egypt's Foreign Exchange Requirements.

- Cmd. 7100. Egypt No.1 (1947). Correspondence concerning the Prolongation of Existing Arrangements Regarding Egypt's Foreign Exchange Requirements.
- Cmd. 7163. Treaty series No.51 (1947). Financial Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Egypt, London, June 7, 1947.
- Cmd. 7179. Egypt No.2 (1947). Papers Regarding the Negotiations for a Revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936.
- Cmd. 7305. Treaty series No.6 (1948). Financial Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Egypt, Cairo, January 5, 1948.
- Cmd. 7675. Treaty series No.25 (1949). Financial Agreement between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government, Cairo, March 31, 1949.
- Cmd. 8336. Treaty series No.67 (1951). Sterling Releases Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government, Cairo, July 1, 1951.
- Cmd. 8419. Egypt No.2 (1951). Anglo-Egyptian conversations on the Defence of the Suez Canal and on the Sudan, December 1950 - November 1951.
- Cmd. 8767 (1952) Note from the Egyptian Government concerning self-government and self-determination for the Sudan, (2 Nov.1951).
- Cmd. 8904. Treaty series No.47 (1953) Agreement on self-Government and self-determination. for the Sudan, Britain and Egypt (12 Feb. 1953).
- Cmd. 9298 (1954) Egypt No.2. Agreement on the Suez Canal Base: Britain and Egypt (October 19,1954).

B. HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES

5th Ser.	Vol.241	Coll.241	
" "	" 414	" 2004-5	
" "	" 421	" 217	
" "	" 422	" 781-2	
" "	" 423	" 774-5, 788.	

5th Ser.	Vol.	432	Coll.	617-18, 619-20.
"	"	"	"	295-6
"	"	"	"	1963
"	"	"	"	19-21
"	"	"	"	151-2
"	"	"	"	955-6, 2252-3.
"	"	"	"	340-7, 423-67, 1184
"	"	"	"	1263-4
"	"	"	"	1409, 424-7, 836-7, 1409.
"	"	"	"	243-4
"	"	"	"	972-6
"	"	"	"	34-36
"	"	"	"	1014-15
"	"	"	"	33-34
"	"	"	"	602-6
"	"	"	"	1289-91, 2064-65.
"	"	"	"	1374-6
"	"	"	"	885-9, 1083-8.
"	"	"	"	2060-1.
"	"	"	"	319-20, 102-4.
"	"	"	"	1590-1.
"	"	"	"	724-822.
"	"	"	"	222, 1607-13.

C. HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATES

5th Ser.	Vol.	57,	Col.	986
"	"	"	"	139
"	"	"	"	873
"	"	"	"	181
"	"	"	"	351

D. BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS
(Foreign Office, London) Vols. 59, 83, 84.

E. UNITED NATIONS RECORDS

- (a) Security Council, Official Records
 No. 59 p. 1343-5.
 No. 70 p. 1745-67, 1767-84.
 No. 73 p. 1871; 1889.
 No. 75 p. 1945-56
 555th mtg. p. 9-11
 No. 59 pp. 1343-5.

- (b) United Nations Documents. S/2194
 S/2298
 A/2310

F. DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

(Royal Institute of International Affairs, London)
Year 1936; 1937, 1939-46 (2 vols.)
Year 1947-48, 1949-50, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954.

Hurewitz, J.C. : Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East
Vol. II 1914-56.

Butler, W. : Documents on British Foreign Policy
1918-39.

H.M.S.O. London : Foreign Relations of the United States
1945-54 (annual) (Washington, Govt. Printing Press).

Documents relating to the Palestine Problem, London,
(Jewish Agency, 1945).

St. Antony's Papers No. 4 (London, 1958).

" " " No. 11 (London, 1961).

G. EGYPT'S OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

Gamal Abdel Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution
(Ministry of National Guidance, Information Administration, Cairo, 1954).

Egyptian Green Book, Records of Conversations,
Notes and Papers exchanged between the
Royal Egyptian Government and the United
Kingdom Government, March 1950 - November
1951, Cairo, 1951.

Ministry of Education, Department of Culture,
Egypt : A Historical Synopsis.

Government Publications (Cairo)
The Nile Waters Agreement (Cairo, 1948).

Select Studies Committee, The Suez Canal : Facts and Documents (No. 5 Cairo, 1956).

H. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

5 June 1950, 22 October 1951, 29 October 1951,
19 November 1951, 31 December 1951, 15 September 1952,
23 March 1953, 8 June 1953, 15 June 1953, 10 November 1954,
15 November 1954, 9 April 1956.

I. MEMOIRES AND AUTO-BIOGRAPHIES

- Ismail Sidki Pasha : Mudhakarali, (Dar ul Hilal, Cairo, 1950, in Arabic).
- Anthony Eden (memoirs) : Full Circle (London, 1960)
- Mohammed Neguib : Egypt's Destiny (London, 1955).
- Anwar El Sadat : The Revolt on the Nile (London, 1957).
- Gamal Abdel Nasser : The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo, 1954).
- Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Mills, W., (N.Y. 1951).
- Truman, H.S. (Memoirs) : Vol.II, Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956).
- Williams, F. : Earnest Bevin, (London, 1951).
- : A Prime Minister Remembers the war and post-war memoirs of the Lt.Hon.Earl Attee (London, 1961).

2. O t h e r S o u r c e s

- A. Royal Institute of International Affairs, London,
Survey of International Affairs,
1939-45) Separate volumes.
1945-50)
1950-1955 (Annual series)
- Council of Foreign Relation, New York,
The United States in World Affairs
1950-54 (Annual series)

3. B o o k s

- Abbas, M. : The Sudan Question (London, 1951).
- Ahmed, J.M. : The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism (Oxford, 1960).
- Al, Sayyid, A.L. : Egypt and Cromer (London, 1968).
- Armajani, Y. : Middle East Past and Present (N.J. 1970).

- Antonious, G. : The Arab Awakening (London, 1938).
- Baddour, A.F. : Sudanese-Egyptian Relations (Hague, 1960).
- Berque, J. : The Arabs, Their History and Future (London, 1964).
- Blaxland, G. : Objective Egypt (London, 1966).
- Brockelmann, G. : History of Islamic Peoples (London, 1947).
- Bullard, Sir Reader : The Middle East - A Political and Economic Survey (London, R.I.I.A., 1958)
- Blunt, W.S. : Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (London, 1895).
- Barawy, R. : The Military coup in Egypt (Cairo, 1952).
- " " : Egypt, Britain and the Sudan (Cairo, 1952).
- Bilankin, G. : Cairo to Riyadh Diary (London, 1950).
- Berger, M. : The Arab World Today (N.Y., 1952).
- Chatham House Study Group : British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East (London, 1958).
- Collins, R.O. & Tignor, R.L. : Egypt and the Sudan (N.J. 1967).
- Campbell, J.C. : Defense of the Middle East (N.Y. 1960).
- Churchill, W. : The River War (London, 1949).
- Childers, E.B. : The Road to Suez (London, 1962).
- Cromer : Modern Egypt (London, 1911).
- Connell, J. : The most important country (London, 1957).
- Dunne, H.J. : Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt (Washington, 1950).
- Edwards, I.E.S. : The Pyramids of Egypt (London, 1951).
- Elgood, P.G. : The Transit of Egypt (London, 1928).
- Elizabeth, M. : The Mediterranean in Politics (London, 1938)
- " " : Britain's Moment in Middle East (London

- Fedden, R. : The Land of Egypt (London, 1939).
- Fisher, S.N. : Social Forces in the Middle East, Cornell, (N.Y., 1955).
- Gardiner, Sir, A. : Egypt of the Pharaohs (London, 1961).
- Ghorbal, S. : The beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet Ali (London, 1928).
- Glubb, J.B. : A Soldier with the Arabs (London, 1957).
- Harari, M. : Government and Politics of the Middle East (N.J., 1962).
- Hilton, R. : The Thirteenth Power (London, 1958).
- Haim, S.G., ed. : Arab Nationalism (Berkely, 1962).
- Harris, C.P. : Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (Hague, 1964).
- Hottinger, A. : The Arabs, their History culture and palace in the Modern World (London, 1963).
- Hurst, H.E. : The Nile (London, 1952).
- Hussein, A.A. : As Sudan (Cairo, 1935).
- Issawi, C. : Egypt in Mid-Century (London, 1954).
- " " : Egypt - An account of economic and social analysis (London, R.I.I.A., 1954).
- " " : Egypt in Revolution (Oxford, 1963).
- Jarvis, H.W. : Pharo to Faruk (London, 1956).
- Joesten, J. : Nasser, The Rise to Power.
- Kerr, M. : The Arabs Cold War (Oxford, 1965).
- Kirk, G.E. : A Short History of the Middle East, from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times (London, 1955).
- " " : The Middle East 1945-50 (London, R.I.I.A., 1956).
- Kimche, J. : Seven Fallen Pillars (London, 1953).
- Kimche, J. & David : Both sides of the Hill : Britain and the Palestine War (London, 1960).

- Laqueur, W.Z. : Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London, 1956).
- " " : Soviet Union and the Middle East (London, 1959).
- Lloyd, Lord : Egypt since Cromer (London, 1933).
- Long, C. : The New World of Islam (New York, 1921).
- Lewis, B. : The Arabs in History (London, 1950).
- Lilienthal, A.M. : What Price Israel? (Chicago, 1953).
- Lewis, B. : The Middle East and the West (London, 1963-4).
- Lacouture, J. & S. : Egypt in Transition (London, 1958).
- Little, T. : Egypt (London, 1958).
- " " : Modern Egypt (London, 1967).
- " " : High Dam at Aswan (London, 1965).
- Lenczowski, G. : The Middle East in World Affairs (Cornell University Press, 1958).
- Lengyel, E. : Egypt's Role in World Affairs (Washington, D.C., 1957).
- Mac Michael, H. : The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (London, 1934).
- Marlowe, J. : Anglo-Egyptian Relations (1800-1956) (London, 1965).
- " " : Four Aspects of Egypt (London, 1966).
- " " : Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism (London, 1961).
- Milner, Lord : England and Egypt (London, 1892).
- Monroe, E. : Britain's moment in the Middle East 1914-56 (London, 1963).
- Mansfield, P. : Nasser's Egypt (London, 1965).
- Newman, E.W.P. : Great Britain in Egypt (London,
- Nutting, A. : No end of a lesson - The story of the Suez (London, 1966).
- Patrick, O'Brien : The Revolution in Egypt's economic system from Private enterprise to socialism 1952-1966 (London, 1966).

- Rahim, A.M. : Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan 1899-1956 (Oxford, 1969).
- Robert, St.J. : The Boss - The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser (London, 1960).
- Rowalt, M. : Founders of Modern Egypt (Asia, N.D.India, 1962).
- " " : A Family in Egypt (London, 1956).
- Royal Institute of International Affairs : Great Britain and Egypt 1914-51 (Information Paper 19 London, 1952).
- Rafii, Abd El-Rehman : Tarikh ul-Harakat el-Qanmiyyat-wa Tathawuar El-Hukuna (Vols.1,2-3, Cairo).
- Rifaat, Bey M. : The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London, 1947).
- Safran, N. : Egypt in Search of Political Community (Oxford, 1961).
- Sayegh, F.A. : Arab Unity (New York, 1958).
- " " : The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World (Sanfrancisco, 1964).
- Schonfield, H.J. : The Suez Canal in World Affairs (London, 1952).
- Steward D. : Young Egypt (London, 1957).
- Taha, H. : The Future of Culture in Egypt (Cairo, 1957).
- Tignore, R.L. : Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt (N.J. 1960).
- Taylor, A.R. : Percluide to Israel : an analysis of Zionist diplomacy, (N.Y., 1959).
- Thornton, A.P. : The Imperial Idea and its enemies (London, 1959).
- Warriner, D. : Land Reforms and Development in the Middle Eas (London, 1957).
- Wavell, A.P., Ist Viscount : Allenby in Egypt (London, 1943).
- Wint, G. and P.Clavocressi : Middle East in Crisis (Penguin Books, 1957).
- Watt, D.C. : Britain and the Suez Canal, (London, R.I.I.A. 1956).

- Wheelock, K. : Nasser's New Egypt (New York, 1960)
Yousuf, A. : Independent Egypt (London, 1940).
Young, Sir George : Egypt (London, 1957).
Zayid, M. Y. : Egypt's struggle for Independence (Beruit, 1965).

4. NEWS PAPERS AND PERIODICALS

A. A r a b i c

Al Ahram, Cairo

Al Gamhuria, Cairo

Al Mussawar, Cairo

Al Akhbar, Cairo

Al Hayat, Beruit

Al Bath, Beruit

Al Misri, Cairo

Al Balagh, Cairo

B. E n g l i s h

The Egyptian Gazette, Cairo

The Daily Star, Beruit

The Arab Observer, Cairo

La Bourse Egyptienne, (Cairo)

Quarterly Bulletin of the National Bank of Egypt (Cairo)

The Arab World (Weekly), Beruit

The Mideast Missor (Weekly) Cairo

The Times

The Manchester Guardian

The New York Times

The Washington Post

The Daily Telegraph

The New York Herald Tribune

Soviet News

- C. The Middle East Journal 8 (Summa 1954) pp. 251-66.
9 (Summer 1954) pp. 239-55.
International Affairs, Jan. 1953, 1-10.
International Affairs, 30 July 1954, pp. 320-30.
No. 3, March 1953, pp. 104-5.
The Middle Eastern Affairs No. 6, Feb. 1955, pp. 33-41.
Royal Central Asian Journal, July-Oct. 45, Vol. 32, pp. 233-47.
The Islamic Literature, May 1953.
Fortune Sept. 1944
The Middle East Forum 4 Vol. XLV 1969, pp. 25-56.

The American Political Science Review 2

June 1953, pp. 518-20.

Round Table March 1951, March 1955.

African World, April, 1948.

India Quarterly, No.4 October-December 1951.

The Listener 25 Jan. 1951.

EGYPT'S RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN

(1945-1954)

(A B S T R A C T)

**THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

By
SHAH ABDUL QAYYUM
Lecturer in Political Science

Under the Supervision of
Dr. S. A. H. HAQQI
Professor & Head of the Department of Political Science



Department of Political Science
Aligarh Muslim University Aligarh,
1970

A B S T R A C T

Egypt's long and arduous struggle to emancipate herself from the yoke of British imperialism can be divided in four stages. The first phase of her nationalism began with the popular uprising of Colonel Ahmed ^AOrabi against the interference of foreign powers in Egypt's domestic matters. ~~The~~ British forcibly suppressed his nationalist campaign and occupied Egypt in 1882.

The First World War and the subsequent provisions of the then world leadership assuring self determination and freedom for all non-self governing dominions added impetus to their upsurge and consequently, compelled Great Britain to grant partial autonomy to Egypt to manage her municipal affairs in February 1922. Matters relating to foreign policy, defence, the minorities and the Sudan were still the sole concern of His Majesty's Government. The Egyptians, though bitter about the reserved points, nevertheless, accepted it as a step towards the attainment of full independence.

The Second Phase of Egypt's relations with Britain began with the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty between them. Nahas Pasha the then Prime Minister of the Wafdist Government, accepted and signed the instrument under great pressure of mounting international tension. With the intensifying bitterness and growing hostility between the Allied on the one hand and the Axis

Powers on the other, the danger of a major conflagration had, by then, become almost certain, and, it was a foregone conclusion that in such an eventuality, Egypt was not destined to remain aloof or unaffected. Being a British-occupied territory, she had already become the natural target of the Axis assault. For the same reason she was also denied the freedom to choose sides.

The third important phase of Egypt's nationalist struggle began with the end of the World War II. In the new scheme of things, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the strongest and, therefore, the most dominant Powers. Economic prosperity and military strength of Great Britain had been largely reduced by the stresses and strains of the war. The emergence of nationalist campaigns throughout Asia and Africa, inspired by the ideals and objectives of the United Nations, further compelled the British to redefine their relations with the people hitherto under her dominance or subjugation.

The advent of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom held out a hope and a promise to leave Egypt to the sole charge of the Egyptians, Prime Minister Attlee boldly recognized their claim and the need to revise the 1936 treaty, as the circumstances under which it had been concluded had substantially changed. The Egyptians reciprocated the British gestures of goodwill by adopting moderate and accommodating attitude towards Britain's vital

interests in their country. The two countries had nearly reached an agreement to replace the treaty by a new Pact of friendship and cooperation - the Sidké-Bevin Agreement, but for the question of the Sudan. Due to pressures of domestic politics, Attlee's government backed-out of its pledges regarding the unity of the Nile valley under the Egyptian Crown.

The fate of Egypt's appeal to the Security Council against Britain's occupation of another member's territory without the latter's consent, however, confirmed ^{her} their suspicion that the United Nations, would never act against the interests of a major Power.

A return to direct negotiations, held between June 1950 and October 1951, accomplished little, except that a plethora of notes and conversations changed hands but yielded nothing essential. Their basic contentions remained irreconciled. Egypt was now more anxious and determined to have her rights, while Britain continued to press her to join a Western-sponsored military arrangement as a pre-condition for a settlement which meant their continued presence in a new form.

Having thus tried negotiations, international appeal and the hope of a new balance of power, the Egyptians took the courageous step to denounce the 1936 Treaty. After all, how long could a suffering people have patience to continue prolonged

abortive negotiations. Moreover, chances of a Conservative victory at the polls in the U.K., were also an important consideration in taking such an action. The Conservatives could not be expected to concede to the Egyptian demands.

But the denunciation of the treaty did not end Egypt's frustrations or its problems in relation to the West. It is one thing to do away with a piece of paper and quite another to unseat a military occupation. Proclaiming Faruk "King of Egypt and the Sudan" did not really unite the Nile Valley. Britain's reaction was bitter and resentful, she considered Egypt's action illegal and hence ineffective and inconsequential as regarded her position under the said Treaty. At Ismailia, Great Britain used force and killed many Egyptian police-man as a preventive measure.' The incident led to the sack of Cairo on January 26, 1952.

This chaotic and futile situation paved the way for the new "purification" regime of July 23, 1952. The old party leaders and palace-clique had failed to deal with the national crisis nothing was left but to dismiss them and make a fresh start. The process began with the forced abdication of the king on July 26, 1952.

The revolutionary regime soon discovered that the stability and popularity of the new order as well as the implementation of their programme of reform and development were dependent

or an early settlement of their outstanding issues with the British. The question of the Suez Canal evacuation and the Sudan were therefore, taken immediately by the new elite.

After considerable debate and hard bargaining, the Revolutionary Council however, succeeded in resolving their disputes with Great Britain. They showed remarkable straightforwardness, and foresight based on realism and guided by their determination to secure a peaceful settlement. On the question of the Sudan, they recognised the principle of self-determination and finally conceded to the sudanese the right to their own independent national existence.

An agreement on the evacuation of Suez Canal took longer and more tenuous course of negotiations. The delay was mainly caused by a split in the council of the Revolution on the question of its leadership and direction. Nasser's victory was seen in Great Britain as a guarantee against political instability and disorder. It also represented a more sober, though determined, approach towards the Anglo-Egyptian controversy. He displayed great diplomatic astuteness by concealing to the British insistence on the reactivation of the base in the event of an attack on the Arab states or Turkey. And thus, at longlast, the two countries reached an agreement on the evacuation of the British troops from the Suez Canal zone on July 27, 1954.

The agreement put an end to the 72 years of Britain's occupation of Egypt. The Egyptians celebrated the conclusion of the agreement as the most glorious event in their history. On this day they became a truly independent nation, capable of shaping ~~the~~ own destiny, without any limitation on her sovereign status.

After the two most important issues of controversy with Great Britain were thus amicably settled, Egypt was quite willing to inculcate better understanding, rather cordial relations with the West. Nasser and his colleagues of the revolutionary council, ruling with widespread popular support but without the hampering pressure of parties and Parliaments, were sincerely determined to transform their country into a really modern and prosperous nation. They expected the Western countries to help them in the realization of this objective. Denied this assistance, they naturally felt inclined towards the other quarter. Great Britain's sponsorship of the Baghdad Pact was considered in Egypt an attempt to keep the Arabs weak and divided. From then onwards, Egypt led the forces of opposition in the Arab world to the western defence schemes and military alliances and became one of the major champions of the policy of neutralism and non-alignment both in Asia and Africa. .

In brief, the history of Egypt's relations with Great Britain is a record of a constant conflict between the former's demand for unconditional independence and the latter's concern

for its 'historic' position. To the Egyptians nothing was more important and urgent than the attainment of complete freedom. To realise this objective they willingly sacrificed, rather postponed, their country's socio-economic reform and regeneration. With the passage of time their nationalist struggle became increasingly vigorous and assertive as was occasionally manifested into acts of sabotage and violence. The continued presence of foreign troops inside Egypt, against the will of her people was a constant irritation and a reminder of the incompleteness of their sovereignty, and a reflection on their national dignity. Unfortunately the western scholars, by and large, have tried to complicate the story in order to divert attention from its simple justice. They have purposely attributed Egypt's unrest to her poor economic conditions, and to a low standard of living, while Egypt's contention was that her people hate Britain's occupation and could ^{not} rest until it was ended. This has been the primary ~~note~~ of every Government in Egypt. The position of parties and the popularity of their leaders was determined by their ability to deal with the British effectively. Their tenure of governments also depended mostly on their achievements at the popular front. Every new government was finally caught between the dilemma of actual British possession and the pressure of the country for evacuation. Egypt's national development has suffered because the main tempo of her political life has centered round her struggle with the British. It was evident that until the burning issue of her relations with Britain was not satisfactorily solved, Egypt could not hope to have a really stable government so as ^{to} put international problems of the country in its proper perspective.